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| Deinde considerandum est de gratia gratis data quae consistit in sermone, de qua dicitur I ad Cor. XII, alii datur per spiritum sermo sapientiae, alii sermo scientiae. Et circa hoc quaeruntur duo. | We must now consider the gratuitous grace that attaches to words; of which the Apostle says (1 Cor. 12:8): "To one . . . by the Spirit is given the word of wisdom, and to another the word of knowledge." Under this head there are two points of inquiry: |
| Primo, utrum in sermone consistat aliqua gratia gratis data. | (1) Whether any gratuitous grace attaches to words? |
| Secundo, quibus haec gratia competit. | (2) To whom is the grace becoming? |
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| Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod in sermone non consistat aliqua gratia gratis data. Gratia enim datur ad id quod excedit facultatem naturae. Sed ex naturali ratione adinventa est ars rhetorica, per quam aliquis potest sic dicere ut doceat, ut delectet, ut flectat, sicut Augustinus dicit, in IV de Doct. Christ. Hoc autem pertinet ad gratiam sermonis. Ergo videtur quod gratia sermonis non sit gratia gratis data. | Objection 1: It would seem that a gratuitous grace does not attach to words. For grace is given for that which surpasses the faculty of nature. But natural reason has devised the art of rhetoric whereby a man is able to speak so as to teach, please, and persuade, as Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. iv, 12). Now this belongs to the grace of words. Therefore it would seem that the grace of words is not a gratuitous grace. |
| Praeterea, omnis gratia ad regnum Dei pertinet. Sed apostolus dicit, I ad Cor. IV, non in sermone est regnum Dei, sed in virtute. Ergo in sermone non consistit aliqua gratia gratis data. | Objection 2: Further, all grace pertains to the kingdom of God. But the Apostle says (1 Cor. 4:20): "The kingdom of God is not in speech, but in power." Therefore there is no gratuitous grace connected with words. |
| Praeterea, nulla gratia datur ex meritis, quia si ex operibus, iam non est gratia, ut dicitur Rom. XI. Sed sermo datur alicui ex meritis, dicit enim Gregorius, exponens illud Psalmi, ne auferas de ore meo verbum veritatis, quod verbum veritatis omnipotens Deus facientibus tribuit, et non facientibus tollit. Ergo videtur quod donum sermonis non sit gratia gratis data. | Objection 3: Further, no grace is given through merit, since "if by grace, it is not now of works" (Rm. 11:6). But the word is sometimes given to a man on his merits. For Gregory says (Moral. xi, 15) in explanation of Ps. 118:43, "Take not Thou the word of truth utterly out of my mouth" that "the word of truth is that which Almighty God gives to them that do it, and takes away from them that do it not." Therefore it would seem that the gift of the word is not a gratuitous grace. |
| Praeterea, sicut necesse est quod homo per sermonem pronuntiet ea quae pertinent ad donum sapientiae vel scientiae, ita etiam ea quae pertinent ad virtutem fidei. Ergo, si ponitur sermo sapientiae et sermo scientiae gratia gratis data, pari ratione deberet poni sermo fidei inter gratias gratis datas. | Objection 4: Further, it behooves man to declare in words things pertaining to the virtue of faith, no less than those pertaining to the gift of wisdom or of knowledge. Therefore if the word of wisdom and the word of knowledge are reckoned gratuitous graces, the word of faith should likewise be placed among the gratuitous graces. |
| Sed in contrarium est quod dicitur Eccli. VI, lingua eucharis, idest gratiosa, in bono homine abundabit. Sed bonitas hominis est ex gratia. Ergo etiam et gratiositas sermonis. | On the contrary, It is written (Ecclus. 6:5): "A gracious tongue in a good man shall abound [Vulg.: 'aboundeth']." Now man's goodness is by grace. Therefore graciousness in words is also by grace. |
| Respondeo dicendum quod gratiae gratis datae dantur ad utilitatem aliorum, ut supra dictum est. Cognitio autem quam aliquis a Deo accipit, in utilitatem alterius converti non posset nisi mediante locutione. Et quia spiritus sanctus non deficit in aliquo quod pertineat ad Ecclesiae utilitatem, etiam providet membris Ecclesiae in locutione, non solum ut aliquis sic loquatur ut a diversis possit intelligi, quod pertinet ad donum linguarum; sed etiam quod efficaciter loquatur, quod pertinet ad gratiam sermonis. | I answer that, The gratuitous graces are given for the profit of others, as stated above (FS, Question [111], Articles [1],4). Now the knowledge a man receives from God cannot be turned to another's profit, except by means of speech. And since the Holy Ghost does not fail in anything that pertains to the profit of the Church, He provides also the members of the Church with speech; to the effect that a man not only speaks so as to be understood by different people, which pertains to the gift of tongues, but also speaks with effect, and this pertains to the grace "of the word." |
| Et hoc tripliciter. Primo quidem, ad instruendum intellectum, quod fit dum aliquis sic loquitur quod doceat. Secundo, ad movendum affectum, ut scilicet libenter audiat verbum Dei, quod fit dum aliquis sic loquitur quod auditores delectet. Quod non debet aliquis quaerere propter favorem suum, sed ut homines alliciantur ad audiendum verbum Dei. Tertio, ad hoc quod aliquis amet ea quae verbis significantur, et velit ea implere, quod fit dum aliquis sic loquitur quod auditorem flectat. Ad quod quidem efficiendum spiritus sanctus utitur lingua hominis quasi quodam instrumento, ipse autem est qui perficit operationem interius. Unde Gregorius dicit, in homilia Pentecostes, nisi corda auditorum spiritus sanctus repleat, ad aures corporis vox docentium incassum sonat. | This happens in three ways. First, in order to instruct the intellect, and this is the case when a man speaks so as "to teach." Secondly, in order to move the affections, so that a man willingly hearkens to the word of God. This is the case when a man speaks so as "to please" his hearers, not indeed with a view to his own favor, but in order to draw them to listen to God's word. Thirdly, in order that men may love that which is signified by the word, and desire to fulfill it, and this is the case when a man so speaks as "to sway" his hearers. In order to effect this the Holy Ghost makes use of the human tongue as of an instrument; but He it is Who perfects the work within. Hence Gregory says in a homily for Pentecost (Hom. xxx in Ev.): "Unless the Holy Ghost fill the hearts of the hearers, in vain does the voice of the teacher resound in the ears of the body." |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut miraculose Deus quandoque operatur quodam excellentiori modo etiam ea quae natura potest operari, ita etiam spiritus sanctus excellentius operatur per gratiam sermonis id quod potest ars operari inferiori modo. | Reply to Objection 1: Even as by a miracle God sometimes works in a more excellent way those things which nature also can work, so too the Holy Ghost effects more excellently by the grace of words that which art can effect in a less efficient manner. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod apostolus ibi loquitur de sermone qui innititur humanae eloquentiae, absque virtute spiritus sancti. Unde praemisit, cognoscam, non sermonem eorum qui inflati sunt, sed virtutem. Et de seipso praemiserat supra, II, sermo meus et praedicatio mea non fuit in persuasibilibus humanae sapientiae verbis, sed in ostensione spiritus et virtutis. | Reply to Objection 2: The Apostle is speaking there of the word that relies on human eloquence without the power of the Holy Ghost. Wherefore he says just before (1 Cor. 4:19): "I . . . will know, not the speech of them that are puffed up, but the power": and of himself he had already said (1 Cor. 2:4): "My speech and my preaching was not in the persuasive words of human wisdom, but in the showing of the spirit and power." |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, gratia sermonis datur alicui ad utilitatem aliorum. Unde quandoque subtrahitur propter auditoris culpam, quandoque autem propter culpam ipsius loquentis. Bona autem opera utriusque non merentur directe hanc gratiam, sed solum impediunt huius gratiae impedimenta. Nam etiam gratia gratum faciens subtrahitur propter culpam, non tamen eam meretur aliquis per bona opera, per quae tamen tollitur gratiae impedimentum. | Reply to Objection 3: As stated above, the grace of the word is given to a man for the profit of others. Hence it is withdrawn sometimes through the fault of the hearer, and sometimes through the fault of the speaker. The good works of either of them do not merit this grace directly, but only remove the obstacles thereto. For sanctifying grace also is withdrawn on account of a person's fault, and yet he does not merit it by his good works, which, however, remove the obstacles to grace. |
| Ad quartum dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, gratia sermonis ordinatur ad utilitatem aliorum. Quod autem aliquis fidem suam aliis communicet, fit per sermonem scientiae seu sapientiae, unde Augustinus dicit, XIV de Trin., quod scire quemadmodum fides et piis opituletur et contra impios defendatur, videtur apostolus scientiam appellare. Et ideo non oportuit quod poneret sermonem fidei, sed suffecit ponere sermonem scientiae et sapientiae. | Reply to Objection 4: As stated above, the grace of the word is directed to the profit of others. Now if a man communicates his faith to others this is by the word of knowledge or of wisdom. Hence Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 1) that "to know how faith may profit the godly and be defended against the ungodly, is apparently what the Apostle means by knowledge." Hence it was not necessary for him to mention the word of faith, but it was sufficient for him to mention the word of knowledge and of wisdom. |
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| Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod gratia sermonis sapientiae et scientiae pertineat etiam ad mulieres. Ad huiusmodi enim gratiam pertinet doctrina, sicut dictum est. Sed docere competit mulieri, dicitur enim Prov. IV, unigenitus fui coram matre mea, et docebat me. Ergo haec gratia competit mulieribus. | Objection 1: It would seem that the grace of the word of wisdom and knowledge is becoming even to women. For teaching is pertinent to this grace, as stated in the foregoing Article. Now it is becoming to a woman to teach; for it is written (Prov. 4:3,4): "I was an only son in the sight of my mother, and she taught me [*Vulg.: 'I was my father's son, tender, and as an only son in the sight of my mother. And he taught me.']." Therefore this grace is becoming to women. |
| Praeterea, maior est gratia prophetiae quam gratia sermonis, sicut maior est contemplatio veritatis quam eius enuntiatio. Sed prophetia conceditur mulieribus, sicut legitur Iudic. IV de Debbora; et IV Reg. XXII, de Holda, prophetissa, uxore Sellum; et Act. XXI, de quatuor filiabus Philippi. Apostolus etiam dicit, I ad Cor. XI, omnis mulier orans aut prophetans, et cetera. Ergo videtur quod multo magis gratia sermonis competit mulieri. | Objection 2: Further, the grace of prophecy is greater than the grace of the word, even as the contemplation of truth is greater than its utterance. But prophecy is granted to women, as we read of Deborah (Judges 4:4), and of Holda the prophetess, the wife of Sellum (4 Kgs. 22:14), and of the four daughters of Philip (Acts 21:9). Moreover the Apostle says (1 Cor. 11:5): "Every woman praying or prophesying," etc. Much more therefore would it seem that the grace of the word is becoming to a woman. |
| Praeterea, I Petri IV dicitur, unusquisque, sicut accepit gratiam, in alterutrum illam administrantes. Sed quaedam mulieres accipiunt gratiam sapientiae et scientiae, quam non possunt aliis administrare nisi per gratiam sermonis. Ergo gratia sermonis competit mulieribus. | Objection 3: Further, it is written (1 Pt. 4:10): "As every man hath received grace ministering the same one to another." Now some women receive the grace of wisdom and knowledge, which they cannot minister to others except by the grace of the word. Therefore the grace of the word is becoming to women. |
| Sed contra est quod apostolus dicit, I ad Cor. XIV, mulieres in Ecclesiis taceant; et I ad Tim. II, docere mulieri non permitto. Hoc autem praecipue pertinet ad gratiam sermonis. Ergo gratia sermonis non competit mulieribus. | On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Cor. 14:34): "Let women keep silence in the churches," and (1 Tim. 2:12): "I suffer not a woman to teach." Now this pertains especially to the grace of the word. Therefore the grace of the word is not becoming to women. |
| Respondeo dicendum quod sermone potest aliquis uti dupliciter. Uno modo, private ad unum vel paucos, familiariter colloquendo. Et quantum ad hoc, gratia sermonis potest competere mulieribus. Alio modo, publice alloquendo totam Ecclesiam. Et hoc mulieri non conceditur. Primo quidem, et principaliter, propter conditionem feminei sexus, qui debet esse subditus viro, ut patet Gen. III. Docere autem et persuadere publice in Ecclesia non pertinet ad subditos, sed ad praelatos. Magis tamen viri subditi ex commissione possunt exequi, quia non habent huiusmodi subiectionem ex naturali sexu, sicut mulieres, sed ex aliquo accidentaliter supervenienti. Secundo, ne animi hominum alliciantur ad libidinem. Dicitur enim Eccli. IX, colloquium illius quasi ignis exardescit. Tertio, quia, ut communiter, mulieres non sunt in sapientia perfectae, ut eis possit convenienter publica doctrina committi. | I answer that, Speech may be employed in two ways: in one way privately, to one or a few, in familiar conversation, and in this respect the grace of the word may be becoming to women; in another way, publicly, addressing oneself to the whole church, and this is not permitted to women. First and chiefly, on account of the condition attaching to the female sex, whereby woman should be subject to man, as appears from Gn. 3:16. Now teaching and persuading publicly in the church belong not to subjects but to the prelates (although men who are subjects may do these things if they be so commissioned, because their subjection is not a result of their natural sex, as it is with women, but of some thing supervening by accident). Secondly, lest men's minds be enticed to lust, for it is written (Ecclus. 9:11): "Her conversation burneth as fire." Thirdly, because as a rule women are not perfected in wisdom, so as to be fit to be intrusted with public teaching. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod illa auctoritas loquitur de doctrina privata, qua mater filium erudit. | Reply to Objection 1: The passage quoted speaks of private teaching whereby a father instructs his son. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod gratia prophetiae attenditur secundum mentem illuminatam a Deo, ex qua parte non est in hominibus sexuum differentia, secundum illud Coloss. III, induentes novum hominem, qui renovatur secundum imaginem eius qui creavit eum, ibi non est masculus et femina. Sed gratia sermonis pertinet ad instructionem hominum, inter quos differentia sexuum invenitur. Unde non est similis ratio de utroque. | Reply to Objection 2: The grace of prophecy consists in God enlightening the mind, on the part of which there is no difference of sex among men, according to Col. 3:10,11, "Putting on the new" man, "him who is renewed unto knowledge, according to the image of Him that created him, where there is neither male nor female [*Vulg.: 'Neither Gentile nor Jew, circumcision nor uncircumcision, Barbarian nor Scythian, bond nor free.' Cf. FP, Question [93], Article [6], ad 2 footnote]." Now the grace of the word pertains to the instruction of men among whom the difference of sex is found. Hence the comparison fails. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod gratiam divinitus acceptam diversimode aliqui administrant, secundum diversitatem conditionis ipsorum. Unde mulieres, si gratiam sapientiae aut scientiae habeant, possunt eam administrare secundum privatam doctrinam, non autem secundum publicam. | Reply to Objection 3: The recipients of a divinely conferred grace administer it in different ways according to their various conditions. Hence women, if they have the grace of wisdom or of knowledge, can administer it by teaching privately but not publicly. |