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Deinde considerandum est de modo unionis verbi incarnati.
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| Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod unio verbi incarnati sit facta in una natura. Dicit enim Cyrillus, et inducitur in gestis Concilii Chalcedonensis, non oportet intelligere duas naturas, sed unam naturam Dei verbi incarnatam. Quod quidem non fieret nisi unio esset in natura. Ergo unio verbi incarnati facta est in natura. | Objection 1: It would seem that the Union of the Word Incarnate took place in the nature. For Cyril says (he is quoted in the acts of the Council of Chalcedon, part ii, act. 1): "We must understand not two natures, but one incarnate nature of the Word of God"; and this could not be unless the union took place in the nature. Therefore the union of the Word Incarnate took place in the nature. |
| Praeterea, Athanasius dicit, sicut anima rationalis et caro conveniunt in constitutione humanae naturae, sic Deus et homo conveniunt in constitutione alicuius unius naturae. Ergo facta est unio in natura. | Objection 2: Further, Athanasius says that, as the rational soul and the flesh together form the human nature, so God and man together form a certain one nature; therefore the union took place in the nature. |
| Praeterea, duarum naturarum una non denominatur ex altera nisi aliquo modo in invicem transmutentur. Sed divina natura et humana in Christo ab invicem denominantur, dicit enim Cyrillus divinam naturam esse incarnatam; et Gregorius Nazianzenus dicit naturam humanam esse deificatam; ut patet per Damascenum. Ergo ex duabus naturis videtur esse facta una natura. | Objection 3: Further, of two natures one is not denominated by the other unless they are to some extent mutually transmuted. But the Divine and human natures in Christ are denominated one by the other; for Cyril says (quoted in the acts of the Council of Chalcedon, part ii, act. 1) that the Divine nature "is incarnate"; and Gregory Nazianzen says (Ep. i ad Cledon.) that the human nature is "deified," as appears from Damascene (De Fide Orth. iii, 6,11). Therefore from two natures one seems to have resulted. |
| Sed contra est quod dicitur in determinatione Concilii Chalcedonensis, confitemur in novissimis diebus filium Dei unigenitum inconfuse, immutabiliter, indivise, inseparabiliter agnoscendum, nusquam sublata differentia naturarum propter unionem. Ergo unio non est facta in natura. | On the contrary, It is said in the declaration of the Council of Chalcedon: "We confess that in these latter times the only-begotten Son of God appeared in two natures, without confusion, without change, without division, without separation---the distinction of natures not having been taken away by the union." Therefore the union did not take place in the nature. |
| Respondeo dicendum quod ad huius quaestionis evidentiam, oportet considerare quid sit natura. Sciendum est igitur quod nomen naturae a nascendo est dictum vel sumptum. Unde primo est impositum hoc nomen ad significandum generationem viventium, quae nativitas vel pullulatio dicitur, ut dicatur natura quasi nascitura. Deinde translatum est nomen naturae ad significandum principium huius generationis. Et quia principium generationis in rebus viventibus est intrinsecum, ulterius derivatum est nomen naturae ad significandum quodlibet principium intrinsecum motus, secundum quod philosophus dicit, in II Physic., quod natura est principium motus in eo in quo est per se et non secundum accidens. Hoc autem principium vel forma est, vel materia. Unde quandoque natura dicitur forma, quandoque vero materia. Et quia finis generationis naturalis est, in eo quod generatur, essentia speciei, quam significat definitio, inde est quod huiusmodi essentia speciei vocatur etiam natura. Et hoc modo Boetius naturam definit, in libro de duabus naturis, dicens, natura est unamquamque rem informans specifica differentia, quae scilicet complet definitionem speciei. Sic ergo nunc loquimur de natura, secundum quod natura significat essentiam, vel quod quid est, sive quidditatem speciei. | I answer that, To make this question clear we must consider what is "nature." Now it is to be observed that the word "nature" comes from nativity. Hence this word was used first of all to signify the begetting of living beings, which is called "birth" or "sprouting forth," the word "natura" meaning, as it were, "nascitura." Afterwards this word "nature" was taken to signify the principle of this begetting; and because in living things the principle of generation is an intrinsic principle, this word "nature" was further employed to signify any intrinsic principle of motion: thus the Philosopher says (Phys. ii) that "nature is the principle of motion in that in which it is essentially and not accidentally." Now this principle is either form or matter. Hence sometimes form is called nature, and sometimes matter. And because the end of natural generation, in that which is generated, is the essence of the species, which the definition signifies, this essence of the species is called the "nature." And thus Boethius defines nature (De Duab. Nat.): "Nature is what informs a thing with its specific difference,"---i.e. which perfects the specific definition. But we are now speaking of nature as it signifies the essence, or the "what-it-is," or the quiddity of the species. |
| Hoc autem modo accipiendo naturam, impossibile est unionem verbi incarnati esse factam in natura. Tripliciter enim aliquid unum ex duobus vel pluribus constituitur. Uno modo, ex duobus perfectis integris remanentibus. Quod quidem fieri non potest nisi in his quorum forma est compositio, vel ordo, vel figura, sicut ex multis lapidibus absque aliquo ordine adunatis per solam compositionem fit acervus; ex lapidibus autem et lignis secundum aliquem ordinem dispositis, et etiam ad aliquam figuram redactis, fit domus. Et secundum hoc, posuerunt aliqui unionem esse per modum confusionis, quae scilicet est sine ordine; vel commensurationis, quae est cum ordine. Sed hoc non potest esse. Primo quidem, quia compositio, ordo vel figura non est forma substantialis, sed accidentalis. Et sic sequeretur quod unio incarnationis non esset per se, sed per accidens, quod infra improbabitur. Secundo, quia ex huiusmodi non fit unum simpliciter, sed secundum quid, remanent enim plura actu. Tertio, quia forma talium non est natura, sed magis ars, sicut forma domus. Et sic non constitueretur una natura in Christo, ut ipsi volunt. | Now, if we take nature in this way, it is impossible that the union of the Incarnate Word took place in the nature. For one thing is made of two or more in three ways. First, from two complete things which remain in their perfection. This can only happen to those whose form is composition, order, or figure, as a heap is made up of many stones brought together without any order, but solely with juxtaposition; and a house is made of stones and beams arranged in order, and fashioned to a figure. And in this way some said the union was by manner of confusion (which is without order) or by manner of commensuration (which is with order). But this cannot be. First, because neither composition nor order nor figure is a substantial form, but accidental; and hence it would follow that the union of the Incarnation was not essential, but accidental, which will be disproved later on (Article [6]). Secondly, because thereby we should not have an absolute unity, but relative only, for there remain several things actually. Thirdly, because the form of such is not a nature, but an art, as the form of a house; and thus one nature would not be constituted in Christ, as they wish. |
| Alio modo fit aliquid ex perfectis, sed transmutatis, sicut ex elementis fit mixtum. Et sic aliqui dixerunt unionem incarnationis esse factam per modum complexionis. Sed hoc non potest esse. Primo quidem, quia natura divina est omnino immutabilis, ut in prima parte dictum est. Unde nec ipsa potest converti in aliud, cum sit incorruptibilis, nec aliud in ipsam, cum ipsa sit ingenerabilis. Secundo, quia id quod est commixtum, nulli miscibilium est idem specie, differt enim caro a quolibet elementorum specie. Et sic Christus nec esset eiusdem naturae cum patre, nec cum matre. Tertio, quia ex his quae plurimum distant non potest fieri commixtio, solvitur enim species unius eorum, puta si quis guttam aquae amphorae vini apponat. Et secundum hoc, cum natura divina in infinitum excedat humanam, non potest esse mixtio, sed remanebit sola natura divina. | Secondly, one thing is made up of several things, perfect but changed, as a mixture is made up of its elements; and in this way some have said that the union of the Incarnation was brought about by manner of combination. But this cannot be. First, because the Divine Nature is altogether immutable, as has been said (FP, Question [9], Articles [1],2), hence neither can it be changed into something else, since it is incorruptible; nor can anything else be changed into it, for it cannot be generated. Secondly, because what is mixed is of the same species with none of the elements; for flesh differs in species from any of its elements. And thus Christ would be of the same nature neither with His Father nor with His Mother. Thirdly, because there can be no mingling of things widely apart; for the species of one of them is absorbed, e.g. if we were to put a drop of water in a flagon of wine. And hence, since the Divine Nature infinitely exceeds the human nature, there could be no mixture, but the Divine Nature alone would remain. |
| Tertio modo fit aliquid ex aliquibus non permutatis, sed imperfectis, sicut ex anima et corpore fit homo; et similiter ex diversis membris. Sed hoc dici non potest de incarnationis mysterio. Primo quidem, quia utraque natura est secundum suam rationem perfecta, divina scilicet et humana. Secundo, quia divina et humana natura non possunt constituere aliquid per modum partium quantitativarum, sicut membra constituunt corpus, quia natura divina est incorporea. Neque per modum formae et materiae, quia divina natura non potest esse forma alicuius, praesertim corporei. Sequeretur etiam quod species resultans esset communicabilis pluribus, et ita essent plures Christi. Tertio, quia Christus neque esset humanae naturae, neque divinae, differentia enim addita variat speciem, sicut unitas in numeris, sicut dicitur in VIII Metaphys. | Thirdly, a thing is made up of things not mixed nor changed, but imperfect; as man is made up of soul and body, and likewise of divers members. But this cannot be said of the mystery of the Incarnation. First, because each nature, i.e. the Divine and the human, has its specific perfection. Secondly, because the Divine and human natures cannot constitute anything after the manner of quantitative parts, as the members make up the body; for the Divine Nature is incorporeal; nor after the manner of form and matter, for the Divine Nature cannot be the form of anything, especially of anything corporeal, since it would follow that the species resulting therefrom would be communicable to several, and thus there would be several Christs. Thirdly, because Christ would exist neither in human nature nor in the Divine Nature: since any difference varies the species, as unity varies number, as is said (Metaph. viii, text. 10). |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod illa auctoritas Cyrilli exponitur in quinta synodo sic, si quis, unam naturam Dei verbi incarnatam dicens, non sic accipit sicut patres docuerunt, quia ex divina natura et humana unione secundum subsistentiam facta, sed ex talibus vocibus naturam unam sive substantiam divinitatis et carnis Christi introducere conatur, talis anathema sit. Non ergo sensus est quod in incarnatione ex duabus naturis sit una natura constituta, sed quia una natura Dei verbi carnem univit in persona. | Reply to Objection 1: This authority of Cyril is expounded in the Fifth Synod (i.e. Constantinople II, coll. viii, can. 8) thus: "If anyone proclaiming one nature of the Word of God to be incarnate does not receive it as the Fathers taught, viz. that from the Divine and human natures (a union in subsistence having taken place) one Christ results, but endeavors from these words to introduce one nature or substance of the Divinity and flesh of Christ, let such a one be anathema." Hence the sense is not that from two natures one results; but that the Nature of the Word of God united flesh to Itself in Person. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod ex anima et corpore constituitur in unoquoque nostrum duplex unitas, naturae, et personae. Naturae quidem, secundum quod anima unitur corpori, formaliter perficiens ipsum, ut ex duabus fiat una natura, sicut ex actu et potentia, vel materia et forma. Et quantum ad hoc non attenditur similitudo, quia natura divina non potest esse corporis forma, ut in primo probatum est. Unitas vero personae constituitur ex eis inquantum est unus aliquis subsistens in carne et anima. Et quantum ad hoc attenditur similitudo, unus enim Christus subsistit in divina natura et humana. | Reply to Objection 2: From the soul and body a double unity, viz. of nature and person---results in each individual---of nature inasmuch as the soul is united to the body, and formally perfects it, so that one nature springs from the two as from act and potentiality or from matter and form. But the comparison is not in this sense, for the Divine Nature cannot be the form of a body, as was proved (FP, Question [3], Article [8]). Unity of person results from them, however, inasmuch as there is an individual subsisting in flesh and soul; and herein lies the likeness, for the one Christ subsists in the Divine and human natures. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut Damascenus dicit, natura divina dicitur incarnata, quia est unita carni personaliter non quod sit in naturam carnis conversa. Similiter etiam caro dicitur deificata, ut ipse dicit, non per conversionem, sed per unionem ad verbum, salvis suis proprietatibus, ut intelligatur caro deificata quia facta est Dei verbi caro, non quia facta sit Deus. | Reply to Objection 3: As Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 6,11), the Divine Nature is said to be incarnate because It is united to flesh personally, and not that It is changed into flesh. So likewise the flesh is said to be deified, as he also says (De Fide Orth. 15,17), not by change, but by union with the Word, its natural properties still remaining, and hence it may be considered as deified, inasmuch as it becomes the flesh of the Word of God, but not that it becomes God. |
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| Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod unio verbi incarnati non sit facta in persona. Persona enim Dei non est aliud a natura ipsius, ut habitum est in primo. Si ergo unio non est in natura, sequitur quod non sit facta in persona. | Objection 1: It would seem that the union of the Incarnate Word did not take place in the person. For the Person of God is not distinct from His Nature, as we said (FP, Question [39], Article [1]). If, therefore, the union did not take place in the nature, it follows that it did not take place in the person. |
| Praeterea, natura humana non est minoris dignitatis in Christo quam in nobis. Personalitas autem ad dignitatem pertinet, ut in primo habitum est. Cum ergo natura humana in nobis propriam personalitatem habeat, multo magis habuit propriam personalitatem in Christo. | Objection 2: Further, Christ's human nature has no less dignity than ours. But personality belongs to dignity, as was stated above (FP, Question [29], Article [3], ad 2). Hence, since our human nature has its proper personality, much more reason was there that Christ's should have its proper personality. |
| Praeterea, sicut Boetius dicit, in libro de duabus naturis, persona est rationalis naturae individua substantia. Sed verbum Dei assumpsit naturam humanam individuam, natura enim universalis non sistit secundum se, sed in nuda contemplatione consideratur, ut Damascenus dicit. Ergo humana natura habet suam personalitatem. Non ergo videtur quod sit facta unio in persona. | Objection 3: Further, as Boethius says (De Duab. Nat.), a person is an individual substance of rational nature. But the Word of God assumed an individual human nature, for "universal human nature does not exist of itself, but is the object of pure thought," as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 11). Therefore the human nature of Christ has its personality. Hence it does not seem that the union took place in the person. |
| Sed contra est quod in Chalcedonensi synodo legitur, non in duas personas partitum aut divisum, sed unum et eundem filium unigenitum dominum nostrum Iesum Christum confitemur. Ergo facta est unio verbi in persona. | On the contrary, We read in the Synod of Chalcedon (Part ii, act. 5): "We confess that our Lord Jesus Christ is not parted or divided into two persons, but is one and the same only-Begotten Son and Word of God." Therefore the union took place in the person. |
| Respondeo dicendum quod persona aliud significat quam natura. Natura enim significat essentiam speciei, quam significat definitio. Et si quidem his quae ad rationem speciei pertinent nihil aliud adiunctum inveniri posset, nulla necessitas esset distinguendi naturam a supposito naturae, quod est individuum subsistens in natura illa, quia unumquodque individuum subsistens in natura aliqua esset omnino idem cum sua natura. Contingit autem in quibusdam rebus subsistentibus inveniri aliquid quod non pertinet ad rationem speciei, scilicet accidentia et principia individuantia, sicut maxime apparet in his quae sunt ex materia et forma composita. Et ideo in talibus etiam secundum rem differt natura et suppositum, non quasi omnino aliqua separata, sed quia in supposito includitur ipsa natura speciei, et superadduntur quaedam alia quae sunt praeter rationem speciei. Unde suppositum significatur ut totum, habens naturam sicut partem formalem et perfectivam sui. Et propter hoc in compositis ex materia et forma natura non praedicatur de supposito, non enim dicimus quod hic homo sit sua humanitas. Si qua vero res est in qua omnino nihil est aliud praeter rationem speciei vel naturae suae, sicut est in Deo, ibi non est aliud secundum rem suppositum et natura, sed solum secundum rationem intelligendi, quia natura dicitur secundum quod est essentia quaedam; eadem vero dicitur suppositum secundum quod est subsistens. Et quod est dictum de supposito, intelligendum est de persona in creatura rationali vel intellectuali, quia nihil aliud est persona quam rationalis naturae individua substantia, secundum Boetium. Omne igitur quod inest alicui personae, sive pertineat ad naturam eius sive non, unitur ei in persona. Si ergo humana natura verbo Dei non unitur in persona, nullo modo ei unitur. Et sic totaliter tollitur incarnationis fides, quod est subruere totam fidem Christianam. Quia igitur verbum habet naturam humanam sibi unitam, non autem ad suam naturam divinam pertinentem consequens est quod unio sit facta in persona verbi, non autem in natura. | I answer that, Person has a different meaning from "nature." For nature, as has been said (Article [1]), designates the specific essence which is signified by the definition. And if nothing was found to be added to what belongs to the notion of the species, there would be no need to distinguish the nature from the suppositum of the nature (which is the individual subsisting in this nature), because every individual subsisting in a nature would be altogether one with its nature. Now in certain subsisting things we happen to find what does not belong to the notion of the species, viz. accidents and individuating principles, which appears chiefly in such as are composed of matter and form. Hence in such as these the nature and the suppositum really differ; not indeed as if they were wholly separate, but because the suppositum includes the nature, and in addition certain other things outside the notion of the species. Hence the suppositum is taken to be a whole which has the nature as its formal part to perfect it; and consequently in such as are composed of matter and form the nature is not predicated of the suppositum, for we do not say that this man is his manhood. But if there is a thing in which there is nothing outside the species or its nature (as in God), the suppositum and the nature are not really distinct in it, but only in our way of thinking, inasmuch it is called "nature" as it is an essence, and a "suppositum" as it is subsisting. And what is said of a suppositum is to be applied to a person in rational or intellectual creatures; for a person is nothing else than "an individual substance of rational nature," according to Boethius. Therefore, whatever adheres to a person is united to it in person, whether it belongs to its nature or not. Hence, if the human nature is not united to God the Word in person, it is nowise united to Him; and thus belief in the Incarnation is altogether done away with, and Christian faith wholly overturned. Therefore, inasmuch as the Word has a human nature united to Him, which does not belong to His Divine Nature, it follows that the union took place in the Person of the Word, and not in the nature. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, licet in Deo non sit aliud secundum rem natura et persona, differt tamen secundum modum significandi, sicut dictum est, quia persona significat per modum subsistentis. Et quia natura humana sic unitur verbo ut verbum in ea subsistat, non autem ut aliquid addatur ei ad rationem suae naturae, vel ut eius natura in aliquid transmutetur, ideo unio facta est in persona, non in natura. | Reply to Objection 1: Although in God Nature and Person are not really distinct, yet they have distinct meanings, as was said above, inasmuch as person signifies after the manner of something subsisting. And because human nature is united to the Word, so that the Word subsists in it, and not so that His Nature receives therefrom any addition or change, it follows that the union of human nature to the Word of God took place in the person, and not in the nature. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod personalitas necessario intantum pertinet ad dignitatem alicuius rei et perfectionem, inquantum ad dignitatem et perfectionem eius pertinet quod per se existat, quod in nomine personae intelligitur. Dignius autem est alicui quod existat in aliquo se digniori, quam quod existat per se. Et ideo ex hoc ipso humana natura dignior est in Christo quam in nobis, quia in nobis, quasi per se existens, propriam personalitatem habet in Christo autem existit in persona verbi. Sicut etiam esse completivum speciei pertinet ad dignitatem formae, tamen sensitivum nobilius est in homine, propter coniunctionem ad nobiliorem formam completivam, quam sit in bruto animali, in quo est forma completiva. | Reply to Objection 2: Personality pertains of necessity to the dignity of a thing, and to its perfection so far as it pertains to the dignity and perfection of that thing to exist by itself (which is understood by the word "person"). Now it is a greater dignity to exist in something nobler than oneself than to exist by oneself. Hence the human nature of Christ has a greater dignity than ours, from this very fact that in us, being existent by itself, it has its own personality, but in Christ it exists in the Person of the Word. Thus to perfect the species belongs to the dignity of a form, yet the sensitive part in man, on account of its union with the nobler form which perfects the species, is more noble than in brutes, where it is itself the form which perfects. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod Dei verbum non assumpsit naturam humanam in universali, sed in atomo, idest in individuo, sicut Damascenus dicit, alioquin oporteret quod cuilibet homini conveniret esse Dei verbum, sicut convenit Christo. Sciendum est tamen quod non quodlibet individuum in genere substantiae, etiam in rationali natura, habet rationem personae, sed solum illud quod per se existit, non autem illud quod existit in alio perfectiori. Unde manus Socratis, quamvis sit quoddam individuum, non est tamen persona, quia non per se existit, sed in quodam perfectiori, scilicet in suo toto. Et hoc etiam potest significari in hoc quod persona dicitur substantia individua, non enim manus est substantia completa, sed pars substantiae. Licet igitur humana natura sit individuum quoddam in genere substantiae, quia tamen non per se separatim existit, sed in quodam perfectiori, scilicet in persona Dei verbi, consequens est quod non habeat personalitatem propriam. Et ideo facta est unio in persona. | Reply to Objection 3: The Word of God "did not assume human nature in general, but 'in atomo'"---that is, in an individual---as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 11) otherwise every man would be the Word of God, even as Christ was. Yet we must bear in mind that not every individual in the genus of substance, even in rational nature, is a person, but that alone which exists by itself, and not that which exists in some more perfect thing. Hence the hand of Socrates, although it is a kind of individual, is not a person, because it does not exist by itself, but in something more perfect, viz. in the whole. And hence, too, this is signified by a "person" being defined as "an individual substance," for the hand is not a complete substance, but part of a substance. Therefore, although this human nature is a kind of individual in the genus of substance, it has not its own personality, because it does not exist separately, but in something more perfect, viz. in the Person of the Word. Therefore the union took place in the person. |
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| Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod unio verbi incarnati non sit facta in supposito, sive in hypostasi. Dicit enim Augustinus, in Enchirid., divina substantia et humana utrumque est unus Dei filius, sed aliud propter verbum, et aliud propter hominem. Leo Papa etiam dicit, in epistola ad Flavianum, unum horum coruscat miraculis, et aliud succumbit iniuriis. Sed omne quod est aliud et aliud, differt supposito. Ergo unio verbi incarnati non est facta in supposito. | Objection 1: It would seem that the union of the Word Incarnate did not take place in the suppositum or hypostasis. For Augustine says (Enchiridion xxxv, xxxviii): "Both the Divine and human substance are one Son of God, but they are one thing [aliud] by reason of the Word and another thing [aliud] by reason of the man." And Pope Leo says in his letter to Flavian (Ep. xxviii): "One of these is glorious with miracles, the other succumbs under injuries." But "one" [aliud] and "the other" [aliud] differ in suppositum. Therefore the union of the Word Incarnate did not take place in the suppositum. |
| Praeterea, hypostasis nihil est aliud quam substantia particularis, ut Boetius dicit, in libro de duabus naturis. Manifestum est autem quod in Christo est quaedam alia substantia particularis praeter hypostasim verbi, scilicet corpus et anima et compositum ex eis. Ergo in Christo est alia hypostasis praeter hypostasim verbi Dei. | Objection 2: Further, hypostasis is nothing more than a "particular substance," as Boethius says (De Duab. Nat.). But it is plain that in Christ there is another particular substance beyond the hypostasis of the Word, viz. the body and the soul and the resultant of these. Therefore there is another hypostasis in Him besides the hypostasis of the Word. |
| Praeterea, hypostasis verbi non continetur in aliquo genere, neque sub specie, ut patet ex his quae in prima parte dicta sunt. Sed Christus, secundum quod est factus homo, continetur sub specie humana, dicit enim Dionysius, I cap. de Div. Nom., intra nostram factus est naturam qui omnem ordinem secundum omnem naturam supersubstantialiter excedit. Non autem continetur sub specie humana nisi sit hypostasis quaedam humanae speciei. Ergo in Christo est alia hypostasis praeter hypostasim verbi Dei. Et sic idem quod prius. | Objection 3: Further, the hypostasis of the Word is not included in any genus or species, as is plain from FP, Question [3], Article [5]. But Christ, inasmuch as He is made man, is contained under the species of man; for Dionysius says (Div. Nom. 1): "Within the limits of our nature He came, Who far surpasses the whole order of nature supersubstantially." Now nothing is contained under the human species unless it be a hypostasis of the human species. Therefore in Christ there is another hypostasis besides the hypostasis of the Word of God; and hence the same conclusion follows as above. |
| Sed contra est quod Damascenus dicit, in III libro, in domino nostro Iesu Christo duas naturas cognoscimus, unam autem hypostasim. | On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 3,4,5): "In our Lord Jesus Christ we acknowledge two natures and one hypostasis." |
| Respondeo dicendum quod quidam, ignorantes habitudinem hypostasis ad personam, licet concederent in Christo unam solam personam, posuerunt tamen aliam hypostasim Dei et aliam hominis, ac si unio sit facta in persona, non in hypostasi. Quod quidem apparet erroneum tripliciter. Primo, ex hoc quod persona supra hypostasim non addit nisi determinatam naturam, scilicet rationalem; secundum quod Boetius dicit, in libro de duabus naturis, quod persona est rationalis naturae individua substantia. Et ideo idem est attribuere propriam hypostasim humanae naturae in Christo, et propriam personam. Quod intelligentes sancti patres, utrumque in Concilio quinto, apud Constantinopolim celebrato, damnaverunt, dicentes, si quis introducere conetur in mysterio Christi duas subsistentias seu duas personas, talis anathema sit, nec enim adiectionem personae vel subsistentiae suscepit sancta Trinitas, incarnato uno de sancta Trinitate, Deo verbo. Subsistentia autem idem est quod res subsistens, quod est proprium hypostasis, ut patet per Boetium, in libro de duabus naturis. Secundo quia, si detur quod persona aliquid addat supra hypostasim in quo possit fieri unio, hoc nihil est aliud quam proprietas ad dignitatem pertinens, secundum quod a quibusdam dicitur quod persona est hypostasis proprietate distincta ad dignitatem pertinente. Si ergo facta sit unio in persona et non in hypostasi, consequens erit quod non sit facta unio nisi secundum dignitatem quandam. Et hoc est, approbante synodo Ephesina, damnatum a Cyrillo sub his verbis, si quis in uno Christo dividit subsistentias post adunationem, sola copulans eas coniunctione quae secundum dignitatem vel auctoritatem est vel secundum potentiam, et non magis concursu secundum adunationem naturalem, anathema sit. Tertio, quia tantum hypostasis est cui attribuuntur operationes et proprietates naturae, et ea etiam quae ad naturae rationem pertinent in concreto, dicimus enim quod hic homo ratiocinatur, et est risibilis, et est animal rationale. Et hac ratione hic homo dicitur esse suppositum, quia scilicet supponitur his quae ad hominem pertinent, eorum praedicationem recipiens. Si ergo sit alia hypostasis in Christo praeter hypostasim verbi, sequetur quod de aliquo alio quam de verbo verificentur ea quae sunt hominis, puta esse natum de virgine, passum, crucifixum et sepultum. Et hoc etiam damnatum est, approbante Concilio Ephesino, sub his verbis, si quis personis duabus vel subsistentiis eas quae sunt in evangelicis et apostolicis Scripturis impartitur voces, aut de Christo a sanctis dictas, aut ab ipso de se; et quasdam quidem velut homini praeter illud ex Deo verbum specialiter intellecto applicat, quasdam vero, velut Deo decibiles, soli ex Deo patre verbo, anathema sit. Sic igitur patet esse haeresim ab olim damnatam dicere quod in Christo sunt duae hypostases vel duo supposita, sive quod unio non sit facta in hypostasi vel supposito. Unde in eadem synodo legitur, si quis non confitetur carni secundum subsistentiam unitum ex Deo patre verbum, unumque esse Christum cum sua carne, eundem scilicet Deum et hominem, anathema sit. | I answer that, Some who did not know the relation of hypostasis to person, although granting that there is but one person in Christ, held, nevertheless, that there is one hypostasis of God and another of man, and hence that the union took place in the person and not in the hypostasis. Now this, for three reasons, is clearly erroneous. First, because person only adds to hypostasis a determinate nature, viz. rational, according to what Boethius says (De Duab. Nat.), "a person is an individual substance of rational nature"; and hence it is the same to attribute to the human nature in Christ a proper hypostasis and a proper person. And the holy Fathers, seeing this, condemned both in the Fifth Council held at Constantinople, saying: "If anyone seeks to introduce into the mystery of the Incarnation two subsistences or two persons, let him be anathema. For by the incarnation of one of the Holy Trinity, God the Word, the Holy Trinity received no augment of person or subsistence." Now "subsistence" is the same as the subsisting thing, which is proper to hypostasis, as is plain from Boethius (De Duab. Nat.). Secondly, because if it is granted that person adds to hypostasis something in which the union can take place, this something is nothing else than a property pertaining to dignity; according as it is said by some that a person is a "hypostasis distinguished by a property pertaining to dignity." If, therefore, the union took place in the person and not in the hypostasis, it follows that the union only took place in regard to some dignity. And this is what Cyril, with the approval of the Council of Ephesus (part iii, can. 3), condemned in these terms: "If anyone after the uniting divides the subsistences in the one Christ, only joining them in a union of dignity or authority or power, and not rather in a concourse of natural union, let him be anathema." Thirdly, because to the hypostasis alone are attributed the operations and the natural properties, and whatever belongs to the nature in the concrete; for we say that this man reasons, and is risible, and is a rational animal. So likewise this man is said to be a suppositum, because he underlies [supponitur] whatever belongs to man and receives its predication. Therefore, if there is any hypostasis in Christ besides the hypostasis of the Word, it follows that whatever pertains to man is verified of some other than the Word, e.g. that He was born of a Virgin, suffered, was crucified, was buried. And this, too, was condemned with the approval of the Council of Ephesus (part iii, can. 4) in these words: "If anyone ascribes to two persons or subsistences such words as are in the evangelical and apostolic Scriptures, or have been said of Christ by the saints, or by Himself of Himself, and, moreover, applies some of them to the man, taken as distinct from the Word of God, and some of them (as if they could be used of God alone) only to the Word of God the Father, let him be anathema." Therefore it is plainly a heresy condemned long since by the Church to say that in Christ there are two hypostases, or two supposita, or that the union did not take place in the hypostasis or suppositum. Hence in the same Synod (can. 2) it is said: "If anyone does not confess that the Word was united to flesh in subsistence, and that Christ with His flesh is both---to wit, God and man---let him be anathema." |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut accidentalis differentia facit alterum, ita differentia essentialis facit aliud. Manifestum est autem quod alteritas, quae provenit ex differentia accidentali, potest ad eandem hypostasim vel suppositum in rebus creatis pertinere, eo quod idem numero potest diversis accidentibus subesse, non autem contingit in rebus creatis quod idem numero subsistere possit diversis essentiis vel naturis. Unde sicut quod dicitur alterum et alterum in creaturis, non significat diversitatem suppositi, sed solum diversitatem formarum accidentalium; ita quod Christus dicitur aliud et aliud, non importat diversitatem suppositi sive hypostasis, sed diversitatem naturarum. Unde Gregorius Nazianzenus dicit, in epistola ad Chelidonium, aliud et aliud sunt ea ex quibus salvator est, non alius autem et alius. Dico vero aliud et aliud e contrario quam in Trinitate habet. Ibi enim alius et alius dicimus, ut non subsistentias confundamus, non aliud autem et aliud. | Reply to Objection 1: As accidental difference makes a thing "other" [alterum], so essential difference makes "another thing" [aliud]. Now it is plain that the "otherness" which springs from accidental difference may pertain to the same hypostasis or suppositum in created things, since the same thing numerically can underlie different accidents. But it does not happen in created things that the same numerically can subsist in divers essences or natures. Hence just as when we speak of "otherness" in regard to creatures we do not signify diversity of suppositum, but only diversity of accidental forms, so likewise when Christ is said to be one thing or another thing, we do not imply diversity of suppositum or hypostasis, but diversity of nature. Hence Gregory Nazianzen says in a letter to Chelidonius (Ep. ci): "In the Saviour we may find one thing and another, yet He is not one person and another. And I say 'one thing and another'; whereas, on the contrary, in the Trinity we say one Person and another (so as not to confuse the subsistences), but not one thing and another." |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod hypostasis significat substantiam particularem non quocumque modo, sed prout est in suo complemento. Secundum vero quod venit in unionem alicuius magis completi, non dicitur hypostasis, sicut manus aut pes. Et similiter humana natura in Christo, quamvis sit substantia particularis, quia tamen venit in unionem cuiusdam completi, scilicet totius Christi prout est Deus et homo, non potest dici hypostasis vel suppositum, sed illud completum ad quod concurrit, dicitur esse hypostasis vel suppositum. | Reply to Objection 2: Hypostasis signifies a particular substance, not in every way, but as it is in its complement. Yet as it is in union with something more complete, it is not said to be a hypostasis, as a hand or a foot. So likewise the human nature in Christ, although it is a particular substance, nevertheless cannot be called a hypostasis or suppositum, seeing that it is in union with a completed thing, viz. the whole Christ, as He is God and man. But the complete being with which it concurs is said to be a hypostasis or suppositum. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod etiam in rebus creatis res aliqua singularis non ponitur in genere vel specie ratione eius quod pertinet ad eius individuationem, sed ratione naturae, quae secundum formam determinatur, cum individuatio magis sit secundum materiam in rebus compositis. Sic igitur dicendum est quod Christus est in specie humana ratione naturae assumptae, non ratione ipsius hypostasis. | Reply to Objection 3: In created things a singular thing is placed in a genus or species, not on account of what belongs to its individuation, but on account of its nature, which springs from its form, and in composite things individuation is taken more from matter. Hence we say that Christ is in the human species by reason of the nature assumed, and not by reason of the hypostasis. |
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| Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod persona Christi non sit composita. Persona enim Christi non est aliud quam persona vel hypostasis verbi, ut ex dictis patet. Sed in verbo non est aliud persona et natura, ut patet ex his quae dicta sunt in prima parte. Cum ergo natura verbi sit simplex, ut in primo ostensum est, impossibile est quod persona Christi sit composita. | Objection 1: It would seem that the Person of Christ is not composite. For the Person of Christ is naught else than the Person or hypostasis of the Word, as appears from what has been said (Article [2]). But in the Word, Person and Nature do not differ, as appears from FP, Question [39], Article [1]. Therefore since the Nature of the Word is simple, as was shown above (FP, Question [3], Article [7]), it is impossible that the Person of Christ be composite. |
| Praeterea, omnis compositio videtur esse ex partibus. Sed divina natura non potest habere rationem partis, quia omnis pars habet rationem imperfecti. Ergo impossibile est quod persona Christi sit composita ex duabus naturis. | Objection 2: Further, all composition requires parts. But the Divine Nature is incompatible with the notion of a part, for every part implicates the notion of imperfection. Therefore it is impossible that the Person of Christ be composed of two natures. |
| Praeterea, quod componitur ex aliquibus, videtur esse homogeneum eis, sicut ex corporibus non componitur nisi corpus. Si igitur ex duabus naturis aliquid sit in Christo compositum, consequens erit quod illud non erit persona, sed natura. Et sic in Christo erit facta unio in natura. Quod est contra praedicta. | Objection 3: Further, what is composed of others would seem to be homogeneous with them, as from bodies only a body can be composed. Therefore if there is anything in Christ composed of the two natures, it follows that this will not be a person but a nature; and hence the union in Christ will take place in the nature, which is contrary to Article [2]. |
| Sed contra est quod Damascenus dicit, III libro, in domino Iesu Christo duas naturas cognoscimus, unam autem hypostasim, ex utrisque compositam. | On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 3,4,5), "In the Lord Jesus Christ we acknowledge two natures, but one hypostasis composed from both." |
| Respondeo dicendum quod persona sive hypostasis Christi dupliciter considerari potest. Uno modo, secundum id quod est in se. Et sic est omnino simplex, sicut et natura verbi. Alio modo, secundum rationem personae vel hypostasis, ad quam pertinet subsistere in aliqua natura. Et secundum hoc, persona Christi subsistit in duabus naturis. Unde, licet sit ibi unum subsistens, est tamen ibi alia et alia ratio subsistendi. Et sic dicitur persona composita, inquantum unum duobus subsistit. | I answer that, The Person or hypostasis of Christ may be viewed in two ways. First as it is in itself, and thus it is altogether simple, even as the Nature of the Word. Secondly, in the aspect of person or hypostasis to which it belongs to subsist in a nature; and thus the Person of Christ subsists in two natures. Hence though there is one subsisting being in Him, yet there are different aspects of subsistence, and hence He is said to be a composite person, insomuch as one being subsists in two. |
| Et per hoc patet responsio ad primum. | And thereby the solution to the first is clear. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod illa compositio personae ex naturis non dicitur esse ratione partium, sed potius ratione numeri, sicut omne illud in quo duo conveniunt, potest dici ex eis compositum. | Reply to Objection 2: This composition of a person from natures is not so called on account of parts, but by reason of number, even as that in which two things concur may be said to be composed of them. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod non in omni compositione hoc verificatur quod illud quod componitur sit homogeneum componentibus, sed solum in partibus continui; nam continuum non componitur nisi ex continuis. Animal vero componitur ex anima et corpore, quorum neutrum est animal. | Reply to Objection 3: It is not verified in every composition, that the thing composed is homogeneous with its component parts, but only in the parts of a continuous thing; for the continuous is composed solely of continuous [parts]. But an animal is composed of soul and body, and neither of these is an animal. |
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| Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod in Christo non fuerit unio animae et corporis. Ex unione enim animae et corporis in nobis causatur persona vel hypostasis hominis. Si ergo anima et corpus fuerunt in Christo unita, sequitur quod fuerit ex unione eorum aliqua hypostasis constituta. Non autem hypostasis verbi Dei, quae est aeterna. Ergo in Christo erit aliqua persona vel hypostasis praeter hypostasim verbi. Quod est contra praedicta. | Objection 1: It would seem that in Christ there was no union of soul and body. For from the union of soul and body in us a person or a human hypostasis is caused. Hence if the soul and body were united in Christ, it follows that a hypostasis resulted from their union. But this was not the hypostasis of God the Word, for It is eternal. Therefore in Christ there would be a person or hypostasis besides the hypostasis of the Word, which is contrary to Articles [2],3. |
| Praeterea, ex unione animae et corporis constituitur natura humanae speciei. Damascenus autem dicit, in III libro, quod in domino nostro Iesu Christo non est communem speciem accipere. Ergo in eo non est facta compositio animae et corporis. | Objection 2: Further, from the union of soul and body results the nature of the human species. But Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 3), that "we must not conceive a common species in the Lord Jesus Christ." Therefore there was no union of soul and body in Him. |
| Praeterea, anima non coniungitur corpori nisi ut vivificet ipsum. Sed corpus Christi poterat vivificari ab ipso verbo Dei, quod est fons et principium vitae. Ergo in Christo non fuit unio animae et corporis. | Objection 3: Further, the soul is united to the body for the sole purpose of quickening it. But the body of Christ could be quickened by the Word of God Himself, seeing He is the fount and principle of life. Therefore in Christ there was no union of soul and body. |
| Sed contra est quod corpus non dicitur animatum nisi ex unione animae. Sed corpus Christi dicitur animatum, secundum illud quod Ecclesia cantat, animatum corpus assumens, de virgine nasci dignatus est. Ergo in Christo fuit unio animae et corporis. | On the contrary, The body is not said to be animated save from its union with the soul. Now the body of Christ is said to be animated, as the Church chants: "Taking an animate body, He deigned to be born of a Virgin" [*Feast of the Circumcision, Ant. ii, Lauds]. Therefore in Christ there was a union of soul and body. |
| Respondeo dicendum quod Christus dicitur homo univoce cum hominibus aliis, utpote eiusdem speciei existens, secundum illud apostoli, Philipp. II, in similitudinem hominum factus. Pertinet autem ad rationem speciei humanae quod anima corpori uniatur, non enim forma constituit speciem nisi per hoc quod sit actus materiae; et hoc est ad quod generatio terminatur, per quam natura speciem intendit. Unde necesse est dicere quod in Christo fuerit anima unita corpori, et contrarium est haereticum, utpote derogans veritati humanitatis Christi. | I answer that, Christ is called a man univocally with other men, as being of the same species, according to the Apostle (Phil. 2:7), "being made in the likeness of a man." Now it belongs essentially to the human species that the soul be united to the body, for the form does not constitute the species, except inasmuch as it becomes the act of matter, and this is the terminus of generation through which nature intends the species. Hence it must be said that in Christ the soul was united to the body; and the contrary is heretical, since it destroys the truth of Christ's humanity. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ex hac ratione moti fuerunt illi qui negaverunt unionem animae et corporis in Christo, ne per hoc scilicet cogerentur personam novam aut hypostasim in Christo inducere; quia videbant quod in puris hominibus ex unione animae ad corpus constituitur persona. Sed hoc ideo in puris hominibus accidit quia anima et corpus sic in eis coniunguntur ut per se existant. Sed in Christo uniuntur ad invicem ut adiuncta alteri principaliori quod subsistit in natura ex eis composita. Et propter hoc ex unione animae et corporis in Christo non constituitur nova hypostasis seu persona, sed advenit ipsum coniunctum personae seu hypostasi praeexistenti. Nec propter hoc sequitur quod sit minoris efficaciae unio animae et corporis in Christo quam in nobis. Quia ipsa coniunctio ad nobilius non adimit virtutem aut dignitatem, sed auget, sicut anima sensitiva in animalibus constituit speciem, quia consideratur ut ultima forma; non autem in hominibus, quamvis in eis sit nobilior et virtuosior; et hoc per adiunctionem ulterioris et nobilioris perfectionis animae rationalis, ut etiam supra dictum est. | Reply to Objection 1: This would seem to be the reason which was of weight with such as denied the union of the soul and body in Christ, viz. lest they should thereby be forced to admit a second person or hypostasis in Christ, since they saw that the union of soul and body in mere men resulted in a person. But this happens in mere men because the soul and body are so united in them as to exist by themselves. But in Christ they are united together, so as to be united to something higher, which subsists in the nature composed of them. And hence from the union of the soul and body in Christ a new hypostasis or person does not result, but what is composed of them is united to the already existing hypostasis or Person. Nor does it therefore follow that the union of the soul and body in Christ is of less effect than in us, for its union with something nobler does not lessen but increases its virtue and worth; just as the sensitive soul in animals constitutes the species, as being considered the ultimate form, yet it does not do so in man, although it is of greater effect and dignity, and this because of its union with a further and nobler perfection, viz. the rational soul, as has been said above (Article [2], ad 2). |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod verbum Damasceni potest intelligi dupliciter. Uno modo, ut referatur ad humanam naturam. Quae quidem non habet rationem communis speciei secundum quod est in uno solo individuo, sed secundum quod est abstracta ab omni individuo, prout in nuda contemplatione consideratur; vel secundum quod est in omnibus individuis. Filius autem Dei non assumpsit humanam naturam prout est in sola consideratione intellectus, quia sic non assumpsisset ipsam rem humanae naturae. Nisi forte diceretur quod humana natura esset quaedam idea separata, sicut Platonici posuerunt hominem sine materia. Sed tunc filius Dei non assumpsisset carnem, contra id quod dicitur Luc. ult., spiritus carnem et ossa non habet, sicut me videtis habere. Similiter etiam non potest dici quod filius Dei assumpsit humanam naturam prout est in omnibus individuis eiusdem speciei, quia sic omnes homines assumpsisset. Relinquitur ergo, ut Damascenus postea dicit in eodem libro, quod assumpserit naturam humanam in atomo, idest in individuo, non quidem in alio individuo, quod sit suppositum vel hypostasis illius naturae, quam in persona filii Dei. | Reply to Objection 2: This saying of Damascene may be taken in two ways: First, as referring to human nature, which, as it is in one individual alone, has not the nature of a common species, but only inasmuch as either it is abstracted from every individual, and considered in itself by the mind, or according as it is in all individuals. Now the Son of God did not assume human nature as it exists in the pure thought of the intellect, since in this way He would not have assumed human nature in reality, unless it be said that human nature is a separate idea, just as the Platonists conceived of man without matter. But in this way the Son of God would not have assumed flesh, contrary to what is written (Lk. 24:39), "A spirit hath not flesh and bones as you see Me to have." Neither can it be said that the Son of God assumed human nature as it is in all the individuals of the same species, otherwise He would have assumed all men. Therefore it remains, as Damascene says further on (De Fide Orth. iii, 11) that He assumed human nature "in atomo," i.e. in an individual; not, indeed, in another individual which is a suppositum or a person of that nature, but in the Person of the Son of God. |
| Alio modo potest intelligi dictum Damasceni ut non referatur ad naturam humanam, quasi ex unione animae et corporis non resultet una communis natura, quae est humana, sed est referendum ad unionem duarum naturarum, divinae scilicet et humanae, ex quibus non componitur aliquid tertium, quod sit quaedam natura communis; quia sic illud esset natum praedicari de pluribus. Et hoc ibi intendit. Unde subdit, neque enim generatus est, neque unquam generabitur alius Christus, ex deitate et humanitate, in deitate et humanitate, Deus perfectus, idem et homo perfectus. | Secondly, this saying of Damascene may be taken not as referring to human nature, as if from the union of soul and body one common nature (viz. human) did not result, but as referring to the union of the two natures Divine and human: which do not combine so as to form a third something that becomes a common nature, for in this way it would become predicable of many, and this is what he is aiming at, since he adds: "For there was not generated, neither will there ever be generated, another Christ, Who from the Godhead and manhood, and in the Godhead and manhood, is perfect God and perfect man." |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod duplex est principium vitae corporalis. Unum quidem effectivum. Et hoc modo verbum Dei est principium omnis vitae. Alio modo est aliquid principium vitae formaliter. Cum enim vivere viventibus sit esse, ut dicit philosophus, in II de anima; sicut unumquodque formaliter est per suam formam, ita corpus vivit per animam. Et hoc modo non potuit corpus vivere per verbum, quod non potest esse corporis forma. | Reply to Objection 3: There are two principles of corporeal life: one the effective principle, and in this way the Word of God is the principle of all life; the other, the formal principle of life, for since "in living things to be is to live," as the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 37), just as everything is formally by its form, so likewise the body lives by the soul: in this way a body could not live by the Word, Which cannot be the form of a body. |
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| Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod humana natura fuerit unita verbo Dei accidentaliter. Dicit enim apostolus, Philipp. II, de filio Dei, quod habitu inventus est ut homo. Sed habitus accidentaliter advenit ei cuius est, sive accipiatur habitus prout est unum de decem generibus; sive prout est species qualitatis. Ergo humana natura accidentaliter unita est filio Dei. | Objection 1: It would seem that the human nature was united to the Word of God accidentally. For the Apostle says (Phil. 2:7) of the Son of God, that He was "in habit found as a man." But habit is accidentally associated with that to which it pertains, whether habit be taken for one of the ten predicaments or as a species of quality. Therefore human nature is accidentally united to the Son of God. |
| Praeterea, omne quod advenit alicui post esse completum, advenit ei accidentaliter, hoc enim dicimus accidens quod potest alicui et adesse et abesse praeter subiecti corruptionem. Sed natura humana advenit ex tempore filio Dei habenti esse perfectum ab aeterno. Ergo advenit ei accidentaliter. | Objection 2: Further, whatever comes to a thing that is complete in being comes to it accidentally, for an accident is said to be what can come or go without the subject being corrupted. But human nature came to Christ in time, Who had perfect being from eternity. Therefore it came to Him accidentally. |
| Praeterea, quidquid non pertinet ad naturam seu essentiam alicuius rei, est accidens eius, quia omne quod est vel est substantia, vel est accidens. Sed humana natura non pertinet ad essentiam vel naturam filii Dei divinam, quia non est facta unio in natura, ut supra dictum est. Ergo oportet quod natura humana accidentaliter filio Dei advenerit. | Objection 3: Further, whatever does not pertain to the nature or the essence of a thing is its accident, for whatever is, is either a substance or an accident. But human nature does not pertain to the Divine Essence or Nature of the Son of God, for the union did not take place in the nature, as was said above (Article [1]). Hence the human nature must have accrued accidentally to the Son of God. |
| Praeterea, instrumentum accidentaliter advenit. Sed natura humana in Christo fuit divinitatis instrumentum, dicit enim Damascenus, in III libro, quod caro Christi instrumentum divinitatis existit. Ergo videtur quod humana natura fuerit filio Dei unita accidentaliter. | Objection 4: Further, an instrument accrues accidentally. But the human nature was the instrument of the Godhead in Christ, for Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 15), that "the flesh of Christ is the instrument of the Godhead." Therefore it seems that the human nature was united to the Son of God accidentally. |
| Sed contra est quod illud quod accidentaliter praedicatur, non praedicat aliquid, sed quantum vel quale vel aliquo modo se habens si igitur humana natura accidentaliter adveniret, cum dicitur Christus esse homo, non praedicaretur aliquid, sed quale aut quantum aut aliquo modo se habens. Quod est contra decretalem Alexandri Papae dicentis, cum Christus sit perfectus Deus et perfectus homo, qua temeritate audent quidam dicere quod Christus, secundum quod est homo, non est aliquid? | On the contrary, Whatever is predicated accidentally, predicates, not substance, but quantity, or quality, or some other mode of being. If therefore the human nature accrues accidentally, when we say Christ is man, we do not predicate substance, but quality or quantity, or some other mode of being, which is contrary to the Decretal of Pope Alexander III, who says (Conc. Later. iii): "Since Christ is perfect God and perfect man, what foolhardiness have some to dare to affirm that Christ as man is not a substance?" |
| Respondeo dicendum quod, ad huius quaestionis evidentiam, sciendum est quod circa mysterium unionis duarum naturarum in Christo, duplex haeresis insurrexit. Una quidem confundentium naturas, sicut Eutychetis et Dioscori, qui posuerunt quod ex duabus naturis est constituta una natura; ita quod confitentur Christum esse ex duabus naturis, quasi ante unionem distinctis; non autem in duabus naturis, quasi post unionem naturarum distinctione cessante. Alia vero fuit haeresis Nestorii et Theodori Mopsuesteni separantium personas. Posuerunt enim aliam esse personam filii Dei, et filii hominis. Quas dicebant sibi invicem esse unitas, primo quidem, secundum inhabitationem, inquantum scilicet verbum Dei habitavit in illo homine sicut in templo. Secundo, secundum unitatem affectus, inquantum scilicet voluntas illius hominis est semper conformis voluntati Dei. Tertio modo, secundum operationem, prout scilicet dicebant hominem illum esse Dei verbi instrumentum. Quarto, secundum dignitatem honoris, prout omnis honor qui exhibetur filio Dei, exhibetur filio hominis, propter coniunctionem ad filium Dei. Quinto, secundum aequivocationem, idest secundum communicationem nominum, prout scilicet dicimus illum hominem esse Deum et filium Dei. Manifestum est autem omnes istos modos accidentalem unionem importare. | I answer that, In evidence of this question we must know that two heresies have arisen with regard to the mystery of the union of the two natures in Christ. The first confused the natures, as Eutyches and Dioscorus, who held that from the two natures one nature resulted, so that they confessed Christ to be "from" two natures (which were distinct before the union), but not "in" two natures (the distinction of nature coming to an end after the union). The second was the heresy of Nestorius and Theodore of Mopsuestia, who separated the persons. For they held the Person of the Son of God to be distinct from the Person of the Son of man, and said these were mutually united: first, "by indwelling," inasmuch as the Word of God dwelt in the man, as in a temple; secondly, "by unity of intention," inasmuch as the will of the man was always in agreement with the will of the Word of God; thirdly, "by operation," inasmuch as they said the man was the instrument of the Word of God; fourthly, "by greatness of honor," inasmuch as all honor shown to the Son of God was equally shown to the Son of man, on account of His union with the Son of God; fifthly, "by equivocation," i.e. communication of names, inasmuch as we say that this man is God and the Son of God. Now it is plain that these modes imply an accidental union. |
| Quidam autem posteriores magistri, putantes se has haereses declinare, in eas per ignorantiam inciderunt. Quidam enim eorum concesserunt unam Christi personam, sed posuerunt duas hypostases, sive duo supposita; dicentes hominem quendam, compositum ex anima et corpore, a principio suae conceptionis esse assumptum a Dei verbo. Et haec est prima opinio quam Magister ponit in sexta distinctione tertii libri sententiarum. Alii vero, volentes servare unitatem personae, posuerunt Christi animam non esse corpori unitam, sed haec duo, separata ab invicem, esse unita verbo accidentaliter, ut sic non cresceret numerus personarum. Et haec est tertia opinio quam Magister ibidem ponit. | But some more recent masters, thinking to avoid these heresies, through ignorance fell into them. For some conceded one person in Christ, but maintained two hypostases, or two supposita, saying that a man, composed of body and soul, was from the beginning of his conception assumed by the Word of God. And this is the first opinion set down by the Master (Sent. iii, D, 6). But others desirous of keeping the unity of person, held that the soul of Christ was not united to the body, but that these two were mutually separate, and were united to the Word accidentally, so that the number of persons might not be increased. And this is the third opinion which the Master sets down (Sent. iii, D, 6). |
| Utraque autem harum opinionum incidit in haeresim Nestorii. Prima quidem, quia idem est ponere duas hypostases vel duo supposita in Christo, quod ponere duas personas, ut supra dictum est. Et si fiat vis in nomine personae, considerandum est quod etiam Nestorius utebatur unitate personae, propter unitatem dignitatis et honoris. Unde et quinta synodus definit anathema eum qui dicit unam personam secundum dignitatem, honorem et adorationem, sicut Theodorus et Nestorius insanientes conscripserunt. Alia vero opinio incidit in errorem Nestorii quantum ad hoc, quod posuit unionem accidentalem. Non enim differt dicere quod verbum Dei unitum est homini Christo secundum inhabitationem sicut in templo suo, sicut dicebat Nestorius; et dicere quod unitum fuit verbum homini secundum induitionem sicut vestimento, sicut dicit tertia opinio. Quae etiam dicit peius aliquid quam Nestorius, quod anima et corpus non sunt unita. | But both of these opinions fall into the heresy of Nestorius; the first, indeed, because to maintain two hypostases or supposita in Christ is the same as to maintain two persons, as was shown above (Article [3]). And if stress is laid on the word "person," we must have in mind that even Nestorius spoke of unity of person on account of the unity of dignity and honor. Hence the fifth Council (Constantinople II, coll. viii, can. 5) directs an anathema against such a one as holds "one person in dignity, honor and adoration, as Theodore and Nestorius foolishly wrote." But the other opinion falls into the error of Nestorius by maintaining an accidental union. For there is no difference in saying that the Word of God is united to the Man Christ by indwelling, as in His temple (as Nestorius said), or by putting on man, as a garment, which is the third opinion; rather it says something worse than Nestorius---to wit, that the soul and body are not united. |
| Fides autem Catholica, medium tenens inter praedictas positiones, neque dicit esse unionem factam Dei et hominis secundum essentiam vel naturam; neque etiam secundum accidens; sed medio modo, secundum subsistentiam seu hypostasim. Unde in quinta synodo legitur, cum multis modis unitas intelligatur, qui iniquitatem Apollinarii et Eutychetis sequuntur, interemptionem eorum quae convenerunt colentes, (idest, interimentes utramque naturam), unionem secundum confusionem dicunt; Theodori autem et Nestorii sequaces, divisione gaudentes, affectualem unitatem introducunt, sancta vero Dei Ecclesia, utriusque perfidiae impietatem reiiciens unionem Dei verbi ad carnem secundum compositionem confitetur, quod est secundum subsistentiam. Sic igitur patet quod secunda trium opinionum quas Magister ponit, quae asserit unam hypostasim Dei et hominis, non est dicenda opinio, sed sententia Catholicae fidei. Similiter etiam prima opinio, quae ponit duas hypostases; et tertia, quae ponit unionem accidentalem; non sunt dicendae opiniones, sed haereses in Conciliis ab Ecclesia damnatae. | Now the Catholic faith, holding the mean between the aforesaid positions, does not affirm that the union of God and man took place in the essence or nature, nor yet in something accidental, but midway, in a subsistence or hypostasis. Hence in the fifth Council (Constantinople II, coll. viii, can. 5) we read: "Since the unity may be understood in many ways, those who follow the impiety of Apollinaris and Eutyches, professing the destruction of what came together" (i.e. destroying both natures), "confess a union by mingling; but the followers of Theodore and Nestorius, maintaining division, introduce a union of purpose. But the Holy Church of God, rejecting the impiety of both these treasons, confesses a union of the Word of God with flesh, by composition, which is in subsistence." Therefore it is plain that the second of the three opinions, mentioned by the Master (Sent. iii, D, 6), which holds one hypostasis of God and man, is not to be called an opinion, but an article of Catholic faith. So likewise the first opinion which holds two hypostases, and the third which holds an accidental union, are not to be styled opinions, but heresies condemned by the Church in Councils. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut Damascenus dicit, in III libro, non necesse autem omnifariam et indefective assimilari exempla, quod enim in omnibus simile, idem utique erit, et non exemplum. Et maxime in divinis, impossibile enim simile exemplum invenire et in theologia, idest in deitate personarum, et in dispensatione, idest in mysterio incarnationis. Humana igitur natura in Christo assimilatur habitui, idest vestimento, non quidem quantum ad accidentalem unionem, sed quantum ad hoc, quod verbum videtur per humanam naturam, sicut homo per vestimentum. Et etiam quantum ad hoc, quod vestimentum mutatur, quia scilicet formatur secundum figuram eius qui induit ipsum, qui a sua forma non mutatur propter vestimentum, et similiter humana natura assumpta a verbo Dei est meliorata, ipsum autem verbum Dei non est mutatum; ut exponit Augustinus, in libro octogintatrium quaestionum. | Reply to Objection 1: As Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 26): "Examples need not be wholly and at all points similar, for what is wholly similar is the same, and not an example, and especially in Divine things, for it is impossible to find a wholly similar example in the Theology," i.e. in the Godhead of Persons, "and in the Dispensation," i.e. the mystery of the Incarnation. Hence the human nature in Christ is likened to a habit, i.e. a garment, not indeed in regard to accidental union, but inasmuch as the Word is seen by the human nature, as a man by his garment, and also inasmuch as the garment is changed, for it is shaped according to the figure of him who puts it on, and yet he is not changed from his form on account of the garment. So likewise the human nature assumed by the Word of God is ennobled, but the Word of God is not changed, as Augustine says (Qq. 83, qu. 73). |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod illud quod advenit post esse completum, accidentaliter advenit, nisi trahatur in communionem illius esse completi. Sicut in resurrectione corpus adveniet animae praeexistenti, non tamen accidentaliter, quia ad idem esse assumetur, ut scilicet corpus habeat esse vitale per animam. Non est autem sic de albedine, quia aliud est esse albi, et aliud esse hominis cui advenit albedo. Verbum autem Dei ab aeterno esse completum habuit secundum hypostasim sive personam, ex tempore autem advenit ei natura humana, non quasi assumpta ad unum esse prout est naturae, sicut corpus assumitur ad esse animae; sed ad unum esse prout est hypostasis vel personae. Et ideo humana natura non unitur accidentaliter filio Dei. | Reply to Objection 2: Whatever accrues after the completion of the being comes accidentally, unless it be taken into communion with the complete being, just as in the resurrection the body comes to the soul which pre-exists, yet not accidentally, because it is assumed unto the same being, so that the body has vital being through the soul; but it is not so with whiteness, for the being of whiteness is other than the being of man to which whiteness comes. But the Word of God from all eternity had complete being in hypostasis or person; while in time the human nature accrued to it, not as if it were assumed unto one being inasmuch as this is of the nature (even as the body is assumed to the being of the soul), but to one being inasmuch as this is of the hypostasis or person. Hence the human nature is not accidentally united to the Son of God. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod accidens dividitur contra substantiam. Substantia autem, ut patet V Metaphys., dupliciter dicitur, uno modo, essentia sive natura; alio modo, pro supposito sive hypostasi. Unde sufficit ad hoc quod non sit unio accidentalis, quod sit facta unio secundum hypostasim, licet non sit facta unio secundum naturam. | Reply to Objection 3: Accident is divided against substance. Now substance, as is plain from Metaph. v, 25, is taken in two ways: first, for essence or nature; secondly, for suppositum or hypostasis---hence the union having taken place in the hypostasis, is enough to show that it is not an accidental union, although the union did not take place in the nature. |
| Ad quartum dicendum quod non omne quod assumitur ut instrumentum, pertinet ad hypostasim assumentis, sicut patet de securi et gladio nihil tamen prohibet illud quod assumitur ad unitatem hypostasis, se habere ut instrumentum, sicut corpus hominis vel membra eius. Nestorius igitur posuit quod natura humana est assumpta a verbo solum per modum instrumenti, non autem ad unitatem hypostasis. Et ideo non concedebat quod homo ille vere esset filius Dei, sed instrumentum eius. Unde Cyrillus dicit, in epistola ad monachos Aegypti, hunc Emanuelem, idest Christum, non tanquam instrumenti officio sumptum dicit Scriptura, sed tanquam Deum vere humanatum, idest hominem factum. Damascenus autem posuit naturam humanam in Christo esse sicut instrumentum ad unitatem hypostasis pertinens. | Reply to Objection 4: Not everything that is assumed as an instrument pertains to the hypostasis of the one who assumes, as is plain in the case of a saw or a sword; yet nothing prevents what is assumed into the unity of the hypostasis from being as an instrument, even as the body of man or his members. Hence Nestorius held that the human nature was assumed by the Word merely as an instrument, and not into the unity of the hypostasis. And therefore he did not concede that the man was really the Son of God, but His instrument. Hence Cyril says (Epist. ad Monach. Aegyptii): "The Scripture does not affirm that this Emmanuel," i.e. Christ, "was assumed for the office of an instrument, but as God truly humanized," i.e. made man. But Damascene held that the human nature in Christ is an instrument belonging to the unity of the hypostasis. |
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| Ad septimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod unio divinae et humanae naturae non sit aliquid creatum. Nihil enim in Deo creatum potest esse, quia quidquid est in Deo, Deus est. Sed unio est in Deo, quia ipse Deus est humanae naturae unitus. Ergo videtur quod unio non sit aliquid creatum. | Objection 1: It would seem that the union of the Divine and human natures is not anything created. For there can be nothing created in God, because whatever is in God is God. But the union is in God, for God Himself is united to human nature. Therefore it seems that the union is not anything created. |
| Praeterea, finis est potissimum in unoquoque. Sed finis unionis est divina hypostasis sive persona, ad quam terminata est unio. Ergo videtur quod huiusmodi unio maxime debeat iudicari secundum conditionem divinae hypostasis. Quae non est aliquid creatum. Ergo nec ipsa unio est aliquid creatum. | Objection 2: Further, the end holds first place in everything. But the end of the union is the Divine hypostasis or Person in which the union is terminated. Therefore it seems that this union ought chiefly to be judged with reference to the dignity of the Divine hypostasis, which is not anything created. Therefore the union is nothing created. |
| Praeterea, propter quod unumquodque, et illud magis. Sed homo dicitur esse creator propter unionem. Ergo multo magis ipsa unio non est aliquid creatum, sed creator. | Objection 3: Further, "That which is the cause of a thing being such is still more so" (Poster. i). But man is said to be the Creator on account of the union. Therefore much more is the union itself nothing created, but the Creator. |
| Sed contra est, quod incipit esse ex tempore, est creatum. Sed unio illa non fuit ab aeterno, sed incoepit esse ex tempore. Ergo unio est aliquid creatum. | On the contrary, Whatever has a beginning in time is created. Now this union was not from eternity, but began in time. Therefore the union is something created. |
| Respondeo dicendum quod unio de qua loquimur est relatio quaedam quae consideratur inter divinam naturam et humanam, secundum quod conveniunt in una persona filii Dei. Sicut autem in prima parte dictum est, omnis relatio quae consideratur inter Deum et creaturam, realiter quidem est in creatura, per cuius mutationem talis relatio innascitur, non autem est realiter in Deo, sed secundum rationem tantum, quia non nascitur secundum mutationem Dei. Sic igitur dicendum est quod haec unio de qua loquimur, non est in Deo realiter, sed secundum rationem tantum in humana autem natura, quae creatura quaedam est, est realiter. Et ideo oportet dicere quod sit quoddam creatum. | I answer that, The union of which we are speaking is a relation which we consider between the Divine and the human nature, inasmuch as they come together in one Person of the Son of God. Now, as was said above (FP, Question [13], Article [7]), every relation which we consider between God and the creature is really in the creature, by whose change the relation is brought into being; whereas it is not really in God, but only in our way of thinking, since it does not arise from any change in God. And hence we must say that the union of which we are speaking is not really in God, except only in our way of thinking; but in the human nature, which is a creature, it is really. Therefore we must say it is something created. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod haec unio non est in Deo realiter sed solum secundum rationem tantum, dicitur enim Deus unitus creaturae ex hoc quod creatura unita est ei, absque Dei mutatione. | Reply to Objection 1: This union is not really in God, but only in our way of thinking, for God is said to be united to a creature inasmuch as the creature is really united to God without any change in Him. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod ratio relationis, sicut et motus dependet ex fine vel termino, sed esse eius dependet ex subiecto. Et quia unio talis non habet esse reale nisi in natura creata, ut dictum est, consequens est quod habeat esse creatum. | Reply to Objection 2: The specific nature of a relation, as of motion, depends on the subject. And since this union has its being nowhere save in a created nature, as was said above, it follows that it has a created being. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod homo dicitur et est Deus propter unionem inquantum terminatur ad hypostasim divinam. Non tamen sequitur quod ipsa unio sit creator vel Deus, quia quod aliquid dicatur creatum, hoc magis respicit esse ipsius quam relationem. | Reply to Objection 3: A man is called Creator and is God because of the union, inasmuch as it is terminated in the Divine hypostasis; yet it does not follow that the union itself is the Creator or God, because that a thing is said to be created regards its being rather than its relation. |
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| Ad octavum sic proceditur. Videtur quod idem sit unio quod assumptio. Relationes enim, sicut et motus, specificantur secundum terminum. Sed idem est terminus assumptionis et unionis, scilicet divina hypostasis. Ergo videtur quod non differant unio et assumptio. | Objection 1: It would seem that union is the same as assumption. For relations, as motions, are specified by their termini. Now the term of assumption and union is one and the same, viz. the Divine hypostasis. Therefore it seems that union and assumption are not different. |
| Praeterea, in mysterio incarnationis idem videtur esse uniens et assumens, unitum et assumptum. Sed unio et assumptio videntur sequi actionem et passionem unientis et uniti, vel assumentis et assumpti. Ergo videtur idem esse unio quod assumptio. | Objection 2: Further, in the mystery of the Incarnation the same thing seems to be what unites and what assumes, and what is united and what is assumed. But union and assumption seem to follow the action and passion of the thing uniting and the united, of the thing assuming and the assumed. Therefore union seems to be the same as assumption. |
| Praeterea, Damascenus dicit, in III libro, aliud est unio, aliud incarnatio. Nam unio solam demonstrat copulationem, ad quid autem facta est, non adhuc. Incarnatio autem et humanatio determinant ad quem sit facta copulatio. Sed similiter assumptio non determinat ad quem facta sit copulatio. Ergo videtur idem esse unio et assumptio. | Objection 3: Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 11): "Union is one thing, incarnation is another; for union demands mere copulation, and leaves unsaid the end of the copulation; but incarnation and humanation determine the end of copulation." But likewise assumption does not determine the end of copulation. Therefore it seems that union is the same as assumption. |
| Sed contra est quod divina natura dicitur unita, non autem assumpta. | On the contrary, The Divine Nature is said to be united, not assumed. |
| Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, unio importat relationem divinae naturae et humanae secundum quod conveniunt in una persona. Omnis autem relatio quae incipit esse ex tempore, ex aliqua mutatione causatur. Mutatio autem consistit in actione et passione. Sic igitur dicendum est quod prima et principalis differentia inter unionem et assumptionem est quod unio importat ipsam relationem, assumptio autem actionem secundum quam dicitur aliquis assumens, vel passionem secundum quam dicitur aliquid assumptum. Ex hac autem differentia accipitur secundo alia differentia. Nam assumptio dicitur sicut in fieri, unio autem sicut in facto esse. Et ideo uniens dicitur esse unitum, assumens autem non dicitur esse assumptum. Natura enim humana significatur ut in termino assumptionis ad hypostasim divinam per hoc quod dicitur homo, unde vere dicimus quod filius Dei, qui est uniens sibi humanam naturam, est homo. Sed humana natura in se considerata, idest in abstracto, significatur ut assumpta, non autem dicimus quod filius Dei sit humana natura. Ex eodem etiam sequitur tertia differentia, quod relatio, praecipue aequiparantiae, non magis se habet ad unum extremum quam ad aliud; actio autem et passio diversimode se habent ad agens et patiens, et ad diversos terminos. Et ideo assumptio determinat terminum et a quo et ad quem, dicitur enim assumptio quasi ab alio ad se sumptio, unio autem nihil horum determinat. Unde indifferenter dicitur quod humana natura est unita divinae, et e converso. Non autem dicitur divina natura assumpta ab humana, sed e converso, quia humana natura adiuncta est ad personalitatem divinam, ut scilicet persona divina in humana natura subsistat. | I answer that, As was stated above (Article [7]), union implies a certain relation of the Divine Nature and the human, according as they come together in one Person. Now all relations which begin in time are brought about by some change; and change consists in action and passion. Hence the "first" and principal difference between assumption and union must be said to be that union implies the relation: whereas assumption implies the action, whereby someone is said to assume, or the passion, whereby something is said to be assumed. Now from this difference another "second" difference arises, for assumption implies "becoming," whereas union implies "having become," and therefore the thing uniting is said to be united, but the thing assuming is not said to be assumed. For the human nature is taken to be in the terminus of assumption unto the Divine hypostasis when man is spoken of; and hence we can truly say that the Son of God, Who assumes human nature unto Himself, is man. But human nature, considered in itself, i.e. in the abstract, is viewed as assumed; and we do not say the Son of God is human nature. From this same follows a "third" difference, which is that a relation, especially one of equiparance, is no more to one extreme than to the other, whereas action and passion bear themselves differently to the agent and the patient, and to different termini. And hence assumption determines the term whence and the term whither; for assumption means a taking to oneself from another. But union determines none of these things. hence it may be said indifferently that the human nature is united with the Divine, or conversely. But the Divine Nature is not said to be assumed by the human, but conversely, because the human nature is joined to the Divine personality, so that the Divine Person subsists in human nature. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod unio et assumptio non eodem modo se habent ad terminum, sed diversimode, sicut dictum est. | Reply to Objection 1: Union and assumption have not the same relation to the term, but a different relation, as was said above. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod uniens et assumens non omnino sunt idem. Nam omnis persona assumens est uniens, non autem e converso. Nam persona patris univit naturam humanam filio, non autem sibi et ideo dicitur uniens, non assumens. Et similiter non est idem unitum et assumptum. Nam divina natura dicitur unita, non assumpta. | Reply to Objection 2: What unites and what assumes are not the same. For whatsoever Person assumes unites, and not conversely. For the Person of the Father united the human nature to the Son, but not to Himself; and hence He is said to unite and not to assume. So likewise the united and the assumed are not identical, for the Divine Nature is said to be united, but not assumed. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod assumptio determinat cui facta est copulatio ex parte assumentis, inquantum assumptio dicitur quasi ad se sumptio. Sed incarnatio et humanatio ex parte assumpti, quod est caro, vel natura humana. Et ideo assumptio differt ratione et ab unione, et ab incarnatione seu humanatione. | Reply to Objection 3: Assumption determines with whom the union is made on the part of the one assuming, inasmuch as assumption means taking unto oneself [ad se sumere], whereas incarnation and humanation (determine with whom the union is made) on the part of the thing assumed, which is flesh or human nature. And thus assumption differs logically both from union and from incarnation or humanation. |
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| Ad nonum sic proceditur. Videtur quod unio duarum naturarum non sit maxima unionum. Unitum enim deficit in ratione unitatis ab eo quod est unum, eo quod unitum dicitur per participationem, unum autem per essentiam. Sed in rebus creatis aliquid dicitur esse simpliciter unum, sicut praecipue patet de ipsa unitate quae est principium numeri. Ergo huiusmodi unio de qua loquimur, non importat maximam unitatem. | Objection 1: It would seem that the union of the two natures in Christ is not the greatest of all unions. For what is united falls short of the unity of what is one, since what is united is by participation, but one is by essence. Now in created things there are some that are simply one, as is shown especially in unity itself, which is the principle of number. Therefore the union of which we are speaking does not imply the greatest of all unions. |
| Praeterea, quanto ea quae uniuntur magis distant, tanto minor est unio. Sed ea quae secundum hanc unionem uniuntur, maxime distant, scilicet natura divina et humana, distant enim in infinitum. Ergo huiusmodi est minima unio. | Objection 2: Further, the greater the distance between things united, the less the union. Now, the things united by this union are most distant---namely, the Divine and human natures; for they are infinitely apart. Therefore their union is the least of all. |
| Praeterea, per unionem aliquid fit unum. Sed ex unione animae et corporis in nobis fit aliquid unum in persona et natura, ex unione autem divinae et humanae naturae fit aliquid unum solum in persona. Ergo maior est unio animae ad corpus quam divinae naturae ad humanam. Et sic unio de qua loquimur, non importat maximam unitatem. | Objection 3: Further, from union there results one. But from the union of soul and body in us there arises what is one in person and nature; whereas from the union of the Divine and human nature there results what is one in person only. Therefore the union of soul and body is greater than that of the Divine and human natures; and hence the union of which we speak does not imply the greatest unity. |
| Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in I de Trin., quod homo potius est in filio quam filius in patre. Filius autem est in patre per unitatem essentiae, homo autem est in filio per unionem incarnationis. Ergo maior est unio incarnationis quam unitas divinae essentiae. Quae tamen est maxima unitatum. Et sic, per consequens, unio incarnationis importat maximam unitatem. | On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. i, 10) that "man is in the Son of God, more than the Son in the Father." But the Son is in the Father by unity of essence, and man is in the Son by the union of the Incarnation. Therefore the union of the Incarnation is greater than the unity of the Divine Essence, which nevertheless is the greatest union; and thus the union of the Incarnation implies the greatest unity. |
| Respondeo dicendum quod unio importat coniunctionem aliquorum in aliquo uno. Potest ergo unio incarnationis dupliciter accipi, uno modo, ex parte eorum quae coniunguntur; et alio modo, ex parte eius in quo coniunguntur. Et ex hac parte huiusmodi unio habet praeeminentiam inter alias uniones, nam unitas personae divinae, in qua uniuntur duae naturae, est maxima. Non autem habet praeeminentiam ex parte eorum quae coniunguntur. | I answer that, Union implies the joining of several in some one thing. Therefore the union of the Incarnation may be taken in two ways: first, in regard to the things united; secondly, in regard to that in which they are united. And in this regard this union has a pre-eminence over other unions; for the unity of the Divine Person, in which the two natures are united, is the greatest. But it has no pre-eminence in regard to the things united. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod unitas personae divinae est maior quam unitas numeralis, quae scilicet est principium numeri. Nam unitas divinae personae est unitas per se subsistens, non recepta in aliquo per participationem, est etiam in se completa, habens in se quidquid pertinet ad rationem unitatis. Et ideo non competit sibi ratio partis, sicut unitati numerali, quae est pars numeri, et quae participatur in rebus numeratis. Et ideo quantum ad hoc unio incarnationis praeeminet unitati numerali, ratione scilicet unitatis personae. Non autem ratione naturae humanae, quae non est ipsa unitas personae divinae, sed est ei unita. | Reply to Objection 1: The unity of the Divine Person is greater than numerical unity, which is the principle of number. For the unity of a Divine Person is an uncreated and self-subsisting unity, not received into another by participation. Also, it is complete in itself, having in itself whatever pertains to the nature of unity; and therefore it is not compatible with the nature of a part, as in numerical unity, which is a part of number, and which is shared in by the things numbered. And hence in this respect the union of the Incarnation is higher than numerical unity by reason of the unity of the Divine Person, and not by reason of the human nature, which is not the unity of the Divine Person, but is united to it. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod ratio illa procedit ex parte coniunctorum, non autem ex parte personae in qua est facta unio. | Reply to Objection 2: This reason regards the things united, and not the Person in Whom the union takes place. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod unitas divinae personae est maior unitas quam unitas et personae et naturae in nobis. Et ideo unio incarnationis est maior quam unio animae et corporis in nobis. | Reply to Objection 3: The unity of the Divine Person is greater than the unity of person and nature in us; and hence the union of the Incarnation is greater than the union of soul and body in us. |
| Quia vero id quod in contrarium obiicitur falsum supponit, scilicet quod maior sit unio incarnationis quam unitas personarum divinarum in essentia, dicendum est ad auctoritatem Augustini quod humana natura non est magis in filio Dei quam filius Dei in patre sed multo minus, sed ipse homo, quantum ad aliquid, est magis in filio quam filius in patre; inquantum scilicet idem supponitur in hoc quod dico homo, prout sumitur pro Christo, et in hoc quod dico, filius Dei; non autem idem est suppositum patris et filii. | And because what is urged in the argument "on the contrary" rests upon what is untrue---namely, that the union of the Incarnation is greater than the unity of the Divine Persons in Essence---we must say to the authority of Augustine that the human nature is not more in the Son of God than the Son of God in the Father, but much less. But the man in some respects is more in the Son than the Son in the Father---namely, inasmuch as the same suppositum is signified when I say "man," meaning Christ, and when I say "Son of God"; whereas it is not the same suppositum of Father and Son. |
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| Ad decimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod unio incarnationis non sit per gratiam. Gratia enim est accidens quoddam, ut in secunda parte habitum est. Sed unio humanae naturae ad divinam non est facta per accidens, ut supra ostensum est. Ergo videtur quod unio incarnationis non sit facta per gratiam. | Objection 1: It would seem that the union of the Incarnation did not take place by grace. For grace is an accident, as was shown above (FS, Question [110], Article [2]). But the union of the human nature to the Divine did not take place accidentally, as was shown above (Article [6]). Therefore it seems that the union of the Incarnation did not take place by grace. |
| Praeterea, gratiae subiectum est anima. Sed sicut dicitur Coloss. II, in Christo habitavit plenitudo divinitatis corporaliter. Ergo videtur quod illa unio non sit facta per gratiam. | Objection 2: Further, the subject of grace is the soul. But it is written (Col. 2:9): "In Christ [Vulg.: 'Him'] dwelleth all the fulness of the Godhead corporeally." Therefore it seems that this union did not take place by grace. |
| Praeterea, quilibet sanctus Deo unitur per gratiam. Si igitur unio incarnationis fuit per gratiam, videtur quod non aliter dicatur Christus esse Deus quam alii sancti homines. | Objection 3: Further, every saint is united to God by grace. If, therefore, the union of the Incarnation was by grace, it would seem that Christ is said to be God no more than other holy men. |
| Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro de Praedest. sanctorum, ea gratia fit ab initio fidei suae homo quicumque Christianus, qua gratia homo ille ab initio suo factus est Christus. Sed homo ille factus est Christus per unionem ad divinam naturam. Ergo unio illa fuit per gratiam. | On the contrary, Augustine says (De Praed. Sanct. xv): "By the same grace every man is made a Christian, from the beginning of his faith, as this man from His beginning was made Christ." But this man became Christ by union with the Divine Nature. Therefore this union was by grace. |
| Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut in secunda parte dictum est, gratia dupliciter dicitur, uno modo, ipsa voluntas Dei gratis aliquid dantis; alio modo, ipsum gratuitum donum Dei. Indiget autem humana natura gratuita Dei voluntate ad hoc quod elevetur in Deum, cum hoc sit supra facultatem naturae suae. Elevatur autem humana natura in Deum dupliciter. Uno modo, per operationem, qua scilicet sancti cognoscunt et amant Deum. Alio modo, per esse personale, qui quidem modus est singularis Christo, in quo humana natura assumpta est ad hoc quod sit personae filii Dei. Manifestum est autem quod ad perfectionem operationis requiritur quod potentia sit perfecta per habitum, sed quod natura habeat esse in supposito suo, non fit mediante aliquo habitu. | I answer that, As was said above (FS, Question [110], Article [1]), grace is taken in two ways:--first, as the will of God gratuitously bestowing something; secondly, as the free gift of God. Now human nature stands in need of the gratuitous will of God in order to be lifted up to God, since this is above its natural capability. Moreover, human nature is lifted up to God in two ways: first, by operation, as the saints know and love God; secondly, by personal being, and this mode belongs exclusively to Christ, in Whom human nature is assumed so as to be in the Person of the Son of God. But it is plain that for the perfection of operation the power needs to be perfected by a habit, whereas that a nature has being in its own suppositum does not take place by means of a habit. |
| Sic igitur dicendum est quod, si gratia accipiatur ipsa Dei voluntas gratis aliquid faciens, vel gratum seu acceptum aliquem habens, unio incarnationis facta est per gratiam, sicut et unio sanctorum ad Deum per cognitionem et amorem. Si vero gratia dicatur ipsum gratuitum Dei donum, sic ipsum quod est humanam naturam esse unitam personae divinae, potest dici quaedam gratia, inquantum nullis praecedentibus meritis hoc est factum, non autem ita quod sit aliqua gratia habitualis qua mediante talis unio fiat. | And hence we must say that if grace be understood as the will of God gratuitously doing something or reputing anything as well-pleasing or acceptable to Him, the union of the Incarnation took place by grace, even as the union of the saints with God by knowledge and love. But if grace be taken as the free gift of God, then the fact that the human nature is united to the Divine Person may be called a grace, inasmuch as it took place without being preceded by any merits---but not as though there were an habitual grace, by means of which the union took place. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod gratia quae est accidens, est quaedam similitudo divinitatis participata in homine. Per incarnationem autem humana natura non dicitur participasse similitudinem aliquam divinae naturae, sed dicitur esse coniuncta ipsi naturae divinae in persona filii. Maius autem est ipsa res quam similitudo eius participata. | Reply to Objection 1: The grace which is an accident is a certain likeness of the Divinity participated by man. But by the Incarnation human nature is not said to have participated a likeness of the Divine nature, but is said to be united to the Divine Nature itself in the Person of the Son. Now the thing itself is greater than a participated likeness of it. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod gratia habitualis est solum in anima, sed gratia, idest gratuitum Dei donum quod est uniri divinae personae, pertinet ad totam naturam humanam, quae componitur ex anima et corpore. Et per hunc modum dicitur plenitudo divinitatis in Christo corporaliter habitasse, quia est unita divina natura non solum animae, sed etiam corpori. Quamvis etiam possit dici quod dicitur habitasse in Christo corporaliter, idest non umbraliter, sicut habitavit in sacramentis veteris legis, de quibus ibidem subditur quod sunt umbra futurorum, corpus autem est Christus, prout scilicet corpus contra umbram dividitur. Dicunt etiam quidam quod divinitas dicitur in Christo habitasse corporaliter, scilicet tribus modis, sicut corpus habet tres dimensiones, uno modo, per essentiam, praesentiam et potentiam, sicut in ceteris creaturis; alio modo, per gratiam gratum facientem, sicut in sanctis tertio modo, per unionem personalem, quod est proprium sibi. | Reply to Objection 2: Habitual grace is only in the soul; but the grace, i.e. the free gift of God, of being united to the Divine Person belongs to the whole human nature, which is composed of soul and body. And hence it is said that the fulness of the Godhead dwelt corporeally in Christ because the Divine Nature is united not merely to the soul, but to the body also. Although it may also be said that it dwelt in Christ corporeally, i.e. not as in a shadow, as it dwelt in the sacraments of the old law, of which it is said in the same place (Col. 2:17) that they are the "shadow of things to come but the body is Christ" [Vulg.: 'Christ's'], inasmuch as the body is opposed to the shadow. And some say that the Godhead is said to have dwelt in Christ corporeally, i.e. in three ways, just as a body has three dimensions: first, by essence, presence, and power, as in other creatures; secondly, by sanctifying grace, as in the saints; thirdly, by personal union, which is proper to Christ. |
| Unde patet responsio ad tertium, quia scilicet unio incarnationis non est facta solum per gratiam habitualem, sicut alii sancti uniuntur Deo; sed secundum subsistentiam, sive personam. | Hence the reply to the third is manifest, viz. because the union of the Incarnation did not take place by habitual grace alone, but in subsistence or person. |
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| Ad undecimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod unio incarnationis fuerit aliqua merita subsecuta. Quia super illud Psalmi, fiat misericordia tua, domine, super nos, quemadmodum speravimus in te, dicit Glossa, hic insinuatur desiderium prophetae de incarnatione, et meritum impletionis. Ergo incarnatio cadit sub merito. | Objection 1: It would seem that the union of the Incarnation followed upon certain merits, because upon Ps. 32:22, "Let Thy mercy, o Lord, be upon us, as," etc. a gloss says: "Here the prophet's desire for the Incarnation and its merited fulfilment are hinted at." Therefore the Incarnation falls under merit. |
| Praeterea, quicumque meretur aliquid, meretur illud sine quo illud haberi non potest. Sed antiqui patres merebantur vitam aeternam, ad quam pervenire non poterant nisi per incarnationem, dicit enim Gregorius, in libro Moral., hi qui ante Christi adventum in hunc mundum venerunt, quantamlibet iustitiae virtutem haberent, ex corporibus educti in sinum caelestis patriae statim recipi nullo modo poterant, quia nondum ille venerat qui iustorum animas in perpetua sede collocaret. Ergo videtur quod meruerint incarnationem. | Objection 2: Further, whoever merits anything merits that without which it cannot be. But the ancient Fathers merited eternal life, to which they were able to attain only by the Incarnation; for Gregory says (Moral. xiii): "Those who came into this world before Christ's coming, whatsoever eminency of righteousness they may have had, could not, on being divested of the body, at once be admitted into the bosom of the heavenly country, seeing that He had not as yet come Who, by His own descending, should place the souls of the righteous in their everlasting seat." Therefore it would seem that they merited the Incarnation. |
| Praeterea, de beata virgine cantatur quod dominum omnium meruit portare, quod quidem factum est per incarnationem. Ergo incarnatio cadit sub merito. | Objection 3: Further, of the Blessed Virgin it is sung that "she merited to bear the Lord of all" [*Little Office of B. V. M., Dominican Rite, Ant. at Benedictus], and this took place through the Incarnation. Therefore the Incarnation falls under merit. |
| Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro de Praedest. sanctorum, quisquis in capite nostro praecedentia merita singularis illius generationis invenerit, ipse in nobis, membris eius, praecedentia merita multiplicatae regenerationis inquirat. Sed nulla merita praecesserunt regenerationem nostram secundum illud Tit. III, non ex operibus iustitiae quae fecimus nos, sed secundum suam misericordiam salvos nos fecit per lavacrum regenerationis. Ergo nec illam Christi generationem aliqua merita praecesserunt. | On the contrary, Augustine says (De Praed. Sanct. xv): "Whoever can find merits preceding the singular generation of our Head, may also find merits preceding the repeated regeneration of us His members." But no merits preceded our regeneration, according to Titus 3:5: "Not by the works of justice which we have done, but according to His mercy He saved us, by the laver of regeneration." Therefore no merits preceded the generation of Christ. |
| Respondeo dicendum quod, quantum ad ipsum Christum, manifestum est ex praemissis quod nulla eius merita potuerunt praecedere unionem. Non enim ponimus quod ante fuerit purus homo, et postea per meritum bonae vitae obtinuerit esse filius Dei, sicut posuit Photinus, sed ponimus quod a principio suae conceptionis ille homo vere fuerit filius Dei, utpote non habens aliam hypostasim quam filium Dei, secundum illud Luc. I, quod ex te nascetur sanctum, vocabitur filius Dei. Et ideo omnis operatio illius hominis subsecuta est unionem. Unde nulla eius operatio potuit esse meritum unionis. | I answer that, With regard to Christ Himself, it is clear from the above (Article [10]) that no merits of His could have preceded the union. For we do not hold that He was first of all a mere man, and that afterwards by the merits of a good life it was granted Him to become the Son of God, as Photinus held; but we hold that from the beginning of His conception this man was truly the Son of God, seeing that He had no other hypostasis but that of the Son of God, according to Luke 1:35: "The Holy which shall be born of thee shall be called the Son of God." And hence every operation of this man followed the union. Therefore no operation of His could have been meritorious of the union. |
| Sed neque etiam opera cuiuscumque alterius hominis potuerunt esse meritoria huius unionis ex condigno. Primo quidem, quia opera meritoria hominis proprie ordinantur ad beatitudinem, quae est virtutis praemium, et consistit in plena Dei fruitione. Unio autem incarnationis, cum sit in esse personali, transcendit unionem mentis beatae ad Deum, quae est per actum fruentis. Et ita non potest cadere sub merito. Secundo, quia gratia non potest cadere sub merito, quia est merendi principium. Unde multo minus incarnatio cadit sub merito, quae est principium gratiae, secundum illud Ioan. I, gratia et veritas per Iesum Christum facta est. Tertio, quia incarnatio Christi est reformativa totius humanae naturae. Et ideo non cadit sub merito alicuius hominis singularis, quia bonum alicuius puri hominis non potest esse causa boni totius naturae. Ex congruo tamen meruerunt sancti patres incarnationem, desiderando et petendo. Congruum enim erat ut Deus exaudiret eos qui ei obediebant. | Neither could the needs of any other man whatsoever have merited this union condignly: first, because the meritorious works of man are properly ordained to beatitude, which is the reward of virtue, and consists in the full enjoyment of God. Whereas the union of the Incarnation, inasmuch as it is in the personal being, transcends the union of the beatified mind with God, which is by the act of the soul in fruition; and therefore it cannot fall under merit. Secondly, because grace cannot fall under merit, for the principle of merit does not fall under merit; and therefore neither does grace, for it is the principle of merit. Hence, still less does the Incarnation fall under merit, since it is the principle of grace, according to Jn. 1:17: "Grace and truth came by Jesus Christ." Thirdly, because the Incarnation is for the reformation of the entire human nature, and therefore it does not fall under the merit of any individual man, since the goodness of a mere man cannot be the cause of the good of the entire nature. Yet the holy Fathers merited the Incarnation congruously by desiring and beseeching; for it was becoming that God should harken to those who obeyed Him. |
| Et per hoc patet responsio ad primum. | And thereby the reply to the First Objection is manifest. |
| Ad secundum dicendum hoc esse falsum, quod sub merito cadat omne illud sine quo praemium esse non potest. Quaedam enim sunt quae non solum requiruntur ad praemium, sed etiam praeexiguntur ad meritum, sicut divina bonitas et eius gratia, et ipsa hominis natura. Et similiter incarnationis mysterium est principium merendi, quia de plenitudine Christi omnes accepimus, ut dicitur Ioan. I. | Reply to Objection 2: It is false that under merit falls everything without which there can be no reward. For there is something pre-required not merely for reward, but also for merit, as the Divine goodness and grace and the very nature of man. And again, the mystery of the Incarnation is the principle of merit, because "of His fulness we all have received" (Jn. 1:16). |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod beata virgo dicitur meruisse portare dominum Iesum Christum, non quia meruit Deum incarnari, sed quia meruit, ex gratia sibi data, illum puritatis et sanctitatis gradum ut congrue posset esse mater Dei. | Reply to Objection 3: The Blessed Virgin is said to have merited to bear the Lord of all; not that she merited His Incarnation, but because by the grace bestowed upon her she merited that grade of purity and holiness, which fitted her to be the Mother of God. |
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| Ad duodecimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod gratia unionis non fuerit Christo homini naturalis. Unio enim incarnationis non est facta in natura, sed in persona, ut supra dictum est. Sed unumquodque denominatur a termino. Ergo gratia illa magis debet dici personalis quam naturalis. | Objection 1: It would seem that the grace of union was not natural to the man Christ. For the union of the Incarnation did not take place in the nature, but in the Person, as was said above (Article [2]). Now a thing is denominated from its terminus. Therefore this grace ought rather to be called personal than natural. |
| Praeterea, gratia dividitur contra naturam, sicut gratuita, quae sunt a Deo, distinguuntur contra naturalia, quae sunt a principio intrinseco. Sed eorum quae ex opposito dividuntur, unum non denominatur ab alio. Ergo gratia Christi non est ei naturalis. | Objection 2: Further, grace is divided against nature, even as gratuitous things, which are from God, are distinguished from natural things, which are from an intrinsic principle. But if things are divided in opposition to one another, one is not denominated by the other. Therefore the grace of Christ was not natural to Him. |
| Praeterea, naturale dicitur quod est secundum naturam. Sed gratia unionis non est naturalis Christo secundum naturam divinam, quia sic conveniret etiam aliis personis. Neque etiam naturalis est ei secundum naturam humanam, quia sic conveniret omnibus hominibus qui sunt eiusdem naturae cum ipso. Ergo videtur quod nullo modo gratia unionis sit Christo naturalis. | Objection 3: Further, natural is that which is according to nature. But the grace of union is not natural to Christ in regard to the Divine Nature, otherwise it would belong to the other Persons; nor is it natural to Him according to the human nature, otherwise it would belong to all men, since they are of the same nature as He. Therefore it would seem that the grace of union is nowise natural to Christ. |
| Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in Enchirid., in naturae humanae susceptione fit quodammodo ipsa gratia illi homini naturalis, qua nullum possit admittere peccatum. | On the contrary, Augustine says (Enchiridion xl): "In the assumption of human nature, grace itself became somewhat natural to that man, so as to leave no room for sin in Him." |
| Respondeo dicendum quod, secundum philosophum, in V Metaphys., natura uno modo dicitur ipsa nativitas, alio modo essentia rei. Unde naturale potest aliquid dici dupliciter. Uno modo, quod est tantum ex principiis essentialibus rei, sicut igni naturale est sursum ferri. Alio modo dicitur esse homini naturale quod ab ipsa nativitate habet, secundum illud Ephes. II, eramus natura filii irae; et Sap. XII, nequam est natio eorum, et naturalis malitia ipsorum. Gratia igitur Christi, sive unionis sive habitualis, non potest dici naturalis quasi causata ex principiis naturae humanae in ipso, quamvis possit dici naturalis quasi proveniens in naturam humanam Christi causante divina natura ipsius. Dicitur autem naturalis utraque gratia in Christo inquantum eam a nativitate habuit, quia ab initio conceptionis fuit natura humana divinae personae unita, et anima eius fuit munere gratiae repleta. | I answer that, According to the Philosopher (Metaph. v, 5), nature designates, in one way, nativity; in another, the essence of a thing. Hence natural may be taken in two ways: first, for what is only from the essential principles of a thing, as it is natural to fire to mount; secondly, we call natural to man what he has had from his birth, according to Eph. 2:3: "We were by nature children of wrath"; and Wis. 12:10: "They were a wicked generation, and their malice natural." Therefore the grace of Christ, whether of union or habitual, cannot be called natural as if caused by the principles of the human nature of Christ, although it may be called natural, as if coming to the human nature of Christ by the causality of His Divine Nature. But these two kinds of grace are said to be natural to Christ, inasmuch as He had them from His nativity, since from the beginning of His conception the human nature was united to the Divine Person, and His soul was filled with the gift of grace. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, licet unio non sit facta in natura, est tamen causata ex virtute divinae naturae, quae est vere natura Christi. Et etiam convenit Christo a principio nativitatis. | Reply to Objection 1: Although the union did not take place in the nature, yet it was caused by the power of the Divine Nature, which is truly the nature of Christ, and it, moreover, belonged to Christ from the beginning of His nativity. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod non secundum idem dicitur gratia, et naturalis. Sed gratia quidem dicitur inquantum non est ex merito, naturalis autem dicitur inquantum est ex virtute divinae naturae in humanitate Christi ab eius nativitate. | Reply to Objection 2: The union is not said to be grace and natural in the same respect; for it is called grace inasmuch as it is not from merit; and it is said to be natural inasmuch as by the power of the Divine Nature it was in the humanity of Christ from His nativity. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod gratia unionis non est naturalis Christo secundum humanam naturam, quasi ex principiis humanae naturae causata. Et ideo non oportet quod conveniat omnibus hominibus. Est tamen naturalis ei secundum humanam naturam, propter proprietatem nativitatis ipsius, prout sic conceptus est ex spiritu sancto ut esset idem naturalis filius Dei et hominis. Secundum vero divinam naturam est ei naturalis, inquantum divina natura est principium activum huius gratiae. Et hoc convenit toti Trinitati, scilicet huius gratiae esse activum principium. | Reply to Objection 3: The grace of union is not natural to Christ according to His human nature, as if it were caused by the principles of the human nature, and hence it need not belong to all men. Nevertheless, it is natural to Him in regard to the human nature on account of the "property" of His birth, seeing that He was conceived by the Holy Ghost, so that He might be the natural Son of God and of man. But it is natural to Him in regard to the Divine Nature, inasmuch as the Divine Nature is the active principle of this grace; and this belongs to the whole Trinity---to wit, to be the active principle of this grace. |