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| Cognito de aliquo an sit, inquirendum restat quomodo sit, ut sciatur de eo quid sit. Sed quia de Deo scire non possumus quid sit, sed quid non sit, non possumus considerare de Deo quomodo sit, sed potius quomodo non sit. | When the existence of a thing has been ascertained there remains the
further question of the manner of its existence, in order that we may
know its essence. Now, because we cannot know what God is, but rather
what He is not, we have no means for considering how God is, but rather
how He is not. |
| Primo ergo considerandum est quomodo non sit; secundo, quomodo a nobis cognoscatur; tertio, quomodo nominetur. | Therefore, we must consider: (1) How He is not; (2) How He is known by us; (3) How He is named. |
| Potest autem ostendi de Deo quomodo non sit, removendo ab eo ea quae ei non conveniunt, utpote compositionem, motum, et alia huiusmodi. Primo ergo inquiratur de simplicitate ipsius, per quam removetur ab eo compositio. Et quia simplicia in rebus corporalibus sunt imperfecta et partes, secundo inquiretur de perfectione ipsius; tertio, de infinitate eius; quarto, de immutabilitate; quinto, de unitate. | Now it can be shown how God is not, by denying Him whatever is opposed to the idea of Him, viz. composition, motion, and the like. Therefore (1)
we must discuss His simplicity, whereby we deny composition in Him; and
because whatever is simple in material things is imperfect and a part of
something else, we shall discuss (2) His perfection; (3) His infinity;
(4) His immutability; (5) His unity. |
| Circa primum quaeruntur octo. | Concerning His simplicity, there are eight points of inquiry: |
| Primo, utrum Deus sit corpus. | (1) Whether God is a body? |
| Secundo, utrum sit in eo compositio formae et materiae. | (2) Whether He is composed of matter and form? |
| Tertio, utrum sit in eo compositio quidditatis, sive essentiae, vel naturae, et subiecti. | (3) Whether in Him there is composition of quiddity, essence or nature, and subject? |
| Quarto, utrum sit in eo compositio quae est ex essentia et esse. | (4) Whether He is composed of essence and existence? |
| Quinto, utrum sit in eo compositio generis et differentiae. | (5) Whether He is composed of genus and difference? |
| Sexto, utrum sit in eo compositio subiecti et accidentis. | (6) Whether He is composed of subject and accident? |
| Septimo, utrum sit quocumque modo compositus, vel totaliter simplex. | (7) Whether He is in any way composite, or wholly simple? |
| Octavo, utrum veniat in compositionem cum aliis. | (8) Whether He enters into composition with other things? |
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| Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Deus sit corpus. Corpus enim est quod habet trinam dimensionem. Sed sacra Scriptura attribuit Deo trinam dimensionem, dicitur enim Iob XI, excelsior caelo est, et quid facies? Profundior Inferno, et unde cognosces? Longior terra mensura eius, et latior mari. Ergo Deus est corpus. | Objection 1: It seems that God is a body. For a body is that which has the three dimensions. But Holy Scripture attributes the three dimensions to
God, for it is written: "He is higher than Heaven, and what wilt thou do?
He is deeper than Hell, and how wilt thou know? The measure of Him is
longer than the earth and broader than the sea" (Job 11:8,9). Therefore
God is a body. |
| Praeterea, omne figuratum est corpus, cum figura sit qualitas circa quantitatem. Sed Deus videtur esse figuratus, cum scriptum sit Gen. I, faciamus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem nostram, figura enim imago dicitur, secundum illud Hebr. I, cum sit splendor gloriae, et figura substantiae eius, idest imago. Ergo Deus est corpus. | Objection 2: Further, everything that has figure is a body, since figure is a
quality of quantity. But God seems to have figure, for it is written:
"Let us make man to our image and likeness" (Gn. 1:26). Now a figure is
called an image, according to the text: "Who being the brightness of His
glory and the figure," i.e. the image, "of His substance" (Heb. 1:3).
Therefore God is a body. |
| Praeterea, omne quod habet partes corporeas, est corpus. Sed Scriptura attribuit Deo partes corporeas, dicitur enim Iob XL, si habes brachium ut Deus; et in Psalmo, oculi domini super iustos; et, dextera domini fecit virtutem. Ergo Deus est corpus. | Objection 3: Further, whatever has corporeal parts is a body. Now Scripture attributes corporeal parts to God. "Hast thou an arm like God?" (Job 40:4); and "The eyes of the Lord are upon the just" (Ps. 33:16); and "The
right hand of the Lord hath wrought strength" (Ps. 117:16). Therefore God
is a body. |
| Praeterea, situs non convenit nisi corpori. Sed ea quae ad situm pertinent, in Scripturis dicuntur de Deo, dicitur enim Isaiae VI, vidi dominum sedentem; et Isaiae III, stat ad iudicandum dominus. Ergo Deus est corpus. | Objection 4: Further, posture belongs only to bodies. But something which supposes posture is said of God in the Scriptures: "I saw the Lord sitting" (Is. 6:1), and "He standeth up to judge" (Is. 3:13). Therefore God is a body. |
| Praeterea, nihil potest esse terminus localis a quo vel ad quem, nisi sit corpus vel aliquod corporeum. Sed Deus in Scriptura dicitur esse terminus localis ut ad quem, secundum illud Psalmi, accedite ad eum, et illuminamini; et ut a quo, secundum illud Hierem. XVII, recedentes a te in terra scribentur. Ergo Deus est corpus. | Objection 5: Further, only bodies or things corporeal can be a local term "wherefrom" or "whereto." But in the Scriptures God is spoken of as a
local term "whereto," according to the words, "Come ye to Him and be
enlightened" (Ps. 33:6), and as a term "wherefrom": "All they that depart
from Thee shall be written in the earth" (Jer. 17:13). Therefore God is a
body. |
| Sed contra est quod dicitur Ioan. IV, spiritus est Deus. | On the contrary, It is written in the Gospel of St. John (Jn. 4:24):
"God is a spirit." |
| Respondeo dicendum absolute Deum non esse corpus. Quod tripliciter ostendi potest. Primo quidem, quia nullum corpus movet non motum, ut patet inducendo per singula. Ostensum est autem supra quod Deus est primum movens immobile. Unde manifestum est quod Deus non est corpus. Secundo, quia necesse est id quod est primum ens, esse in actu, et nullo modo in potentia. Licet enim in uno et eodem quod exit de potentia in actum, prius sit potentia quam actus tempore, simpliciter tamen actus prior est potentia, quia quod est in potentia, non reducitur in actum nisi per ens actu. Ostensum est autem supra quod Deus est primum ens. Impossibile est igitur quod in Deo sit aliquid in potentia. Omne autem corpus est in potentia, quia continuum, inquantum huiusmodi, divisibile est in infinitum. Impossibile est igitur Deum esse corpus. Tertio, quia Deus est id quod est nobilissimum in entibus, ut ex dictis patet. Impossibile est autem aliquod corpus esse nobilissimum in entibus. Quia corpus aut est vivum, aut non vivum. Corpus autem vivum, manifestum est quod est nobilius corpore non vivo. Corpus autem vivum non vivit inquantum corpus, quia sic omne corpus viveret, oportet igitur quod vivat per aliquid aliud, sicut corpus nostrum vivit per animam. Illud autem per quod vivit corpus, est nobilius quam corpus. Impossibile est igitur Deum esse corpus. | I answer that, It is absolutely true that God is not a body; and this
can be shown in three ways. First, because no body is in motion unless it
be put in motion, as is evident from induction. Now it has been already
proved (Question [2], Article [3]), that God is the First Mover, and is Himself unmoved.
Therefore it is clear that God is not a body. Secondly, because the first
being must of necessity be in act, and in no way in potentiality. For
although in any single thing that passes from potentiality to actuality,
the potentiality is prior in time to the actuality; nevertheless,
absolutely speaking, actuality is prior to potentiality; for whatever is
in potentiality can be reduced into actuality only by some being in
actuality. Now it has been already proved that God is the First Being. It
is therefore impossible that in God there should be any potentiality. But
every body is in potentiality because the continuous, as such, is
divisible to infinity; it is therefore impossible that God should be a
body. Thirdly, because God is the most noble of beings. Now it is
impossible for a body to be the most noble of beings; for a body must be
either animate or inanimate; and an animate body is manifestly nobler
than any inanimate body. But an animate body is not animate precisely as
body; otherwise all bodies would be animate. Therefore its animation
depends upon some other thing, as our body depends for its animation on
the soul. Hence that by which a body becomes animated must be nobler than
the body. Therefore it is impossible that God should be a body. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, sacra Scriptura tradit nobis spiritualia et divina sub similitudinibus corporalium. Unde, cum trinam dimensionem Deo attribuit, sub similitudine quantitatis corporeae, quantitatem virtualem ipsius designat, utpote per profunditatem, virtutem ad cognoscendum occulta; per altitudinem, excellentiam virtutis super omnia; per longitudinem, durationem sui esse; per latitudinem, affectum dilectionis ad omnia. Vel, ut dicit Dionysius, cap. IX de Div. Nom., per profunditatem Dei intelligitur incomprehensibilitas ipsius essentiae; per longitudinem, processus virtutis eius, omnia penetrantis; per latitudinem vero, superextensio eius ad omnia, inquantum scilicet sub eius protectione omnia continentur. | Reply to Objection 1: As we have said above (Question [1], Article [9]), Holy Writ puts before
us spiritual and divine things under the comparison of corporeal things.
Hence, when it attributes to God the three dimensions under the
comparison of corporeal quantity, it implies His virtual quantity; thus,
by depth, it signifies His power of knowing hidden things; by height, the
transcendence of His excelling power; by length, the duration of His
existence; by breadth, His act of love for all. Or, as says Dionysius
(Div. Nom. ix), by the depth of God is meant the incomprehensibility of
His essence; by length, the procession of His all-pervading power; by
breadth, His overspreading all things, inasmuch as all things lie under
His protection. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod homo dicitur esse ad imaginem Dei, non secundum corpus, sed secundum id quo homo excellit alia animalia, unde, Gen. I, postquam dictum est, faciamus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem nostram, subditur, ut praesit piscibus maris, et cetera. Excellit autem homo omnia animalia quantum ad rationem et intellectum. Unde secundum intellectum et rationem, quae sunt incorporea, homo est ad imaginem Dei. | Reply to Objection 2: Man is said to be after the image of God, not as regards
his body, but as regards that whereby he excels other animals. Hence,
when it is said, "Let us make man to our image and likeness", it is
added, "And let him have dominion over the fishes of the sea" (Gn. 1:26). Now man excels all animals by his reason and intelligence; hence
it is according to his intelligence and reason, which are incorporeal,
that man is said to be according to the image of God. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod partes corporeae attribuuntur Deo in Scripturis ratione suorum actuum, secundum quandam similitudinem. Sicut actus oculi est videre, unde oculus de Deo dictus, significat virtutem eius ad videndum modo intelligibili, non sensibili. Et simile est de aliis partibus. | Reply to Objection 3: Corporeal parts are attributed to God in Scripture on
account of His actions, and this is owing to a certain parallel. For
instance the act of the eye is to see; hence the eye attributed to God
signifies His power of seeing intellectually, not sensibly; and so on
with the other parts. |
| Ad quartum dicendum quod etiam ea quae ad situm pertinent, non attribuuntur Deo nisi secundum quandam similitudinem, sicut dicitur sedens, propter suam immobilitatem et auctoritatem; et stans, propter suam fortitudinem ad debellandum omne quod adversatur. | Reply to Objection 4: Whatever pertains to posture, also, is only attributed to
God by some sort of parallel. He is spoken of as sitting, on account of
His unchangeableness and dominion; and as standing, on account of His
power of overcoming whatever withstands Him. |
| Ad quintum dicendum quod ad Deum non acceditur passibus corporalibus, cum ubique sit, sed affectibus mentis, et eodem modo ab eo receditur. Et sic accessus et recessus, sub similitudine localis motus, designant spiritualem affectum. | Reply to Objection 5: We draw near to God by no corporeal steps, since He is everywhere, but by the affections of our soul, and by the actions of that
same soul do we withdraw from Him; thus, to draw near to or to withdraw
signifies merely spiritual actions based on the metaphor of local motion. |
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| Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod in Deo sit compositio formae et materiae. Omne enim quod habet animam, est compositum ex materia et forma, quia anima est forma corporis. Sed Scriptura attribuit animam Deo, introducitur enim ad Hebr. X, ex persona Dei, iustus autem meus ex fide vivit; quod si subtraxerit se, non placebit animae meae. Ergo Deus est compositus ex materia et forma. | Objection 1: It seems that God is composed of matter and form. For whatever
has a soul is composed of matter and form; since the soul is the form of
the body. But Scripture attributes a soul to God; for it is mentioned in
Hebrews (Heb. 10:38), where God says: "But My just man liveth by faith;
but if he withdraw himself, he shall not please My soul." Therefore God
is composed of matter and form. |
| Praeterea, ira, gaudium, et huiusmodi, sunt passiones coniuncti, ut dicitur I de anima. Sed huiusmodi attribuuntur Deo in Scriptura dicitur enim in Psalmo, iratus est furore dominus in populum suum. Ergo Deus ex materia et forma est compositus. | Objection 2: Further, anger, joy and the like are passions of the composite.
But these are attributed to God in Scripture: "The Lord was exceeding
angry with His people" (Ps. 105:40). Therefore God is composed of matter
and form. |
| Praeterea, materia est principium individuationis. Sed Deus videtur esse individuum, non enim de multis praedicatur. Ergo est compositus ex materia et forma. | Objection 3: Further, matter is the principle of individualization. But God
seems to be individual, for He cannot be predicated of many. Therefore He
is composed of matter and form. |
| Sed contra, omne compositum ex materia et forma est corpus, quantitas enim dimensiva est quae primo inhaeret materiae. Sed Deus non est corpus, ut ostensum est. Ergo Deus non est compositus ex materia et forma. | On the contrary, Whatever is composed of matter and form is a body; for
dimensive quantity is the first property of matter. But God is not a body
as proved in the preceding Article; therefore He is not composed of
matter and form. |
| Respondeo dicendum quod impossibile est in Deo esse materiam. Primo quidem, quia materia est id quod est in potentia. Ostensum est autem quod Deus est purus actus, non habens aliquid de potentialitate. Unde impossibile est quod Deus sit compositus ex materia et forma. Secundo, quia omne compositum ex materia et forma est perfectum et bonum per suam formam, unde oportet quod sit bonum per participationem, secundum quod materia participat formam. Primum autem quod est bonum et optimum, quod Deus est, non est bonum per participationem, quia bonum per essentiam, prius est bono per participationem. Unde impossibile est quod Deus sit compositus ex materia et forma. Tertio, quia unumquodque agens agit per suam formam, unde secundum quod aliquid se habet ad suam formam, sic se habet ad hoc quod sit agens. Quod igitur primum est et per se agens, oportet quod sit primo et per se forma. Deus autem est primum agens, cum sit prima causa efficiens, ut ostensum est. Est igitur per essentiam suam forma; et non compositus ex materia et forma. | I answer that, It is impossible that matter should exist in God. First,
because matter is in potentiality. But we have shown (Question [2], Article [3]) that
God is pure act, without any potentiality. Hence it is impossible that
God should be composed of matter and form. Secondly, because everything
composed of matter and form owes its perfection and goodness to its form;
therefore its goodness is participated, inasmuch as matter participates
the form. Now the first good and the best—viz. God—is not a
participated good, because the essential good is prior to the
participated good. Hence it is impossible that God should be composed of
matter and form. Thirdly, because every agent acts by its form; hence the
manner in which it has its form is the manner in which it is an agent.
Therefore whatever is primarily and essentially an agent must be
primarily and essentially form. Now God is the first agent, since He is
the first efficient cause. He is therefore of His essence a form; and not
composed of matter and form. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod anima attribuitur Deo per similitudinem actus. Quod enim volumus aliquid nobis, ex anima nostra est, unde illud dicitur esse placitum animae Dei, quod est placitum voluntati ipsius. | Reply to Objection 1: A soul is attributed to God because His acts resemble the
acts of a soul; for, that we will anything, is due to our soul. Hence
what is pleasing to His will is said to be pleasing to His soul. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod ira et huiusmodi attribuuntur Deo secundum similitudinem effectus, quia enim proprium est irati punire, ira eius punitio metaphorice vocatur. | Reply to Objection 2: Anger and the like are attributed to God on account of a
similitude of effect. Thus, because to punish is properly the act of an
angry man, God's punishment is metaphorically spoken of as His anger. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod formae quae sunt receptibiles in materia individuantur per materiam, quae non potest esse in alio, cum sit primum subiectum substans, forma vero, quantum est de se, nisi aliquid aliud impediat, recipi potest a pluribus. Sed illa forma quae non est receptibilis in materia, sed est per se subsistens, ex hoc ipso individuatur, quod non potest recipi in alio, et huiusmodi forma est Deus. Unde non sequitur quod habeat materiam. | Reply to Objection 3: Forms which can be received in matter are individualized by
matter, which cannot be in another as in a subject since it is the first
underlying subject; although form of itself, unless something else
prevents it, can be received by many. But that form which cannot be
received in matter, but is self-subsisting, is individualized precisely
because it cannot be received in a subject; and such a form is God. Hence
it does not follow that matter exists in God. |
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| Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod non sit idem Deus quod sua essentia vel natura. Nihil enim est in seipso. Sed essentia vel natura Dei, quae est deitas, dicitur esse in Deo. Ergo videtur quod Deus non sit idem quod sua essentia vel natura. | Objection 1: It seems that God is not the same as His essence or nature. For
nothing can be in itself. But the substance or nature of God—i.e. the
Godhead—is said to be in God. Therefore it seems that God is not the
same as His essence or nature. |
| Praeterea, effectus assimilatur suae causae, quia omne agens agit sibi simile. Sed in rebus creatis non est idem suppositum quod sua natura, non enim idem est homo quod sua humanitas. Ergo nec Deus est idem quod sua deitas. | Objection 2: Further, the effect is assimilated to its cause; for every agent
produces its like. But in created things the "suppositum" is not
identical with its nature; for a man is not the same as his humanity.
Therefore God is not the same as His Godhead. |
| Contra, de Deo dicitur quod est vita, et non solum quod est vivens, ut patet Ioan. XIV, ego sum via, veritas et vita. Sicut autem se habet vita ad viventem, ita deitas ad Deum. Ergo Deus est ipsa deitas. | On the contrary, It is said of God that He is life itself, and not only that He is a living thing: "I am the way, the truth, and the life" (Jn. 14:6). Now the relation between Godhead and God is the same as the
relation between life and a living thing. Therefore God is His very
Godhead. |
| Respondeo dicendum quod Deus est idem quod sua essentia vel natura. Ad cuius intellectum sciendum est, quod in rebus compositis ex materia et forma, necesse est quod differant natura vel essentia et suppositum. Quia essentia vel natura comprehendit in se illa tantum quae cadunt in definitione speciei, sicut humanitas comprehendit in se ea quae cadunt in definitione hominis, his enim homo est homo, et hoc significat humanitas, hoc scilicet quo homo est homo. Sed materia individualis, cum accidentibus omnibus individuantibus ipsam, non cadit in definitione speciei, non enim cadunt in definitione hominis hae carnes et haec ossa, aut albedo vel nigredo, vel aliquid huiusmodi. Unde hae carnes et haec ossa, et accidentia designantia hanc materiam, non concluduntur in humanitate. Et tamen in eo quod est homo, includuntur, unde id quod est homo, habet in se aliquid quod non habet humanitas. Et propter hoc non est totaliter idem homo et humanitas, sed humanitas significatur ut pars formalis hominis; quia principia definientia habent se formaliter, respectu materiae individuantis. In his igitur quae non sunt composita ex materia et forma, in quibus individuatio non est per materiam individualem, idest per hanc materiam, sed ipsae formae per se individuantur, oportet quod ipsae formae sint supposita subsistentia. Unde in eis non differt suppositum et natura. Et sic, cum Deus non sit compositus ex materia et forma, ut ostensum est, oportet quod Deus sit sua deitas, sua vita, et quidquid aliud sic de Deo praedicatur. | I answer that, God is the same as His essence or nature. To understand
this, it must be noted that in things composed of matter and form, the
nature or essence must differ from the "suppositum," because the essence
or nature connotes only what is included in the definition of the
species; as, humanity connotes all that is included in the definition of
man, for it is by this that man is man, and it is this that humanity
signifies, that, namely, whereby man is man. Now individual matter, with
all the individualizing accidents, is not included in the definition of
the species. For this particular flesh, these bones, this blackness or
whiteness, etc., are not included in the definition of a man. Therefore
this flesh, these bones, and the accidental qualities distinguishing this
particular matter, are not included in humanity; and yet they are
included in the thing which is man. Hence the thing which is a man has
something more in it than has humanity. Consequently humanity and a man
are not wholly identical; but humanity is taken to mean the formal part
of a man, because the principles whereby a thing is defined are regarded
as the formal constituent in regard to the individualizing matter. On the
other hand, in things not composed of matter and form, in which
individualization is not due to individual matter—that is to say, to
"this" matter—the very forms being individualized of themselves—it is
necessary the forms themselves should be subsisting "supposita."
Therefore "suppositum" and nature in them are identified. Since God then
is not composed of matter and form, He must be His own Godhead, His own
Life, and whatever else is thus predicated of Him. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod de rebus simplicibus loqui non possumus, nisi per modum compositorum, a quibus cognitionem accipimus. Et ideo, de Deo loquentes, utimur nominibus concretis, ut significemus eius subsistentiam, quia apud nos non subsistunt nisi composita, et utimur nominibus abstractis, ut significemus eius simplicitatem. Quod ergo dicitur deitas vel vita, vel aliquid huiusmodi, esse in Deo, referendum est ad diversitatem quae est in acceptione intellectus nostri; et non ad aliquam diversitatem rei. | Reply to Objection 1: We can speak of simple things only as though they were like
the composite things from which we derive our knowledge. Therefore in
speaking of God, we use concrete nouns to signify His subsistence,
because with us only those things subsist which are composite; and we use
abstract nouns to signify His simplicity. In saying therefore that
Godhead, or life, or the like are in God, we indicate the composite way
in which our intellect understands, but not that there is any composition
in God. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod effectus Dei imitantur ipsum, non perfecte, sed secundum quod possunt. Et hoc ad defectum imitationis pertinet, quod id quod est simplex et unum, non potest repraesentari nisi per multa, et sic accidit in eis compositio, ex qua provenit quod in eis non est idem suppositum quod natura. | Reply to Objection 2: The effects of God do not imitate Him perfectly, but only
as far as they are able; and the imitation is here defective, precisely
because what is simple and one, can only be represented by divers things;
consequently, composition is accidental to them, and therefore, in them
"suppositum" is not the same as nature. |
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| Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod in Deo non sit idem essentia et esse. Si enim hoc sit, tunc ad esse divinum nihil additur. Sed esse cui nulla fit additio, est esse commune quod de omnibus praedicatur, sequitur ergo quod Deus sit ens commune praedicabile de omnibus. Hoc autem est falsum, secundum illud Sap. XIV, incommunicabile nomen lignis et lapidibus imposuerunt. Ergo esse Dei non est eius essentia. | Objection 1: It seems that essence and existence are not the same in God. For
if it be so, then the divine being has nothing added to it. Now being to
which no addition is made is universal being which is predicated of all
things. Therefore it follows that God is being in general which can be
predicated of everything. But this is false: "For men gave the
incommunicable name to stones and wood" (Wis. 14:21). Therefore God's
existence is not His essence. |
| Praeterea, de Deo scire possumus an sit, ut supra dictum est. Non autem possumus scire quid sit. Ergo non est idem esse Dei, et quod quid est eius, sive quidditas vel natura. | Objection 2: Further, we can know "whether" God exists as said above (Question [2], Article [2]); but we cannot know "what" He is. Therefore God's existence is not
the same as His essence—that is, as His quiddity or nature. |
| Sed contra est quod Hilarius dicit in VII de Trin., esse non est accidens in Deo, sed subsistens veritas. Id ergo quod subsistit in Deo, est suum esse. | On the contrary, Hilary says (Trin. vii): "In God existence is not an
accidental quality, but subsisting truth." Therefore what subsists in God
is His existence. |
| Respondeo dicendum quod Deus non solum est sua essentia, ut ostensum est, sed etiam suum esse. Quod quidem multipliciter ostendi potest. Primo quidem, quia quidquid est in aliquo quod est praeter essentiam eius, oportet esse causatum vel a principiis essentiae, sicut accidentia propria consequentia speciem, ut risibile consequitur hominem et causatur ex principiis essentialibus speciei; vel ab aliquo exteriori, sicut calor in aqua causatur ab igne. Si igitur ipsum esse rei sit aliud ab eius essentia, necesse est quod esse illius rei vel sit causatum ab aliquo exteriori, vel a principiis essentialibus eiusdem rei. Impossibile est autem quod esse sit causatum tantum ex principiis essentialibus rei, quia nulla res sufficit quod sit sibi causa essendi, si habeat esse causatum. Oportet ergo quod illud cuius esse est aliud ab essentia sua, habeat esse causatum ab alio. Hoc autem non potest dici de Deo, quia Deum dicimus esse primam causam efficientem. Impossibile est ergo quod in Deo sit aliud esse, et aliud eius essentia. Secundo, quia esse est actualitas omnis formae vel naturae, non enim bonitas vel humanitas significatur in actu, nisi prout significamus eam esse. Oportet igitur quod ipsum esse comparetur ad essentiam quae est aliud ab ipso, sicut actus ad potentiam. Cum igitur in Deo nihil sit potentiale, ut ostensum est supra, sequitur quod non sit aliud in eo essentia quam suum esse. Sua igitur essentia est suum esse. Tertio, quia sicut illud quod habet ignem et non est ignis, est ignitum per participationem, ita illud quod habet esse et non est esse, est ens per participationem. Deus autem est sua essentia, ut ostensum est. Si igitur non sit suum esse, erit ens per participationem, et non per essentiam. Non ergo erit primum ens, quod absurdum est dicere. Est igitur Deus suum esse, et non solum sua essentia. | I answer that, God is not only His own essence, as shown in the
preceding article, but also His own existence. This may be shown in
several ways. First, whatever a thing has besides its essence must be
caused either by the constituent principles of that essence (like a
property that necessarily accompanies the species—as the faculty of
laughing is proper to a man—and is caused by the constituent principles
of the species), or by some exterior agent—as heat is caused in water
by fire. Therefore, if the existence of a thing differs from its essence,
this existence must be caused either by some exterior agent or by its
essential principles. Now it is impossible for a thing's existence to be
caused by its essential constituent principles, for nothing can be the
sufficient cause of its own existence, if its existence is caused.
Therefore that thing, whose existence differs from its essence, must have
its existence caused by another. But this cannot be true of God; because
we call God the first efficient cause. Therefore it is impossible that in
God His existence should differ from His essence. Secondly, existence is
that which makes every form or nature actual; for goodness and humanity
are spoken of as actual, only because they are spoken of as existing.
Therefore existence must be compared to essence, if the latter is a
distinct reality, as actuality to potentiality. Therefore, since in God
there is no potentiality, as shown above (Article [1]), it follows that in Him
essence does not differ from existence. Therefore His essence is His
existence. Thirdly, because, just as that which has fire, but is not
itself fire, is on fire by participation; so that which has existence but
is not existence, is a being by participation. But God is His own
essence, as shown above (Article [3]) if, therefore, He is not His own existence
He will be not essential, but participated being. He will not therefore
be the first being—which is absurd. Therefore God is His own existence,
and not merely His own essence. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod aliquid cui non fit additio potest intelligi dupliciter. Uno modo, ut de ratione eius sit quod non fiat ei additio; sicut de ratione animalis irrationalis est, ut sit sine ratione. Alio modo intelligitur aliquid cui non fit additio, quia non est de ratione eius quod sibi fiat additio, sicut animal commune est sine ratione, quia non est de ratione animalis communis ut habeat rationem; sed nec de ratione eius est ut careat ratione. Primo igitur modo, esse sine additione, est esse divinum, secundo modo, esse sine additione, est esse commune. | Reply to Objection 1: A thing that has nothing added to it can be of two kinds.
Either its essence precludes any addition; thus, for example, it is of
the essence of an irrational animal to be without reason. Or we may
understand a thing to have nothing added to it, inasmuch as its essence
does not require that anything should be added to it; thus the genus
animal is without reason, because it is not of the essence of animal in
general to have reason; but neither is it to lack reason. And so the
divine being has nothing added to it in the first sense; whereas
universal being has nothing added to it in the second sense. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod esse dupliciter dicitur, uno modo, significat actum essendi; alio modo, significat compositionem propositionis, quam anima adinvenit coniungens praedicatum subiecto. Primo igitur modo accipiendo esse, non possumus scire esse Dei, sicut nec eius essentiam, sed solum secundo modo. Scimus enim quod haec propositio quam formamus de Deo, cum dicimus Deus est, vera est. Et hoc scimus ex eius effectibus, ut supra dictum est. | Reply to Objection 2: "To be" can mean either of two things. It may mean the act
of essence, or it may mean the composition of a proposition effected by
the mind in joining a predicate to a subject. Taking "to be" in the first
sense, we cannot understand God's existence nor His essence; but only in
the second sense. We know that this proposition which we form about God
when we say "God is," is true; and this we know from His effects (Question [2], Article [2]).
|
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| Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Deus sit in genere aliquo. Substantia enim est ens per se subsistens. Hoc autem maxime convenit Deo. Ergo Deus est in genere substantiae. | Objection 1: It seems that God is contained in a genus. For a substance is a
being that subsists of itself. But this is especially true of God.
Therefore God is in a genus of substance. |
| Praeterea, unumquodque mensuratur per aliquid sui generis; sicut longitudines per longitudinem, et numeri per numerum. Sed Deus est mensura omnium substantiarum, ut patet per Commentatorem, X Metaphys. Ergo Deus est in genere substantiae. | Objection 2: Further, nothing can be measured save by something of its own
genus; as length is measured by length and numbers by number. But God is
the measure of all substances, as the Commentator shows (Metaph. x).
Therefore God is in the genus of substance. |
| Sed contra, genus est prius, secundum intellectum, eo quod in genere continetur. Sed nihil est prius Deo, nec secundum rem, nec secundum intellectum. Ergo Deus non est in aliquo genere. | On the contrary, In the mind, genus is prior to what it contains. But
nothing is prior to God either really or mentally. Therefore God is not
in any genus. |
| Respondeo dicendum quod aliquid est in genere dupliciter. Uno modo simpliciter et proprie; sicut species, quae sub genere continentur. Alio modo, per reductionem, sicut principia et privationes, sicut punctus et unitas reducuntur ad genus quantitatis, sicut principia; caecitas autem, et omnis privatio, reducitur ad genus sui habitus. Neutro autem modo Deus est in genere. Quod enim non possit esse species alicuius generis, tripliciter ostendi potest. Primo quidem, quia species constituitur ex genere et differentia. Semper autem id a quo sumitur differentia constituens speciem, se habet ad illud unde sumitur genus, sicut actus ad potentiam. Animal enim sumitur a natura sensitiva per modum concretionis; hoc enim dicitur animal, quod naturam sensitivam habet, rationale vero sumitur a natura intellectiva, quia rationale est quod naturam intellectivam habet, intellectivum autem comparatur ad sensitivum, sicut actus ad potentiam. Et similiter manifestum est in aliis. Unde, cum in Deo non adiungatur potentia actui, impossibile est quod sit in genere tanquam species. Secundo, quia, cum esse Dei sit eius essentia, ut ostensum est, si Deus esset in aliquo genere, oporteret quod genus eius esset ens, nam genus significat essentiam rei, cum praedicetur in eo quod quid est. Ostendit autem philosophus in III Metaphys., quod ens non potest esse genus alicuius, omne enim genus habet differentias quae sunt extra essentiam generis; nulla autem differentia posset inveniri, quae esset extra ens; quia non ens non potest esse differentia. Unde relinquitur quod Deus non sit in genere. Tertio, quia omnia quae sunt in genere uno, communicant in quidditate vel essentia generis, quod praedicatur de eis in eo quod quid est. Differunt autem secundum esse, non enim idem est esse hominis et equi, nec huius hominis et illius hominis. Et sic oportet quod quaecumque sunt in genere, differant in eis esse et quod quid est, idest essentia. In Deo autem non differt, ut ostensum est. Unde manifestum est quod Deus non est in genere sicut species. Et ex hoc patet quod non habet genus, neque differentias; neque est definitio ipsius; neque demonstratio, nisi per effectum, quia definitio est ex genere et differentia, demonstrationis autem medium est definitio. Quod autem Deus non sit in genere per reductionem ut principium, manifestum est ex eo quod principium quod reducitur in aliquod genus, non se extendit ultra genus illud, sicut punctum non est principium nisi quantitatis continuae, et unitas quantitatis discretae. Deus autem est principium totius esse, ut infra ostendetur. Unde non continetur in aliquo genere sicut principium. | I answer that, A thing can be in a genus in two ways; either absolutely
and properly, as a species contained under a genus; or as being reducible
to it, as principles and privations. For example, a point and unity are
reduced to the genus of quantity, as its principles; while blindness and
all other privations are reduced to the genus of habit. But in neither
way is God in a genus. That He cannot be a species of any genus may be
shown in three ways. First, because a species is constituted of genus and
difference. Now that from which the difference constituting the species
is derived, is always related to that from which the genus is derived, as
actuality is related to potentiality. For animal is derived from
sensitive nature, by concretion as it were, for that is animal, which has
a sensitive nature. Rational being, on the other hand, is derived from
intellectual nature, because that is rational, which has an intellectual
nature, and intelligence is compared to sense, as actuality is to
potentiality. The same argument holds good in other things. Hence since
in God actuality is not added to potentiality, it is impossible that He
should be in any genus as a species. Secondly, since the existence of God
is His essence, if God were in any genus, He would be the genus "being",
because, since genus is predicated as an essential it refers to the
essence of a thing. But the Philosopher has shown (Metaph. iii) that
being cannot be a genus, for every genus has differences distinct from
its generic essence. Now no difference can exist distinct from being; for
non-being cannot be a difference. It follows then that God is not in a
genus. Thirdly, because all in one genus agree in the quiddity or essence
of the genus which is predicated of them as an essential, but they differ
in their existence. For the existence of man and of horse is not the
same; as also of this man and that man: thus in every member of a genus,
existence and quiddity—i.e. essence—must differ. But in God they do
not differ, as shown in the preceding article. Therefore it is plain that
God is not in a genus as if He were a species. From this it is also plain
that He has no genus nor difference, nor can there be any definition of
Him; nor, save through His effects, a demonstration of Him: for a
definition is from genus and difference; and the mean of a demonstration
is a definition. That God is not in a genus, as reducible to it as its
principle, is clear from this, that a principle reducible to any genus
does not extend beyond that genus; as, a point is the principle of
continuous quantity alone; and unity, of discontinuous quantity. But God
is the principle of all being. Therefore He is not contained in any genus
as its principle. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod substantiae nomen non significat hoc solum quod est per se esse, quia hoc quod est esse, non potest per se esse genus, ut ostensum est. Sed significat essentiam cui competit sic esse, idest per se esse, quod tamen esse non est ipsa eius essentia. Et sic patet quod Deus non est in genere substantiae. | Reply to Objection 1: The word substance signifies not only what exists of itself—for existence cannot of itself be a genus, as shown in the body
of the article; but, it also signifies an essence that has the property
of existing in this way—namely, of existing of itself; this existence,
however, is not its essence. Thus it is clear that God is not in the
genus of substance. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod obiectio illa procedit de mensura proportionata, hanc enim oportet esse homogeneam mensurato. Deus autem non est mensura proportionata alicui. Dicitur tamen mensura omnium, ex eo quod unumquodque tantum habet de esse, quantum ei appropinquat. | Reply to Objection 2: This objection turns upon proportionate measure which must
be homogeneous with what is measured. Now, God is not a measure
proportionate to anything. Still, He is called the measure of all things,
in the sense that everything has being only according as it resembles Him. |
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| Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod in Deo sint aliqua accidentia. Substantia enim nulli est accidens, ut dicitur in I Physic. Quod ergo in uno est accidens, non potest in alio esse substantia, sicut probatur quod calor non sit forma substantialis ignis, quia in aliis est accidens. Sed sapientia, virtus, et huiusmodi, quae in nobis sunt accidentia, Deo attribuuntur. Ergo et in Deo sunt accidentia. | Objection 1: It seems that there are accidents in God. For substance cannot be
an accident, as Aristotle says (Phys. i). Therefore that which is an
accident in one, cannot, in another, be a substance. Thus it is proved
that heat cannot be the substantial form of fire, because it is an
accident in other things. But wisdom, virtue, and the like, which are
accidents in us, are attributes of God. Therefore in God there are
accidents. |
| Praeterea, in quolibet genere est unum primum. Multa autem sunt genera accidentium. Si igitur prima illorum generum non sunt in Deo, erunt multa prima extra Deum, quod est inconveniens. | Objection 2: Further, in every genus there is a first principle. But there are
many "genera" of accidents. If, therefore, the primal members of these
genera are not in God, there will be many primal beings other than
God—which is absurd. |
| Sed contra, omne accidens in subiecto est. Deus autem non potest esse subiectum, quia forma simplex non potest esse subiectum, ut dicit Boetius in Lib. de Trin. Ergo in Deo non potest esse accidens. | On the contrary, Every accident is in a subject. But God cannot be a
subject, for "no simple form can be a subject", as Boethius says (De
Trin.). Therefore in God there cannot be any accident. |
| Respondeo dicendum quod, secundum praemissa, manifeste apparet quod in Deo accidens esse non potest. Primo quidem, quia subiectum comparatur ad accidens, sicut potentia ad actum, subiectum enim secundum accidens est aliquo modo in actu. Esse autem in potentia, omnino removetur a Deo, ut ex praedictis patet. Secundo, quia Deus est suum esse, et, ut Boetius dicit in Lib. de Hebdomad., licet id quod est, aliquid aliud possit habere adiunctum, tamen ipsum esse nihil aliud adiunctum habere potest, sicut quod est calidum, potest habere aliquid extraneum quam calidum, ut albedinem; sed ipse calor nihil habet praeter calorem. Tertio, quia omne quod est per se, prius est eo quod est per accidens. Unde, cum Deus sit simpliciter primum ens, in eo non potest esse aliquid per accidens. Sed nec accidentia per se in eo esse possunt, sicut risibile est per se accidens hominis. Quia huiusmodi accidentia causantur ex principiis subiecti, in Deo autem nihil potest esse causatum, cum sit causa prima. Unde relinquitur quod in Deo nullum sit accidens. | I answer that, From all we have said, it is clear there can be no
accident in God. First, because a subject is compared to its accidents as
potentiality to actuality; for a subject is in some sense made actual by
its accidents. But there can be no potentiality in God, as was shown
(Question [2], Article [3]). Secondly, because God is His own existence; and as Boethius
says (Hebdom.), although every essence may have something superadded to
it, this cannot apply to absolute being: thus a heated substance can have
something extraneous to heat added to it, as whiteness, nevertheless
absolute heat can have nothing else than heat. Thirdly, because what is
essential is prior to what is accidental. Whence as God is absolute
primal being, there can be in Him nothing accidental. Neither can He have
any essential accidents (as the capability of laughing is an essential
accident of man), because such accidents are caused by the constituent
principles of the subject. Now there can be nothing caused in God, since
He is the first cause. Hence it follows that there is no accident in God. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod virtus et sapientia non univoce dicuntur de Deo et de nobis, ut infra patebit. Unde non sequitur quod accidentia sint in Deo, sicut in nobis. | Reply to Objection 1: Virtue and wisdom are not predicated of God and of us
univocally. Hence it does not follow that there are accidents in God as
there are in us. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod, cum substantia sit prior accidentibus, principia accidentium reducuntur in principia substantiae sicut in priora. Quamvis Deus non sit primum contentum in genere substantiae, sed primum extra omne genus, respectu totius esse. | Reply to Objection 2: Since substance is prior to its accidents, the principles
of accidents are reducible to the principles of the substance as to that
which is prior; although God is not first as if contained in the genus of
substance; yet He is first in respect to all being, outside of every
genus. |
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| Ad septimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non sit omnino simplex. Ea enim quae sunt a Deo, imitantur ipsum, unde a primo ente sunt omnia entia, et a primo bono sunt omnia bona. Sed in rebus quae sunt a Deo, nihil est omnino simplex. Ergo Deus non est omnino simplex. | Objection 1: It seems that God is not altogether simple. For whatever is from God must imitate Him. Thus from the first being are all beings; and from
the first good is all good. But in the things which God has made, nothing
is altogether simple. Therefore neither is God altogether simple. |
| Praeterea, omne quod est melius, Deo attribuendum est. Sed, apud nos, composita sunt meliora simplicibus, sicut corpora mixta elementis, et elementa suis partibus. Ergo non est dicendum quod Deus sit omnino simplex. | Objection 2: Further, whatever is best must be attributed to God. But with us that which is composite is better than that which is simple; thus,
chemical compounds are better than simple elements, and animals than the
parts that compose them. Therefore it cannot be said that God is
altogether simple. |
| Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, VI de Trin., quod Deus vere et summe simplex est. | On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. iv, 6,7): "God is truly and
absolutely simple." |
| Respondeo dicendum quod Deum omnino esse simplicem, multipliciter potest esse manifestum. Primo quidem per supradicta. Cum enim in Deo non sit compositio, neque quantitativarum partium, quia corpus non est; neque compositio formae et materiae, neque in eo sit aliud natura et suppositum; neque aliud essentia et esse, neque in eo sit compositio generis et differentiae; neque subiecti et accidentis, manifestum est quod Deus nullo modo compositus est, sed est omnino simplex. Secundo, quia omne compositum est posterius suis componentibus, et dependens ex eis. Deus autem est primum ens, ut supra ostensum est. Tertio, quia omne compositum causam habet, quae enim secundum se diversa sunt, non conveniunt in aliquod unum nisi per aliquam causam adunantem ipsa. Deus autem non habet causam, ut supra ostensum est, cum sit prima causa efficiens. Quarto, quia in omni composito oportet esse potentiam et actum, quod in Deo non est, quia vel una partium est actus respectu alterius; vel saltem omnes partes sunt sicut in potentia respectu totius. Quinto, quia omne compositum est aliquid quod non convenit alicui suarum partium. Et quidem in totis dissimilium partium, manifestum est, nulla enim partium hominis est homo, neque aliqua partium pedis est pes. In totis vero similium partium, licet aliquid quod dicitur de toto, dicatur de parte, sicut pars aeris est aer, et aquae aqua; aliquid tamen dicitur de toto, quod non convenit alicui partium, non enim si tota aqua est bicubita, et pars eius. Sic igitur in omni composito est aliquid quod non est ipsum. Hoc autem etsi possit dici de habente formam, quod scilicet habeat aliquid quod non est ipsum (puta in albo est aliquid quod non pertinet ad rationem albi), tamen in ipsa forma nihil est alienum. Unde, cum Deus sit ipsa forma, vel potius ipsum esse, nullo modo compositus esse potest. Et hanc rationem tangit Hilarius, VII de Trin., dicens, Deus, qui virtus est, ex infirmis non continetur, neque qui lux est, ex obscuris coaptatur. | I answer that, The absolute simplicity of God may be shown in many ways.
First, from the previous articles of this question. For there is neither
composition of quantitative parts in God, since He is not a body; nor
composition of matter and form; nor does His nature differ from His
"suppositum"; nor His essence from His existence; neither is there in Him
composition of genus and difference, nor of subject and accident.
Therefore, it is clear that God is nowise composite, but is altogether
simple. Secondly, because every composite is posterior to its component
parts, and is dependent on them; but God is the first being, as shown
above (Question [2], Article [3]). Thirdly, because every composite has a cause, for
things in themselves different cannot unite unless something causes them
to unite. But God is uncaused, as shown above (Question [2], Article [3]), since He is
the first efficient cause. Fourthly, because in every composite there
must be potentiality and actuality; but this does not apply to God; for
either one of the parts actuates another, or at least all the parts are
potential to the whole. Fifthly, because nothing composite can be
predicated of any single one of its parts. And this is evident in a whole
made up of dissimilar parts; for no part of a man is a man, nor any of
the parts of the foot, a foot. But in wholes made up of similar parts,
although something which is predicated of the whole may be predicated of
a part (as a part of the air is air, and a part of water, water),
nevertheless certain things are predicable of the whole which cannot be
predicated of any of the parts; for instance, if the whole volume of
water is two cubits, no part of it can be two cubits. Thus in every
composite there is something which is not it itself. But, even if this
could be said of whatever has a form, viz. that it has something which is
not it itself, as in a white object there is something which does not
belong to the essence of white; nevertheless in the form itself, there is
nothing besides itself. And so, since God is absolute form, or rather
absolute being, He can be in no way composite. Hilary implies this
argument, when he says (De Trin. vii): "God, Who is strength, is not made
up of things that are weak; nor is He Who is light, composed of things
that are dim." |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ea quae sunt a Deo, imitantur Deum sicut causata primam causam. Est autem hoc de ratione causati, quod sit aliquo modo compositum, quia ad minus esse eius est aliud quam quod quid est, ut infra patebit. | Reply to Objection 1: Whatever is from God imitates Him, as caused things imitate
the first cause. But it is of the essence of a thing to be in some sort
composite; because at least its existence differs from its essence, as
will be shown hereafter, (Question [4], Article [3]). |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod apud nos composita sunt meliora simplicibus, quia perfectio bonitatis creaturae non invenitur in uno simplici, sed in multis. Sed perfectio divinae bonitatis invenitur in uno simplici, ut infra ostendetur. | Reply to Objection 2: With us composite things are better than simple things,
because the perfections of created goodness cannot be found in one simple
thing, but in many things. But the perfection of divine goodness is found
in one simple thing (Question [4], Article [1] and Question [6], Article [2]). |
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| Ad octavum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Deus in compositionem aliorum veniat. Dicit enim Dionysius, IV cap. Cael. Hier., esse omnium est, quae super esse est deitas. Sed esse omnium intrat compositionem uniuscuiusque. Ergo Deus in compositionem aliorum venit. | Objection 1: It seems that God enters into the composition of other things,
for Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv): "The being of all things is that
which is above being—the Godhead." But the being of all things enters
into the composition of everything. Therefore God enters into the
composition of other things. |
| Praeterea, Deus est forma, dicit enim Augustinus, in libro de verbis domini, quod verbum Dei (quod est Deus) est forma quaedam non formata. Sed forma est pars compositi. Ergo Deus est pars alicuius compositi. | Objection 2: Further, God is a form; for Augustine says (De Verb. Dom.,
[*Serm. xxxviii]) that, "the word of God, which is God, is an uncreated
form." But a form is part of a compound. Therefore God is part of some
compound. |
| Praeterea, quaecumque sunt et nullo modo differunt, sunt idem. Sed Deus et materia prima sunt, et nullo modo differunt. Ergo penitus sunt idem. Sed materia prima intrat compositionem rerum. Ergo et Deus. Probatio mediae, quaecumque differunt, aliquibus differentiis differunt, et ita oportet ea esse composita; sed Deus et materia prima sunt omnino simplicia; ergo nullo modo differunt. | Objection 3: Further, whatever things exist, in no way differing from each
other, are the same. But God and primary matter exist, and in no way
differ from each other. Therefore they are absolutely the same. But
primary matter enters into the composition things. Therefore also does
God. Proof of the minor—whatever things differ, they differ by some
differences, and therefore must be composite. But God and primary matter
are altogether simple. Therefore they nowise differ from each other. |
| Sed contra est quod dicit Dionysius, II cap. de Div. Nom., quod neque tactus est eius (scilicet Dei), neque alia quaedam ad partes commiscendi communio. | On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ii): "There can be no
touching Him," i.e. God, "nor any other union with Him by mingling part
with part." |
| Praeterea, dicitur in libro de causis, quod causa prima regit omnes res, praeterquam commisceatur eis. | Further, the first cause rules all things without commingling with them, as the Philosopher says (De Causis). |
| Respondeo dicendum quod circa hoc fuerunt tres errores. Quidam enim posuerunt quod Deus esset anima mundi, ut patet per Augustinum in Lib. VII de civitate Dei, et ad hoc etiam reducitur, quod quidam dixerunt Deum esse animam primi caeli. Alii autem dixerunt Deum esse principium formale omnium rerum. Et haec dicitur fuisse opinio Almarianorum. Sed tertius error fuit David de Dinando, qui stultissime posuit Deum esse materiam primam. Omnia enim haec manifestam continent falsitatem, neque est possibile Deum aliquo modo in compositionem alicuius venire, nec sicut principium formale, nec sicut principium materiale. Primo quidem, quia supra diximus Deum esse primam causam efficientem. Causa autem efficiens cum forma rei factae non incidit in idem numero, sed solum in idem specie, homo enim generat hominem. Materia vero cum causa efficiente non incidit in idem numero, nec in idem specie, quia hoc est in potentia, illud vero in actu. Secundo, quia cum Deus sit prima causa efficiens, eius est primo et per se agere. Quod autem venit in compositionem alicuius, non est primo et per se agens, sed magis compositum, non enim manus agit, sed homo per manum; et ignis calefacit per calorem. Unde Deus non potest esse pars alicuius compositi. Tertio, quia nulla pars compositi potest esse simpliciter prima in entibus; neque etiam materia et forma, quae sunt primae partes compositorum. Nam materia est in potentia, potentia autem est posterior actu simpliciter, ut ex dictis patet. Forma autem quae est pars compositi, est forma participata, sicut autem participans est posterius eo quod est per essentiam, ita et ipsum participatum; sicut ignis in ignitis est posterior eo quod est per essentiam. Ostensum est autem quod Deus est primum ens simpliciter. | I answer that, On this point there have been three errors. Some have
affirmed that God is the world-soul, as is clear from Augustine (De Civ.
Dei vii, 6). This is practically the same as the opinion of those who
assert that God is the soul of the highest heaven. Again, others have
said that God is the formal principle of all things; and this was the
theory of the Almaricians. The third error is that of David of Dinant,
who most absurdly taught that God was primary matter. Now all these
contain manifest untruth; since it is not possible for God to enter into
the composition of anything, either as a formal or a material principle.
First, because God is the first efficient cause. Now the efficient cause
is not identical numerically with the form of the thing caused, but only
specifically: for man begets man. But primary matter can be neither
numerically nor specifically identical with an efficient cause; for the
former is merely potential, while the latter is actual. Secondly,
because, since God is the first efficient cause, to act belongs to Him
primarily and essentially. But that which enters into composition with
anything does not act primarily and essentially, but rather the composite
so acts; for the hand does not act, but the man by his hand; and, fire
warms by its heat. Hence God cannot be part of a compound. Thirdly,
because no part of a compound can be absolutely primal among beings—not
even matter, nor form, though they are the primal parts of every
compound. For matter is merely potential; and potentiality is absolutely
posterior to actuality, as is clear from the foregoing (Question [3], Article [1]):
while a form which is part of a compound is a participated form; and as
that which participates is posterior to that which is essential, so
likewise is that which is participated; as fire in ignited objects is
posterior to fire that is essentially such. Now it has been proved that
God is absolutely primal being (Question [2], Article [3]). |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod deitas dicitur esse omnium effective et exemplariter, non autem per essentiam. | Reply to Objection 1: The Godhead is called the being of all things, as their
efficient and exemplar cause, but not as being their essence. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod verbum est forma exemplaris, non autem forma quae est pars compositi. | Reply to Objection 2: The Word is an exemplar form; but not a form that is part
of a compound. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod simplicia non differunt aliquibus aliis differentiis, hoc enim compositorum est. Homo enim et equus differunt rationali et irrationali differentiis, quae quidem differentiae non differunt amplius ab invicem aliis differentiis. Unde, si fiat vis in verbo, non proprie dicuntur differre, sed diversa esse, nam, secundum philosophum X Metaphys., diversum absolute dicitur, sed omne differens aliquo differt. Unde, si fiat vis in verbo, materia prima et Deus non differunt, sed sunt diversa seipsis. Unde non sequitur quod sint idem. | Reply to Objection 3: Simple things do not differ by added differences—for this is the property of compounds. Thus man and horse differ by their
differences, rational and irrational; which differences, however, do not
differ from each other by other differences. Hence, to be quite accurate,
it is better to say that they are, not different, but diverse. Hence,
according to the Philosopher (Metaph. x), "things which are diverse are
absolutely distinct, but things which are different differ by something."
Therefore, strictly speaking, primary matter and God do not differ, but
are by their very being, diverse. Hence it does not follow they are the
same. |