St. Thomas Aquinas

The Summa Theologica

(Benziger Bros. edition, 1947)
Translated by
Fathers of the English Dominican Province

 

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OF THE GRACE OF CHRIST, AS HE IS THE HEAD OF THE CHURCH (EIGHT ARTICLES)

Deinde considerandum est de gratia Christi secundum quod est caput Ecclesiae. Et circa hoc quaeruntur octo.    We must now consider the grace of Christ as the Head of the Church; and under this head there are eight points of inquiry:
Primo, utrum Christus sit caput Ecclesiae.     (1) Whether Christ is the Head of the Church?
Secundo, utrum sit caput hominum quantum ad corpus, vel solum quantum ad animas.     (2) Whether He is the Head of men as regards their bodies or only as regards their souls?
Tertio, utrum sit caput omnium hominum.     (3) Whether He is the Head of all men?
Quarto, utrum sit caput Angelorum.     (4) Whether He is the Head of the angels?
Quinto, utrum gratia secundum quam est caput Ecclesiae, sit eadem cum habituali eius secundum quod est quidam homo singularis.     (5) Whether the grace of Christ as Head of the Church is the same as His habitual grace as an individual man?
Sexto, utrum esse caput Ecclesiae sit proprium Christo.     (6) Whether to be Head of the Church is proper to Christ?
Septimo, utrum Diabolus sit caput omnium malorum.     (7) Whether the devil is the head of all the wicked?
Octavo, utrum Antichristus etiam possit dici caput omnium malorum.     (8) Whether Anti-christ can be called the head of all the wicked?

 

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Whether Christ is the Head of the Church?

Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Christo, secundum quod est homo, non competat esse caput Ecclesiae. Caput enim influit sensum et motum in membra. Sensus autem et motus spiritualis, qui est per gratiam, non influitur nobis a Christo homine, quia, sicut dicit Augustinus, in XV de Trin., nec etiam Christus, secundum quod est homo, dat spiritum sanctum, sed solum inquantum est Deus. Ergo ei, secundum quod est homo, non competit esse caput Ecclesiae.   Objection 1: It would seem that it does not belong to Christ as man to be Head of the Church. For the head imparts sense and motion to the members. Now spiritual sense and motion which are by grace, are not imparted to us by the Man Christ, because, as Augustine says (De Trin. i, 12; xv, 24), "not even Christ, as man, but only as God, bestows the Holy Ghost." Therefore it does not belong to Him as man to be Head of the Church.
Praeterea, capitis non videtur esse aliud caput. Sed Christi, secundum quod est homo, caput est Deus, secundum illud I Cor. XI, caput Christi Deus. Ergo ipse Christus non est caput.   Objection 2: Further, it is not fitting for the head to have a head. But God is the Head of Christ, as man, according to 1 Cor. 11:3, "The Head of Christ is God." Therefore Christ Himself is not a head.
Praeterea, caput in homine est quoddam particulare membrum influentiam recipiens a corde. Sed Christus est universale principium totius Ecclesiae. Ergo non est Ecclesiae caput.   Objection 3: Furthermore, the head of a man is a particular member, receiving an influx from the heart. But Christ is the universal principle of the whole Church. Therefore He is not the Head of the Church.
Sed contra est quod dicitur Ephes. I, ipsum dedit caput super omnem Ecclesiam.   On the contrary, It is written (Eph. 1:22): "And He . . . hath made Him head over all the Church."
Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut tota Ecclesia dicitur unum corpus mysticum per similitudinem ad naturale corpus hominis, quod secundum diversa membra habet diversos actus, ut apostolus docet, Rom. XII et I Cor. XII; ita Christus dicitur caput Ecclesiae secundum similitudinem humani capitis. In quo tria possumus considerare, scilicet ordinem, perfectionem et virtutem. Ordinem, quia caput est prima pars hominis, incipiendo a superiori. Et inde est quod omne principium consuevit vocari caput, secundum illud Ierem. II, ad omne caput viae posuisti lupanar tibi. Perfectionem autem, quia in capite vigent omnes sensus et interiores et exteriores, cum in ceteris membris sit solus tactus. Et inde est quod dicitur Isaiae IX, senex et honorabilis ipse est caput. Virtutem vero, quia virtus et motus ceterorum membrorum, et gubernatio eorum in suis actibus, est a capite, propter vim sensitivam et motivam ibi dominantem. Unde et rector dicitur caput populi, secundum illud I Reg. XV, cum esses parvulus in oculis tuis, caput in tribubus Israel factus es. Haec autem tria competunt Christo spiritualiter. Primo enim, secundum propinquitatem ad Deum gratia eius altior et prior est, etsi non tempore, quia omnes alii acceperunt gratiam per respectum ad gratiam ipsius, secundum illud Rom. VIII, quos praescivit, hos et praedestinavit conformes fieri imaginis filii sui, ut sit ipse primogenitus in multis fratribus. Secundo vero, perfectionem habet quantum ad plenitudinem omnium gratiarum, secundum illud Ioan. I, vidimus eum plenum gratiae et veritatis, ut supra ostensum est. Tertio, virtutem habuit influendi gratiam in omnia membra Ecclesiae, secundum illud Ioan. I, de plenitudine eius omnes accepimus. Et sic patet quod convenienter dicitur Christus caput Ecclesiae.   I answer that, As the whole Church is termed one mystic body from its likeness to the natural body of a man, which in divers members has divers acts, as the Apostle teaches (Rm. 12; 1 Cor. 12), so likewise Christ is called the Head of the Church from a likeness with the human head, in which we may consider three things, viz. order, perfection, and power: "Order," indeed; for the head is the first part of man, beginning from the higher part; and hence it is that every principle is usually called a head according to Ezech. 16:25: "At every head of the way, thou hast set up a sign of thy prostitution"---"Perfection," inasmuch as in the head dwell all the senses, both interior and exterior, whereas in the other members there is only touch, and hence it is said (Is. 9:15): "The aged and honorable, he is the head"---"Power," because the power and movement of the other members, together with the direction of them in their acts, is from the head, by reason of the sensitive and motive power there ruling; hence the ruler is called the head of a people, according to 1 Kgs. 15:17: "When thou wast a little one in thy own eyes, wast thou not made the head of the tribes of Israel?" Now these three things belong spiritually to Christ. First, on account of His nearness to God His grace is the highest and first, though not in time, since all have received grace on account of His grace, according to Rm. 8:29: "For whom He foreknew, He also predestinated to be made conformable to the image of His Son; that He might be the first-born amongst many brethren." Secondly, He had perfection as regards the fulness of all graces, according to Jn. 1:14, "We saw Him [Vulg.: 'His glory'] . . . full of grace and truth," as was shown, Question [7], Article [9]. Thirdly, He has the power of bestowing grace on all the members of the Church, according to Jn. 1:16: "Of His fulness we have all received." And thus it is plain that Christ is fittingly called the Head of the Church.
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod dare gratiam aut spiritum sanctum convenit Christo secundum quod Deus, auctoritative, sed instrumentaliter ei convenit secundum quod est homo, inquantum scilicet eius humanitas fuit instrumentum divinitatis eius. Et ita actiones ipsius ex virtute divinitatis fuerunt nobis salutiferae, utpote gratiam in nobis causantes, et per meritum et per efficientiam quandam. Augustinus autem negat Christum, secundum quod est homo, dare spiritum sanctum per auctoritatem. Instrumentaliter autem, sive ministerialiter, etiam alii sancti dicuntur dare spiritum sanctum, secundum illud Galat. III, qui tribuit vobis spiritum sanctum, et cetera.   Reply to Objection 1: To give grace or the Holy Ghost belongs to Christ as He is God, authoritatively; but instrumentally it belongs also to Him as man, inasmuch as His manhood is the instrument of His Godhead. And hence by the power of the Godhead His actions were beneficial, i.e. by causing grace in us, both meritoriously and efficiently. But Augustine denies that Christ as man gives the Holy Ghost authoritatively. Even other saints are said to give the Holy Ghost instrumentally, or ministerially, according to Gal. 3:5: "He . . . who giveth to you the Spirit."
Ad secundum dicendum quod in metaphoricis locutionibus non oportet attendi similitudinem quantum ad omnia, sic enim non esset similitudo, sed rei veritas. Capitis igitur naturalis non est caput aliud, quia corpus humanum non est pars alterius corporis. Sed corpus similitudinarie dictum, idest aliqua multitudo ordinata, est pars alterius multitudinis, sicut multitudo domestica est pars multitudinis civilis. Et ideo paterfamilias, qui est caput multitudinis domesticae, habet super se caput rectorem civitatis. Et per hunc modum nihil prohibet caput Christi esse Deum, cum tamen ipse sit caput Ecclesiae.   Reply to Objection 2: In metaphorical speech we must not expect a likeness in all respects; for thus there would be not likeness but identity. Accordingly a natural head has not another head because one human body is not part of another; but a metaphorical body, i.e. an ordered multitude, is part of another multitude as the domestic multitude is part of the civil multitude; and hence the father who is head of the domestic multitude has a head above him, i.e. the civil governor. And hence there is no reason why God should not be the Head of Christ, although Christ Himself is Head of the Church.
Ad tertium dicendum quod caput habet manifestam eminentiam respectu exteriorum membrorum, sed cor habet quandam influentiam occultam. Et ideo cordi comparatur spiritus sanctus, qui invisibiliter Ecclesiam vivificat et unit, capiti comparatur Christus, secundum visibilem naturam, qua homo hominibus praefertur.   Reply to Objection 3: The head has a manifest pre-eminence over the other exterior members; but the heart has a certain hidden influence. And hence the Holy Ghost is likened to the heart, since He invisibly quickens and unifies the Church; but Christ is likened to the Head in His visible nature in which man is set over man.

 

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Whether Christ is the Head of men as to their bodies or only as to their souls?

Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Christus non sit caput hominum quantum ad corpora. Christus enim dicitur caput Ecclesiae inquantum influit spiritualem sensum et motum gratiae in Ecclesiam. Sed huius spiritualis sensus et motus capax non est corpus. Ergo non est caput hominum secundum corpora.   Objection 1: It would seem that Christ is not the Head of men as to their bodies. For Christ is said to be the Head of the Church inasmuch as He bestows spiritual sense and the movement of grace on the Church. But a body is not capable of this spiritual sense and movement. Therefore Christ is not the Head of men as regards their bodies.
Praeterea, secundum corpora communicamus cum brutis. Si ergo Christus esset caput hominum quantum ad corpora, sequeretur quod etiam esset caput brutorum animalium. Quod est inconveniens.   Objection 2: Further, we share bodies with the brutes. If therefore Christ was the Head of men as to their bodies, it would follow that He was the Head of brute animals; and this is not fitting.
Praeterea, Christus corpus suum ab aliis hominibus traxit, ut patet Matth. I et Luc. III. Sed caput est primum inter cetera membra, ut dictum est. Ergo Christus non est caput Ecclesiae quantum ad corpora.   Objection 3: Further, Christ took His body from other men, as is clear from Mt. 1 and Luke 3. But the head is the first of the members, as was said above (Article [1], ad 3). Therefore Christ is not the Head of the Church as regards bodies.
Sed contra est quod dicitur Philipp. III, reformabit corpus humilitatis nostrae, configuratum corpori claritatis suae.   On the contrary, It is written (Phil. 3:21): "Who will reform the body of our lowness, made like to the body of His glory."
Respondeo dicendum quod corpus humanum habet naturalem ordinem ad animam rationalem, quae est propria forma eius et motor. Et inquantum quidem est forma eius, recipit ab anima vitam et ceteras proprietates convenientes humano corpori secundum suam speciem. Inquantum vero anima est motor corporis, corpus instrumentaliter servit animae. Sic ergo dicendum quod habet vim influendi Christi humanitas inquantum est coniuncta Dei verbo, cui corpus unitur per animam, ut supra dictum est. Unde tota Christi humanitas, secundum scilicet animam et corpus, influit in homines et quantum ad animam et quantum ad corpus, sed principaliter quantum ad animam; secundario quantum ad corpus. Uno modo, inquantum membra corporis exhibentur arma iustitiae in anima existenti per Christum, ut apostolus dicit, Rom. VI. Alio modo, inquantum vita gloriae ab anima derivatur ad corpus, secundum illud Rom. VIII, qui suscitavit Iesum a mortuis, vivificabit et mortalia corpora vestra, propter inhabitantem spiritum eius in vobis.   I answer that, The human body has a natural relation to the rational soul, which is its proper form and motor. Inasmuch as the soul is its form, it receives from the soul life and the other properties which belong specifically to man; but inasmuch as the soul is its motor, the body serves the soul instrumentally. Therefore we must hold that the manhood of Christ had the power of "influence," inasmuch as it is united to the Word of God, to Whom His body is united through the soul, as stated above (Question [6], Article [1]). Hence the whole manhood of Christ, i.e. according to soul and body, influences all, both in soul and body; but principally the soul, and secondarily the body: First, inasmuch as the "members of the body are presented as instruments of justice" in the soul that lives through Christ, as the Apostle says (Rm. 6:13): secondly, inasmuch as the life of glory flows from the soul on to the body, according to Rm. 8:11: "He that raised up Jesus from the dead shall quicken also your mortal bodies, because of His Spirit that dwelleth in you."
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod sensus spiritualis gratiae non pervenit quidem ad corpus primo et principaliter, sed secundario et instrumentaliter, ut dictum est.   Reply to Objection 1: The spiritual sense of grace does not reach to the body first and principally, but secondarily and instrumentally, as was said above.
Ad secundum dicendum quod corpus animalis bruti nullam habitudinem habet ad animam rationalem, sicut habet corpus humanum. Et ideo non est simile.   Reply to Objection 2: The body of an animal has no relation to a rational soul, as the human body has. Hence there is no parity.
Ad tertium dicendum quod, licet Christus traxerit materiam corporis ab aliis hominibus, vitam tamen immortalem corporis omnes homines trahunt ab ipso, secundum illud I Cor. XV, sicut in Adam omnes moriuntur, ita in Christo omnes vivificabuntur.   Reply to Objection 3: Although Christ drew the matter of His body from other men, yet all draw from Him the immortal life of their body, according to 1 Cor. 15:22: "And as in Adam all die, so also in Christ all shall be made alive."

 

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Whether Christ is the Head of all men?

Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod Christus non sit caput omnium hominum. Caput enim non habet relationem nisi ad membra sui corporis. Infideles autem nullo modo sunt membra Ecclesiae, quae est corpus Christi, ut dicitur Ephes. I. Ergo Christus non est caput omnium hominum.   Objection 1: It would seem that Christ is not the Head of all men. For the head has no relation except to the members of its body. Now the unbaptized are nowise members of the Church which is the body of Christ, as it is written (Eph. 1:23). Therefore Christ is not the Head of all men.
Praeterea, apostolus dicit, Ephes. V, quod Christus tradidit semetipsum pro Ecclesia, ut ipse sibi exhiberet Ecclesiam gloriosam, non habentem maculam aut rugam aut aliquid huiusmodi. Sed multi sunt, etiam fideles, in quibus invenitur macula aut ruga peccati. Ergo nec erit omnium fidelium Christus caput.   Objection 2: Further, the Apostle writes to the Ephesians (5:25,27): "Christ delivered Himself up for" the Church "that He might present it to Himself a glorious Church, not having spot or wrinkle or any such thing." But there are many of the faithful in whom is found the spot or the wrinkle of sin. Therefore Christ is not the Head of all the faithful.
Praeterea, sacramenta veteris legis comparantur ad Christum sicut umbra ad corpus, ut dicitur Coloss. II. Sed patres veteris testamenti sacramentis illis suo tempore serviebant, secundum illud Heb. VIII, exemplari et umbrae deserviunt caelestium. Non ergo pertinebant ad corpus Christi. Et ita Christus non est caput omnium hominum.   Objection 3: Further, the sacraments of the Old Law are compared to Christ as the shadow to the body, as is written (Col. 2:17). But the fathers of the Old Testament in their day served unto these sacraments, according to Heb. 8:5: "Who serve unto the example and shadow of heavenly things." Hence they did not pertain to Christ's body, and therefore Christ is not the Head of all men.
Sed contra est quod dicitur I Tim. IV, salvator omnium est, et maxime fidelium. Et I Ioan. II, ipse est propitiatio pro peccatis nostris, non autem pro nostris tantum, sed etiam pro totius mundi. Salvare autem homines, aut propitiatorem esse pro peccatis eorum, competit Christo secundum quod est caput. Ergo Christus est caput omnium hominum.   On the contrary, It is written (1 Tim. 4:10): "Who is the Saviour of all men, especially of the faithful," and (1 Jn. 2:2): "He is the propitiation for our sins, and not for ours only, but also for those of the whole world." Now to save men and to be a propitiation for their sins belongs to Christ as Head. Therefore Christ is the Head of all men.
Respondeo dicendum quod haec est differentia inter corpus hominis naturale et corpus Ecclesiae mysticum, quod membra corporis naturalis sunt omnia simul, membra autem corporis mystici non sunt omnia simul, neque quantum ad esse naturae, quia corpus Ecclesiae constituitur ex hominibus qui fuerunt a principio mundi usque ad finem ipsius; neque etiam quantum ad esse gratiae, quia eorum etiam qui sunt in uno tempore, quidam gratia carent postmodum habituri, aliis eam iam habentibus. Sic igitur membra corporis mystici non solum accipiuntur secundum quod sunt in actu, sed etiam secundum quod sunt in potentia. Quaedam tamen sunt in potentia quae nunquam reducuntur ad actum, quaedam vero quae quandoque reducuntur ad actum, secundum hunc triplicem gradum, quorum unus est per fidem, secundus per caritatem viae, tertius per fruitionem patriae. Sic ergo dicendum est quod, accipiendo generaliter secundum totum tempus mundi, Christus est caput omnium hominum, sed secundum diversos gradus. Primo enim et principaliter est caput eorum qui actu uniuntur sibi per gloriam. Secundo, eorum qui actu uniuntur sibi per caritatem. Tertio, eorum qui actu uniuntur sibi per fidem. Quarto vero, eorum qui sibi uniuntur solum potentia nondum ad actum reducta, quae tamen est ad actum reducenda, secundum divinam praedestinationem. Quinto vero, eorum qui in potentia sibi sunt uniti quae nunquam reducetur ad actum, sicut homines in hoc mundo viventes qui non sunt praedestinati. Qui tamen, ex hoc mundo recedentes, totaliter desinunt esse membra Christi, quia iam nec sunt in potentia ut Christo uniantur.   I answer that, This is the difference between the natural body of man and the Church's mystical body, that the members of the natural body are all together, and the members of the mystical are not all together---neither as regards their natural being, since the body of the Church is made up of the men who have been from the beginning of the world until its end---nor as regards their supernatural being, since, of those who are at any one time, some there are who are without grace, yet will afterwards obtain it, and some have it already. We must therefore consider the members of the mystical body not only as they are in act, but as they are in potentiality. Nevertheless, some are in potentiality who will never be reduced to act, and some are reduced at some time to act; and this according to the triple class, of which the first is by faith, the second by the charity of this life, the third by the fruition of the life to come. Hence we must say that if we take the whole time of the world in general, Christ is the Head of all men, but diversely. For, first and principally, He is the Head of such as are united to Him by glory; secondly, of those who are actually united to Him by charity; thirdly, of those who are actually united to Him by faith; fourthly, of those who are united to Him merely in potentiality, which is not yet reduced to act, yet will be reduced to act according to Divine predestination; fifthly, of those who are united to Him in potentiality, which will never be reduced to act; such are those men existing in the world, who are not predestined, who, however, on their departure from this world, wholly cease to be members of Christ, as being no longer in potentiality to be united to Christ.
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod illi qui sunt infideles, etsi actu non sint de Ecclesia, sunt tamen in potentia. Quae quidem potentia in duobus fundatur, primo quidem et principaliter, in virtute Christi, quae sufficiens est ad salutem totius humani generis; secundario, in arbitrii libertate.   Reply to Objection 1: Those who are unbaptized, though not actually in the Church, are in the Church potentially. And this potentiality is rooted in two things---first and principally, in the power of Christ, which is sufficient for the salvation of the whole human race; secondly, in free-will.
Ad secundum dicendum quod esse Ecclesiam gloriosam, non habentem maculam neque rugam, est ultimus finis, ad quem perducimur per passionem Christi. Unde hoc erit in statu patriae, non autem in statu viae, in quo, si dixerimus quia peccatum non habemus, nosmetipsos seducimus, ut dicitur I Ioan. I. Sunt tamen quaedam, scilicet mortalia, quibus carent illi qui sunt membra Christi per actualem unionem caritatis. Qui vero his peccatis subduntur, non sunt membra Christi actualiter, sed potentialiter, nisi forte imperfecte, per fidem informem, quae unit Christo secundum quid et non simpliciter ut scilicet per Christum homo assequatur vitam gratiae; fides enim sine operibus mortua est, ut dicitur Iac. II. Percipiunt tamen tales a Christo quendam actum vitae, qui est credere, sicut si membrum mortificatum moveatur aliqualiter ab homine.   Reply to Objection 2: To be "a glorious Church not having spot or wrinkle" is the ultimate end to which we are brought by the Passion of Christ. Hence this will be in heaven, and not on earth, in which "if we say we have no sin, we deceive ourselves," as is written (1 Jn. 1:8). Nevertheless, there are some, viz. mortal, sins from which they are free who are members of Christ by the actual union of charity; but such as are tainted with these sins are not members of Christ actually, but potentially; except, perhaps, imperfectly, by formless faith, which unites to God, relatively but not simply, viz. so that man partake of the life of grace. For, as is written (James 2:20): "Faith without works is dead." Yet such as these receive from Christ a certain vital act, i.e. to believe, as if a lifeless limb were moved by a man to some extent.
Ad tertium dicendum quod sancti patres non insistebant sacramentis legalibus tanquam quibusdam rebus, sed sicut imaginibus et umbris futurorum. Idem autem est motus in imaginem, inquantum est imago, et in rem, ut patet per philosophum, in libro de memoria et reminiscentia. Et ideo antiqui patres, servando legalia sacramenta, ferebantur in Christum per fidem et dilectionem eandem qua et nos in ipsum ferimur. Et ita patres antiqui pertinebant ad idem corpus Ecclesiae ad quod nos pertinemus.   Reply to Objection 3: The holy Fathers made use of the legal sacraments, not as realities, but as images and shadows of what was to come. Now it is the same motion to an image as image, and to the reality, as is clear from the Philosopher (De Memor. et Remin. ii). Hence the ancient Fathers, by observing the legal sacraments, were borne to Christ by the same faith and love whereby we also are borne to Him, and hence the ancient Fathers belong to the same Church as we.

 

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Whether Christ is the Head of the angels?

Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Christus, secundum quod homo, non sit caput Angelorum. Caput enim et membra sunt unius naturae. Sed Christus, secundum quod homo, non est conformis in natura cum Angelis, sed solum cum hominibus, quia, ut dicitur Heb. II, nusquam Angelos apprehendit, sed semen Abrahae apprehendit. Ergo Christus, secundum quod homo, non est caput Angelorum.   Objection 1: It would seem that Christ as man is not the head of the angels. For the head and members are of one nature. But Christ as man is not of the same nature with the angels, but only with men, since, as is written (Heb. 2:16): "For nowhere doth He take hold of the angels, but of the seed of Abraham He taketh hold." Therefore Christ as man is not the head of the angels.
Praeterea, illorum Christus est caput qui pertinent ad Ecclesiam, quae est corpus eius, ut dicitur Ephes. I. Sed Angeli non pertinent ad Ecclesiam, nam Ecclesia est congregatio fidelium; fides autem non est in Angelis; non enim ambulant per fidem, sed per speciem, alioquin peregrinarentur a domino, secundum quod apostolus argumentatur, II Cor. V. Ergo Christus, secundum quod homo, non est caput Angelorum.   Objection 2: Further, Christ is the head of such as belong to the Church, which is His Body, as is written (Eph. 1:23). But the angels do not belong to the Church. For the Church is the congregation of the faithful: and in the angels there is no faith, for they do not "walk by faith" but "by sight," otherwise they would be "absent from the Lord," as the Apostle argues (2 Cor. 5:6,7). Therefore Christ as man is not head of the angels.
Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, super Ioan., quod sicut verbum quod erat a principio apud patrem, vivificat animas, ita verbum caro factum vivificat corpora, quibus Angeli carent. Sed verbum caro factum est Christus secundum quod homo. Ergo Christus, secundum quod homo, non influit vitam Angelis. Et ita, secundum quod homo, non est caput Angelorum.   Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (Tract. xix; xxiii in Joan.), that as "the Word" which "was in the beginning with the Father" quickens souls, so the "Word made flesh" quickens bodies, which angels lack. But the Word made flesh is Christ as man. Therefore Christ as man does not give life to angels, and hence as man He is not the head of the angels.
Sed contra est quod apostolus dicit, Coloss. II, qui est caput omnis principatus et potestatis. Et eadem ratio est de Angelis aliorum ordinum. Ergo Christus est caput Angelorum.   On the contrary, The Apostle says (Col. 2:10), "Who is the head of all Principality and Power," and the same reason holds good with the other orders of angels. Therefore Christ is the Head of the angels.
Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, ubi est unum corpus, necesse est ponere unum caput. Unum autem corpus similitudinarie dicitur una multitudo ordinata in unum secundum distinctos actus sive officia. Manifestum est autem quod ad unum finem, qui est gloria divinae fruitionis, ordinantur et homines et Angeli. Unde corpus Ecclesiae mysticum non solum consistit ex hominibus, sed etiam ex Angelis. Totius autem huius multitudinis Christus est caput, quia propinquius se habet ad Deum, et perfectius participat dona ipsius, non solum quam homines, sed etiam quam Angeli; et de eius influentia non solum homines recipiunt, sed etiam Angeli. Dicitur enim Ephes. I, quod constituit eum, scilicet Christum Deus pater, ad dexteram suam in caelestibus, supra omnem principatum et potestatem et virtutem et dominationem, et omne nomen quod nominatur non solum in hoc saeculo, sed etiam in futuro, et omnia subiecit sub pedibus eius. Et ideo Christus non solum est caput hominum, sed etiam Angelorum. Unde Matth. IV legitur quod accesserunt Angeli et ministrabant ei.   I answer that, As was said above (Article [1], ad 2), where there is one body we must allow that there is one head. Now a multitude ordained to one end, with distinct acts and duties, may be metaphorically called one body. But it is manifest that both men and angels are ordained to one end, which is the glory of the Divine fruition. Hence the mystical body of the Church consists not only of men but of angels. Now of all this multitude Christ is the Head, since He is nearer God, and shares His gifts more fully, not only than man, but even than angels; and of His influence not only men but even angels partake, since it is written (Eph. 1:20-22): that God the Father set "Him," namely Christ, "on His right hand in the heavenly places, above all Principality and Power and Virtue and Dominion and every name that is named not only in this world, but also in that which is to come. And He hath subjected all things under His feet." Therefore Christ is not only the Head of men, but of angels. Hence we read (Mt. 4:11) that "angels came and ministered to Him."
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod influentia Christi super omnes homines principaliter quidem est quantum ad animas, secundum quas homines conveniunt cum Angelis in natura generis, licet non in natura speciei. Et huius conformitatis ratione Christus potest dici caput Angelorum, licet deficiat conformitas quantum ad corpora.   Reply to Objection 1: Christ's influence over men is chiefly with regard to their souls; wherein men agree with angels in generic nature, though not in specific nature. By reason of this agreement Christ can be said to be the Head of the angels, although the agreement falls short as regards the body.
Ad secundum dicendum quod Ecclesia secundum statum viae est congregatio fidelium, sed secundum statum patriae est congregatio comprehendentium. Christus autem non solum fuit viator, sed etiam comprehensor. Et ideo non solum fidelium, sed etiam comprehendentium est caput, utpote plenissime habens gratiam et gloriam.   Reply to Objection 2: The Church, on earth, is the congregation of the faithful; but, in heaven, it is the congregation of comprehensors. Now Christ was not merely a wayfarer, but a comprehensor. And therefore He is the Head not merely of the faithful, but of comprehensors, as having grace and glory most fully.
Ad tertium dicendum quod Augustinus ibi loquitur secundum quandam assimilationem causae ad effectum, prout scilicet res corporalis agit in corpora, et res spiritualis in res spirituales. Tamen humanitas Christi, ex virtute spiritualis naturae, scilicet divinae, potest aliquid causare non solum in spiritibus hominum, sed etiam in spiritibus Angelorum, propter maximam coniunctionem eius ad Deum, scilicet secundum unionem personalem.   Reply to Objection 3: Augustine here uses the similitude of cause and effect, i.e. inasmuch as corporeal things act on bodies, and spiritual things on spiritual things. Nevertheless, the humanity of Christ, by virtue of the spiritual nature, i.e. the Divine, can cause something not only in the spirits of men, but also in the spirits of angels, on account of its most close conjunction with God, i.e. by personal union.

 

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Whether the grace of Christ, as Head of the Church, is the same as His habitual grace, inasmuch as He is Man?

Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod non sit eadem gratia qua Christus est caput Ecclesiae, cum gratia singulari illius hominis. Dicit enim apostolus, Rom. V, si unius delicto multi mortui sunt, multo magis gratia Dei et donum in gratia unius hominis Iesu Christi in plures abundavit. Sed aliud est peccatum actuale ipsius Adae, et aliud peccatum originale, quod traduxit in posteros. Ergo alia est gratia personalis, quae est propria ipsius Christi, et alia est gratia eius inquantum est caput Ecclesiae, quae ab ipso ad alios derivatur.   Objection 1: It would seem that the grace whereby Christ is Head of the Church and the individual grace of the Man are not the same. For the Apostle says (Rm. 5:15): "If by the offense of one many died, much more the grace of God and the gift, by the grace of one man, Jesus Christ, hath abounded unto many." But the actual sin of Adam is distinct from original sin which he transmitted to his posterity. Hence the personal grace which is proper to Christ is distinct from His grace, inasmuch as He is the Head of the Church, which flows to others from Him.
Praeterea, habitus distinguuntur secundum actus. Sed ad alium actum ordinatur in Christo gratia eius personalis, scilicet ad sanctificationem illius animae, et ad alium actum ordinatur gratia capitis, scilicet ad sanctificandum alios. Ergo alia est gratia personalis ipsius Christi, et alia est gratia eius inquantum est caput Ecclesiae.   Objection 2: Further, habits are distinguished by acts. But the personal grace of Christ is ordained to one act, viz. the sanctification of His soul; and the capital grace is ordained to another, viz. to sanctifying others. Therefore the personal grace of Christ is distinct from His grace as He is the Head of the Church.
Praeterea, sicut supra dictum est, in Christo distinguitur triplex gratia, scilicet gratia unionis, gratia capitis, et gratia singularis illius hominis. Sed gratia singularis Christi est alia a gratia unionis. Ergo est etiam alia a gratia capitis.   Objection 3: Further, as was said above (Question [6], Article [6]), in Christ we distinguish a threefold grace, viz. the grace of union, capital grace, and the individual grace of the Man. Now the individual grace of Christ is distinct from the grace of union. Therefore it is also distinct from the capital grace.
Sed contra est quod dicitur Ioan. I, de plenitudine eius omnes accepimus. Secundum hoc autem est caput nostrum, quod ab eo accipimus. Ergo secundum hoc quod habet plenitudinem gratiae, est caput nostrum. Plenitudinem autem gratiae habuit secundum quod perfecte fuit in illo gratia personalis, ut supra dictum est. Ergo secundum gratiam personalem est caput nostrum. Et ita non est alia gratia capitis, et alia gratia personalis.   On the contrary, It is written (Jn. 1:16): "Of His fulness we all have received." Now He is our Head, inasmuch as we receive from Him. Therefore He is our Head, inasmuch as He has the fulness of grace. Now He had the fulness of grace, inasmuch as personal grace was in Him in its perfection, as was said above (Question [7], Article [9]). Hence His capital and personal grace are not distinct.
Respondeo dicendum quod unumquodque agit inquantum est ens actu. Oportet autem quod sit idem actu quo aliquid est actu, et quo agit, et sic idem est calor quo ignis est calidus, et quo calefacit. Non tamen omnis actus quo aliquid est actu, sufficit ad hoc quod sit principium agendi in alia, cum enim agens sit praestantius patiente, ut Augustinus dicit, XII super Gen. ad Litt., et philosophus, in III de anima, oportet quod agens in alia habeat actum secundum eminentiam quandam. Dictum est autem supra quod in anima Christi recepta est gratia secundum maximam eminentiam. Et ideo ex eminentia gratiae quam accepit, competit sibi quod gratia illa ad alios derivetur. Quod pertinet ad rationem capitis. Et ideo eadem est secundum essentiam gratia personalis qua anima Christi est iustificata, et gratia eius secundum quam est caput Ecclesiae iustificans alios, differt tamen secundum rationem.   I answer that, Since everything acts inasmuch as it is a being in act, it must be the same act whereby it is in act and whereby it acts, as it is the same heat whereby fire is hot and whereby it heats. Yet not every act whereby anything is in act suffices for its being the principle of acting upon others. For since the agent is nobler than the patient, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 16) and the Philosopher (De Anima iii, 19), the agent must act on others by reason of a certain pre-eminence. Now it was said above (Article [1]; Question [7], Article [9]) grace was received by the soul of Christ in the highest way; and therefore from this pre-eminence of grace which He received, it is from Him that this grace is bestowed on others---and this belongs to the nature of head. Hence the personal grace, whereby the soul of Christ is justified, is essentially the same as His grace, as He is the Head of the Church, and justifies others; but there is a distinction of reason between them.
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod peccatum originale in Adam, quod est peccatum naturae, derivatum est a peccato actuali ipsius, quod est peccatum personale, quia in eo persona corrupit naturam; qua corruptione mediante, peccatum primi hominis derivatur ad posteros, secundum quod natura corrupta corrumpit personam. Sed gratia non derivatur a Christo in nos mediante natura humana, sed per solam personalem actionem ipsius Christi. Unde non oportet in Christo distinguere duplicem gratiam, quarum una respondeat naturae, alia personae, sicut in Adam distinguitur peccatum naturae et personae.   Reply to Objection 1: Original sin in Adam, which is a sin of the nature, is derived from his actual sin, which is a personal sin, because in him the person corrupted the nature; and by means of this corruption the sin of the first man is transmitted to posterity, inasmuch as the corrupt nature corrupts the person. Now grace is not vouchsafed us by means of human nature, but solely by the personal action of Christ Himself. Hence we must not distinguish a twofold grace in Christ, one corresponding to the nature, the other to the person as in Adam we distinguish the sin of the nature and of the person.
Ad secundum dicendum quod diversi actus quorum unus est ratio et causa alterius, non diversificant habitum. Actus autem personalis gratiae, qui est sanctum facere formaliter habentem, est ratio iustificationis aliorum, quae pertinet ad gratiam capitis. Et inde est quod per huiusmodi differentiam non diversificatur essentia habitus.   Reply to Objection 2: Different acts, one of which is the reason and the cause of the other, do not diversify a habit. Now the act of the personal grace which is formally to sanctify its subject, is the reason of the justification of others, which pertains to capital grace. Hence it is that the essence of the habit is not diversified by this difference.
Ad tertium dicendum quod gratia personalis et gratia capitis ordinantur ad aliquem actum, gratia autem unionis non ordinatur ad actum, sed ad esse personale. Et ideo gratia personalis et gratia capitis conveniunt in essentia habitus, non autem gratia unionis. Quamvis gratia personalis possit quodammodo dici gratia unionis, prout facit congruitatem quandam ad unionem. Et secundum hoc, una per essentiam est gratia unionis et gratia capitis et gratia singularis personae, sed differens sola ratione.   Reply to Objection 3: Personal and capital grace are ordained to an act; but the grace of union is not ordained to an act, but to the personal being. Hence the personal and the capital grace agree in the essence of the habit; but the grace of union does not, although the personal grace can be called in a manner the grace of union, inasmuch as it brings about a fitness for the union; and thus the grace of union, the capital, and the personal grace are one in essence, though there is a distinction of reason between them.

 

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Whether it is proper to Christ to be Head of the Church?

Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod esse caput Ecclesiae non sit proprium Christo. Dicitur enim I Reg. XV, cum esses parvulus in oculis tuis, caput in tribubus Israel factus es. Sed una est Ecclesia in novo et in veteri testamento. Ergo videtur quod, eadem ratione, alius homo praeter Christum potest esse caput Ecclesiae.   Objection 1: It seems that it is not proper to Christ to be Head of the Church. For it is written (1 Kgs. 15:17): "When thou wast a little one in thy own eyes, wast thou not made the head of the tribes of Israel?" Now there is but one Church in the New and the Old Testament. Therefore it seems that with equal reason any other man than Christ might be head of the Church.
Praeterea, ex hoc Christus dicitur caput Ecclesiae quod gratiam influit Ecclesiae membris. Sed etiam ad alios pertinet gratiam aliis praebere, secundum illud Ephes. IV, omnis sermo malus ab ore vestro non procedat, sed si quis bonus est ad aedificationem fidei, ut det gratiam audientibus. Ergo videtur quod etiam alii quam Christo competat esse caput Ecclesiae.   Objection 2: Further, Christ is called Head of the Church from His bestowing grace on the Church's members. But it belongs to others also to grant grace to others, according to Eph. 4:29: "Let no evil speech proceed from your mouth; but that which is good to the edification of faith, that it may administer grace to the hearers." Therefore it seems to belong also to others than Christ to be head of the Church.
Praeterea, Christus, ex eo quod praeest Ecclesiae, non solum dicitur caput, sed etiam pastor et fundamentum Ecclesiae. Sed non soli sibi Christus retinuit nomen pastoris, secundum illud I Pet. V, cum apparuerit princeps pastorum, percipietis immarcescibilem gloriae coronam. Nec etiam nomen fundamenti, secundum illud Apoc. XXI, murus civitatis habens fundamenta duodecim. Ergo videtur quod nec etiam nomen capitis sibi soli retinuerit.   Objection 3: Further, Christ by His ruling over the Church is not only called "Head," but also "Shepherd" and "Foundation." Now Christ did not retain for Himself alone the name of Shepherd, according to 1 Pt. 5:4, "And when the prince of pastors shall appear, you shall receive a never-fading crown of glory"; nor the name of Foundation, according to Apoc. 21:14: "And the wall of the city had twelve foundations." Therefore it seems that He did not retain the name of Head for Himself alone.
Sed contra est quod dicitur Coloss. II, caput Ecclesiae est ex quo corpus, per nexus et coniunctiones subministratum et constructum, crescit in augmentum Dei. Sed hoc soli Christo convenit. Ergo solus Christus est caput Ecclesiae.   On the contrary, It is written (Col. 2:19): "The head" of the Church is that "from which the whole body, by joints and bands being supplied with nourishment and compacted groweth unto the increase of God." But this belongs only to Christ. Therefore Christ alone is Head of the Church.
Respondeo dicendum quod caput in alia membra influit dupliciter. Uno modo, quodam intrinseco influxu, prout virtus motiva et sensitiva a capite derivatur ad cetera membra. Alio modo, secundum exteriorem quandam gubernationem, prout scilicet secundum visum et alios sensus, qui in capite radicantur, dirigitur homo in exterioribus actibus. Interior autem effluxus gratiae non est ab aliquo nisi a solo Christo, cuius humanitas, ex hoc quod est divinitati adiuncta, habet virtutem iustificandi. Sed influxus in membra Ecclesiae quantum ad exteriorem gubernationem, potest aliis convenire. Et secundum hoc, aliqui alii possunt dici capita Ecclesiae, secundum illud Amos VI, optimates capita populorum. Differenter tamen a Christo. Primo quidem, quantum ad hoc, quod Christus est caput omnium eorum qui ad Ecclesiam pertinent secundum omnem locum et tempus et statum, alii autem homines dicuntur capita secundum quaedam specialia loca, sicut episcopi suarum Ecclesiarum; vel etiam secundum determinatum tempus, sicut Papa est caput totius Ecclesiae, scilicet tempore sui pontificatus; et secundum determinatum statum, prout scilicet sunt in statu viatoris. Alio modo, secundum quod Christus est caput Ecclesiae propria virtute et auctoritate, alii vero dicuntur capita inquantum vicem gerunt Christi; secundum illud II Cor. II, nam et ego, quod donavi, si quid donavi, propter vos, in persona Christi; et II Cor. V, pro Christo legatione fungimur, tanquam Deo exhortante per nos.   I answer that, The head influences the other members in two ways. First, by a certain intrinsic influence, inasmuch as motive and sensitive force flow from the head to the other members; secondly, by a certain exterior guidance, inasmuch as by sight and the senses, which are rooted in the head, man is guided in his exterior acts. Now the interior influx of grace is from no one save Christ, Whose manhood, through its union with the Godhead, has the power of justifying; but the influence over the members of the Church, as regards their exterior guidance, can belong to others; and in this way others may be called heads of the Church, according to Amos 6:1, "Ye great men, heads of the people"; differently, however, from Christ. First, inasmuch as Christ is the Head of all who pertain to the Church in every place and time and state; but all other men are called heads with reference to certain special places, as bishops of their Churches. Or with reference to a determined time as the Pope is the head of the whole Church, viz. during the time of his Pontificate, and with reference to a determined state, inasmuch as they are in the state of wayfarers. Secondly, because Christ is the Head of the Church by His own power and authority; while others are called heads, as taking Christ's place, according to 2 Cor. 2:10, "For what I have pardoned, if I have pardoned anything, for your sakes I have done it in the person of Christ," and 2 Cor. 5:20, "For Christ therefore we are ambassadors, God, as it were, exhorting by us."
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod verbum illud intelligitur secundum quod ratio capitis consideratur ex exteriori gubernatione, prout rex dicitur caput regni sui.   Reply to Objection 1: The word "head" is employed in that passage in regard to exterior government; as a king is said to be the head of his kingdom.
Ad secundum dicendum quod homo non dat gratiam interius influendo sed exterius persuadendo ad ea quae sunt gratiae.   Reply to Objection 2: Man does not distribute grace by interior influx, but by exteriorly persuading to the effects of grace.
Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut dicit Augustinus, super Ioan., si praepositi Ecclesiae pastores sunt, quomodo unus pastor est, nisi quia sunt illi omnes unius membra pastoris? Et similiter alii possunt dici fundamenta et capita, inquantum sunt unius capitis et fundamenti membra. Et tamen, sicut Augustinus ibidem dicit, quod pastor est, dedit membris suis, ostium vero se nemo nostrum dicit; hoc sibi ipse proprium tenuit. Et hoc ideo quia in ostio importatur principalis auctoritas, inquantum ostium est per quod omnes ingrediuntur in domum, et ipse solus Christus est per quem accessum habemus in gratiam istam in qua stamus. Per alia vero nomina praedicta potest importari auctoritas non solum principalis, sed etiam secundaria.   Reply to Objection 3: As Augustine says (Tract. xlvi in Joan.): "If the rulers of the Church are Shepherds, how is there one Shepherd, except that all these are members of one Shepherd?" So likewise others may be called foundations and heads, inasmuch as they are members of the one Head and Foundation. Nevertheless, as Augustine says (Tract. xlvii), "He gave to His members to be shepherds; yet none of us calleth himself the Door. He kept this for Himself alone." And this because by door is implied the principal authority, inasmuch as it is by the door that all enter the house; and it is Christ alone by "Whom also we have access . . . into this grace, wherein we stand" (Rm. 5:2); but by the other names above-mentioned there may be implied not merely the principal but also the secondary authority.

 

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Whether the devil is the head of all the wicked?

Ad septimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Diabolus non sit caput malorum. Ad rationem enim capitis pertinet quod influat sensum et motum in membra, ut dicit quaedam Glossa, ad Ephes. I, super illud, ipsum dedit caput, et cetera. Sed Diabolus non habet virtutem influendi malitiam peccati, quod ex voluntate peccantis procedit. Ergo Diabolus non potest dici caput malorum.   Objection 1: It would seem that the devil is not the head of the wicked. For it belongs to the head to diffuse sense and movement into the members, as a gloss says, on Eph. 1:22, "And made Him head," etc. But the devil has no power of spreading the evil of sin, which proceeds from the will of the sinner. Therefore the devil cannot be called the head of the wicked.
Praeterea, per quodlibet peccatum fit homo malus. Sed non omnia peccata sunt a Diabolo. Quod quidem manifestum est de peccatis Daemonum, qui non ex persuasione alterius peccaverunt. Similiter etiam nec omne peccatum hominis ex Diabolo procedit, dicitur enim in libro de ecclesiasticis dogmatibus, non omnes cogitationes nostrae malae semper Diaboli instinctu excitantur, sed aliquoties ex motu arbitrii nostri emergunt. Ergo Diabolus non est caput omnium malorum.   Objection 2: Further, by every sin a man is made evil. But not every sin is from the devil; and this is plain as regards the demons, who did not sin through the persuasion of another; so likewise not every sin of man proceeds from the devil, for it is said (De Eccles. Dogm. lxxxii): "Not all our wicked thoughts are always raised up by the suggestion of the devil; but sometimes they spring from the movement of our will." Therefore the devil is not the head of all the wicked.
Praeterea, unum caput uni corpori praeficitur. Sed tota multitudo malorum non videtur habere aliquid in quo uniantur, quia malum malo contingit esse contrarium; contingit enim ex diversis defectibus, ut Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom. Ergo Diabolus non potest dici caput omnium malorum.   Objection 3: Further, one head is placed on one body. But the whole multitude of the wicked do not seem to have anything in which they are united, for evil is contrary to evil and springs from divers defects, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). Therefore the devil cannot be called the head of all the wicked.
Sed contra est quod, super illud Iob XVIII, memoria illius pereat de terra, dicit Glossa, de unoquoque iniquo dicitur ut ad caput, idest Diabolum, revertatur.   On the contrary, A gloss [*St. Gregory, Moral. xiv] on Job 18:17, "Let the memory of him perish from the earth," says: "This is said of every evil one, yet so as to be referred to the head," i.e. the devil.
Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, caput non solum interius influit membris, sed etiam exterius gubernat, eorum actus dirigendo ad aliquem finem. Sic igitur potest dici aliquis caput alicuius multitudinis vel secundum utrumque, scilicet secundum interiorem influxum et exteriorem gubernationem, et sic est Christus caput Ecclesiae, ut dictum est. Vel secundum solam exteriorem gubernationem, et sic quilibet princeps vel praelatus est caput multitudinis sibi subiectae. Et per hunc modum dicitur Diabolus caput omnium malorum, nam, ut dicitur Iob XLI, ipse est rex super omnes filios superbiae. Pertinet autem ad gubernatorem ut eos quos gubernat ad suum finem perducat. Finis autem Diaboli est aversio rationalis creaturae a Deo, unde a principio hominem ab obedientia divini praecepti removere tentavit. Ipsa autem aversio a Deo habet rationem finis inquantum appetitur sub specie libertatis, secundum illud Ierem. II, a saeculo confregisti iugum, rupisti vincula, dixisti, non serviam. Inquantum igitur ad hunc finem aliqui adducuntur peccando, sub Diaboli regimine et gubernatione cadunt. Et ex hoc dicitur eorum caput.   I answer that, As was said above (Article [6]), the head not only influences the members interiorly, but also governs them exteriorly, directing their actions to an end. Hence it may be said that anyone is the head of a multitude, either as regards both, i.e. by interior influence and exterior governance, and thus Christ is the Head of the Church, as was stated (Article [6]); or as regards exterior governance, and thus every prince or prelate is head of the multitude subject to him. And in this way the devil is head of all the wicked. For, as is written (Job 41:25): "He is king over all the children of pride." Now it belongs to a governor to lead those whom he governs to their end. But the end of the devil is the aversion of the rational creature from God; hence from the beginning he has endeavored to lead man from obeying the Divine precept. But aversion from God has the nature of an end, inasmuch as it is sought for under the appearance of liberty, according to Jer. 2:20: "Of old time thou hast broken my yoke, thou hast burst my bands, and thou saidst, 'I will not serve.'" Hence, inasmuch as some are brought to this end by sinning, they fall under the rule and government of the devil, and therefore he is called their head.
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, licet Diabolus non influat interius rationali menti, tamen suggerendo inducit ad malum.   Reply to Objection 1: Although the devil does not influence the rational mind interiorly, yet he beguiles it to evil by persuasion.
Ad secundum dicendum quod gubernator non semper suggerit singulis ut eius voluntati obediant, sed proponit omnibus signum suae voluntatis, ad cuius sequelam aliqui excitantur inducti, alii sponte propria, sicut patet in duce exercitus, cuius vexillum sequuntur milites etiam nullo persuadente. Sic igitur primum peccatum Diaboli, qui ab initio peccat, ut dicitur I Ioan. III, propositum est omnibus ad sequendum, quod quidam imitantur per suggestionem ipsius, quidam propria sponte absque ulla suggestione. Et secundum hoc, omnium malorum caput est Diabolus, inquantum illum imitantur, secundum illud Sap. II, invidia Diaboli mors introivit in orbem terrarum, imitantur autem illum qui sunt ex parte illius.   Reply to Objection 2: A governor does not always suggest to his subjects to obey his will; but proposes to all the sign of his will, in consequence of which some are incited by inducement, and some of their own free-will, as is plain in the leader of an army, whose standard all the soldiers follow, though no one persuades them. Therefore in the same way, the first sin of the devil, who "sinneth from the beginning" (1 Jnn 3:8), is held out to all to be followed, and some imitate at his suggestion, and some of their own will without any suggestion. And hence the devil is the head of all the wicked, inasmuch as they imitate Him, according to Wis. 2:24,25: "By the envy of the devil, death came into the world. And they follow him that are of his side."
Ad tertium dicendum quod omnia peccata conveniunt in aversione a Deo, licet ad invicem differant secundum conversionem ad diversa commutabilia bona.   Reply to Objection 3: All sins agree in aversion from God, although they differ by conversion to different changeable goods.

 

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Whether Anti-christ may be called the head of all the wicked?

Ad octavum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Antichristus non sit caput malorum. Unius enim corporis non sunt diversa capita. Sed Diabolus est caput multitudinis malorum. Non ergo Antichristus est eorum caput.   Objection 1: It would seem that Antichrist is not the head of the wicked. For there are not several heads of one body. But the devil is the head of the multitude of the wicked. Therefore Anti-christ is not their head.
Praeterea, Antichristus est membrum Diaboli. Sed caput distinguitur a membris. Ergo Antichristus non est caput malorum.   Objection 2: Further, Anti-christ is a member of the devil. Now the head is distinguished from the members. Therefore Anti-christ is not the head of the wicked.
Praeterea, caput habet influentiam in membra. Sed Antichristus nullam habet influentiam in malos homines qui eum praecesserunt. Ergo Antichristus non est caput malorum.   Objection 3: Further, the head has an influence over the members. But Anti-christ has no influence over the wicked who have preceded him. Therefore Anti-christ is not the head of the wicked.
Sed contra est quod Iob XXI, super illud, interrogate quemlibet de viatoribus, dicit Glossa, dum de omnium malorum corpore loqueretur, subito ad omnium iniquorum caput, Antichristum, verba convertit.   On the contrary, A gloss [*St. Gregory, Moral. xv] on Job 21:29, "Ask any of them that go by the way," says: "Whilst he was speaking of the body of all the wicked, suddenly he turned his speech to Anti-christ the head of all evil-doers."
Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, in capite naturali tria inveniuntur, scilicet ordo, perfectio et virtus influendi. Quantum ergo ad ordinem temporis, non dicitur esse Antichristus caput malorum, quasi eius peccatum praecesserit, sicut praecessit peccatum Diaboli. Similiter etiam non dicitur esse malorum caput propter virtutem influendi. Si enim aliquos sui temporis ad malum sit conversurus, exterius inducendo; non tamen illi qui ante eum fuerunt, ab ipso sunt in malitiam inducti, nec eius malitiam sunt imitati. Unde secundum hoc non posset dici caput omnium malorum, sed aliquorum. Relinquitur igitur quod dicatur caput omnium malorum propter malitiae perfectionem. Unde super illud II Thess. II, ostendens se tanquam sit Deus, dicit Glossa, sicut in Christo omnis plenitudo divinitatis inhabitavit, ita in Antichristo plenitudo omnis malitiae, non quidem ita quod humanitas eius sit assumpta a Diabolo in unitate personae, sicut humanitas Christi a filio Dei; sed quia Diabolus malitiam suam eminentius ei influit suggerendo quam omnibus aliis. Et secundum hoc, omnes alii mali qui praecesserunt sunt quasi quaedam figura Antichristi, secundum illud II Thess. II, mysterium iam operatur iniquitatis.   I answer that, As was said above (Article [1]), in the head are found three things: order, perfection, and the power of influencing. But as regards the order of the body, Anti-christ is not said to be the head of the wicked as if his sin had preceded, as the sin of the devil preceded. So likewise he is not called the head of the wicked from the power of influencing, although he will pervert some in his day by exterior persuasion; nevertheless those who were before him were not beguiled into wickedness by him nor have imitated his wickedness. Hence he cannot be called the head of all the wicked in this way, but of some. Therefore it remains to be said that he is the head of all the wicked by reason of the perfection of his wickedness. Hence, on 2 Thess. 2:4, "Showing himself as if he were God," a gloss says: "As in Christ dwelt the fulness of the Godhead, so in Anti-christ the fulness of all wickedness." Not indeed as if his humanity were assumed by the devil into unity of person, as the humanity of Christ by the Son of God; but that the devil by suggestion infuses his wickedness more copiously into him than into all others. And in this way all the wicked who have gone before are signs of Anti-christ, according to 2 Thess. 2:7, "For the mystery of iniquity already worketh."
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Diabolus et Antichristus non sunt duo capita, sed unum, quia Antichristus dicitur esse caput inquantum plenissime invenitur in eo impressa malitia Diaboli. Unde super illud II Thess. II, ostendens se tanquam sit Deus, dicit Glossa, in ipso erit caput omnium malorum, scilicet Diabolus, qui est rex super omnes filios superbiae. Non autem dicitur in eo esse per unionem personalem; nec per intrinsecam habitationem, quia sola Trinitas menti illabitur, ut dicitur in libro de ecclesiasticis dogmatibus, sed per malitiae effectum.   Reply to Objection 1: The devil and Anti-christ are not two heads, but one; since Anti-christ is called the head, inasmuch as the wickedness of the devil is most fully impressed on him. Hence, on 2 Thess. 2:4, "Showing himself as if he were God," a gloss says: "The head of all the wicked, namely the devil, who is king over all the children of pride will be in him." Now he is said to be in him not by personal union, nor by indwelling, since "the Trinity alone dwells in the mind" (as is said De Eccles. Dogm. lxxxiii), but by the effect of wickedness.
Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut caput Christi est Deus, et tamen ipse est caput Ecclesiae, ut supra dictum est; ita Antichristus est membrum Diaboli, et tamen ipse est caput malorum.   Reply to Objection 2: As the head of Christ is God, and yet He is the Head of the Church, as was said above (Article [1], ad 2), so likewise Anti-christ is a member of the devil and yet is head of the wicked.
Ad tertium dicendum quod Antichristus non dicitur caput omnium malorum propter similitudinem influentiae, sed propter similitudinem perfectionis. In eo enim Diabolus quasi malitiam suam ducet ad caput, per modum quo dicitur aliquis ad caput propositum suum ducere, cum illud perfecerit.   Reply to Objection 3: Anti-christ is said to be the head of all the wicked not by a likeness of influence, but by a likeness of perfection. For in him the devil, as it were, brings his wickedness to a head, in the same way that anyone is said to bring his purpose to a head when he executes it.

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