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Deinde considerandum est de scientia Christi. Circa quam duo consideranda sunt,
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| Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod in Christo non fuerit aliqua scientia praeter divinam. Ad hoc enim necessaria est scientia ut per eam aliqua cognoscantur. Sed Christus per scientiam divinam cognoscebat omnia. Superfluum igitur fuisset quod in eo esset quaedam alia scientia. | Objection 1: It would seem that in Christ there was no knowledge except the Divine. For knowledge is necessary that things may be known thereby. But by His Divine knowledge Christ knew all things. Therefore any other knowledge would have been superfluous in Him. |
| Praeterea, lux minor per maiorem offuscatur. Sed omnis scientia creata comparatur ad scientiam Dei increatam sicut lux minor ad maiorem. Ergo in Christo non refulsit alia scientia quam divina. | Objection 2: Further, the lesser light is dimmed by the greater. But all created knowledge in comparison with the uncreated knowledge of God is as the lesser to the greater light. Therefore there shone in Christ no other knowledge except the Divine. |
| Praeterea, unio humanae naturae ad divinam facta est in persona, ut ex supra dictis patet. Ponitur autem in Christo, secundum quosdam, quaedam scientia unionis, per quam scilicet Christus ea quae ad mysterium incarnationis pertinent plenius scivit quam aliquis alius. Cum ergo unio personalis contineat duas naturas, videtur quod in Christo non sint duae scientiae, sed una tantum scientia pertinens ad utramque naturam. | Objection 3: Further, the union of the human nature with the Divine took place in the Person, as is clear from Question [2], Article [2]. Now, according to some there is in Christ a certain "knowledge of the union," whereby Christ knew what belongs to the mystery of the Incarnation more fully than anyone else. Hence, since the personal union contains two natures, it would seem that there are not two knowledges in Christ, but one only, pertaining to both natures. |
| Sed contra est quod Ambrosius dicit, in libro de incarnatione, Deus in carne perfectionem humanae naturae assumpsit, suscepit sensum hominis, sed non sensum carnis inflatum. Sed ad sensum hominis pertinet scientia creata. Ergo in eo fuit alia scientia praeter divinam. | On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Incarnat. vii): "God assumed the perfection of human nature in the flesh; He took upon Himself the sense of man, but not the swollen sense of the flesh." But created knowledge pertains to the sense of man. Therefore in Christ there was created knowledge. |
| Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut ex supra dictis patet, filius Dei humanam naturam integram assumpsit, idest, non corpus solum, sed etiam animam; non solum sensitivam, sed etiam rationalem. Et ideo oportuit quod haberet scientiam creatam, propter tria. Primo quidem, propter animae perfectionem. Anima enim, secundum se considerata, est in potentia ad intelligibilia cognoscenda, est enim sicut tabula in qua nihil est scriptum; et tamen possibile est in ea scribi, propter intellectum possibilem, in quo est omnia fieri, ut dicitur in III de anima. Quod autem est in potentia, est imperfectum nisi reducatur ad actum. Non autem fuit conveniens ut filius Dei humanam naturam imperfectam assumeret, sed perfectam, utpote qua mediante, totum humanum genus erat ad perfectum reducendum. Et ideo oportuit quod anima Christi esset perfecta per aliquam scientiam, quae esset proprie perfectio eius. Et ideo oportuit in Christo esse aliquam scientiam praeter scientiam divinam. Alioquin anima Christi esset imperfectior omnibus animabus aliorum hominum. Secundo quia, cum quaelibet res sit propter suam operationem, ut dicitur in II de caelo et mundo, frustra haberet Christus animam intellectualem, si non intelligeret secundum illam. Quod pertinet ad scientiam creatam. Tertio, quia aliqua scientia creata pertinet ad animae humanae naturam, scilicet illa per quam naturaliter cognoscimus prima principia, scientiam enim hic large accipimus pro qualibet cognitione intellectus humani. Nihil autem naturalium Christo defuit, quia totam humanam naturam suscepit, ut supra dictum est. Et ideo in sexta synodo damnata est positio negantium in Christo duas esse scientias, vel duas sapientias. | I answer that, As said above (Question [5]), the Son of God assumed an entire human nature, i.e. not only a body, but also a soul, and not only a sensitive, but also a rational soul. And therefore it behooved Him to have created knowledge, for three reasons. First, on account of the soul's perfection. For the soul, considered in itself, is in potentiality to knowing intelligible things. since it is like "a tablet on which nothing is written," and yet it may be written upon through the possible intellect, whereby it may become all things, as is said De Anima iii, 18. Now what is in potentiality is imperfect unless reduced to act. But it was fitting that the Son of God should assume, not an imperfect, but a perfect human nature, since the whole human race was to be brought back to perfection by its means. Hence it behooved the soul of Christ to be perfected by a knowledge, which would be its proper perfection. And therefore it was necessary that there should be another knowledge in Christ besides the Divine knowledge, otherwise the soul of Christ would have been more imperfect than the souls of the rest of men. Secondly, because, since everything is on account of its operation, as stated De Coel. ii, 17, Christ would have had an intellective soul to no purpose if He had not understood by it; and this pertains to created knowledge. Thirdly, because some created knowledge pertains to the nature of the human soul, viz. that whereby we naturally know first principles; since we are here taking knowledge for any cognition of the human intellect. Now nothing natural was wanting to Christ, since He took the whole human nature, as stated above (Question [5]). And hence the Sixth Council [*Third Council of Constantinople, Act. 4] condemned the opinion of those who denied that in Christ there are two knowledges or wisdoms. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Christus cognovit omnia per scientiam divinam operatione increata, quae est ipsa Dei essentia, Dei enim intelligere est sua substantia, ut probatur in XII Metaphys. Unde hic actus non potuit esse animae humanae Christi, cum sit alterius naturae. Si igitur non fuisset in anima Christi alia scientia praeter divinam, nihil cognovisset. Et ita frustra fuisset assumpta, cum res sit propter suam operationem. | Reply to Objection 1: Christ knew all things with the Divine knowledge by an uncreated operation which is the very Essence of God; since God's understanding is His substance, as the Philosopher proves (Metaph. xii, text. 39). Hence this act could not belong to the human soul of Christ, seeing that it belongs to another nature. Therefore, if there had been no other knowledge in the soul of Christ, it would have known nothing; and thus it would have been assumed to no purpose, since everything is on account of its operation. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod, si duo lumina accipiantur eiusdem ordinis, minus offuscatur per maius, sicut lumen solis offuscat lumen candelae, quorum utrumque accipitur in ordine illuminantis. Sed si accipiatur maius in ordine illuminantis et minus in ordine illuminati, minus lumen non offuscatur per maius, sed magis augetur, sicut lumen aeris per lumen solis. Et hoc modo lumen scientiae non offuscatur, sed clarescit in anima Christi per lumen scientiae divinae, quae est lux vera illuminans omnem hominem venientem in hunc mundum, ut dicitur Ioan. I. | Reply to Objection 2: If the two lights are supposed to be in the same order, the lesser is dimmed by the greater, as the light of the sun dims the light of a candle, both being in the class of illuminants. But if we suppose two lights, one of which is in the class of illuminants and the other in the class of illuminated, the lesser light is not dimmed by the greater, but rather is strengthened, as the light of the air by the light of the sun. And in this manner the light of knowledge is not dimmed, but rather is heightened in the soul of Christ by the light of the Divine knowledge, which is "the true light which enlighteneth every man that cometh into this world," as is written Jn. 1:9. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod, ex parte unitorum, ponitur scientia in Christo et quantum ad naturam divinam et quantum ad humanam, ita quod per unionem, secundum quam est eadem hypostasis Dei et hominis, id quod est Dei attribuitur homini, et id quod est hominis attribuitur Deo, ut supra dictum est. Sed ex parte ipsius unionis non potest poni in Christo aliqua scientia. Nam unio illa est ad esse personale, scientia autem non convenit personae nisi ratione alicuius naturae. | Reply to Objection 3: On the part of what are united we hold there is a knowledge in Christ, both as to His Divine and as to His human nature; so that, by reason of the union whereby there is one hypostasis of God and man, the things of God are attributed to man, and the things of man are attributed to God, as was said above (Question [3], Articles [1],6). But on the part of the union itself we cannot admit any knowledge in Christ. For this union is in personal being, and knowledge belongs to person only by reason of a nature. |
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| Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod in Christo non fuerit scientia beatorum vel comprehensorum. Scientia enim beatorum est per participationem divini luminis, secundum illud Psalmi, in lumine tuo videbimus lumen. Sed Christus non habuit lumen divinum tanquam participatum, sed ipsam divinitatem in se habuit substantialiter manentem, secundum illud Coloss. II, in ipso habitat omnis plenitudo divinitatis corporaliter. Ergo in ipso non fuit scientia beatorum. | Objection 1: It would seem that in Christ there was not the knowledge of the blessed or comprehensors. For the knowledge of the blessed is a participation of Divine light, according to Ps. 35:10: "In Thy light we shall see light." Now Christ had not a participated light, but He had the Godhead Itself substantially abiding in Him, according to Col. 2:9: "For in Him dwelleth all the fulness of the Godhead corporeally." Therefore in Christ there was not the knowledge of the blessed. |
| Praeterea, scientia beatorum eos beatos facit, secundum illud Ioan. XVII, haec est vita aeterna, ut cognoscant te, verum Deum, et quem misisti, Iesum Christum. Sed homo ille fuit beatus ex hoc ipso quod fuit Deo unitus in persona, secundum illud Psalmi, beatus quem elegisti et assumpsisti. Non ergo oportet ponere in ipso scientiam beatorum. | Objection 2: Further, the knowledge of the blessed makes them blessed, according to Jn. 17:3: "This is eternal life: that they may know Thee, the only true God, and Jesus Christ Whom Thou hast sent." But this Man was blessed through being united to God in person, according to Ps. 64:5: "Blessed is He Whom Thou hast chosen and taken to Thee." Therefore it is not necessary to suppose the knowledge of the blessed in Him. |
| Praeterea, duplex scientia homini competit, una secundum suam naturam; alia supra suam naturam. Scientia autem beatorum, quae in divina visione consistit, non est secundum naturam hominis, sed supra eius naturam. In Christo autem fuit alia supernaturalis scientia multo fortior et altior, scilicet scientia divina. Non igitur oportuit in Christo esse scientiam beatorum. | Objection 3: Further, to man belongs a double knowledge---one by nature, one above nature. Now the knowledge of the blessed, which consists in the vision of God, is not natural to man, but above his nature. But in Christ there was another and much higher supernatural knowledge, i.e. the Divine knowledge. Therefore there was no need of the knowledge of the blessed in Christ. |
| Sed contra, scientia beatorum in Dei visione vel cognitione consistit. Sed ipse plene cognovit Deum, etiam secundum quod homo, secundum illud Ioan. VIII, scio eum, et sermonem eius servo. Ergo in Christo fuit scientia beatorum. | On the contrary, The knowledge of the blessed consists in the knowledge of God. But He knew God fully, even as He was man, according to Jn. 8:55: "I do know Him, and do keep His word." Therefore in Christ there was the knowledge of the blessed. |
| Respondeo dicendum quod illud quod est in potentia, reducitur in actum per id quod est actu, oportet enim esse calidum id per quod alia calefiunt. Homo autem est in potentia ad scientiam beatorum, quae in visione Dei consistit, et ad eam ordinatur sicut ad finem, est enim creatura rationalis capax illius beatae cognitionis, inquantum est ad imaginem Dei. Ad hunc autem finem beatitudinis homines reducuntur per Christi humanitatem, secundum illud Heb. II, decebat eum propter quem omnia et per quem omnia, qui multos filios in gloriam adduxerat, auctorem salutis eorum per passionem consummari. Et ideo oportuit quod cognitio ipsa in Dei visione consistens excellentissime Christo homini conveniret, quia semper causam oportet esse potiorem causato. | I answer that, What is in potentiality is reduced to act by what is in act; for that whereby things are heated must itself be hot. Now man is in potentiality to the knowledge of the blessed, which consists in the vision of God; and is ordained to it as to an end; since the rational creature is capable of that blessed knowledge, inasmuch as he is made in the image of God. Now men are brought to this end of beatitude by the humanity of Christ, according to Heb. 2:10: "For it became Him, for Whom are all things, and by Whom are all things, Who had brought many children unto glory, to perfect the author of their salvation by His passion." And hence it was necessary that the beatific knowledge, which consists in the vision of God, should belong to Christ pre-eminently, since the cause ought always to be more efficacious than the effect. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod divinitas unita est humanitati Christi secundum personam, et non secundum naturam vel essentiam, sed cum unitate personae remanet distinctio naturarum. Et ideo anima Christi, quae est pars humanae naturae, per aliquod lumen participatum a natura divina perfecta est ad scientiam beatam, qua Deus per essentiam videtur. | Reply to Objection 1: The Godhead is united to the manhood of Christ in Person, not in essence or nature; yet with the unity of Person remains the distinction of natures. And therefore the soul of Christ, which is a part of human nature, through a light participated from the Divine Nature, is perfected with the beatific knowledge whereby it sees God in essence. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod ex ipsa unione homo ille est beatus beatitudine increata, sicut ex unione est Deus. Sed praeter beatitudinem increatam, oportuit in natura humana Christi esse quandam beatitudinem creatam, per quam anima eius in ultimo fine humanae naturae constitueretur. | Reply to Objection 2: By the union this Man is blessed with the uncreated beatitude, even as by the union He is God; yet besides the uncreated beatitude it was necessary that there should be in the human nature of Christ a created beatitude, whereby His soul was established in the last end of human nature. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod visio seu scientia beata est quodammodo supra naturam animae rationalis, inquantum scilicet propria virtute ad eam pervenire non potest. Alio vero modo est secundum naturam ipsius, inquantum scilicet per naturam suam est capax eius, prout scilicet ad imaginem Dei facta est, ut supra dictum est. Sed scientia increata est omnibus modis supra naturam animae humanae. | Reply to Objection 3: The beatific vision and knowledge are to some extent above the nature of the rational soul, inasmuch as it cannot reach it of its own strength; but in another way it is in accordance with its nature, inasmuch as it is capable of it by nature, having been made to the likeness of God, as stated above. But the uncreated knowledge is in every way above the nature of the human soul. |
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| Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod in Christo non sit alia scientia indita, praeter scientiam beatam. Omnis enim alia scientia creata comparatur ad scientiam beatam sicut imperfectum ad perfectum. Sed, praesente perfecta cognitione, excluditur cognitio imperfecta, sicut manifesta visio faciei excludit aenigmaticam visionem fidei ut patet I Cor. XIII. Cum igitur in Christo fuerit scientia beata, ut dictum est, videtur quod non potuerit in eo alia esse scientia indita. | Objection 1: It would seem that there was not in Christ another infused knowledge besides the beatific knowledge. For all other knowledge compared to the beatific knowledge is like imperfect to perfect. But imperfect knowledge is removed by the presence of perfect knowledge, as the clear "face-to-face" vision removes the enigmatical vision of faith, as is plain from 1 Cor. 13:10,12. Since, therefore, in Christ there was the beatific knowledge, as stated above (Article [2]), it would seem that there could not be any other imprinted knowledge. |
| Praeterea, imperfectior modus cognitionis disponit ad perfectiorem sicut opinio, quae est per syllogismum dialecticum, disponit ad scientiam, quae est per syllogismum demonstrativum. Habita autem perfectione, non est ulterius necessaria dispositio, sicut, habito termino, non est necessarius motus. Cum igitur cognitio quaecumque alia creata comparetur ad cognitionem beatam sicut imperfectum ad perfectum, et sicut dispositio ad terminum, videtur quod, cum Christus habuerit cognitionem beatam, quod non fuerit ei necessarium habere aliam cognitionem. | Objection 2: Further, an imperfect mode of cognition disposes towards a more perfect, as opinion, the result of dialectical syllogisms, disposes towards science, which results from demonstrative syllogisms. Now, when perfection is reached, there is no further need of the disposition, even as on reaching the end motion is no longer necessary. Hence, since every created cognition is compared to beatific cognition, as imperfect to perfect and as disposition to its term, it seems that since Christ had beatific knowledge, it was not necessary for Him to have any other knowledge. |
| Praeterea, sicut materia corporalis est in potentia ad formam sensibilem, ita intellectus possibilis est in potentia ad formam intelligibilem. Sed materia corporalis non potest simul recipere duas formas sensibiles, unam perfectiorem et aliam minus perfectam. Ergo nec anima potest simul recipere duplicem scientiam, unam perfectiorem et aliam minus perfectam. Et sic idem quod prius. | Objection 3: Further, as corporeal matter is in potentiality to sensible forms, so the possible intellect is in potentiality to intelligible forms. Now corporeal matter cannot receive two forms at once! one more perfect and the other less perfect. Therefore neither can the soul receive a double knowledge at once, one more perfect and the other less perfect; and hence the same conclusion as above. |
| Sed contra est quod dicitur Coloss. II, quod in Christo sunt omnes thesauri sapientiae et scientiae absconditi. | On the contrary, It is written (Col. 2:3) that in Christ "are hid all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge." |
| Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, decebat quod natura humana assumpta a verbo Dei, imperfecta non esset. Omne autem quod est in potentia, est imperfectum nisi reducatur ad actum. Intellectus autem possibilis humanus est in potentia ad omnia intelligibilia. Reducitur autem ad actum per species intelligibiles, quae sunt formae quaedam completivae ipsius, ut patet ex his quae dicuntur in III de anima. Et ideo oportet in Christo scientiam ponere inditam, inquantum per verbum Dei animae Christi, sibi personaliter unitae, impressae sunt species intelligibiles ad omnia ad quae est intellectus possibilis in potentia, sicut etiam per verbum Dei impressae sunt species intelligibiles menti angelicae in principio creationis rerum, ut patet per Augustinum, super Gen. ad Litt. Et ideo, sicut in Angelis, secundum eundem Augustinum, ponitur duplex cognitio, una scilicet matutina, per quam cognoscunt res in verbo, et alia vespertina, per quam cognoscunt res in propria natura per species sibi inditas; ita, praeter scientiam divinam increatam, est in Christo, secundum eius animam, scientia beata, qua cognoscit verbum et res in verbo; et scientia indita sive infusa, per quam cognoscit res in propria natura per species intelligibiles humanae menti proportionatas. | I answer that, As stated above (Article [1]), it was fitting that the human nature assumed by the Word of God should not be imperfect. Now everything in potentiality is imperfect unless it be reduced to act. But the passive intellect of man is in potentiality to all intelligible things. and it is reduced to act by intelligible species, which are its completive forms, as is plain from what is said De Anima iii, 32,38. And hence we must admit in the soul of Christ an infused knowledge, inasmuch as the Word of God imprinted upon the soul of Christ, which is personally united to Him, intelligible species of all things to which the possible intellect is in potentiality; even as in the beginning of the creation of things, the Word of God imprinted intelligible species upon the angelic mind, as is clear from Augustine (Gen. ad lit. ii, 8). And therefore, even as in the angels, according to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. iv, 22,24,30), there is a double knowledge---one the morning knowledge, whereby they know things in the Word; the other the evening knowledge, whereby they know things in their proper natures by infused species; so likewise, besides the Divine and uncreated knowledge in Christ, there is in His soul a beatific knowledge, whereby He knows the Word, and things in the Word; and an infused or imprinted knowledge, whereby He knows things in their proper nature by intelligible species proportioned to the human mind. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod visio imperfecta fidei in sui ratione includit oppositum manifestae visionis, eo quod de ratione fidei est ut sit de non visis, ut in secunda parte habitum est. Sed cognitio quae est per species inditas, non includit aliquid oppositum cognitionis beatae. Et ideo non est eadem ratio utrobique. | Reply to Objection 1: The imperfect vision of faith is essentially opposed to manifest vision, seeing that it is of the essence of faith to have reference to the unseen, as was said above (SS, Question [1], Article [4]). But cognition by infused species includes no opposition to beatific cognition. Therefore there is no parity. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod dispositio se habet ad perfectionem dupliciter, uno modo, sicut via ducens in perfectionem; alio modo, sicut effectus a perfectione procedens. Per calorem enim disponitur materia ad suscipiendum formam ignis, qua tamen adveniente, calor non cessat, sed remanet quasi quidam effectus talis formae. Et similiter opinio, ex syllogismo dialectico causata, est via ad scientiam, quae per demonstrationem acquiritur, qua tamen acquisita, potest remanere cognitio quae est per syllogismum dialecticum, quasi consequens scientiam demonstrativam quae est per causam; quia ille qui cognoscit causam, ex hoc etiam magis potest cognoscere signa probabilia, ex quibus procedit dialecticus syllogismus. Et similiter in Christo simul cum scientia beatitudinis manet scientia indita, non quasi via ad beatitudinem, sed quasi per beatitudinem confirmata. | Reply to Objection 2: Disposition is referred to perfection in two ways: first, as a way leading to perfection; secondly, as an effect proceeding from perfection; thus matter is disposed by heat to receive the form of fire, and, when this comes, the heat does not cease, but remains as an effect of this form. So, too, opinion caused by a dialectical syllogism is a way to knowledge, which is acquired by demonstration, yet, when this has been acquired, there may still remain the knowledge gained by the dialectical syllogism, following, so to say, the demonstrative knowledge, which is based on the cause, since he who knows the cause is thereby enabled the better to understand the probable signs from which dialectical syllogisms proceed. So likewise in Christ, together with the beatific knowledge, there still remains infused knowledge, not as a way to beatitude, but as strengthened by beatitude. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod cognitio beata non fit per speciem quae sit similitudo divinae essentiae, vel eorum quae in divina essentia cognoscuntur, ut patet ex his quae in prima parte dicta sunt, sed talis cognitio est ipsius divinae essentiae immediate, per hoc quod ipsa essentia divina unitur menti beatae sicut intelligibile intelligenti. Quae quidem essentia divina est forma excedens proportionem cuiuslibet creaturae. Unde nihil prohibet quin, cum hac forma superexcedente, simul insint rationali menti species intelligibiles proportionatae suae naturae. | Reply to Objection 3: The beatific knowledge is not by a species, that is a similitude of the Divine Essence, or of whatever is known in the Divine Essence, as is plain from what has been said in the FP, Question [12], Article [2]; but it is a knowledge of the Divine Essence immediately, inasmuch as the Divine Essence itself is united to the beatified mind as an intelligible to an intelligent being; and the Divine Essence is a form exceeding the capacity of any creature whatsoever. Hence, together with this super-exceeding form, there is nothing to hinder from being in the rational mind, intelligible species, proportioned to its nature. |
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| Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod in Christo non fuerit aliqua scientia experimentalis acquisita. Quidquid enim Christo conveniens fuit, excellentissime habuit. Sed Christus non habuit excellentissime scientiam acquisitam, non enim institit studio litterarum, quo perfectissime scientia acquiritur; dicitur enim Ioan. VII, mirabantur Iudaei, dicentes, quomodo hic litteras scit, cum non didicerit? Ergo videtur quod in Christo non fuerit aliqua scientia acquisita. | Objection 1: It would seem that in Christ there was no empiric and acquired knowledge. For whatever befitted Christ, He had most perfectly. Now Christ did not possess acquired knowledge most perfectly, since He did not devote Himself to the study of letters, by which knowledge is acquired in its perfection; for it is said (Jn. 7:15): "The Jews wondered, saying: How doth this Man know letters, having never learned?" Therefore it seems that in Christ there was no acquired knowledge. |
| Praeterea, ei quod est plenum, non potest aliquid superaddi. Sed potentia animae Christi fuit impleta per species intelligibiles divinitus inditas, ut dictum est. Non ergo potuerunt supervenire eius animae aliquae species acquisitae. | Objection 2: Further, nothing can be added to what is full. But the power of Christ's soul was filled with intelligible species divinely infused, as was said above (A. 3). Therefore no acquired species could accrue to His soul. |
| Praeterea, in eo qui iam habitum scientiae habet, per ea quae a sensu accipit, non acquiritur novus habitus, quia sic duae formae eiusdem speciei simul essent in eodem, sed habitus qui prius inerat, confirmatur et augetur. Cum ergo Christus habuerit habitum scientiae inditae, non videtur quod per ea quae sensu percepit, aliquam aliam scientiam acquisierit. | Objection 3: Further, he who already has the habit of knowledge, acquires no new habit, through what he receives from the senses (otherwise two forms of the same species would be in the same thing together); but the habit which previously existed is strengthened and increased. Therefore, since Christ had the habit of infused knowledge, it does not seem that He acquired a new knowledge through what He perceived by the senses. |
| Sed contra est quod Heb. V dicitur, cum esset filius Dei, didicit ex his quae passus est, obedientiam, Glossa, idest, expertus est. Fuit ergo in Christo aliqua experimentalis scientia, quae est scientia acquisita. | On the contrary, It is written (Heb. 5:8): "Whereas . . . He was the Son of God, He learned obedience by the things which He suffered," i.e. "experienced," says a gloss. Therefore there was in the soul of Christ an empiric knowledge, which is acquired knowledge. |
| Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut ex supra dictis patet, nihil eorum quae Deus in nostra natura plantavit, defuit humanae naturae assumptae a verbo Dei. Manifestum est autem quod in humana natura Deus plantavit non solum intellectum possibilem, sed etiam intellectum agentem. Unde necesse est dicere quod in anima Christi non solum intellectus possibilis, sed etiam intellectus agens fuerit. Si autem in aliis Deus et natura nihil frustra fecerunt, ut philosophus dicit, in I de caelo et mundo, multo minus in anima Christi aliquid fuit frustra. Frustra autem est quod non habet propriam operationem, cum omnis res sit propter suam operationem, ut dicitur in II de caelo et mundo. Propria autem operatio intellectus agentis est facere species intelligibiles actu, abstrahendo eas a phantasmatibus, unde dicitur in III de anima quod intellectus agens est quo est omnia facere. Sic igitur necesse est dicere quod in Christo fuerunt aliquae species intelligibiles per actionem intellectus agentis in intellectu possibili eius receptae. Quod est esse in ipso scientiam acquisitam, quam quidam experimentalem nominant. Et ideo, quamvis aliter alibi scripserim, dicendum est in Christo scientiam acquisitam fuisse. Quae proprie est scientia secundum modum humanum, non solum ex parte recipientis subiecti, sed etiam ex parte causae agentis, nam talis scientia ponitur in Christo secundum lumen intellectus agentis, quod est humanae naturae connaturale. Scientia autem infusa attribuitur animae humanae secundum lumen desuper infusum, qui modus cognoscendi est proportionatus naturae angelicae. Scientia vero beata, per quam ipsa Dei essentia videtur, est propria et connaturalis soli Deo, ut in prima parte dictum est. | I answer that, As is plain from Article [1], nothing that God planted in our nature was wanting to the human nature assumed by the Word of God. Now it is manifest that God planted in human nature not only a passive, but an active intellect. Hence it is necessary to say that in the soul of Christ there was not merely a passive, but also an active intellect. But if in other things God and nature make nothing in vain, as the Philosopher says (De Coel. i, 31; ii, 59), still less in the soul of Christ is there anything in vain. Now what has not its proper operation is useless, as is said in De Coel. ii, 17. Now the proper operation of the active intellect is to make intelligible species in act, by abstracting them from phantasms; hence, it is said (De Anima iii, 18) that the active intellect is that "whereby everything is made actual." And thus it is necessary to say that in Christ there were intelligible species received in the passive intellect by the action of the active intellect---which means that there was acquired knowledge in Him, which some call empiric. And hence, although I wrote differently (Sent. iii, D, xiv, Article [3]; D, xviii, Article [3]), it must be said that in Christ there was acquired knowledge, which is properly knowledge in a human fashion, both as regards the subject receiving and as regards the active cause. For such knowledge springs from Christ's active intellect, which is natural to the human soul. But infused knowledge is attributed to the soul, on account of a light infused from on high, and this manner of knowing is proportioned to the angelic nature. But the beatific knowledge, whereby the very Essence of God is seen, is proper and natural to God alone, as was said in the FP, Question [12], Article [4]. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, cum duplex sit modus acquirendi scientiam, scilicet inveniendo et addiscendo, modus qui est per inventionem est praecipuus, modus autem qui est per disciplinam est secundarius. Unde dicitur in I Ethic., ille quidem est optimus qui omnia per seipsum intelligit, bonus autem et ille qui bene dicenti obediet. Et ideo Christo magis competebat habere scientiam acquisitam per inventionem quam per disciplinam, praesertim cum ipse daretur a Deo omnibus in doctorem, secundum illud Ioel II, laetamini in domino Deo vestro, quia dedit vobis doctorem iustitiae. | Reply to Objection 1: Since there is a twofold way of acquiring knowledge---by discovery and by being taught---the way of discovery is the higher, and the way of being taught is secondary. Hence it is said (Ethic. i, 4): "He indeed is the best who knows everything by himself: yet he is good who obeys him that speaks aright." And hence it was more fitting for Christ to possess a knowledge acquired by discovery than by being taught, especially since He was given to be the Teacher of all, according to Joel 2:23: "Be joyful in the Lord your God, because He hath given you a Teacher of justice." |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod humana mens duplicem habet respectum. Unum quidem ad superiora. Et secundum hunc respectum, anima Christi fuit plena per scientiam inditam. Alius autem respectus eius est ad inferiora, idest ad phantasmata, quae sunt nata movere mentem humanam per virtutem intellectus agentis. Oportuit autem quod etiam secundum hunc respectum anima Christi scientia impleretur, non quin prima plenitudo menti humanae sufficeret secundum seipsam; sed oportebat eam perfici etiam secundum comparationem ad phantasmata. | Reply to Objection 2: The human mind has two relations---one to higher things, and in this respect the soul of Christ was full of the infused knowledge. The other relation is to lower things, i.e. to phantasms, which naturally move the human mind by virtue of the active intellect. Now it was necessary that even in this respect the soul of Christ should be filled with knowledge, not that the first fulness was insufficient for the human mind in itself, but that it behooved it to be also perfected with regard to phantasms. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod alia ratio est de habitu acquisito, et de habitu infuso. Nam habitus scientiae acquiritur per comparationem humanae mentis ad phantasmata, unde secundum eandem rationem non potest alius habitus iterato acquiri. Sed habitus scientiae infusae est alterius rationis, utpote a superiori descendens in animam, non secundum proportionem phantasmatum. Et ideo non est eadem ratio de utroque habitu. | Reply to Objection 3: Acquired and infused habits are not to be classed together; for the habit of knowledge is acquired by the relation of the human mind to phantasms; hence, another habit of the same kind cannot be again acquired. But the habit of infused knowledge is of a different nature, as coming down to the soul from on high, and not from phantasms. And hence there is no parity between these habits. |