St. Thomas Aquinas
The Summa Theologica
Translated by
Fathers of the English Dominican Province
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OF THE QUALITY OF THOSE SOULS WHO DEPART THIS LIFE WITH ORIGINAL SIN ONLY (TWO ARTICLES)
We must next consider the various qualities of souls that are stripped
of their bodies, according to their respective states; and first we shall
treat of the souls which depart this life with original sin only.
Under this head there are two points of inquiry:
(1) Whether these souls suffer from a bodily fire, and are inflicted
with punishment by fire?
(2) Whether these souls suffer from a spiritual torment within
themselves?
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Whether those souls which depart with original sin alone, suffer from a bodily fire, and are punished by fire?
Objection 1: It would seem that souls which depart with none but original sin,
suffer from a bodily fire and are punished by fire. For Augustine
[*Fulgentius, De Fide ad Petrum, xxvii] says: "Hold firmly and doubt not
that children who depart this life without the sacrament of Baptism will
be punished everlastingly." Now punishment denotes sensible pain.
Therefore souls which depart this life with original sin alone, suffer
from a bodily fire and are tormented with the pain of fire.
Objection 2: Further, a greater fault deserves a greater punishment. Now
original sin is greater than venial, because it contains more aversion,
since it deprives its subject of grace, whereas venial sin is compatible
with grace; and again because original sin is punished eternally, whereas
venial sin is punished temporally. Seeing then that venial sin is
deserving of the punishment of fire, much more so is original sin.
Objection 3: Further, sins are more severely punished after this life than
during lifetime, for in this life there is room for mercy. Now, sensible
punishment corresponds to original sin in this life, for children who
have only original sin are justly subject to many sensible punishments.
Therefore sensible punishment is due to it after this life.
Objection 4: Further, even as in actual sin there is aversion and conversion, so in original sin there is something corresponding to aversion, namely the privation of original justice, and something corresponding to conversion, namely concupiscence. Now the punishment of fire is due to actual sin by reason of the conversion. Therefore it is also due to original sin by reason of concupiscence.
Objection 5: Further, after the resurrection the bodies of children will be
either passible or impassible. If they be impassible---and no human body
can be impassible except either on account of the gift of impassibility
(as in the blessed) or by reason of original justice (as in the state of
innocence)---it follows that the bodies of children will either have the
gift of impassibility, and thus will be glorious, so that there will be
no difference between baptized and non-baptized children, which is
heretical, or else they will have original justice, and thus will be
without original sin, and will not be punished for original sin, which is
likewise heretical. If, on the other hand, they be passible, since
everything passible suffers of necessity in the presence of the active,
it follows that in the presence of active sensible bodies they will
suffer sensible punishment.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Enchiridion xxiii) that the mildest
punishment of all will be for those who are burdened with original sin
only. But this would not be so, if they were tormented with sensible
punishment, because the pain of hell fire is most grievous. Therefore
they will not suffer sensible punishment.
Further, the grief of sensible punishment corresponds to the pleasure of
sin (Apoc. 18:7): "As much as she hath glorified herself and lived in
delicacies, so much torment and sorrow give ye to her." But there is no
pleasure in original sin, as neither is there operation, for pleasure
follows operation, as stated in Ethic. x, 4. Therefore punishment by fire
is not due to original sin.
Further, Gregory Nazianzen in his fortieth sermon, which is entitled on
Holy Baptism, distinguishes three classes of unbaptized persons: those
namely who refuse to be baptized, those who through neglect have put off
being baptized until the end of life and have been surprised by sudden
death, and those who, like infants, have failed to receive it through no
fault of theirs. Of the first he says that they will be punished not only
for their other sins, but also for their contempt of Baptism; of the
second, that they will be punished, though less severely than the first,
for having neglected it; and of the last he says that "a just and eternal
Judge will consign them neither to heavenly glory nor to the eternal
pains of hell, for although they have not been signed with Baptism, they
are without wickedness and malice, and have suffered rather than caused
their loss of Baptism." He also gives the reason why, although they do
not reach the glory of heaven, they do not therefore suffer the eternal
punishment suffered by the damned: "Because there is a mean between the
two, since he who deserves not honor and glory is not for that reason
worthy of punishment, and on the other hand he who is not deserving of
punishment is not for that reason worthy of glory and honor."
I answer that, Punishment should be proportionate to fault, according to
the saying of Isaias (27:8), "In measure against measure, when it shall
be cast off, thou shalt judge it." Now the defect transmitted to us
through our origin, and having the character of a sin does not result
from the withdrawal or corruption of a good consequent upon human nature
by virtue of its principles, but from the withdrawal or corruption of
something that had been superadded to nature. Nor does this sin belong to
this particular man, except in so far as he has such a nature, that is
deprived of this good, which in the ordinary course of things he would
have had and would have been able to keep. Wherefore no further
punishment is due to him, besides the privation of that end to which the
gift withdrawn destined him, which gift human nature is unable of itself
to obtain. Now this is the divine vision; and consequently the loss of
this vision is the proper and only punishment of original sin after
death: because, if any other sensible punishment were inflicted after
death for original sin, a man would be punished out of proportion to his
guilt, for sensible punishment is inflicted for that which is proper to
the person, since a man undergoes sensible punishment in so far as he
suffers in his person. Hence, as his guilt did not result from an action
of his own, even so neither should he be punished by suffering himself,
but only by losing that which his nature was unable to obtain. On the
other hand, those who are under sentence for original sin will suffer no
loss whatever in other kinds of perfection and goodness which are
consequent upon human nature by virtue of its principles.
Reply to Objection 1: In the authority quoted punishment denotes, not pain of
sense, but only pain of loss, which is the privation of the divine
vision, even as in Scripture the word "fire" is often wont to signify any
kind of punishment.
Reply to Objection 2: Of all sins original sin is the least, because it is the
least voluntary; for it is voluntary not by the will of the person, but
only by the will of the origin of our nature. But actual sin, even
venial, is voluntary by the will of the person in which it is; wherefore
a lighter punishment is due to original than to venial sin. Nor does it
matter that original sin is incompatible with grace; because privation of
grace has the character, not of sin, but of punishment, except in so far
as it is voluntary: for which reason that which is less voluntary is less
sinful. Again it matters not that actual venial sin is deserving of
temporal punishment, since this is accidental, for as much as he who
falls venially has sufficient grace to attenuate the punishment. For if
venial sin were in a person without grace, it would be punished eternally.
Reply to Objection 3: There is no parity between pain of sense before and after
death, since before death the pain of sense results from the power of the
natural agent, whether the pain of sense be interior as fever or the
like, or exterior as burning and so forth. Whereas after death nothing
will act by natural power, but only according to the order of divine
justice, whether the object of such action be the separate soul, on which
it is clear that fire cannot act naturally, or the body after
resurrection, since then all natural action will cease, through the
cessation of the first movable which is the cause of all bodily movement
and alteration.
Reply to Objection 4: Sensible pain corresponds to sensible pleasure, which is in
the conversion of actual sin: whereas habitual concupiscence, which is in
original sin, has no pleasure. Hence, sensible pain does not correspond
thereto as punishment.
Reply to Objection 5: The bodies of children will be impassible, not through
their being unable in themselves to suffer, but through the lack of an
external agent to act upon them: because, after the resurrection, no body
will act on another, least of all so as to induce corruption by the
action of nature, but there will only be action to the effect of
punishing them by order of the divine justice. Wherefore those bodies to
which pain of sense is not due by divine justice will not suffer
punishment. On the other hand, the bodies of the saints will be
impassible, because they will lack the capability of suffering; hence
impassibility in them will be a gift, but not in children.
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Whether these same souls suffer spiritual affliction on account of the state in which they are?
Objection 1: It would seem that the souls in question suffer spiritual
affliction on account of the state wherein they are, because as
Chrysostom says (Hom. xxiii in Matth.), the punishment of God in that
they will be deprived of seeing God will be more painful than their being
burned in hell fire. Now these souls will be deprived of seeing God.
Therefore they will suffer spiritual affliction thereby.
Objection 2: Further, one cannot, without suffering, lack what one wishes to
have. But these souls would wish to have the divine vision, else their
will would be actually perverse. Therefore since they are deprived of it,
seemingly they also suffer.
Objection 3: Further, if it be said that they do not suffer, because they know
that through no fault of theirs they are deprived thereof, on the
contrary: Freedom from fault does not lessen but increases the pain of
punishment: for a man does not grieve less for that he is disinherited or
deprived of a limb through no fault of his. Therefore these souls
likewise, albeit deprived of so great a good through no fault of theirs,
suffer none the less.
Objection 4: Further, as baptized children are in relation to the merit of
Christ, so are unbaptized children to the demerit of Adam. But baptized
children receive the reward of eternal life by virtue of Christ's merit.
Therefore the unbaptized suffer pain through being deprived of eternal
life on account of Adam's demerit.
Objection 5: Further, separation from what we love cannot be without pain. But
these children will have natural knowledge of God, and for that very
reason will love Him naturally. Therefore since they are separated from
Him for ever, seemingly they cannot undergo this separation without pain.
On the contrary, If unbaptized children have interior sorrow after
death, they will grieve either for their sin or for their punishment. If
for their sin, since they cannot be further cleansed from that sin, their
sorrow will lead them to despair. Now sorrow of this kind in the damned
is the worm of conscience. Therefore these children will have the worm of
conscience, and consequently theirs would not be the mildest punishment,
as Augustine says it is [*See Article [1], "On the contrary"]. If, on the other
hand, they grieve for their punishment, it follows, since their
punishment is justly inflicted by God, that their will opposes itself to
divine justice, and thus would be actually inordinate, which is not to be
granted. Therefore they will feel no sorrow.
Further, right reason does not allow one to be disturbed on account of
what one was unable to avoid; hence Seneca proves (Ep. lxxxv, and De ira
ii, 6) that "a wise man is not disturbed." Now in these children there is
right reason deflected by no actual sin. Therefore they will not be
disturbed for that they undergo this punishment which they could nowise
avoid.
I answer that, on this question there are three opinions. Some say that
these children will suffer no pain, because their reason will be so much
in the dark that they will not know that they lack what they have lost.
It, however, seems improbable that the soul freed from its bodily burden
should ignore things which, to say the least, reason is able to explore,
and many more besides. Hence others say that they have perfect knowledge
of things subject to natural reason, and know God, and that they are
deprived of seeing Him, and that they feel some kind of sorrow on this
account but that their sorrow will be mitigated, in so far as it was not
by their will that they incurred the sin for which they are condemned.
Yet this again would seem improbable, because this sorrow cannot be
little for the loss of so great a good, especially without the hope of
recovery: wherefore their punishment would not be the mildest. Moreover
the very same reason that impugns their being punished with pain of
sense, as afflicting them from without, argues against their feeling
sorrow within, because the pain of punishment corresponds to the pleasure
of sin; wherefore, since original sin is void of pleasure, its punishment
is free of all pain. Consequently others say that they will know
perfectly things subject to natural knowledge, and both the fact of their
being deprived of eternal life and the reason for this privation, and
that nevertheless this knowledge will not cause any sorrow in them. How
this may be possible we must explore.
Accordingly, it must be observed that if one is guided by right reason
one does not grieve through being deprived of what is beyond one's power
to obtain, but only through lack of that which, in some way, one is
capable of obtaining. Thus no wise man grieves for being unable to fly
like a bird, or for that he is not a king or an emperor, since these
things are not due to him; whereas he would grieve if he lacked that to
which he had some kind of claim. I say, then, that every man who has the
use of free-will is adapted to obtain eternal life, because he can
prepare himself for grace whereby to merit eternal life [*Cf. FS, Question [109],
Articles [5],6]; so that if he fail in this, his grief will be very great, since
he has lost what he was able to possess. But children were never adapted
to possess eternal life, since neither was this due to them by virtue of
their natural principles, for it surpasses the entire faculty of nature,
nor could they perform acts of their own whereby to obtain so great a
good. Hence they will nowise grieve for being deprived of the divine
vision; nay, rather will they rejoice for that they will have a large
share of God's goodness and their own natural perfections. Nor can it be
said that they were adapted to obtain eternal life, not indeed by their
own action, but by the actions of others around them, since they could be
baptized by others, like other children of the same condition who have
been baptized and obtained eternal life: for this is of superabundant
grace that one should be rewarded without any act of one's own. Wherefore
the lack of such a grace will not cause sorrow in children who die
without Baptism, any more than the lack of many graces accorded to others
of the same condition makes a wise man to grieve.
Reply to Objection 1: In those who, having the use of free-will, are damned for
actual sin, there was aptitude to obtain eternal life, but not in
children, as stated above. Consequently there is no parity between the
two.
Reply to Objection 2: Although the will may be directed both to the possible and
to the impossible as stated in Ethic. iii, 5, an ordinate and complete
will is only of things which in some way are proportionate to our
capability; and we grieve if we fail to obtain this will, but not if we
fail in the will that is of impossibilities, and which should be called
"velleity" [*Cf. FS, Question [13], Article [5], ad 1; TP, Question [21], Article [4]] rather than
"will"; for one does not will such things absolutely, but one would if
they were possible.
Reply to Objection 3: Everyone has a claim to his own inheritance or bodily
members, wherefore it is not strange that he should grieve at their loss,
whether this be through his own or another's fault: hence it is clear
that the argument is not based on a true comparison.
Reply to Objection 4: The gift of Christ surpasses the sin of Adam, as stated in
Rm. 5:15, seqq. Hence it does not follow that unbaptized children have as
much of evil as the baptized have of good.
Reply to Objection 5: Although unbaptized children are separated from God as
regards the union of glory, they are not utterly separated from Him: in
fact they are united to Him by their share of natural goods, and so will
also be able to rejoice in Him by their natural knowledge and love.
Latin — Supplementum
pr.
Primo: utrum peccato originali post mortem debeatur poena sensibilis in illis qui in originali tantum peccato decedunt.
Secundo: utrum aliquem interiorem dolorem sentiant in anima spiritualem qui pro peccato originali tantum puniuntur.
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Nec obstat quod originale non compatitur secum gratiam. Privatio enim gratiae non habet rationem culpae, sed poenae, nisi inquantum ex voluntate est. Unde ubi minus est de voluntario, minus est de culpa.
Similiter etiam non obstat quod peccato actuali veniali temporalis poena debetur. Quia hoc est per accidens: inquantum decedens in veniali tantum, gratiam habet, virtute cuius poena purgata est. Si autem veniale peccatum sine gratia, in aliquo esset, perpetuam poenam haberet.
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Si dicatur quod non affliguntur quia sciunt se non culpa propria ea esse privatos: contra. Immunitas a culpa dolorem poenae non minuit, sed auget: non enim, si aliquis non propria culpa exheredatur vel mutilatur, propter hoc minus dolet. Ergo etiam, quamvis pueri non propria culpa tanto bono priventur, ex hoc eorum dolor non tollitur.
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Et ideo alii dicunt quod in eis est perfecta cognitio eorum quae naturali cognitioni subiacent, et cognoscunt Deum, et se eius visione privatos esse, et ex hoc aliquem dolorem sentient: tamen mitigabitur eorum dolor, inquantum non propria voluntate culpam incurrerunt pro qua damnati sunt. Hoc etiam probabile non videtur. Quia talis dolor parvus esse non potest de tanti boni amissione, et praecipue sine spe recuperationis. Unde poena eorum non esset mitissima. Praeterea, omnino eadem ratione qua dolore sensibili et exterius affligente non punientur, etiam dolorem interiorem non sentient. Quia dolor poenae delectationi culpae respondet. Unde, delectatione remota a culpa originali, omnis dolor ab eius poena excluditur.
Et ideo alii dicunt quod cognitionem perfectam habebunt eorum quae naturali cognitioni subiacent, et vita aeterna se privatos esse cognoscent, et causam quare ab ea exclusi sunt, nec tamen ex hoc aliquo modo affligentur. Quod qualiter esse posset, videndum est.
Sciendum ergo quod ex hoc quod caret aliquis eo quod suam proportionem excedit, non affligitur, si sit rectae rationis, sed tantum ex hoc quod caret eo ad quod aliquo modo proportionatus fuit: sicut nullus sapiens homo affligitur de hoc quod non potest volare sicut avis, vel quia non est rex vel imperator, cum sibi non sit debitum; affligeretur autem si privaretur eo ad quod habendum aliquo modo aptitudinem habuit. Dico ergo quod omnis homo usum liberi arbitrii habens proportionatus est ad vitam aeternam consequendam: quia potest se ad gratiam praeparare, per quam vitam aeternam merebitur. Et ideo, si ab hoc deficiant, maximus erit dolor eis, quia amittunt illud quod suum esse possibile fuit. Pueri autem nunquam fuerunt proportionati ad hoc quod vitam aeternam haberent: quia nec eis debebatur ex principii naturae, cum omnem facultatem naturae excedat; nec actus proprios habere potuerunt, quibus tantum bonum consequerentur. Et ideo nihil omnino dolebunt de carentia visionis divinae: immo magis gaudebunt de hoc quod participabunt multum de divina bonitate et perfectionibus naturalibus.
Nec potest dici quod fuerunt proportionati ad vitam aeternam consequendam, quamvis non per actionem suam, tamen per actionem aliorum circa eos, quia potuerunt ab aliis baptizari, sicut et multi pueri eiusdem conditionis baptizati vitam aeternam consecuti sunt. Hoc est enim superexcedentis gratiae ut aliquis sine actu proprio praemietur. Unde defectus talis gratiae non magis tristitiam causat in pueris decedentibus non baptizatis, quam in sapientibus hoc quod eis multae gratiae non fiunt quae aliis similibus factae sunt.