Skip to text
JonHaines
Thomas Aquinas / Texts and commentaries
 

St. Thomas Aquinas

The Summa Theologica

(Benziger Bros. edition, 1947)
Translated by
Fathers of the English Dominican Province

 

Index  [<< | >>]
Supplement  [<< | >>]
Question: 21  [<< | >>]


OF THE DEFINITION, CONGRUITY AND CAUSE OF EXCOMMUNICATION (FOUR ARTICLES)


   We must now treat of excommunication: we shall consider: (1) the definition, congruity and cause of excommunication; (2) who has the power to excommunicate; (3) communication with excommunicated persons; (4) absolution from excommunication.

   Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:

    (1) Whether excommunication is suitably defined?

    (2) Whether the Church should excommunicate anyone?

    (3) Whether anyone should be excommunicated for inflicting temporal harm?

    (4) Whether an excommunication unjustly pronounced has any effect?


 

Index  [<< | >>]
Supplement  [<< | >>]
Question: 21  [<< | >>]
Article: 1  [<< | >>]


Whether excommunication is suitably defined as separation from the communion of the Church, etc?


  Objection 1: It would seem that excommunication is unsuitably defined by some thus: "Excommunication is separation from the communion of the Church, as to fruit and general suffrages." For the suffrages of the Church avail for those for whom they are offered. But the Church prays for those who are outside the Church, as, for instance, for heretics and pagans. Therefore she prays also for the excommunicated, since they are outside the Church, and so the suffrages of the Church avail for them.

  Objection 2: Further, no one loses the suffrages of the Church except by his own fault. Now excommunication is not a fault, but a punishment. Therefore excommunication does not deprive a man of the general suffrages of the Church.

  Objection 3: Further, the fruit of the Church seems to be the same as the Church's suffrages, for it cannot mean the fruit of temporal goods, since excommunication does not deprive a man of these. Therefore there is no reason for mentioning both.

  Objection 4: Further, there is a kind of excommunication called minor*, by which man is not deprived of the suffrages of the Church. [*Minor excommunication is no longer recognized by Canon Law.] Therefore this definition is unsuitable.

  I answer that, When a man enters the Church by Baptism, he is admitted to two things, viz. the body of the faithful and the participation of the sacraments: and this latter presupposes the former, since the faithful are united together in the participation of the sacraments. Consequently a person may be expelled from the Church in two ways. First, by being deprived merely of the participation of the sacraments, and this is the minor excommunication. Secondly, by being deprived of both, and this is the major excommunication, of which the above is the definition. Nor can there be a third, consisting in the privation of communion with the faithful, but not of the participation of the sacraments, for the reason already given, because, to wit, the faithful communicate together in the sacraments. Now communion with the faithful is twofold. One consists in spiritual things, such as their praying for one another, and meeting together for the reception of sacred things; while another consists in certain legitimate bodily actions. These different manners of communion are signified in the verse which declares that those who are excommunicate are deprived of---

   "os, orare, vale, communio, mensa." "Os," i.e. we must not give them tokens of goodwill; "orare," i.e. we must not pray with them; "vale," we must not give them marks of respect; "communio," i.e. we must not communicate with them in the sacraments; "mensa," i.e. we must not take meals with them. Accordingly the above definition includes privation of the sacraments in the words "as to the fruit," and from partaking together with the faithful in spiritual things, in the words, "and the general prayers of the Church."

   Another definition is given which expresses the privation of both kinds of acts, and is as follows: "Excommunication is the privation of all lawful communion with the faithful."

  Reply to Objection 1: Prayers are said for unbelievers, but they do not receive the fruit of those prayers unless they be converted to the faith. In like manner prayers may be offered up for those who are excommunicated, but not among the prayers that are said for the members of the Church. Yet they do not receive the fruit so long as they remain under the excommunication, but prayers are said for them that they may receive the spirit of repentance, so that they may be loosed from excommunication.

  Reply to Objection 2: One man's prayers profit another in so far as they can reach to him. Now the action of one man may reach to another in two ways. First, by virtue of charity which unites all the faithful, making them one in God, according to Ps. 118:63: "I am a partaker with all them that fear Thee." Now excommunication does not interrupt this union, since no man can be justly excommunicated except for a mortal sin, whereby a man is already separated from charity, even without being excommunicated. An unjust excommunication cannot deprive a man of charity, since this is one of the greatest of all goods, of which a man cannot be deprived against his will. Secondly, through the intention of the one who prays, which intention is directed to the person he prays for, and this union is interrupted by excommunication, because by passing sentence of excommunication, the Church severs a man from the whole body of the faithful, for whom she prays. Hence those prayers of the Church which are offered up for the whole Church, do not profit those who are excommunicated. Nor can prayers be said for them among the members of the Church as speaking in the Church's name, although a private individual may say a prayer with the intention of offering it for their conversion.

  Reply to Objection 3: The spiritual fruit of the Church is derived not only from her prayers, but also from the sacraments received and from the faithful dwelling together.

  Reply to Objection 4: The minor excommunication does not fulfill all the conditions of excommunication but only a part of them, hence the definition of excommunication need not apply to it in every respect, but only in some.


 

Index  [<< | >>]
Supplement  [<< | >>]
Question: 21  [<< | >>]
Article: 2  [<< | >>]


Whether the Church should excommunicate anyone?


  Objection 1: It would seem that the Church ought not to excommunicate anyone, because excommunication is a kind of curse, and we are forbidden to curse (Rm. 12:14). Therefore the Church should not excommunicate.

  Objection 2: Further, the Church Militant should imitate the Church Triumphant. Now we read in the epistle of Jude (verse 9) that "when Michael the Archangel disputing with the devil contended about the body of Moses, he durst not bring against him the judgment of railing speech, but said: The Lord command thee." Therefore the Church Militant ought not to judge any man by cursing or excommunicating him.

  Objection 3: Further, no man should be given into the hands of his enemies, unless there be no hope for him. Now by excommunication a man is given into the hands of Satan, as is clear from 1 Cor. 5:5. Since then we should never give up hope about anyone in this life, the Church should not excommunicate anyone.

  On the contrary, The Apostle (1 Cor. 5:5) ordered a man to be excommunicated.

   Further, it is written (Mt. 18:17) about the man who refuses to hear the Church: "Let him be to thee as the heathen or publican." But heathens are outside the Church. Therefore they also who refuse to hear the Church, should be banished from the Church by excommunication.

  I answer that, The judgment of the Church should be conformed to the judgment of God. Now God punishes the sinner in many ways, in order to draw him to good, either by chastising him with stripes, or by leaving him to himself so that being deprived of those helps whereby he was kept out of evil, he may acknowledge his weakness, and humbly return to God Whom he had abandoned in his pride. In both these respects the Church by passing sentence of excommunication imitates the judgment of God. For by severing a man from the communion of the faithful that he may blush with shame, she imitates the judgment whereby God chastises man with stripes; and by depriving him of prayers and other spiritual things, she imitates the judgment of God in leaving man to himself, in order that by humility he may learn to know himself and return to God.

  Reply to Objection 1: A curse may be pronounced in two ways: first, so that the intention of the one who curses is fixed on the evil which he invokes or pronounces, and cursing in this sense is altogether forbidden. Secondly, so that the evil which a man invokes in cursing is intended for the good of the one who is cursed, and thus cursing is sometimes lawful and salutary: thus a physician makes a sick man undergo pain, by cutting him, for instance, in order to deliver him from his sickness.

  Reply to Objection 2: The devil cannot be brought to repentance, wherefore the pain of excommunication cannot do him any good.

  Reply to Objection 3: From the very fact that a man is deprived of the prayers of the Church, he incurs a triple loss, corresponding to the three things which a man acquires through the Church's prayers. For they bring an increase of grace to those who have it, or merit grace for those who have it not; and in this respect the Master of the Sentences says (Sent. iv, D, 18): "The grace of God is taken away by excommunication." They also prove a safeguard of virtue; and in this respect he says that "protection is taken away," not that the excommunicated person is withdrawn altogether from God's providence, but that he is excluded from that protection with which He watches over the children of the Church in a more special way. Moreover, they are useful as a defense against the enemy, and in this respect he says that "the devil receives greater power of assaulting the excommunicated person, both spiritually and corporally." Hence in the early Church, when men had to be enticed to the faith by means of outward signs (thus the gift of the Holy Ghost was shown openly by a visible sign), so too excommunication was evidenced by a person being troubled in his body by the devil. Nor is it unreasonable that one, for whom there is still hope, be given over to the enemy, for he is surrendered, not unto damnation, but unto correction, since the Church has the power to rescue him from the hands of the enemy, whenever he is willing.


 

Index  [<< | >>]
Supplement  [<< | >>]
Question: 21  [<< | >>]
Article: 3  [<< | >>]


Whether anyone should be excommunicated for inflicting temporal harm?


  Objection 1: It would seem that no man should be excommunicated for inflicting a temporal harm. For the punishment should not exceed the fault. But the punishment of excommunication is the privation of a spiritual good, which surpasses all temporal goods. Therefore no man should be excommunicated for temporal injuries.

  Objection 2: Further, we should render to no man evil for evil, according to the precept of the Apostle (Rm. 12:17). But this would be rendering evil for evil, if a man were to be excommunicated for doing such an injury. Therefore this ought by no means to be done.

  On the contrary, Peter sentenced Ananias and Saphira to death for keeping back the price of their piece of land (Acts 5:1-10). Therefore it is lawful for the Church to excommunicate for temporal injuries.

  I answer that, By excommunication the ecclesiastical judge excludes a man, in a sense, from the kingdom. Wherefore, since he ought not to exclude from the kingdom others than the unworthy, as was made clear from the definition of the keys (Question [17], Article [2]), and since no one becomes unworthy, unless, through committing a mortal sin, he lose charity which is the way leading to the kingdom, it follows that no man should be excommunicated except for a mortal sin. And since by injuring a man in his body or in his temporalities, one may sin mortally and act against charity, the Church can excommunicate a man for having inflicted temporal injury on anyone. Yet, as excommunication is the most severe punishment, and since punishments are intended as remedies, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. ii), and again since a prudent physician begins with lighter and less risky remedies, therefore excommunication should not be inflicted, even for a mortal sin, unless the sinner be obstinate, either by not coming up for judgment, or by going away before judgment is pronounced, or by failing to obey the decision of the court. For then, if, after due warning, he refuse to obey, he is reckoned to be obstinate, and the judge, not being able to proceed otherwise against him, must excommunicate him.

  Reply to Objection 1: A fault is not measured by the extent of the damage a man does, but by the will with which he does it, acting against charity. Wherefore, though the punishment of excommunication exceeds the harm done, it does not exceed the measure of the sin.

  Reply to Objection 2: When a man is corrected by being punished, evil is not rendered to him, but good: since punishments are remedies, as stated above.


 

Index  [<< | >>]
Supplement  [<< | >>]
Question: 21  [<< | >>]
Article: 4  [<< | >>]


Whether an excommunication unjustly pronounced has any effect?


  Objection 1: It would seem that an excommunication which is pronounced unjustly has no effect at all. Because excommunication deprives a man of the protection and grace of God, which cannot be forfeited unjustly. Therefore excommunication has no effect if it be unjustly pronounced.

  Objection 2: Further, Jerome says (on Mt. 16:19: "I will give to thee the keys"): "It is a pharisaical severity to reckon as really bound or loosed, that which is bound or loosed unjustly." But that severity was proud and erroneous. Therefore an unjust excommunication has no effect.

  On the contrary, According to Gregory (Hom. xxvi in Evang.), "the sentence of the pastor is to be feared whether it be just or unjust." Now there would be no reason to fear an unjust excommunication if it did not hurt. Therefore, etc.

  I answer that, An excommunication may be unjust for two reasons. First, on the part of its author, as when anyone excommunicates through hatred or anger, and then, nevertheless, the excommunication takes effect, though its author sins, because the one who is excommunicated suffers justly, even if the author act wrongly in excommunicating him. Secondly, on the part of the excommunication, through there being no proper cause, or through the sentence being passed without the forms of law being observed. In this case, if the error, on the part of the sentence, be such as to render the sentence void, this has no effect, for there is no excommunication; but if the error does not annul the sentence, this takes effect, and the person excommunicated should humbly submit (which will be credited to him as a merit), and either seek absolution from the person who has excommunicated him, or appeal to a higher judge. If, however, he were to contemn the sentence, he would "ipso facto" sin mortally.

   But sometimes it happens that there is sufficient cause on the part of the excommunicator, but not on the part of the excommunicated, as when a man is excommunicated for a crime which he has not committed, but which has been proved against him: in this case, if he submit humbly, the merit of his humility will compensate him for the harm of excommunication.

  Reply to Objection 1: Although a man cannot lose God's grace unjustly, yet he can unjustly lose those things which on our part dispose us to receive grace. for instance, a man may be deprived of the instruction which he ought to have. It is in this sense that excommunication is said to deprive a man of God's grace, as was explained above (Article [2], ad 3).

  Reply to Objection 2: Jerome is speaking of sin not of its punishments, which can be inflicted unjustly by ecclesiastical superiors.


This document converted to HTML on Fri Jan 02 19:10:49 1998.

Latin — Supplementum

pr.

Consequenter videndum est de excommunicatione. De qua primo considerandum est de definitione excommunicationis, et congruitate, et causa; secundo, de eo qui potest excommunicare et excommunicari; tertio, de participatione cum excommunicatis; quarto, de absolutione ab excommunicatione.

Circa primum quaeruntur quattuor.

Primo: utrum convenienter excommunicatio definiatur.

Secundo: utrum Ecclesia debeat aliquem excommunicare.

Tertio: utrum aliquis pro aliquo temporali damno sit excommunicandus.

Quarto: utrum excommunicatio iniuste lata aliquem effectum habeat.

a. 1 arg. 1

Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod incompetens sit haec definitio excommunicationis a quibusdam posita: excommunicatio est separatio a communione Ecclesiae quoad fructum et suffragia generalia. Suffragia enim Ecclesiae valent eis pro quibus fiunt. Sed Ecclesia orat pro eis qui extra Ecclesiam sunt: sicut pro haereticis et paganis. Ergo etiam pro excommunicatis, qui extra Ecclesiam sunt. Et sic eis suffragia Ecclesiae valent.
B: (Rom 12:14) [b:Rom 12:14]

a. 1 arg. 2

Praeterea, nullus amittit suffragia Ecclesiae nisi per culpam. Sed excommunicatio non est culpa, sed poena. Ergo per excommunicationem non separatur aliquis a suffragiis Ecclesiae communibus.

a. 1 arg. 3

Praeterea, fructus Ecclesiae non videtur esse aliud quam suffragia: non enim potest intelligi de fructu bonorum temporalium, quia haec excommunicatis non auferuntur. Ergo inconvenienter utrumque ponitur.
B: (1Cor 5:5) [b:1Cor 5:5]

a. 1 arg. 4

Praeterea, excommunicatio minor quaedam excommunicatio est. Sed per eam homo non perdit suffragia Ecclesiae. Ergo definitio non est conveniens.
B: (1Cor 5:5) [b:1Cor 5:5]

a. 1 co.

Respondeo dicendum quod ille qui per baptismum in Ecclesia ponitur, ad duo adscribitur: scilicet ad coetum fidelium; et ad participationem sacramentorum. Et hoc secundum praesupponit primum: quia in sacramentis participandis etiam fideles communicant. Et ideo aliquis potest extra Ecclesiam fieri per excommunicationem dupliciter. Uno modo, ita quod separaretur tantum a participatione sacramentorum. Et haec erit excommunicatio minor. Alio modo, ita quod excludatur ab utroque. Et sic erit excommunicatio maior, quae hic definitur. Non autem potest esse tertium, scilicet quod excludatur a communione fidelium et non a participatione sacramentorum, ratione iam dicta: quia scilicet fideles in sacramentis communicant. Sed communicatio fidelium est duplex: quaedam in spiritualibus, sicut mutuae orationes, et conventus ad sacra percipienda; quaedam in corporalibus actibus legitimis. Qui quidem legitimi actus et licita communio his versibus continentur: Si pro delictis anathema quis efficiatur: Os, orare, vale, communio, mensa negatur. Os scilicet, ne osculum detur; orare, ne cum excommunicatis oremus; vale, ne salutentur; communio, ne scilicet in sacramentis cum ipsis aliquis communicet; mensa negatur, ne aliquis cum eis comedat.

Praemissa ergo definitio importat separationem a sacramentis, in hoc quod dicit, quantum ad fructum; et a communione fidelium quantum ad spiritualia, in hoc quod dicit, et suffragia Ecclesiae communia.

Alia autem definitio invenitur quae datur secundum separationem ab utrisque actibus, quae talis est: excommunicatio est a qualibet licita communione vel legitimo actu separatio.
B: (Matt 18:17) [b:Matt 18:17]

a. 1 ad 1

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod pro infidelibus oratur, sed ipsi orationis fructum non percipiunt nisi ad fidem convertantur. Similiter et pro excommunicatis orari potest: quamvis non inter orationes quae pro membris Ecclesiae fiunt. Et tamen fructum non percipiunt quandiu in excommunicatione manent: sed oratur ut detur eis spiritus poenitentiae, ut ab excommunicatione solvantur.

a. 1 ad 2

Ad secundum dicendum quod suffragia alicuius valent alicui secundum quod ei continuantur. Potest tamen actio unius alteri continuari dupliciter. Uno modo, ex vi caritatis, quae omnes fideles connectit ut sint unum in Deo: sicut dicitur in Psalmo 118: particeps ego sum, etc. Et hanc continuationem excommunicatio non intercipit. Quia iuste quis excommunicari non potest nisi pro culpa mortali, per quam a caritate iam divisus est, etiam si non excommunicetur. Iniusta autem excommunicatio caritatem alicui auferte non potest: cum sit de maximis bonis, quae non possunt alicui invito auferri.

Alio modo, per intentionem suffragia facientis, quae in aliquem fertur pro quo fiunt. Et hanc continuationem excommunicatio intercipit: quia Ecclesia per excommunicationis sententiam separat excommunicatos ab universitate fidelium, pro quibus suffragia facit; unde suffragia Ecclesiae ei non prosunt, quae pro tota Ecclesia fiunt. Nec ex persona Ecclesiae, oratio pro eis inter membra Ecclesiae fieri potest: quamvis aliqua persona privata possit ad eius conversionem aliquod suffragium per intentionem dirigere.

a. 1 ad 3

Ad tertium dicendum quod fructus spiritualis Ecclesiae non solum est ex suffragiis, sed etiam ex perceptione sacramentorum et ex convictu fidelium.

a. 1 ad 4

Ad quartum dicendum quod minor excommunicatio non habet perfectam rationem excommunicationis, sed aliquid ipsius participat. Et ideo non oportet quod, totaliter ei excommunicationis definitio conveniat, sed solum quoad aliquid.

a. 2 arg. 1

Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Ecclesia nullum debeat excommunicare. Quia excommunicatio maledictio quaedam est. Sed Rom. 12 prohibemur maledicere. Ergo Ecclesia excommunicare non debet.

a. 2 arg. 2

Praeterea, Ecclesia, militans debet imitari triumphantem. Sed, ut in Epistola Iudae legitur, Michael, cum altercaretur cum diabolo de Moysi corpore, non est ausus iudicium inferre blasphemiae, sed ait: Imperet tibi Deus. Ergo nec Ecclesia militans debet alicui iudicium maledictionis et excommunicationis inferre.
B: (Rom 12:17) [b:Rom 12:17]

a. 2 arg. 3

Praeterea, nullus est in manum hostis tradendus nisi omnino desperatus. Sed per excommunicationem traditur aliquis in manum Satanae: ut patet I Cor. 5. Cum ergo de nemine sit desperandum in vita ista, Ecclesia nullum debet excommunicare.
B: (Acts 5:1-10) [b:Acts 5:1-10]

a. 2 s. c. 1

Sed contra: Est quod Apostolus, I Cor. 5, mandat quendam excommunicari.

a. 2 arg. 4

Praeterea, Matth. 18 dicitur, de illo qui Ecclesiam audire contemnit: sit tibi sicut ethnicus et publicanus. Sed ethnici sunt extra Ecclesiam. Ergo illi qui Ecclesiam audire contemnunt per excommunicationem extra Ecclesiam sunt ponendi.

a. 2 co.

Respondeo dicendum quod iudicium Ecclesiae conforme debet esse iudicio Dei. Deus autem peccatores multipliciter punit, ut ad bonum eos trahat: uno modo, flagellis castigando; alio modo, hominem sibi relinquendo, ut, auxiliis subtractis quibus a malo praepediebatur, suam infirmitatem cognoscat, et humilis ad Deum redeat, a quo superbus discesserat. Et quantum ad utrumque Ecclesia in excommunicationis sententia imitatur divinum iudicium. Inquantum enim eum a communione fidelium separat ut erubescat, imitatur divinum iudicium quo per flagella castigat. Inquantum autem a suffragiis et aliis spiritualibus separat, imitatur divinum iudicium quo hominem sibi relinquit, ut per humilitatem seipsum cognoscens ad Deum redeat.

a. 2 ad 1

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod maledictio potest esse dupliciter. Uno modo, ita quod in malo quod irrogat vel dicit, per intentionem sistat. Et sic maledictio omnibus modis est prohibita. Alio modo, ita quod malum, quod quidem maledicendo imprecatur, ad bonum illius ordinet qui maledicitur. Et sic maledictio quandoque est licita et salutifera: sicut etiam medicus quandoque nocumentum infert infirmo, ut sectionem, per quam ab infirmitate liberetur.

a. 2 ad 2

Ad secundum dicendum quod diabolus incorrigibilis est: et ideo non susceptibilis alicuius boni per excommunicationis poenam.

a. 2 ad 3

Ad tertium dicendum quod ex hoc ipso quod aliquis suffragiis Ecclesiae privatur, triplex incommodum incurrit, per tria quae quis ex suffragiis Ecclesiae consequitur. Valent enim ad augmentum gratiae eis qui habent, vel ad merendum eis qui non habent. Et quantum ad hoc Magister Sententiarum dicit quod gratia Dei per excommunicationem subtrahitur.

Valent etiam ad custodiam virtutis. Et quantum ad hoc dicit quod protectio subtrahitur: non quod omnino a Dei providentia excludantur, sed ab illa protectione qua filios Ecclesiae specialiori modo custodit. Valent etiam ad defendendum ab hoste. Et quantum ad hoc dicit quod diabolo maior potestas faciendi in ipsum datur, et spiritualiter et corporaliter.

Unde in primitiva Ecclesia, quando oportebat per signa homines ad fidem invitare, sicut Spiritus Sancti donum visibili signo manifestabatur, ita et excommunicatio corporali vexatione a diabolo innotescebat. Nec est inconveniens si ille qui non est desperatus hosti datur: quia non datur ei quasi damnandus, sed quasi corrigendus; cum in potestate Ecclesiae sit ex eius manu ipsum cum voluerit eripere.

a. 3 arg. 1

Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod nullus pro temporali damno debeat excommunicari. Quia poena non debet excedere culpam. Sed poena excommunicationis est privatio alicuius boni spiritualis, quod omnibus bonis temporalibus praeeminet. Ergo pro temporalibus nullus est excommunicandus.

a. 3 arg. 2

Praeterea, nulli malum pro malo reddere debemus, secundum Apostoli praeceptum. Sed hoc esset malum pro malo reddere, si pro tali damno quis excommunicatur. Ergo nullo modo hoc debet fieri.
B: (Matt 16:19) [b:Matt 16:19]

a. 3 s. c. 1

Sed contra est quod Petrus Ananiam et Saphiram pro defraudatione pretii agri sententia mortis damnavit. Ergo et Ecclesiae licet pro temporalibus damnis excommunicare.

a. 3 co.

Respondeo dicendum quod per excommunicationem iudex ecclesiasticus excommunicatos excludit a regno quodammodo. Unde, cum non debeat a regno excludere nisi indignos, ut ex definitione clavis patuit; nec aliquis reddatur indignus nisi per peccatum mortale caritatem amiserit, quae est via ducens ad regnum: ideo nullus excommunicari debet nisi pro peccato mortali. Et quia in damnificando aliquem corporaliter vel in rebus temporalibus aliquis mortaliter peccat; et contra caritatem facit, ideo pro damno temporali illato Ecclesiae aliquem excommunicare potest.

Sed quia excommunicatio est gravissima poenarum; poenae autem medicinae sunt, secundum Philosophum, in II Ethic.; sapientis autem medici est a levioribus incipere medicinis et minus periculosis: ideo excommunicatio infligi non debet, etiam pro peccato mortali, nisi contumax fuerit, vel non veniendo ad iudicium, vel ante terminationem iudicii sine licentia recedendo, vel determinationi non parendo. Tunc enim, post quam monitus fuerit, si obedire contempserit, contumax reputatur; et excommunicari debet a iudice, iam non habente quod contra ipsum faciat amplius.
R: Q.. 17 a. 2[t:suppl q. 17 a. 2]

a. 3 ad 1

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod culpae quantitas non mensuratur ex nocumento quod quis facit, sed ex voluntate qua quis facit, contra caritatem agens. Et ideo, quamvis poena excommunicationis excedat nocumentum, non tamen excedit quantitatem culpae.

a. 3 ad 2

Ad secundum dicendum quod, cum aliquis per poenam aliquam corrigitur, non redditur ei malum, sed bonum: quia poenae medicinae sunt, ut dictum est.

a. 4 arg. 1

Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod excommunicatio iniuste lata nullo modo effectum habeat. Quia per excommunicationem protectio et gratia Dei subtrahitur, quae non iniuste subtrahi potest. Ergo excommunicatio iniuste lata non habet effectum.

a. 4 arg. 2

Praeterea, Hieronymus dicit quod est de supercilio Pharisaeorum aestimare esse ligatum vel solutum qui ligatur vel solvitur iniuste. Sed eorum supercilium erat superbum et erroneum. Ergo excommunicatio iniusta nullum habet effectum.

a. 4 s. c. 1

Sed contra: Secundum Gregorium, praecepta pastoris, sive iusta sive iniusta, timenda sunt. Non autem essent timenda nisi aliquid nocerent etiam iniusta. Ergo, etc.

a. 4 co.

Respondeo dicendum quod excommunicatio potest dici iniusta dupliciter. Uno modo, ex parte excommunicantis: sicut cum ex odio vel ex ira aliquis excommunicat. Et tunc excommunicatio nihilominus habet effectum suum, quaevis ille qui excommunicat peccet: quia iste iuste patitur, quamvis ille iniuste faciat.

Alio modo, ex parte excommunicationis ipsius: vel quia causa excommunicationis est indebita; vel quia infertur sententia iuris ordine praetermisso. Et tunc, si sit talis error ex parte sententiae qui sententiam nullam esse faciat, non habet effectum: quia non est excommunicatio. Si autem non annullet sententiam, habet effectum suum. Et debet excommunicatus humiliter obedire, et erit ei ad meritum; vel absolutionem petere debet ab excommunicante; vel ad superiorem iudicem recurrere. Si autem contemneret, eo ipso mortaliter peccaret.

Contingit autem quandoque quod est debita causa ex parte excommunicantis quae non est debita ex parte excommunicati: sicut cum quis pro falso crimine in iudicio probato excommunicatur. Et tunc, si humiliter sustinet, humilitatis mentum recompensat excommunicationis damnum.

a. 4 ad 1

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, quamvis homo gratiam Dei iniuste amittere non possit, potest tamen iniuste amittere illa quae ex parte nostra sunt quae ad gratiam Dei disponunt: sicut patet si subtrahatur alicui doctrinae verbum quod ei debetur. Et hoc modo excommunicatio gratiam Dei subtrahere dicitur, ut in praedictis patet.
R: Q.. 21 a. 2[t:suppl q. 21 a. 2]

a. 4 ad 2

Ad secundum dicendum quod Hieronymus loquitur quantum ad culpas, et non quantum ad poenas: quae possunt etiam iniuste infligi a rectoribus ecclesiarum.