Skip to text
JonHaines
Thomas Aquinas / Texts and commentaries
 

St. Thomas Aquinas

The Summa Theologica

(Benziger Bros. edition, 1947)
Translated by
Fathers of the English Dominican Province

 

Index  [<< | >>]
Supplement  [<< | >>]
Question: 78  [<< | >>]


OF THE TERM "WHEREFROM" OF THE RESURRECTION (THREE ARTICLES)


   We must now consider the term "wherefrom" of the resurrection; and under this head there are three points of inquiry:

    (1) Whether death is the term "wherefrom" of the resurrection in every case?

    (2) Whether ashes are, or dust?

    (3) Whether this dust has a natural inclination towards the soul?


 

Index  [<< | >>]
Supplement  [<< | >>]
Question: 78  [<< | >>]
Article: 1  [<< | >>]


Whether death will be the term "wherefrom" of the resurrection in all cases?


  Objection 1: It would seem that death will not be the term "wherefrom" of the resurrection in all cases. Because some shall not die but shall be clothed with immortality: for it is said in the creed that our Lord "will come to judge the living and the dead." Now this cannot refer to the time of judgment, because then all will be alive; therefore this distinction must refer to the previous time, and consequently all will not die before the judgment.

  Objection 2: Further, a natural and common desire cannot be empty and vain, but is fulfilled in some cases. Now according to the Apostle (2 Cor. 5:4) it is a common desire that "we would not be unclothed but clothed upon." Therefore there will be some who will never be stripped of the body by death, but will be arrayed in the glory of the resurrection.

  Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (Enchiridion cxv) that the four last petitions of the Lord's prayer refer to the present life: and one of them is: "Forgive us our debts [Douay: 'trespasses']." Therefore the Church prays that all debts may be forgiven her in this life. Now the Church's prayer cannot be void and not granted: "If you ask the Father anything in My name, He will give it you" (Jn. 16:23). Therefore at some time of this life the Church will receive the remission of all debts: and one of the debts to which we are bound by the sin of our first parent is that we be born in original sin. Therefore at some time God will grant to the Church that men be born without original sin. But death is the punishment of original sin. Therefore at the end of the world there will be some men who will not die: and so the same conclusion follows.

  Objection 4: Further, the wise man should always choose the shortest way. Now the shortest way is for the men who shall be found living to be transferred to the impassibility of the resurrection, than for them to die first, and afterwards rise again from death to immortality. Therefore God Who is supremely wise will choose this way for those who shall be found living.

  On the contrary, It is written (1 Cor. 15:36): "That which thou sowest is not quickened except it die first," and he is speaking of the resurrection of the body as compared to the seed.

   Further, it is written (1 Cor. 15:22): "As in Adam all die, so also in Christ all shall be made alive." Now all shall be made alive in Christ. Therefore all shall die in Adam: and so all shall rise again from death.

  I answer that, The saints differ in speaking on this question, as may be seen in the text (Sent. iv, D, 43). However, the safer and more common opinion is that all shall die and rise again from death: and this for three reasons. First, because it is more in accord with Divine justice, which condemned human nature for the sin of its first parent, that all who by the act of nature derive their origin from him should contract the stain of original sin, and consequently be the debtors of death. Secondly, because it is more in agreement with Divine Scripture which foretells the resurrection of all; and resurrection is not predicted properly except of that "which has fallen and perished," as the Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iv). Thirdly, because it is more in harmony with the order of nature where we find that what is corrupted and decayed is not renewed except by means of corruption: thus vinegar does not become wine unless the vinegar be corrupted and pass into the juice of the grape. Wherefore since human nature has incurred the defect of the necessity of death, it cannot return to immortality save by means of death. It is also in keeping with the order of nature for another reason, because, as it is stated in Phys. viii, 1, "the movement of heaven is as a kind of life to all existing in nature," just as the movement of the heart is a kind of life of the whole body: wherefore even as all the members become dead on the heart ceasing to move, so when the heavenly movement ceases nothing can remain living with that life which was sustained by the influence of that movement. Now such is the life by which we live now: and therefore it follows that those who shall live after the movement of the heaven comes to a standstill must depart from this life.

  Reply to Objection 1: This distinction of the dead and the living does not apply to the time itself of the judgment, nor to the whole preceding time, since all who are to be judged were living at some time, and dead at some time: but it applies to that particular time which shall precede the judgment immediately, when, to wit, the signs of the judgment shall begin to appear.

  Reply to Objection 2: The perfect desire of the saints cannot be void; but nothing prevents their conditional desire being void. Such is the desire whereby we would not be "unclothed," but "clothed upon," namely if that be possible: and this desire is called by some a "velleity."

  Reply to Objection 3: It is erroneous to say that any one except Christ is conceived without original sin, because those who would be conceived without original sin would not need the redemption which was wrought by Christ, and thus Christ would not be the Redeemer of all men [*See Editor's note which follows TP, Question [26]]. Nor can it be said that they needed not this redemption, because it was granted to them that they should be conceived without sin. For, this grace was vouchsafed---either to their parents, that the sin of nature might be healed in them (because so long as that sin remained they were unable to beget without communicating original sin)---or to nature itself which was healed. Now we must allow that every one needs the redemption of Christ personally, and not only by reason of nature, and one cannot be delivered from an evil or absolved from a debt unless one incur the debt or incur the evil: and consequently all could not reap in themselves the fruit of the Lord's prayer, unless all were born debtors and subject to evil. Hence the forgiveness of debts or delivery from evil cannot be applied to one who is born without a debt or free from evil, but only to one who is born with a debt and is afterwards delivered by the grace of Christ. Nor does it follow, if it can be asserted without error that some die not, that they are born without original sin, although death is a punishment of original sin; because God can of His mercy remit the punishment which one has incurred by a past fault, as He forgave the adulterous woman without punishment (Jn. 8): and in like manner He can deliver from death those who have contracted the debt of death by being born in original sin. And thus it does not follow that if they die not, therefore they were born without original sin.

  Reply to Objection 4: The shortest way is not always the one to be chosen, but only when it is more or equally adapted for attaining the end. It is not so here, as is clear from what we have said.


 

Index  [<< | >>]
Supplement  [<< | >>]
Question: 78  [<< | >>]
Article: 2  [<< | >>]


Whether all will rise again from ashes?


  Objection 1: It would seem that all will not rise again from ashes. For Christ's resurrection is the exemplar of ours. Yet His resurrection was not from ashes, for His flesh saw not corruption according to Ps. 15:10; Acts 2:27,31. Therefore neither will all rise again from ashes.

  Objection 2: Further, the human body is not always burned. Yet a thing cannot be reduced to ashes unless it be burned. Therefore not all will rise again from ashes.

  Objection 3: Further, the body of a dead man is not reduced to ashes immediately after death. But some will rise again at once after death, according to the text (Sent. iv, D, 43), namely those who will be found living. Therefore all will not rise again from ashes.

  Objection 4: Further, the term "wherefrom" corresponds to the term "whereto." Now the term "whereto" of the resurrection is not the same in the good as in the wicked: "We shall all indeed rise again, but we shall not all be changed" (1 Cor. 15:51). Therefore the term "wherefrom" is not the same. And thus, if the wicked rise again from ashes, the good will not rise again from ashes.

  On the contrary, Haymo says (on Rm. 5:10, "For if when we were enemies"): "All who are born in original sin lie under the sentence: Earth thou art and into earth shalt thou go." Now all who shall rise again at the general resurrection were born in original sin, either at their birth within the womb or at least at their birth from the womb. Therefore all will rise again from ashes.

   Further, there are many things in the human body that do not truly belong to human nature. But all these will be removed. Therefore all bodies must needs be reduced to ashes.

  I answer that, The same reasons by which we have shown (Article [1]) that all rise again from death prove also that at the general resurrection all will rise again from ashes, unless the contrary, such as the hastening of their resurrection, be vouchsafed to certain persons by a special privilege of grace. For just as holy writ foretells the resurrection, so does it foretell the reformation of bodies (Phil. 3:21). And thus it follows that even as all die that the bodies of all may be able truly to rise again, so will the bodies of all perish that they may be able to be reformed. For just as death was inflicted by Divine justice as a punishment on man, so was the decay of the body, as appears from Gn. 3:19, "Earth thou art and into earth shalt thou go [*Vulg.: 'Dust thou art and into dust thou shalt return']."

   Moreover the order of nature requires the dissolution not only of the union of soul and body, but also of the mingling of the elements: even as vinegar cannot be brought back to the quality of wine unless it first be dissolved into the prejacent matter: for the mingling of the elements is both caused and preserved by the movement of the heaven, and when this ceases all mixed bodies will be dissolved into pure elements.

  Reply to Objection 1: Christ's resurrection is the exemplar of ours as to the term "whereto," but not as to the term "wherefrom."

  Reply to Objection 2: By ashes we mean all the remains that are left after the dissolution of the body---for two reasons. First, because it was the common custom in olden times to burn the bodies of the dead, and to keep the ashes, whence it became customary to speak of the remains of a human body as ashes. Secondly, on account of the cause of dissolution, which is the flame of the fomes [*Cf. FS, Question [82], Article [3]] whereby the human body is radically infected. Hence, in order to be cleansed of this infection the human body must needs be dissolved into its primary components: and when a thing is destroyed by fire it is said to be reduced to ashes. wherefore the name of ashes is given to those things into which the human body is dissolved.

  Reply to Objection 3: The fire that will cleanse the face of the earth will be able to reduce suddenly to ashes the bodies of those that will be found living, even as it will dissolve other mixed bodies into their prejacent matter.

  Reply to Objection 4: Movement does not take its species from its term "wherefrom" but from its term "whereto." Hence the resurrection of the saints which will be glorious must needs differ from the resurrection of the wicked which will not be glorious, in respect of the term "whereto," and not in respect of the term "wherefrom." And it often happens that the term "whereto" is not the same, whereas the term "wherefrom" is the same---for instance, a thing may be moved from blackness to whiteness and to pallor.


 

Index  [<< | >>]
Supplement  [<< | >>]
Question: 78  [<< | >>]
Article: 3  [<< | >>]


Whether the ashes from which the human body will be restored have any natural inclination towards the soul which will be united to them?


  Objection 1: It would seem that the ashes from which the human body will be restored will have a natural inclination towards the soul which will be united to them. For if they had no inclination towards the soul, they would stand in the same relation to that soul as other ashes. Therefore it would make no difference whether the body that is to be united to that soul were restored from those ashes or from others: and this is false.

  Objection 2: Further, the body is more dependent on the soul than the soul on the body. Now the soul separated from the body is still somewhat dependent on the body, wherefore its movement towards God is retarded on account of its desire for the body, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii). Much more, therefore, has the body when separated from the soul, a natural inclination towards that soul.

  Objection 3: Further, it is written (Job 20:11): "His bones shall be filled with the vices of his youth, and they shall sleep with him in the dust." But vices are only in the soul. Therefore there will still remain in those ashes a natural inclination towards the soul.

  On the contrary, The human body can be dissolved into the very elements, or changed into the flesh of other animals. But the elements are homogeneous, and so is the flesh of a lion or other animal. Since then in the other parts of the elements or animals there is no natural inclination to that soul, neither will there be an inclination towards the soul in those parts into which the human body has been changed. The first proposition is made evident on the authority of Augustine (Enchiridion lxxxviii): "The human body, although changed into the substance of other bodies or even into the elements, although it has become the food and flesh of any animals whatsoever, even of man, will in an instant return to that soul which erstwhile animated it, making it a living and growing man."

   Further, to every natural inclination there corresponds a natural agent: else nature would fail in necessaries. Now the aforesaid ashes cannot be reunited to the same soul by any natural agent. Therefore there is not in them any natural inclination to the aforesaid reunion.

  I answer that, Opinion is threefold on this point. For some say that the human body is never dissolved into its very elements; and so there always remains in the ashes a certain force besides the elements, which gives a natural inclination to the same soul. But this assertion is in contradiction with the authority of Augustine quoted above, as well as with the senses and reason: since whatever is composed of contraries can be dissolved into its component parts. Wherefore others say that these parts of the elements into which the human body is dissolved retain more light, through having been united to the soul, and for this reason have a

   natural inclination to human souls. But this again is nonsensical, since the parts of the elements are of the same nature and have an equal share of light and darkness. Hence we must say differently that in those ashes there is no natural inclination to resurrection, but only by the ordering of Divine providence, which decreed that those ashes should be reunited to the soul: it is on this account that those parts of the elements shall be reunited and not others.

   Hence the Reply to the First Objection is clear.

  Reply to Objection 2: The soul separated from the body remains in the same nature that it has when united to the body. It is not so with the body, and consequently the comparison fails.

  Reply to Objection 3: These words of Job do not mean that the vices actually remain in the ashes of the dead, but that they remain according to the ordering of Divine justice, whereby those ashes are destined to the restoration of the body which will suffer eternally for the sins committed.


This document converted to HTML on Fri Jan 02 19:10:53 1998.

Latin — Supplementum

pr.

Deinde considerandum est de termino a quo resurrectionis.

Circa quod quaeruntur tria.

Primo: utrum mors sit terminus a quo resurrectionis in omnibus.

Secundo: utrum cineres vel pulveres.

Tertio: utrum illi pulveres habeant naturalem inclinationem ad animam.

a. 1 arg. 1

Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod mors non erit terminus a quo resurrectionis in omnibus. Quia quidam non morientur, sed immortalitate supervestientur. Dicitur enim in Symbolo quod ipse venturus est iudicare vivos et mortuos. Hoc autem non potest intelligi quantum ad tempus iudicii: quia tunc erunt omnes vivi. Ergo oportet quod referatur haec distinctio ad tempus praecedens. Et ita non omnes ante iudicium morientur.
B: (Phil 4:4) [b:Phil 4:4]

a. 1 arg. 2

Praeterea, naturale et commune desiderium non potest esse vacuum et inane, quin in aliquibus expleatur. Sed secundum Apostolum, II Cor. 5, (4), hoc est commune desiderium, quod nolumus exspoliari, sed supervestiri. Ergo aliqui erunt qui nunquam exspoliabuntur corpore per mortem, sed supervestientur gloria resurrectionis.
B: (Sir 30:24) [b:Sir 30:24] (Sir 30:25) [b:Sir 30:25]

a. 1 arg. 3

Praeterea, Augustinus, in Enchirid., dicit quod quatuor ultimae petitiones Dominicae orationis ad praesentem vitam pertinent. Quarum una est, dimitte nobis debita nostra. Ergo Ecclesia petit in hac vita sibi omnia debita relaxari. Sed Ecclesiae oratio non potest esse cassa, quin exaudiatur: Ioan. 16, (23), quidquid petieritis Patrem in nomine meo, dabit vobis. Ergo Ecclesia in aliquo huius vitae tempore omnium debitorum remissionem consequetur. Sed unum de debitis, quo pro peccato primi parentis adstringimur, est quod nascimur in originali peccato. Ergo aliquando hoc Ecclesiae Deus praestabit, quod homines sine originali peccato nascentur. Sed mors est poena originalis peccati. Ergo aliqui homines erunt circa finem mundi qui non morientur. Et sic idem quod prius.

a. 1 arg. 4

Praeterea, via compendiosior est semper sapienti magis eligenda. Sed compendiosior via est quod homines qui invenientur vivi in impassibilitatem resurrectionis transferantur, quam quod prius moriantur et postea resurgant a morte in immortalitatem. Ergo Deus, qui est summe sapiens, hanc viam eliget in his qui vivi invenientur. Et sic idem quod prius.

a. 1 s. c. 1

Sed contra: I Cor. 15, (36): quod seminas, non vivificatur nisi prius moriatur. Et loquitur sub similitudine seminis de resurrectione corporum. Ergo corpora a morte resurgent.
B: (Matt 5:5) [b:Matt 5:5]

a. 1 arg. 5

Praeterea, I Cor. 15, (22): sicut in Adam omnes moriuntur, ita in Christo omnes, vivificabuntur. Sed in Christo omnes vivificabuntur. Ergo in Adam omnes morientur. Et sic resurrectio omnium erit a morte.

a. 1 co.

Respondeo dicendum quod super hac quaestione varie loquuntur Sancti, ut in littera patet. Tamen haec est securior et communior opinio, quod omnes morientur et a morte resurgent. Et hoc propter tria. Primo, quia magis concordat divinae iustitiae, quae humanam naturam pro peccato primi parentis damnavit, ut omnes qui per actum naturae ab eo originem ducerent, infectionem originalis peccati contraherent, et per consequens mortis debitores essent.

Secundo, quia magis concordat divinae Scripturae, quae omnium futuram resurrectionem praedicit. Resurrectio autem proprie non est nisi eius quod cecidit et dissolutum est, ut Damascenus dicit.

Tertio, quia magis concordat ordini naturae, in quo invenimus quod id quod corruptum et vitiatum est, in suam novitatem non reducitur nisi corruptione mediante: sicut acetum non fit vinum nisi aceto corrupto et in humorem vitis transeunte. Unde, cum natura humana in defectum necessitatis moriendi devenerit, non erit reditus ad immortalitatem nisi mediante morte.

Convenit etiam ordini naturae propter aliam rationem. Quia, ut in VIII Physic. dicitur, motus caeli est ut vita quaedam natura existentibus omnibus: sicut et motus cordis totius corporis vita quaedam est. Unde sicut, cessante motu cordis, omnia membra mortificantur; ita, cessante motu caeli, non potest aliquid vivum remanere illa vita quae ex influentia illius motus conservabatur. Talis autem vita est qua nunc degimus. Unde oportet quod ex hac vita discedant qui post motum caeli quiescentem victuri sunt.

a. 1 ad 1

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod distinctio illa mortuorum et vivorum non est referenda ad ipsum iudicii tempus; neque ad totum tempus praeteritum, quia omnes iudicandi aliquo tempore fuerunt vivi et aliquo tempore mortui; sed ad illud tempus determinatum quod immediate iudicium praecedet, quando scilicet iudicii signa incipient apparere.

a. 1 ad 2

Ad secundum dicendum quod perfectum desiderium sanctorum non potest esse vanum: sed nihil prohibet desiderium conditionatum eorum vanum esse. Et tale desiderium est quo nolumus exspoliari sed supervestiri: scilicet, si possibile sit. Et hoc desiderium a quibusdam velleitas dicitur.

a. 1 ad 3

Ad tertium dicendum quod hoc est erroneum, dicere quod aliquis sine peccato originali concipiatur, praeter Christum. Quia ille qui sine peccato originali conciperetur, non indigeret redemptione, quae facta est per Christum. Et sic Christus non esset Redemptor omnium.

Nec potest dici quod non hac redemptione indiguerunt quia praestitum fuit eis ut sine peccato conciperentur quia illa gratia facta est parentibus ut in eis vitium naturae sanaretur, quo manente sine originali peccato generare non possent; vel ipsi naturae, quae sanata est. Oportet enim ponere quod quilibet personaliter redemptione Christi indigeat, non solum ratione naturae.

Liberari autem a malo, vel a debito absolvi, non potest nisi qui debitum incurrit vel in malum deiectus fuit. Et ideo non possent omnes fructum Dominicae orationis in seipsis percipere nisi omnes debitores nascerentur et malo subiecti. Unde dimissio debitorum, vel liberatio a malo, non potest intelligi quod aliquis sine debito vel immunis a malo nascatur: sed quia, cum debito natus, postea per gratiam Christi liberatur.

Nec etiam sequitur, si potest sine errore poni quod aliqui non moriantur, quod sine originali nascantur, licet mors sit poena peccati originalis. Quia Deus potest ex misericordia relaxare alicui poenam ad quam obligatur ex culpa praeterita: sicut adulteram sine poena dimisit, Ioan. 8, (11). Et similiter poterit a morte liberare qui reatum mortis contraxerunt cum originali nascendo. Et sic non sequitur: si non morientur, ergo nascuntur sine originali peccato.

a. 1 ad 4

Ad quartum dicendum quod non semper via compendiosior est magis eligenda: sed solum quando est magis vel aequaliter accommoda ad finem consequendum. Et sic non est hic, ut ex dictis patet.

a. 2 arg. 1

Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod non omnium resurrectio erit a cineribus. Resurrectio enim Christi est exemplar nostrae resurrectionis. Sed resurrectio eius non fuit a cineribus: quia caro eius non vidit corruptionem, ut dicitur in Psalmo (15, 10) et Act. 2, (31). Ergo resurrectio omnium non erit ex cineribus.

a. 2 arg. 2

Praeterea, corpus hominis non semper comburitur. Sed in cineres non potest aliquid resolvi nisi per combustionem. Ergo non omnes a cineribus resurgent.

a. 2 arg. 3

Praeterea, corpus hominis mortui non statim in cinerem redigitur. Sed quidam statim post mortem resurgent, ut in littera dicitur, scilicet illi qui vivi invenientur. Ergo non omnes resurgent a cineribus.

a. 2 arg. 4

Praeterea, terminus a quo respondet termino ad quem. Sed terminus ad quem resurrectionis non est idem in bonis et malis: I Cor. 15, (51), omnes quidem resurgemus, sed non omnes immutabimur. Ergo non est idem terminus a quo. Et sic, si mali resurgent a cineribus, boni a cineribus non resurgent.

a. 2 s. c. 1

Sed contra: Est quod dicit Haymo: Omnes in originali peccato natos tenet haec sententia, Terra es et in terram ibis. Sed omnes qui in communi resurrectione resurgent, fuerunt nati in peccato originali: vel nativitate ex utero, vel saltem nativitate in utero. Ergo omnes a cineribus resurgent.

a. 2 arg. 5

Praeterea, multa sunt in corpore humano quae non sunt de veritate humanae naturae. Sed omnia illa auferentur. Ergo oportet omnia corpora in cinerem resolvi.

a. 2 co.

Respondeo dicendum quod eisdem rationibus quibus ostensum est omnes a morte resurgere, est etiam ostendendum quod omnes resurgent a Cineribus in communi resurrectione: nisi aliquibus ex speciali privilegio gratiae sit indultum contrarium, sicut et resurrectionis acceleratio.

Scriptura autem sacra, sicut resurrectionem praenuntiat, ita et corporum reformationem, Philipp. 3, (21). Et ideo oportet quod, sicut omnes moriuntur ad hoc quod omnes vere resurgere possint, ita omnium corpora dissolventur ad hoc quod omnium corpora reformari possint. Sicut etiam in poenam hominis mors a divina iustitia est inflicta, ita et corporis resolutio: ut patet Genes. 3, (19): terra es et in terram ibis.

Similiter etiam ordo naturae exigit ut non solum animae et corporis coniunctio solvatur, sed etiam elementorum commixtio: sicut etiam acetum non potest in vini qualitatem reduci nisi prius facta resolutione in materiam praeiacentem. Ipsa etiam elementorum commixtio ex motu caeli causatur et conservatur. Quo cessante, omnia mixta in pura elementa resolventur.
R: Q.. 78 a. 1[t:suppl q. 78 a. 1]

a. 2 ad 1

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod resurrectio Christi est exemplar nostrae resurrectionis quoad terminum ad quem: non autem quoad terminum a quo.

a. 2 ad 2

Ad secundum dicendum quod cineres intelliguntur omnes reliquiae quae remanent, humano corpore resoluto, duplici ratione. Primo, quia communis mos erat apud antiquos corpora mortuorum comburere et cineres reservare. Unde inolevit modus loquendi ut ea in quae corpus humanum resolvitur, cineres dicantur. Secundo, propter causam resolutionis, quae est incendium fomitis, quo corpus humanum radicitus est infectum. Unde, ad purgationem huius infectionis, oportet usque ad prima componentia corpus humanum resolvi. Quod autem per incendium resolvitur, dicitur in cineres resolvi. Et ideo ea in quae corpus humanum resolvitur, cineres dicuntur.

a. 2 ad 3

Ad tertium dicendum quod ille ignis qui faciem mundi purgabit, poterit statim corpora eorum qui vivi invenientur usque ad cineres resolvere: sicut et alia mixta resolvet in materiam praeiacentem.

a. 2 ad 4

Ad quartum dicendum quod motus non accipit speciem a termino a quo, sed a termino ad quem. Et ideo resurrectio sanctorum, quae erit gloriosa, oportet quod differat a resurrectione impiorum, quae non erit gloriosa, penes terminum ad quem: non autem penes terminum a quo. Contingit enim frequenter non esse eundem terminum ad quem, existente eodem termino a quo: sicut de nigredine potest aliquid moveri in albedinem, et in pallorem.

a. 3 arg. 1

Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod pulveres illi ex quibus corpus humanum reparabitur, aliquam habeant inclinationem naturalem ad animam quae eis coniungetur. Si enim nullam inclinationem habent ad animam, eodem modo se habent ad illam animam sicut alii pulveres. Ergo non esset differentia utrum ex illis vel ex aliis pulveribus reficeretur corpus animae coniungendum. Quod falsum est.

a. 3 arg. 2

Praeterea, maior est dependentia corporis ad animam quam animae ad corpus. Sed anima separata a corpore adhuc habet aliquam dependentiam ad corpus: unde retardatur eius motus in Deum propter appetitum corporis, ut dicit Augustinus. Ergo multo fortius corpus separatum ab anima adhuc habet naturalem inclinationem ad animam.

a. 3 arg. 3

Praeterea, Iob 20, (11) dicitur: ossa eius implebuntur vitiis adolescentiae eius, et cum eo in pulvere dormient. Sed vitia non sunt nisi in anima. Ergo adhuc in illis pulveribus remanebit aliqua naturalis inclinatio ad animam.

a. 3 s. c. 1

Sed contra: Corpus humanum potest resolvi ad ipsa elementa, vel in carnes aliorum animalium converti. Sed elementa sunt homogenea: et similiter caro leonis vel alterius animalis. Cum ergo in aliis partibus elementorum vel animalium non sit aliqua inclinatio naturalis ad illam animam, nec in illis partibus in quas conversum est corpus humanum, erit aliqua inclinatio ad animam. Patet per auctoritatem Augustini, in Enchiridion: corpus humanum, in quamcumque aliorum corporum substantiam, vel in ipsa elementa vertatur; in quorumcumque hominum seu animalium cibum cedat carnemque vertatur; illi animae humanae in puncto temporis redit quae illud prius ut fieret, viveret et cresceret, animavit.

a. 3 arg. 4

Praeterea, cuilibet inclinationi naturali respondet aliquod agens naturale: alias natura deficeret in necessariis. Sed nullo agente naturali possunt praedicti pulveres eidem animae iterato coniungi. Ergo in eis non est aliqua naturalis inclinatio ad praedictam coniunctionem.

a. 3 co.

Respondeo dicendum quod circa hoc est triplex opinio. Quidam dicunt quod corpus humanum nunquam resolvitur usque ad elementa. Et ita semper in cineribus manet aliqua vis addita elementis, quae facit naturalem inclinationem ad eandem animam.

Sed haec positio contrariatur auctoritati Augustini inductae, et sensui, et rationi: quia omnia composita ex contrariis possibile est in ea resolvi ex quibus componuntur.

Et ideo alii dicunt quod illae partes elementorum in quas humanum corpus resolvitur, retinent plus de luce ex hoc quod fuerunt animae humanae coniunctae. Et ex hoc habent quandam inclinationem ad animas.

Sed hoc iterum frivolum est. Quia partes elementorum sunt unius naturae, et aequaliter habent participationem lucis et obscuritatis.

Et ideo aliter dicendum est quod in cineribus illis nulla est inclinatio naturalis ad resurrectionem: sed solum ex ordine divinae providentiae, quo statuit illos cineres iterum animae coniungi. Et ex hoc provenit quod illae partes elementorum iterato coniungentur et non aliae.

a. 3 ad 1

Unde patet solutio ad primum.

a. 3 ad 2

Ad secundum dicendum quod anima separata a corpore manet in eadem natura quam habebat cum corpori esset unita. Quod de corpore non contingit. Et ideo non est simile.

a. 3 ad 3

Ad tertium dicendum quod verbum illud Iob non est intelligendum quod vitia actu maneant in pulveribus mortuorum: sed secundum ordinem divinae iustitiae, quo sunt deputati cineres illi ad corporis reparationem, quod pro peccatis commissis cruciabitur in aeternum.