St. Thomas Aquinas
The Summa Theologica
Translated by
Fathers of the English Dominican Province
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OF THE INTEGRITY OF THE BODIES IN THE RESURRECTION (FIVE ARTICLES)
We must next consider the integrity of the bodies in the resurrection.
Under this head there are five points of inquiry:
(1) Whether all the members of the human body will rise again therein?
(2) Whether the hair and nails will?
(3) Whether the humors will?
(4) Whether whatever the body contained belonging to the truth of human
nature will rise again?
(5) Whether whatever it contained materially will rise again?
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Whether all the members of the human body will rise again?
Objection 1: It would seem that not all the members of the human body will
rise again. For if the end be done away it is useless to repair the
means. Now the end of each member is its act. Since then nothing useless
is done in the Divine works, and since the use of certain members is not
fitting to man after the resurrection, especially the use of the genital
members, for then they "shall neither marry, nor be married" (Mt. 22:30),
it would seem that not all the members shall rise again.
Objection 2: Further, the entrails are members: and yet they will not rise
again. For they can neither rise full, since thus they contain
impurities, nor empty, since nothing is empty in nature. Therefore the
members shall not all rise again.
Objection 3: Further, the body shall rise again that it may be rewarded for
the works which the soul did through it. Now the member of which a thief
has been deprived for theft, and who has afterwards done penance and is
saved, cannot be rewarded at the resurrection, neither for any good deed,
since it has not co-operated in any, nor for evil deeds, since the
punishment of the member would redound to the punishment of man.
Therefore the members will not all rise again.
On the contrary, The other members belong more to the truth of human
nature than hair and nails. Yet these will be restored to man at the
resurrection according to the text (Sent. iv, D, 4). Much more therefore
does this apply to the other members.
Further, "The works of God are perfect" (Dt. 32:4). But the resurrection
will be the work of God. Therefore man will be remade perfect in all his
members.
I answer that, As stated in De Anima ii, 4, "the soul stands in relation
to the body not only as its form and end, but also as efficient cause."
For the soul is compared to the body as art to the thing made by art, as
the Philosopher says (De Anim. Gener. ii, 4), and whatever is shown forth
explicitly in the product of art is all contained implicitly and
originally in the art. In like manner whatever appears in the parts of
the body is all contained originally and, in a way, implicitly in the
soul. Thus just as the work of an art would not be perfect, if its
product lacked any of the things contained in the art, so neither could
man be perfect, unless the whole that is contained enfolded in the soul
be outwardly unfolded in the body, nor would the body correspond in full
proportion to the soul. Since then at the resurrection it behooves man's
body to correspond entirely to the soul, for it will not rise again
except according to the relation it bears to the rational soul, it
follows that man also must rise again perfect, seeing that he is thereby
repaired in order that he may obtain his ultimate perfection.
Consequently all the members that are now in man's body must needs be
restored at the resurrection.
Reply to Objection 1: The members may be considered in two ways in relation to
the soul: either according to the relation of matter to form, or
according to the relation of instrument to agent, since "the whole body
is compared to the whole soul in the same way as one part is to another"
(De Anima ii, 1). If then the members be considered in the light of the
first relationship, their end is not operation, but rather the perfect
being of the species, and this is also required after the resurrection:
but if they be considered in the light of the second relationship, then
their end is operation. And yet it does not follow that when the
operation fails the instrument is useless, because an instrument serves
not only to accomplish the operation of the agent, but also to show its
virtue. Hence it will be necessary for the virtue of the soul's powers to
be shown in their bodily instruments, even though they never proceed to
action, so that the wisdom of God be thereby glorified.
Reply to Objection 2: The entrails will rise again in the body even as the other
members: and they will be filled not with vile superfluities but with
goodly humors.
Reply to Objection 3: The acts whereby we merit are not the acts, properly
speaking, of hand or foot but of the whole man; even as the work of art
is ascribed not to the instrument but to the craftsman. Therefore though
the member which was cut off before a man's repentance did not co-operate
with him in the state wherein he merits glory, yet man himself merits
that the whole man may be rewarded, who with his whole being serves God.
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Whether the hair and nails will rise again in the human body?
Objection 1: It would seem that the hair and nails will not rise again in the
human body. For just as hair and nails result from the surplus of food,
so do urine, sweat and other superfluities or dregs. But these will not
rise again with the body. Neither therefore will hair and nails.
Objection 2: Further, of all the superfluities that are produced from food,
seed comes nearest to the truth of human nature, since though superfluous
it is needed. Yet seed will not rise again in the human body. Much less
therefore will hair and nails.
Objection 3: Further, nothing is perfected by a rational soul that is not
perfected by a sensitive soul. But hair and nails are not perfected by a
sensitive soul, for "we do not feel with them" (De Anima i, 5; iii, 13).
Therefore since the human body rises not again except because it is
perfected by a rational soul, it would seem that the hair and nails will
not rise again.
On the contrary, It is written (Lk. 21:18): "A hair of your head shall
not perish."
Further, hair and nails were given to man as an ornament. Now the bodies of men, especially of the elect, ought to rise again with all their adornment. Therefore they ought to rise again with the hair.
I answer that, The soul is to the animated body, as art is to the work
of art, and is to the parts of the body as art to its instruments:
wherefore an animated body is called an organic body. Now art employs
certain instruments for the accomplishment of the work intended, and
these instruments belong to the primary intention of art: and it also
uses other instruments for the safe-keeping of the principal instruments,
and these belong to the secondary intention of art: thus the art of
warfare employs a sword for fighting, and a sheath for the safe-keeping
of the sword. And so among the parts of an animated body, some are
directed to the accomplishment of the souls' operations, for instance the
heart, liver, hand, foot; while others are directed to the safe-keeping
of the other parts as leaves to cover fruit; and thus hair and nails are
in man for the protection of other parts. Consequently, although they do
not belong to the primary perfection of the human body, they belong to
the secondary perfection: and since man will rise again with all the
perfections of his nature, it follows that hair and nails will rise again
in him.
Reply to Objection 1: Those superfluities are voided by nature, as being useful
for nothing. Hence they do not belong to the perfection of the human
body. It is not so with the superfluities which nature reserves for the
production of hair and nails which she needs for the protection of the
members.
Reply to Objection 2: Seed is not required for the perfection of the individual,
as hair and nails are, but only for the protection of the species.
Reply to Objection 3: Hair and nails are nourished and grow, and so it is clear
that they share in some operation, which would not be possible unless
they were parts in some way perfected by the soul. And since in man there
is but one soul, namely the rational soul, it is clear that they are
perfected by the rational soul, although not so far as to share in the
operation of sense, as neither do bones, and yet it is certain that these
will rise again and that they belong to the integrity of the individual.
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Whether the humors will rise again in the body?
Objection 1: It would seem that the humors will not rise again in the body.
For it is written (1 Cor. 15:50): "Flesh and blood cannot possess the
kingdom of God." Now blood is the chief humor. Therefore it will not rise
again in the blessed, who will possess the kingdom of God, and much less
in others.
Objection 2: Further, humors are intended to make up for the waste. Now after
the resurrection there will be no waste. Therefore the body will not rise
again with humors.
Objection 3: Further, that which is in process of generation in the human body
is not yet perfected by the rational soul. Now the humors are still in
process of generation because they are potentially flesh and bone.
Therefore they are not yet perfected by the rational soul. Now the human
body is not directed to the resurrection except in so far as it is
perfected by the rational soul. Therefore the humors will not rise again.
On the contrary, Whatever enters into the constitution of the human body
will rise again with it. Now this applies to the humors, as appears from
the statement of Augustine (De Spir. et Anima xv) that "the body consists
of functional members; the functional members of homogeneous parts; and
the homogeneous parts of humors." Therefore the humors will rise again in
the body.
Further, our resurrection will be conformed to the resurrection of
Christ. Now in Christ's resurrection His blood rose again, else the wine
would not now be changed into His blood in the Sacrament of the altar.
Therefore the blood will rise again in us also, and in like manner the
other humors.
I answer that, Whatever belongs to the integrity of human nature in
those who take part in the resurrection will rise again, as stated above
(Articles [1],2). Hence whatever humidity of the body belongs to the integrity
of human nature must needs rise again in man. Now there is a threefold
humidity in man. There is one which occurs as receding from the
perfection of the individual---either because it is on the way to
corruption, and is voided by nature, for instance urine, sweat, matter,
and so forth---or because it is directed by nature to the preservation of
the species in some individual, either by the act of the generative
power, as seed, or by the act of the nutritive power, as milk. None of
these humidities will rise again, because they do not belong to the
perfection of the person rising again.
The second kind of humidity is one that has not yet reached its ultimate
perfection, which nature achieves in the individual, yet it is directed
thereto by nature: and this is of two kinds. For there is one kind that
has a definite form and is contained among the parts of the body, for
instance the blood and the other humors which nature has directed to the
members that are produced or nourished therefrom: and yet they have
certain definite forms like the other parts of the body, and consequently
will rise again with the other parts of the body: while another kind of
humidity is in transition from form to form, namely from the form of
humor to the form of member. Humidities of this kind will not rise again,
because after the resurrection each part of the body will be established
in its form, so that one will not pass into another. Wherefore this
humidity that is actually in transition from one form to another will not
rise again. Now this humidity may be considered in a twofold
state---either as being at the beginning of its transformation, and thus
it is called "ros," namely the humidity that is found in the cavities of
the smaller veins---or as in the course of transformation and already
beginning to undergo alteration, and thus it is called "cambium": but in
neither state will it rise again. The third kind of humidity is that
which has already reached its ultimate perfection that nature intends in
the body of the individual, and has already undergone transformation and
become incorporate with the members. This is called "gluten," and since
it belongs to the members it will rise again just as the members will.
Reply to Objection 1: In these words of the Apostle flesh and blood do not denote
the substance of flesh and blood but deeds of flesh and blood, which are
either deeds of sin or the operations of the animal life. Or we may say
with Augustine in his letter to Consentius (Ep. cxlvi) that "flesh and
blood here signify the corruption which is now predominant in flesh and
blood"; wherefore the Apostle's words continue: "Neither shall corruption
possess incorruption."
Reply to Objection 2: Just as the members that serve for generation will be after
the resurrection for the integrity of human nature, and not for the
operation accomplished now by them, so will the humors be in the body not
to make up for waste, but to restore the integrity of human nature and to
show forth its natural power.
Reply to Objection 3: Just as the elements are in the course of generation in
relation to mixed bodies, because they are their matter, yet not so as to
be always in transition when in the mixed body, so too are the humors in
relation to the members. And for this reason as the elements in the parts
of the universe have definite forms, by reason of which they, like mixed
bodies, belong to the perfection of the universe, so too the humors
belong to the perfection of the human body, just as the other parts do,
although they do not reach its entire perfection, as the other parts do,
and although the elements have not perfect forms as mixed bodies have.
But as all the parts of the universe receive their perfection from God,
not equally, but each one according to its mode, so too the humors are in
some way perfected by the rational soul, yet not in the same measure as
the more perfect parts.
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Whether whatever in the body belonged to the truth of human nature will rise again in it?
Objection 1: It would seem that what was in the body, belonging to the truth
of human nature, will not all rise again in it. For food is changed into
the truth of human nature. Now sometimes the flesh of the ox or of other
animals is taken as food. Therefore if whatever belonged to the truth of
human nature will rise again, the flesh of the ox or of other animals
will also rise again: which is inadmissible.
Objection 2: Further, Adam's rib belonged to the truth of human nature in him,
as ours does in us. But Adam's rib will rise again not in Adam but in
Eve, else Eve would not rise again at all since she was made from that
rib. Therefore whatever belonged in man to the truth of human nature will
not all rise again in him.
Objection 3: Further, it is impossible for the same thing from different men
to rise again. Yet it is possible for something in different men to
belong to the truth of human nature, for instance if a man were to
partake of human flesh which would be changed into his substance.
Therefore there will not rise again in man whatever belonged in him to
the truth of human nature.
Objection 4: Further, if it be said that not all the flesh partaken of belongs
to the truth of human nature and that consequently some of it may
possibly rise again in the one man and some in the other---on the
contrary: That which is derived from one's parents would especially seem
to belong to the truth of human nature. But if one who partook of nothing
but human flesh were to beget children that which his child derives from
him must needs be of the flesh of other men partaken of by his father,
since the seed is from the surplus of food, as the Philosopher proves (De
Gen. Animal. i). Therefore what belongs to the truth of human nature in
that child belonged also to the truth of human nature in other men of
whose flesh his father had partaken.
Objection 5: Further, if it be said that what was changed into seed was not
that which belong to the truth of human nature in the flesh of the men
eaten, but something not belonging to the truth of human nature---on the
contrary: Let us suppose that some one is fed entirely on embryos in
which seemingly there is nothing but what belongs to the truth of human
nature since whatever is in them is derived from the parents. If then the
surplus food be changed into seed, that which belonged to the truth of
human nature in the embryos---and after these have received a rational
soul, the resurrection applies to them---must needs belong to the truth
of human nature in the child begotten of that seed. And thus, since the
same cannot rise again in two subjects, it will be impossible for
whatever belonged to the truth of human nature in both to rise again in
both of them.
On the contrary, Whatever belonged to the truth of human nature was
perfected by the rational soul. Now it is through being perfected by the
rational soul that the human body is directed to the resurrection.
Therefore whatever belonged to the truth of human nature will rise again
in each one.
Further, if anything belonging to the truth of human nature in a man be
taken from his body, this will not be the perfect body of a man. Now all
imperfection of a man will be removed at the resurrection, especially in
the elect, to whom it was promised (Lk. 21:18) that not a hair of their
head should perish. Therefore whatever belonged to the truth of human
nature in a man will rise again in him.
I answer that, "Everything is related to truth in the same way as to
being" (Metaph. ii), because a thing is true when it is as it appears to
him who actually knows it. For this reason Avicenna (Metaph. ii) says
that "the truth of anything is a property of the being immutably attached
thereto." Accordingly a thing is said to belong to the truth of human
nature, because it belongs properly to the being of human nature, and
this is what shares the form of human nature, just as true gold is what
has the true form of gold whence gold derives its proper being. In order
therefore to see what it is that belongs to the truth of human nature, we
must observe that there have been three opinions on the question. For
some have maintained that nothing begins anew to belong to the truth of
human nature and that whatever belongs to the truth of human nature, all
of it belonged to the truth of human nature when this was created; and
that this multiplies by itself, so that it is possible for the seed
whereof the child is begotten to be detached therefrom by the begetter,
and that again the detached part multiplies in the child, so that he
reaches perfect quantity by growth, and so on, and that thus was the
whole human race multiplied. Wherefore according to this opinion,
whatever is produced by nourishment. although it seem to have the
appearance of flesh and blood, does not belong to the truth of human
nature.
Others held that something new is added to the truth of human nature by
the natural transformation of the food into the human body, if we
consider the truth of human nature in the species to the preservation of
which the act of the generative power is directed: but that if we
consider the truth of human nature in the individual, to the preservation
and perfection of which the act of the nutritive power is directed, that
which is added by food belongs to the truth of the human nature of the
individual, not primarily but secondarily. For they assert that the truth
of human nature, first and foremost, consists in the radical humor, that
namely which is begotten of the seed of which the human race was
originally fashioned: and that what is changed from food into true flesh
and blood does not belong principally to the truth of human nature in
this particular individual, but secondarily: and that nevertheless this
can belong principally to the truth of human nature in another individual
who is begotten of the seed of the former. For they assert that seed is
the surplus from food, either mingled with something belonging
principally to the truth of human nature in the begetter, according to
some, or without any such admixture, as others maintain. And thus the
nutrimental humor in one becomes the radical humor in another.
The third opinion is that something new begins to belong principally to
the truth of human nature even in this individual, because distinction in
the human body does not require that any signate material part must needs
remain throughout the whole lifetime; any signate part one may take is
indifferent to this, whereas it remains always as regards what belongs to
the species in it, albeit as regards what is material therein it may ebb
and flow. And thus the nutrimental humor is not distinct from the radical
on the part of its principle (so that it be called radical when begotten
of the seed, and nutrimental when produced by the food), but rather on
the part of the term, so that it be called radical when it reaches the
term of generation by the act of the generative, or even nutritive power,
but nutrimental, when it has not yet reached this term, but is still on
the way to give nourishment.
These three opinions have been more fully exposed and examined in the
Second Book (Sent. ii, D, 30); wherefore there is no need for repetition
here, except in so far as the question at issue is concerned. It must
accordingly be observed that this question requires different answers
according to these opinions.
For the first opinion on account of its explanation of the process of
multiplication is able to admit perfection of the truth of human nature,
both as regards the number of individuals and as regards the due quantity
of each individual, without taking into account that which is produced
from food; for this is not added except for the purpose of resisting the
destruction that might result from the action of natural heat, as lead is
added to silver lest it be destroyed in melting. Wherefore since at the
resurrection it behooves human nature to be restored to its perfection,
nor does the natural heat tend to destroy the natural humor, there will
be no need for anything resulting from food to rise again in man, but
that alone will rise again which belonged to the truth of the human
nature of the individual, and this reaches the aforesaid perfection in
number and quantity by being detached and multiplied.
The second opinion, since it maintains that what is produced from food
is needed for the perfection of quantity in the individual and for the
multiplication that results from generation, must needs admit that
something of this product from food shall rise again: not all, however,
but only so much as is required for the perfect restoration of human
nature in all its individuals. Hence this opinion asserts that all that
was in the substance of the seed will rise again in this man who was
begotten of this seed; because this belongs chiefly to the truth of human
nature in him: while of that which afterwards he derives from
nourishment, only so much will rise again in him as is needed for the
perfection of his quantity; and not all, because this does not belong to
the perfection of human nature, except in so far as nature requires it
for the perfection of quantity. Since however this nutrimental humor is
subject to ebb and flow the restoration will be effected in this order,
that what first belonged to the substance of a man's body, will all be
restored, and of that which was added secondly, thirdly, and so on, as
much as is required to restore quantity. This is proved by two reasons.
First, because that which was added was intended to restore what was
wasted at first, and thus it does not belong principally to the truth of
human nature to the same extent as that which came first. Secondly,
because the addition of extraneous humor to the first radical humors
results in the whole mixture not sharing the truth of the specific nature
as perfectly as the first did: and the Philosopher instances as an
example (De Gener. i) the mixing of water with wine, which always weakens
the strength of the wine, so that in the end the wine becomes watery: so
that although the second water be drawn into the species of wine, it does
not share the species of wine as perfectly as the first water added to
the wine. Even so that which is secondly changed from food into flesh
does not so perfectly attain to the species of flesh as that which was
changed first, and consequently does not belong in the same degree to the
truth of human nature nor to the resurrection. Accordingly it is clear
that this opinion maintains that the whole of what belongs to the truth
of human nature principally will rise again, but not the whole of what
belongs to the truth of human nature secondarily.
The third opinion differs somewhat from the second and in some respects
agrees with it. It differs in that it maintains that whatever is under
the form of flesh and bone all belongs to the truth of human nature,
because this opinion does not distinguish as remaining in man during his
whole lifetime any signate matter that belongs essentially and primarily
to the truth of human nature, besides something ebbing and flowing, that
belongs. to the truth of human nature merely on account of the perfection
of quantity, and not on account of the primary being of the species, as
the second opinion asserted. But it states that all the parts that are
not beside the intention of the nature generated belong to the truth of
human nature, as regards what they have of the species, since thus they
remain; but not as regards what they have of matter, since thus they are
indifferent to ebb and flow: so that we are to understand that the same
thing happens in the parts of one man as in the whole population of a
city, for each individual is cut off from the population by death, while
others take their place: wherefore the parts of the people flow back and
forth materially, but remain formally, since these others occupy the very
same offices and positions from which the former were withdrawn, so that
the commonwealth is said to remain the selfsame. In like manner, while
certain parts are on the ebb and others are being restored to the same
shape and position, all the parts flow back and forth as to their matter,
but remain as to their species; and nevertheless the selfsame man remains.
On the other hand, The third opinion agrees with the second, because it
holds that the parts which come secondly do not reach the perfection of
the species so perfectly as those which come first: and consequently the
third opinion asserts that the same thing rises again in man as the
second opinion maintains, but not for quite the same reason. For it holds
that the whole of what is produced from the seed will rise again, not
because it belongs to the truth of human nature otherwise than that which
comes after, but because it shares the truth of human nature more
perfectly: which same order the second opinion applied to those things
that are produced afterwards from food, in which point also these two
opinions agree.
Reply to Objection 1: A natural thing is what it is, not from its matter but from its form; wherefore, although that part of matter which at one time was under the form of bovine flesh rises again in man under the form of human flesh, it does not follow that the flesh of an ox rises again, but the flesh of a man: else one might conclude that the clay from which Adam's body was fashioned shall rise again. The second opinion, however, grants this argument.
Reply to Objection 2: That rib did not belong to the perfection of the individual
in Adam, but was directed to the multiplication of the species. Hence it
will rise again not in Adam but in Eve, just as the seed will rise again,
not in the begetter, but in the begotten.
Reply to Objection 3: According to the first opinion it is easy to reply to this
argument, because the flesh that is eaten never belonged to the truth of
human nature in the eater, but it did belong to the truth of human nature
in him whose flesh was eaten: and thus it will rise again in the latter
but not in the former. according to the second and third opinions, each
one will rise again in that wherein he approached nearest to the perfect
participation of the virtue of the species, and if he approached equally
in both, he will rise again in that wherein he was first, because in that
he first was directed to the resurrection by union with the rational soul
of that man. Hence if there were any surplus in the flesh eaten, not
belonging to the truth of human nature in the first man, it will be
possible for it to rise again in the second: otherwise what belonged to
the resurrection in the first will rise again in him and not in the
second; but in the second its place is taken either by something of that
which was the product from other food, or if he never partook of any
other food than human flesh, the substitution is made by Divine power so
far as the perfection of quantity requires, as it does in those who die
before the perfect age. Nor does this derogate from numerical identity,
as neither does the ebb and flow of parts.
Reply to Objection 4: According to the first opinion this argument is easily
answered. For that opinion asserts that the seed is not from the surplus
food: so that the flesh eaten is not changed into the seed whereof the
child is begotten. But according to the other two opinions we must reply
that it is impossible for the whole of the flesh eaten to be changed into
seed, because it is after much separation that the seed is distilled from
the food, since seed is the ultimate surplus of food. That part of the
eaten flesh which is changed into seed belongs to the truth of human
nature in the one born of the seed more than in the one of whose flesh
the seed was the product. Hence according to the rule already laid down
(ad 3), whatever was changed into the seed will rise again in the person
born of the seed; while the remaining matter will rise again in him of
whose flesh the seed was the product.
Reply to Objection 5: The embryo is not concerned with the resurrection before it
is animated by a rational soul, in which state much has been added to the
seminal substance from the substance of food, since the child is
nourished in the mother's womb. Consequently on the supposition that a
man partook of such food, and that some one were begotten of the surplus
thereof, that which was in the seminal substance will indeed rise again
in the one begotten of that seed; unless it contain something that would
have belonged to the seminal substance in those from whose flesh being
eaten the seed was produced, for this would rise again in the first but
not in the second. The remainder of the eaten flesh, not being changed
into seed, will clearly rise again in the first the Divine power
supplying deficiencies in both. The first opinion is not troubled by this
objection, since it does not hold the seed to be from the surplus food:
but there are many other reasons against it as may be seen in the Second
Book (Sent. ii, D, 30; FP, Question [119], Article [2]).
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Whether whatever was materially in a man's members will all rise again?
Objection 1: It would seem that whatever was materially in a man's members
will all rise again. For the hair, seemingly, is less concerned in the
resurrection than the other members. Yet whatever was in the hair will
all rise again, if not in the hair, at least in other parts of the body,
as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxii) quoted in the text (Sent. iv, D,
44). Much more therefore whatever was materially in the other members
will all rise again.
Objection 2: Further, just as the parts of the flesh are perfected as to
species by the rational soul, so are the parts as to matter. But the
human body is directed to the resurrection through being perfected by a
rational soul. Therefore not only the parts of species but also the parts
of matter will all rise again.
Objection 3: Further, the body derives its totality from the same cause as it
derives its divisibility into parts. But division into parts belongs to a
body in respect of matter the disposition of which is quantity in respect
of which it is divided. Therefore totality is ascribed to the body in
respect of its parts of matter. If then all the parts of matter rise not
again, neither will the whole body rise again: which is inadmissible.
On the contrary, The parts of matter are not permanent in the body but
ebb and flow, as stated in De Gener. i. If, therefore, all the parts of
matter, which remain not but ebb and flow, rise again, either the body of
one who rises again will be very dense, or it will be immoderate in
quantity.
Further, whatever belongs to the truth of human nature in one man can
all be a part of matter in another man, if the latter were to partake of
his flesh. Therefore if all the parts of matter in one man were to rise
again it follows that in one man there will rise again that which belongs
to the truth of human nature in another: which is absurd.
I answer that, What is in man materially, is not directed to the
resurrection, except in so far as it belongs to the truth of human
nature; because it is in this respect that it bears a relation to the
human souls. Now all that is in man materially belongs indeed to the
truth of human nature in so far as it has something of the species, but
not all, if we consider the totality of matter; because all the matter
that was in a man from the beginning of his life to the end would surpass
the quantity due to his species, as the third opinion states, which
opinion seems to me more probable than the others. Wherefore the whole
of what is in man will rise again, if we speak of the totality of the
species which is dependent on quantity, shape, position and order of
parts, but the whole will not rise again if we speak of the totality of
matter. The second and first opinions, however, do not make this
distinction, but distinguish between parts both of which have the species
and matter. But these two opinions agree in that they both state what is
produced from the seed will all rise again even if we speak of totality
of matter: while they differ in this that the first opinion maintains
that nothing will rise again of that which was engendered from food,
whereas the second holds that something but not all, thereof will rise
again, as stated above (Article [4]).
Reply to Objection 1: Just as all that is in the other parts of the body will
rise again, if we speak of the totality of the species, but not if we
speak of material totality, so is it with the hair. In the other parts
something accrues from nourishment which causes growth, and this is
reckoned as another part, if we speak of totality of species, since it
occupies another place and position in the body, and is under other parts
of dimension: and there accrues something which does not cause growth,
but serves to make up for waste by nourishing. and this is not reckoned
as another part of the whole considered in relation to the species, since
it does not occupy another place or position in the body than that which
was occupied by the part that has passed away: although it may be
reckoned another part if we consider the totality of matter. The same
applies to the hair. Augustine, however, is speaking of the cutting of
hair that was a part causing growth of the body; wherefore it must needs
rise again, not however as regards the quantity of hair, lest it should
be immoderate, but it will rise again in other parts as deemed expedient
by Divine providence. Or else he refers to the case when something will
be lacking to the other parts, for then it will be possible for this to
be supplied from the surplus of hair.
Reply to Objection 2: According to the third opinion parts of species are the
same as parts of matter: for the Philosopher does not make this
distinction (De Gener. i) in order to distinguish different parts, but in
order to show that the same parts may be considered both in respect of
species, as to what belongs to the form and species in them, and in
respect of matter, as to that which is under the form and species. Now it
is clear that the matter of the flesh has no relation to the rational
soul except in so far as it is under such a form, and consequently by
reason thereof it is directed to the resurrection. But the first and
second opinions which draw a distinction between parts of species and
parts of matter say that although the rational soul perfects both parts,
it does not perfect parts of matter except by means of the parts of
species, wherefore they are not equally directed to the resurrection.
Reply to Objection 3: In the matter of things subject to generation and
corruption it is necessary to presuppose indefinite dimensions before the
reception of the substantial form. Consequently division which is made
according to these dimensions belongs properly to matter. But complete
and definite quantity comes to matter after the substantial form;
wherefore division that is made in reference to definite quantity regards
the species especially when definite position of parts belongs to the
essence of the species, as in the human body.
Latin — Supplementum
pr.
Circa quod quaeruntur quinque.
Primo: utrum omnia membra corporis humani in ipso resurgant.
Secundo: utrum capilli et ungues.
Tertio: utrum humores.
Quarto: utrum totum id quod fuit in eo de veritate humanae naturae.
Quinto: utrum quidquid in eo materialiter fuerit.
a. 1 arg. 1
a. 1 arg. 2
B: (Isa 43:26) [b:Isa 43:26]
a. 1 arg. 3
B: (Job 31:33) [b:Job 31:33]
a. 1 s. c. 1
a. 1 arg. 4
a. 1 co.
a. 1 ad 1
a. 1 ad 2
a. 1 ad 3
a. 2 arg. 1
B: (Isa 3:9) [b:Isa 3:9]
a. 2 arg. 2
a. 2 arg. 3
a. 2 s. c. 1
a. 2 arg. 4
a. 2 co.
B: (Rom 3:23) [b:Rom 3:23]
a. 2 ad 1
a. 2 ad 2
a. 2 ad 3
a. 3 arg. 1
a. 3 arg. 2
a. 3 arg. 3
a. 3 s. c. 1
a. 3 arg. 4
a. 3 co.
Est autem in homine triplex humiditas. Quaedam enim humiditas est in recedendo a perfectione huius individui: vel quia est in via corruptionis, et a natura abiicitur, sicut urina, sudor et sanies et huiusmodi; vel quia a natura ordinatur ad conservationem speciei in alio individuo, sive per actum generativae, sicut semen, sive per actum nutritivae, sicut lac. Et nulla talium humiditatum resurget: eo quod non est de perfectione individui resurgentis.
Secunda humiditas est quae nondum pervenit ad ultimam perfectionem quam natura operatur in individuo, sed est ad illam ordinata a natura. Et haec est duplex. Quia quaedam est quae habet aliquam formam determinatam, secundum quam continetur inter partes corporis: sicut sanguis et alii tres humores, quos natura ordinavit ad membra quae ex eis generantur, sed tamen habent aliquas formas determinatas, sicut et aliae partes corporis. Et ideo resurgent cum aliis partibus corporis.
Quaedam vero humiditas est in via transeundi de forma in formam, scilicet de forma humoris in formam membri. Et talis humiditas non resurget. Quia post resurrectionem partes corporis singulae in suis formis stabilientur, ut una in aliam non transeat. Et ideo non resurget illa humiditas quae est in ipso actu transeundi de forma in formam. Haec autem humiditas potest in duplici statu accipi. Vel secundum quod est in principio transmutationis: et sic vocatur ros, illa scilicet humiditas quae est in foraminibus parvarum venarum. Vel secundum quod est in progressu transmutationis et incipit iam dealbari: et sic vocatur cambium. In neutro autem statu resurget.
Tertium genus humiditatis est quod iam pervenit ad ultimam perfectionem quam natura intendit in corpore individui: quae iam est dealbata et incorporata membris. Et haec vocatur gluten. Et, cum sit de substantia membrorum, resurget, sicut alia membra resurgunt.
R: Q.. 80 a. 1[t:suppl q. 80 a. 1] Q.. 80 a. 2[t:suppl q. 80 a. 2]
a. 3 ad 1
a. 3 ad 2
B: (Job 9:28) [b:Job 9:28]
a. 3 ad 3
a. 4 arg. 1
a. 4 arg. 2
a. 4 arg. 3
a. 4 arg. 4
a. 4 arg. 5
a. 4 s. c. 1
a. 4 arg. 6
a. 4 co.
Ut ergo videatur quid sit illud quod est de veritate humanae naturae, sciendum est quod circa hoc est triplex opinio. Quidam enim posuerunt quod nihil de novo esse incipit de veritate humanae naturae, sed quidquid ad veritatem humanae naturae pertinet, totum fuit in ipsa institutione humanae naturae de veritate eius; et hoc per seipsum multiplicatur, ut ex eo possit semen decidi a generante, ex quo filius generetur; in quo etiam illa pars decisa multiplicatur, et ad perfectam quantitatem pervenit per augmentum, et sic deinceps; et ita multiplicatum est totum genus humanum. Unde, secundum opinionem hanc, quidquid ex alimento generatur, quamvis videatur speciem carnis aut sanguinis habere, non tamen pertinet ad veritatem humanae naturae.
Alii vero dixerunt quod aliquid de novo additur ad veritatem humanae naturae per transmutationem naturalem alimenti in corpus humanum, considerata veritate humanae naturae in specie, ad cuius conservationem ordinatur actus generativae virtutis. Si autem veritas humanae naturae in individuo consideretur, ad cuius conservationem et perfectionem actus nutritivae virtutis ordinatur, non additur aliquid per alimentum quod sit primo de veritate humanae naturae huius individui, sed solum secundario. Ponunt enim quod veritas humanae naturae primo et principaliter consistit in humido radicali, ex quo est prima constitutio humani generis: quod autem convertitur de alimento in veram carnem et sanguinem, non est principaliter de necessitate humanae naturae illius individui, sed secundario; sed potest esse principaliter de veritate humanae naturae alterius individui, quod ex semine illius generatur. Semen enim ponunt esse superfluum alimenti: vel cum admixtione alicuius quod est primo de veritate humanae naturae in generante, ut quidam dicunt; vel sine admixtione eius, ut dicunt alii. Et sic quod est humidum nutrimentale in uno, fit humidum radicale in alio.
Tertia opinio est quod aliquid de novo incipit esse principaliter de veritate humanae naturae etiam in isto individuo. Quia non est distinctio talis in corpore humano ut aliqua pars materialis signata de necessitate per totam vitam remaneat: sed ad hoc indifferenter se habet quaelibet pars signata accepta, quod manet semper quantum ad id quod est speciei in ea, sed potest fluere et refluere quantum ad id quod est materiae in ipsa. Et sic humidum nutrimentale non distinguitur a radicali ex parte principii, ut dicatur radicale quod est ex semine generatum, nutrimentale quod generatur ex cibo: sed magis distinguitur ex termino, quod radicale dicitur quod ad terminum generationis pervenit per actum generativae vel etiam nutritivae virtutis; se nutrimentale, quod nondum pervenit ad hunc terminum; sed est adhuc in via nutriendi.
Et hae tres opiniones in II libro Sententiarum, dist. 30, plenius percunctatae et investigatae sunt. Et ideo non debent hic repeti, nisi quantum ad propositum pertinet.
Sciendum est ergo quod secundum has opiniones diversimode ad hanc quaestionem oportet respondere. Prima opinio, per viam multiplicationis quam ponit, potest ponere perfectionem humanae naturae, et quantum ad numerum individuorum et quantum ad debitam quantitatem uniuscuiusque individui, absque eo quod ex alimento generatum est; quod quidem non additur nisi ad resistendum consumptioni quae posset induci per actionem caloris naturalis, sicut argento apponitur plumbum ne ex liquefactione consumatur. Unde, cum in resurrectione oporteat naturam humanam in sua perfectione reparari, nec calor naturalis tunc agat ad consumptionem humidi naturalis, nulla necessitas erit quod resurgat aliquid in homine quod ex alimento sit generatum: sed resurget tantum illud quod fuit de veritate humanae naturae individui, et per decisionem et multiplicationem ad praedictam perfectionem pervenit in numero et quantitate.
Secunda autem opinio, quia ponit quod eo quod adgeneratur ex nutrimento, indigetur ad perfectionem quantitatis individui et ad multiplicationem quae fit per generationem, necesse habet ponere aliquid de hoc in quod conversum est alimentum, resurgere: non tamen totum, sed solum quantum indigetur ad perfectam reintegrationem humanae naturae in omnibus suis individuis. Unde ponit haec opinio quod totum illud quod fuit in substantia seminis, resurget in illo homine qui ex illo semine generatus est: quia hoc est principaliter de veritate humanae naturae in ipso. De eo autem quod postea advenit per nutrimentum, tantum resurget in eo quantum est necessarium ad perfectionem quantitatis: et non totum, quia hoc non pertinet aliter ad veritatem humanae naturae nisi quatenus natura indiget eo ad perfectionem quantitatis. Sed quia hoc humidum nutrimentale fluit et refluit, hoc ordine reparabitur quod illud quod primo fuit de substantia corporis hominis, totum reparabitur; et de eo quod secundo et tertio et deinceps advenit, quantum necessarium est ad quantitatem reintegrandam, duplici ratione.
Primo, quia super hoc quod advenit inductum fuit ut illud quod primo erat deperditum repararetur: et ita non ita principaliter pertinet ad veritatem humanae naturae sicut praecedens. Secundo, quia adiunctio humidi extranei ad primum humidum radicale facit quod totum permixtum non ita perfecte participet veritatem speciei sicut primum participabat. Et ponit exemplum Philosophus, in I de Generat., de aqua permixta vino, quae semper virtutem vini debilitat, ita quod in fine ipsum aquosum reddit. Unde, sicut secunda aqua, quamvis assumatur in speciem vini, non tamen ita perfecte speciem vini participat sicut prima quae in vinum assumebatur, ita illud quod de alimento secundo in carnem convertitur, non ita perfecte attingit ad speciem carnis sicut quod primo convertebatur. Et ideo non ita pertinet ad veritatem humanae naturae, nec ad resurrectionem. Sic ergo patet quod haec opinio ponit resurgere totum id quod est de veritate humanae naturae principaliter, non autem totum quod est de veritate humanae naturae secundario.
Tertia autem opinio quantum ad aliquid differt a secunda, et quantum ad aliquid convenit cum ea. Differt quidem quantum ad hoc, quod ponit totum quod est sub forma carnis et ossis eadem ratione ad veritatem humanae naturae pertinere. Quia non distinguit aliquid materiale signatum permanens in homine toto tempore vitae eius, quod per se pertinet ad veritatem humanae naturae et primo; et aliquid fluens et refluens, quod pertinet ad veritatem humanae naturae solum propter quantitatis perfectionem, non propter primum esse speciei; sicut secunda opinio dicebat. Sed ponit omnes partes quae non sunt praeter intentionem naturae adgeneratae, pertinere ad veritatem humanae naturae quantum ad id quod habent de specie, quia sic manent; non autem quantum ad id quod habent de materia, quia sic fluunt et refluunt indifferenter; ut ita etiam intelligamus contingere in partibus unius hominis sicut contingit in tota multitudine civitatis, quia singuli subtrahuntur a multitudine per mortem, aliis in loco eorum succedentibus; unde partes multitudinis fluunt et refluunt materialiter, sed formaliter manent, quia ad eadem officia et ordines substituuntur alii a quibus priores subtrahebantur, unde respublica una numero remanere dicitur. Et similiter etiam dum, quibusdam partibus fluentibus alia reparantur in eadem figura et in eodem situ, omnes partes fluunt et refluunt secundum materiam sed manent secundum speciem, manet nihilominus homo idem numero.
Sed convenit tertia cum secunda opinione quia ponit quod partes secundo advenientes non ita perfecte attingunt ad veritatem speciei sicut quae primo advenerunt. Et ideo idem quod ponit resurgere in homine secunda opinio, ponit tertia: sed non penitus eadem ratione. Ponit enim totum illud quod ex semine generatum est resurgere, non quia alia ratione pertineat ad veritatem humanae naturae quam hoc quod postea advenit: sed quia perfectius veritatem speciei participat. Quem ordinem ponebat secunda opinio in his quae postea adveniunt ex alimento. In quo etiam haec opinio concordat cum illa.
B: (Jas 5:14) [b:Jas 5:14] (Jas 5:16) [b:Jas 5:16]
a. 4 ad 1
a. 4 ad 2
a. 4 ad 3
Sed secundum secundam opinionem et tertiam, unusquisque in illo resurget in quo magis accessit ad perfectam participationem virtutis speciei. Et si aequaliter in utroque accesserit, resurget in illo in quo primo fuit; quia in eo primo habuit ordinem ad resurrectionem ex coniunctione ad animam rationalem illius hominis. Et ideo, si in carnibus comestis fuit aliqua superfluitas quae non pertineret ad veritatem humanae naturae in primo, resurgere poterit in secundo. Alias, illud quod pertinebat ad resurrectionem in primo, resurget in eo et non in secundo: sed in loco eius sumeretur vel aliquid de eo quod ex aliis cibis in carnem secundi conversum est; vel, si nullo cibo unquam pastus fuisset nisi carnibus humanis, divina virtute aliunde suppleretur quantum indigeretur ad perfectionem quantitatis; sicut etiam supplet in illis qui ante perfectam aetatem decedunt. Nec per hoc aliquid praeiudicatur identitati in numero: sicut nec praeiudicatur per hoc quod partes secundum materiam fluunt et refluunt.
a. 4 ad 4
Sed secundum alias duas opiniones, dicendum est quod non est possibile quod totum quod fuit in carnibus comestis in semen convertatur: quia post multam depurationem cibi pervenitur ad decoctionem seminis, quod est superfluitas ultimi cibi. Illud autem quod de carnibus comestis in semen convertitur, pertinet magis ad veritatem humanae naturae in eo quod ex semine nascitur, quam in illo ex cuius carnibus semen est generatum. Et ideo, secundum regulam prius datam, hoc quod in semen conversum est, resurget in eo qui ex semine nascitur; residuum autem materiae resurget in illo ex cuius carnibus comestis semen est generatum.
a. 4 ad 5
Prima autem opinio hac obiectione non arctatur: cum non ponat semen esse ex superfluo alimenti. Sed aliae multae rationes sunt contra eam: ut in II libro, dist. 30, patuit.
a. 5 arg. 1
a. 5 arg. 2
B: (Jas 5:16) [b:Jas 5:16]
a. 5 arg. 3
a. 5 s. c. 1
a. 5 arg. 4
a. 5 co.
Secunda autem opinio et prima non utuntur hac distinctione, sed distinguunt inter partes quarum utraque habet speciem et materiam. Conveniunt autem hae duae opiniones in hoc quod utraque dicit quod illud quod est ex semine generatum, totum resurget, etiam totalitate materiae considerata. Differunt autem in hoc quod de eo quod ex alimento generatur, nihil resurgere ponit prima opinio; secunda vero aliquid eius resurgere ponit, et non totum, ut ex dictis patet.
R: Q.. 80 a. 4[t:suppl q. 80 a. 4]
a. 5 ad 1
a. 5 ad 2
Sed prima et secunda opinio, quae ponunt alias esse partes quae sunt secundum speciem et alias quae sunt secundum materiam, dicunt quod anima, quamvis utrasque partes perficiat, tamen perficit partes secundum materiam mediantibus partibus secundum speciem. Et ideo non habent aequaliter ordinem ad resurrectionem.