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St. Thomas Aquinas

The Summa Theologica

(Benziger Bros. edition, 1947)
Translated by
Fathers of the English Dominican Province

 

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OF THE GENERAL JUDGMENT, AS TO THE TIME AND PLACE AT WHICH IT WILL BE (FOUR ARTICLES)


   We must next consider the general judgment, as to the time and place at which it will be. Under this head there are four points of inquiry:

    (1) Whether there will be a general judgment?

    (2) Whether as regards the debate it will be conducted by word of mouth?

    (3) Whether it will take place at an unknown time?

    (4) Whether it will take place in the valley of Josaphat?


 

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Whether there will be a general judgment?


  Objection 1: It would seem that there will not be a general judgment. For according to Nahum 1:9, following the Septuagint version, "God will not judge the same thing a second time." But God judges now of mans' every work, by assigning punishments and rewards to each one after death, and also by rewarding and punishing certain ones in this life for their good or evil deeds. Therefore it would seem that there will be no other judgment.

  Objection 2: Further, in no judicial inquiry is the sentence carried cut before judgment is pronounced. But the sentence of the Divine judgment on man regards the acquisition of the kingdom or exclusion from the kingdom (Mt. 25:34,41). Therefore since some obtain possession of the kingdom now, and some are excluded from it for ever, it would seem that there will be no other judgment.

  Objection 3: Further, the reason why certain things are submitted to judgment is that we may come to a decision about them. Now before the end of the world each of the damned is awarded his damnation, and each of the blessed his beatitude. Therefore, etc.

  On the contrary, It is written (Mt. 12:41): "The men of Nineve shall rise in judgment with this generation, and shall condemn it." Therefore there will be a judgment after the resurrection.

   Further, it is written (Jn. 5:29): "They that have done good things shall come forth unto the resurrection of life, but they that have done evil, unto the resurrection of judgment." Therefore it would seem that after the resurrection there will be a judgment.

  I answer that, Just as operation refers to the beginning wherefrom things receive their being, so judgment belongs to the term, wherein they are brought to their end. Now we distinguish a twofold operation in God. One is that whereby He first gave things their being, by fashioning their nature and by establishing the distinctions which contribute to the perfection thereof: from this work God is stated to have rested (Gn. 2:2). His other operation is that whereby He works in governing creatures; and of this it is written (Jn. 5:17): "My Father worketh until now; and I work." Hence we distinguish in Him a twofold judgment, but in the reverse order. One corresponds to the work of governance which cannot be without judgment: and by this judgment each one is judged individually according to his works, not only as adapted to himself, but also as adapted to the government of the universe. Hence one man's reward is delayed for the good of others (Heb. 11:13,39,40), and the punishment of one conduces to the profit of another. Consequently it is necessary that there should be another, and that a general judgment corresponding on the other hand with the first formation of things in being, in order that, to wit, just as then all things proceeded immediately from God, so at length the world will receive its ultimate complement, by each one receiving finally his own personal due. Hence at this judgment the Divine justice will be made manifest in all things, whereas now it remains hidden, for as much as at times some persons are dealt with for the profit of others, otherwise than their manifest works would seem to require. For this same reason there will then be a general separation of the good from the wicked, because there will be no further motive for the good to profit by the wicked, or the wicked by the good: for the sake of which profit the good are meanwhile mingled with the wicked, so long as this state of life is governed by Divine providence.

  Reply to Objection 1: Each man is both an individual person and a part of the whole human race: wherefore a twofold judgment is due to him. One, the particular judgment, is that to which he will be subjected after death, when he will receive according as he hath done in the body [*Cf. 2 Cor. 5:10], not indeed entirely but only in part since he will receive not in the body but only in the soul. The other judgment will be passed on him as a part of the human race: thus a man is said to be judged according to human justice, even when judgment is pronounced on the community of which he is a part. Hence at the general judgment of the whole human race by the general separation of the good from the wicked, it follows that each one will be judged. And yet God will not judge "the same thing a second time," since He will not inflict two punishments for one sin, and the punishment which before the judgment was not inflicted completely will be completed at the last judgment, after which the wicked will be tormented at the same time in body and soul.

  Reply to Objection 2: The sentence proper to this general judgment is the general separation of the good from the wicked, which will not precede this judgment. Yet even now, as regards the particular sentence on each individual, the judgment does not at once take full effect since even the good will receive an increase of reward after the judgment, both from the added glory of the body and from the completion of the number of the saints. The wicked also will receive an increase of torment from the added punishment of the body and from the completion of the number of damned to be punished, because the more numerous those with whom they will burn, the more will they themselves burn.

  Reply to Objection 3: The general judgment will regard more directly the generality of men than each individual to be judged, as stated above. Wherefore although before that judgment each one will be certain of his condemnation or reward, he will not be cognizant of the condemnation or reward of everyone else. Hence the necessity of the general judgment.


 

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Whether the judgment will take place by word of mouth?


  Objection 1: It would seem that this judgment, as regards the inquiry and sentence, will take place by word of mouth. For according to Augustine (De Civ. Dei xx) "it is uncertain how many days this judgment will last." But it would not be uncertain if the things we are told will take place at the judgment were to be accomplished only in the mind. Therefore this judgment will take place by word of mouth and not only in the mind.

  Objection 2: Further, Gregory says (Moral. xxvi): "Those at least will hear the words of the Judge, who have confessed their faith in Him by words." Now this cannot be understood as referring to the inner word, because thus all will hear the Judge's words, since all the deeds of other men will be known to all both good and wicked. Therefore it seems that this judgment will take place by word of mouth.

  Objection 3: Further, Christ will judge according to His human form, so as to be visible in the body to all. Therefore in like manner it seems that He will speak with the voice of the body, so as to be heard by all.

  On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xx) that the book of life which is mentioned Apoc. 20:12,[15] "is a kind of Divine energy enabling each one to remember all his good or evil works, and to discern them with the gaze of the mind, with wondrous rapidity, his knowledge accusing or defending his conscience, so that all and each will be judged at the same moment." But if each one's merits were discussed by word of mouth, all and each could not be judged at the same moment. Therefore it would seem that this judgment will not take place by word of mouth.

   Further, the sentence should correspond proportionately to the evidence. Now the evidence both of accusation and of defense will be mental, according to Rm. 2:15,16, "Their conscience bearing witness to them, and their thoughts between themselves accusing or also defending one another in the day when God shall judge the secrets of men." Therefore seemingly, this sentence and the entire judgment will take place mentally.

  I answer that, It is not possible to come to any certain conclusion about the truth of this question. It is, however, the more probable opinion that the whole of this judgment, whether as regards the inquiry, or as regards the accusation of the wicked and the approval of the good or again as regards the sentence on both, will take place mentally. For if the deeds of each individual were to be related by word of mouth, this would require an inconceivable length of time. Thus Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xx) that "if we suppose the book, from the pages of which all will be judged according to Apoc. 20, to be a material book, who will be able to conceive its size and length? or the length of time required for the reading of a book that contains the entire life of every individual?" Nor is less time requisite for telling by word of mouth the deeds of each individual, than for reading them if they were written in a material book. Hence, probably we should understand that the details set forth in Mt. 25 will be fulfilled not by word of mouth but mentally.

  Reply to Objection 1: The reason why Augustine says that "it is uncertain how many days this judgment will last" is precisely because it is not certain whether it will take place mentally or by word of mouth. For if it were to take place by word of mouth, a considerable time would be necessary. but if mentally, it is possible for it to be accomplished in an instant.

  Reply to Objection 2: Even if the judgment is accomplished solely in the mind, the saying of Gregory stands, since though all will be cognizant of their own and of others' deeds, as a result of the Divine energy which the Gospel describes as speech (Mt. 25:84-46), nevertheless those who have had the faith which they received through God's words will be judged from those very words, for it is written (Rm. 2:12): "Whosoever have sinned in the Law shall be judged by the Law." Hence in a special way something will be said to those who had been believers, which will not be said to unbelievers.

  Reply to Objection 3: Christ will appear in body, so that the Judge may be recognized in the body by all, and it is possible for this to take place suddenly. But speech which is measured by time would require an immense length of time, if the judgment took place by word of mouth.


 

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Whether the time of the future judgment is unknown?


  Objection 1: It would seem that the time of the future judgment is not unknown. For just as the holy Fathers looked forward to the first coming, so do we look forward to the second. But the holy Fathers knew the time of the first coming, as proved by the number of weeks mentioned in Daniel 9: wherefore the Jews are reproached for not knowing the time of Christ's coming (Lk. 12:56): "You hypocrites, you know how to discern the face of the heaven and of the earth, but how is it that you do not discern this time?" Therefore it would seem that the time of the second coming when God will come to judgment should also be certified to us.

  Objection 2: Further, we arrive by means of signs at the knowledge of the things signified. Now many signs of the coming judgment are declared to us in Scripture (Mt. 24, Mk. 13, Lk. 21). Therefore we can arrive at the knowledge of that time.

  Objection 3: Further, the Apostle says (1 Cor. 10:11): "It is on us [*'These things . . . are written for our correction, upon whom the ends of the world are come'] that the ends of the world are come," and (1 Jn. 2:18): "Little children, it is the last hour," etc. Since then it is a long time since these things were said, it would seem that now at least we can know that the last judgment is nigh.

  Objection 4: Further, there is no need for the time of the judgment to be hidden, except that each one may be careful to prepare himself for judgment, being in ignorance of the appointed time. Yet the same care would still be necessary even were the time known for certain, because each one is uncertain about the time of his death, of which Augustine says (Ep. ad Hesych. cxcix) that "as each one's last day finds him, so will the world's last day find him." Therefore there is no necessity for the time of the judgment to be uncertain.

  On the contrary, It is written (Mk. 13:32): "Of that day or hour no man knoweth, neither the angels in heaven, nor the Son, but the Father." The Son, however, is said not to know in so far as He does not impart the knowledge to us.

   Further, it is written (1 Thess. 5:2): "The day of the Lord shall so come as a thief in the night." Therefore seemingly, as the coming of a thief in the night is altogether uncertain, the day of the last judgment is altogether uncertain.

  I answer that, God is the cause of things by His knowledge [*Cf. FP, Question [14], Article [8]]. Now He communicates both these things to His creatures, since He both endows some with the power of action on others whereof they are the cause, and bestows on some the knowledge of things. But in both cases He reserves something to Himself, for He operates certain things wherein no creature co-operates with Him, and again He knows certain things which are unknown to any mere creature. Now this should apply to none more than to those things which are subject to the Divine power alone, and in which no creature co-operates with Him. Such is the end of the world when the day of judgment will come. For the world will come to an end by no created cause, even as it derived its existence immediately from God. Wherefore the knowledge of the end of the world is fittingly reserved to God. Indeed our Lord seems to assign this very reason when He said (Acts 1:7): "It is not for you to know the times or moments which the Father hath put in His own power," as though He were to say, "which are reserved to His power alone."

  Reply to Objection 1: At His first coming Christ came secretly according to Is. 45:15, "Verily Thou art a hidden God, the God of Israel, the Saviour." Hence, that He might be recognized by believers, it was necessary for the time to be fixed beforehand with certainty. On the other hand, at the second coming, He will come openly, according to Ps. 49:3, "God shall come manifestly." Consequently there can be no error affecting the knowledge of His coming. Hence the comparison fails.

  Reply to Objection 2: As Augustine says, in his letter to Hesychius concerning the day of judgment (Ep. cxcix), "the signs mentioned in the Gospels do not all refer to the second advent which will happen at the end of the world, but some of them belong to the time of the sack of Jerusalem, which is now a thing of the past, while some, in fact many of them, refer to the advent whereby He comes daily to the Church, whom He visits spiritually when He dwells in us by faith and love." Moreover, the details mentioned in the Gospels and Epistles in connection with the last advent are not sufficient to enable us to determine the time of the judgment, for the trials that are foretold as announcing the proximity of Christ's coming occurred even at the time of the Early Church, in a degree sometimes more sometimes less marked; so that even the days of the apostles were called the last days (Acts 2:17) when Peter expounded the saying of Joel 2:28, "It shall come to pass in the last days," etc., as referring to that time. Yet it was already a long time since then: and sometimes there were more and sometimes less afflictions in the Church. Consequently it is impossible to decide after how long a time it will take place, nor fix the month, year, century, or thousand years as Augustine says in the same book (Ep. ad Hesych. cxcix). And even if we are to believe that at the end these calamities will be more frequent, it is impossible to fix what amount of such calamities will immediately precede the judgment day or the coming of Antichrist, since even at the time of the Early Church persecutions were so bitter, and the corruptions of error were so numerous, that some looked forward to the coming of Antichrist as being near or imminent; as related in Eusebius' History of the Church (vi, 7) and in Jerome's book De Viris Illustribus lii.

  Reply to Objection 3: The statement, "It is the last hour" and similar expressions that are to be found in Scripture do not enable us to know the exact length of time. For they are not intended to indicate a short length of time, but to signify the last state of the world, which is the last age of all, and it is not stated definitely how long this will last. Thus neither is fixed duration appointed to old age, which is the last age of man, since sometimes it is seen to last as long as or even longer than all the previous ages, as Augustine remarks (Qq. 83, qu. lviii). Hence also the Apostle (2 Thess. 2:2) disclaims the false signification which some had given to his words, by believing that the day of the Lord was already at hand.

  Reply to Objection 4: Notwithstanding the uncertainty of death, the uncertainty of the judgment conduces to watchfulness in two ways. First, as regards the thing ignored, since its delay is equal to the length of man's life, so that on either side uncertainty provokes him to greater care. Secondly, for the reason that a man is careful not only of his own person, but also of his family, or of his city or kingdom, or of the whole Church, the length of whose duration is not dependent on the length of man's life. And yet it behooves each of these to be so ordered that the day of the Lord find us not unprepared.


 

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Whether the judgment will take place in the valley of Josaphat?


  Objection 1: It would seem that the judgment will not take place in the valley of Josaphat or in the surrounding locality. For at least it will be necessary for those to be judged to stand on the ground, and those alone to be raised aloft whose business it will be to judge. But the whole land of promise would not be able to contain the multitude of those who are to be judged. Therefore it is impossible for the judgment to take place in the neighborhood of that valley.

  Objection 2: Further, to Christ in His human form judgment is given that He may judge justly, since He was judged unjustly in the court of Pilate, and bore the sentence of an unjust judgment on Golgotha. Therefore these places would be more suitably appointed for the judgment.

  Objection 3: Further, clouds result from the exhalation of vapors. But then there will be no evaporation or exhalation. Therefore it will be impossible for the just to be "taken up . . . in the clouds to meet Christ, into the air": and consequently it will be necessary for both good and wicked to be on the earth, so that a much larger place than this valley will be required.

  On the contrary, It is written (Joel 3:2): "I will gather together all nations and will bring them down into the valley of Josaphat, and I will plead with them there."

   Further, it is written (Acts 1:11): "(This Jesus) . . . shall so come as you have seen Him going into heaven." Now He ascended into heaven from Mount Olivet which overlooks the valley of Josaphat. Therefore He will come to judge in the neighborhood of that place.

  I answer that, We cannot know with any great certainty the manner in which this judgment will take place, nor how men will gather together to the place of judgment; but it may be gathered from Scripture that in all probability He will descend in the neighborhood of Mount Olivet, even as He ascended from there, so as to show that He who descends is the same as He who ascended.

  Reply to Objection 1: A great multitude can be enclosed in a small space. And all that is required is that in the neighborhood of that locality there be a space, however great, to contain the multitude of those who are to be judged, provided that Christ can be seen thence since being raised in the air, and shining with exceeding glory, He will be visible from a great distance.

  Reply to Objection 2: Although through being sentenced unjustly Christ merited His judiciary power, He will not judge with the appearance of infirmity wherein He was judged unjustly, but under the appearance of glory wherein He ascended to the Father. Hence the place of His ascension is more suitable to the judgment than the place where He was condemned.

  Reply to Objection 3: In the opinion of some the name of clouds is here given to certain condensations of the light shining from the bodies of the saints, and not to evaporations from earth and water. Or we may say that those clouds will be produced by Divine power in order to show the parallel between His coming to judge and His ascension; so that He Who ascended in a cloud may come to judgment in a cloud.

   Again the cloud on account of its refreshing influence indicates the mercy of the Judge.


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Latin — Supplementum

pr.

Deinde considerandum est de iudicio generali, tempore et loco in quo fiet.

Circa quod quaeruntur quatuor.

Primo: utrum generale iudicium sit futurum.

Secundo: utrum quantum ad disceptationem

Tertio: utrum fiet tempore ignoto.

Quarto: utrum fiet in valle Iosaphat.

a. 1 arg. 1

Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod generale iudicium non sit futurum. Quia, ut dicitur Nahum 1, (9), non indicabit Deus bis in idipsum. Sed nunc Deus iudicat de singulis hominum operibus: cum post mortem unicuique poenas vel praemia pro meritis tribuit; et dum etiam quosdam in hac vita pro bonis vel malis operibus praemiat vel punit. Ergo videtur quod non sit aliud iudicium futurum.

a. 1 arg. 2

Praeterea, in nullo iudicio executio sententiae praecedit iudicium. Sed sententia divini iudicii quoad homines est de adeptione regni vel exclusione a regno, ut patet Matth. 25, (31 sqq.). Ergo, cum modo aliqui adipiscantur regnum aeternum et quidam excludantur ab ipso perpetuo, videtur quod aliud iudicium non sit futurum.

a. 1 arg. 3

Praeterea, propter hoc aliqua in iudicium oportet adduci, quia dubium est quid de eis definiendum sit. Sed ante finem mundi determinata est unicuique damnatorum sua damnatio, et cuique sanctorum sua beatitudo. Ergo videtur quod non oporteat aliquod futurum iudicium esse.

a. 1 s. c. 1

Sed contra: Matth. 12, (41) dicitur: viri Ninivitae surgent in iudicio cum generatione ista, et condemnabunt eam. Ergo post resurrectionem aliquod iudicium erit.

a. 1 arg. 4

Praeterea, Ioan. 5, (29) dicitur: procedent qui bona egerunt in resurrectionem vitae; qui vero mala, in resurrectionem iudicii. Ergo videtur quod post resurrectionem aliquod iudicium sit futurum.

a. 1 co.

Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut operatio pertinet ad rerum principium, quo producuntur in esse, ita iudicium pertinet ad terminum, quo res ad suum finem perducitur. Distinguitur autem duplex Dei operatio. Una, qua res primitus in esse perduxit, instituens naturam et distinguens ea quae ad completionem ipsius pertinent: a quo quidem opera Deus dicitur quievisse, Genes. 2, (2). Alia eius operatio est qua operatur in gubernatione creaturarum: de qua Ioan. 5, (17): pater meus usque modo operatur, et ego operor. Ita etiam duplex eius iudicium distinguitur, ordine tamen converso. Unum quod respondet operationi gubernationis, quae sine iudicio esse non potest. Per quod quidem iudicium unusquisque singulariter pro suis operibus iudicatur, non solum secundum quod sibi competi, sed secundum quod competit gubernationi universi: unde differtur unius praemiatio pro utilitate aliorum, ut patet Heb. 11, (39, 40), et poenae unius ad profectum alterius cedunt. Unde necesse est ut sit aliquod iudicium universale correspondens ex adverso primae rerum productioni in esse: ut videlicet, sicut tunc omnia processerunt immediate a Deo, ita tunc ultima completio mundo detur, unoquoque accipiente finaliter quod ei debetur secundum seipsum.

Unde in illo iudicio apparebit manifeste divina iustitia quantum ad omnia, quae nunc ex hoc occultantur quod interdum de uno disponitur, ad utilitatem aliorum, aliter quam manifesta opera exigere videantur. Unde etiam et tunc erit universalis separatio bonorum a malis: quia ulterius non erit locus ut mali per bonos vel boni per malos proficiant, propter quem profectum interim commixti inveniuntur boni malis, quoadusque status huius vitae per divinam providentiam gubernatur.

a. 1 ad 1

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod quilibet homo et est singularis quaedam persona, et est pars totius generis humani. Unde et duplex ei iudicium debetur. Unum singulare, quod de eo fiet post mortem, quando recipiet iuxta ea quae in corpore gessit: quamvis non totaliter, quia non quoad corpus, sed quoad animam tantum. Aliud iudicium debet esse de eo secundum quod est pars totius humani generis: sicut aliquis iudicari dicitur, secundum humanam iustitiam, quando etiam iudicium datur de communitate: cuius ipse est pars. Unde et tunc, quando fiet universale iudicium totius humani generis per universalem separationem bonorum a malis, etiam quilibet per consequens iudicabitur. Nec tamen Deus iudicat bis in idipsum: quia non duas poenas pro uno peccato infert; sed poena, quae ante iudicium complete inflicta non fuerat, in ultimo iudicio complebitur, post quod impii cruciabuntur quoad corpus et animam simul.

a. 1 ad 2

Ad secundum dicendum quod propria sententia illius generalis; iudicii est universalis separatio bonorum a malis, quae illud iudicium non praecedet. Sed nec etiam quoad particularem sententiam uniuscuiusque plene praecessit iudicii effectus: quia etiam boni amplius post iudicium praemiabuntur, tum ex gloria corporis adiuncta, tum ex numero sanctorum completo; et mali etiam plus torquebuntur ex adiuncta poena corporis, et impleto in poenis numero damnatorum; quia quanto cum pluribus ardebunt, tanto plus ardebunt.

a. 1 ad 3

Ad tertium dicendum quod universale iudicium magis directe respicit universalitatem hominum quam singulos iudicandorum. Quamvis ergo cuilibet homini ante iudicium sit certa notitia de sua damnatione vel praemio, non tamen omnibus omnium damnatio vel praemium innotescet. Unde iudicium necessarium erit.

a. 2 arg. 1

Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod iudicium illud, quantum ad disceptationem et sententiam, fiet per locutionem vocalem. Quia, ut Augustinus dicit, XX de Civ. Dei, per quot dies hoc futurum iudicium tendatur, hoc incertum est. Sed non esset incertum si illa quae in iudicio dicuntur futura, tantum mentaliter complerentur. Ergo iudicium illud vocaliter fiet, et non solum mentaliter.

a. 2 arg. 2

Praeterea, Gregorius dicit, et habetur in littera: illi saltem verba iudicis audient qui eius fidem verbo tenuerunt. Hoc autem non potest intelligi de verbo interiori: quia sic omnes verba Iudicis audient, quia omnibus, bonis et malis, nota erunt omnia facta aliorum. Ergo videtur quod iudicium illud vocaliter peragetur.

a. 2 arg. 3

Praeterea, Christus secundum formam hominis iudicabit, in qua corporaliter ab omnibus possit videri. Ergo eadem ratione videtur quod corporali voce loquatur, ut ab omnibus audiatur.

a. 2 s. c. 1

Sed contra: Augustinus dicit, XX de Civ. Dei, quod liber vitae, de quo Apoc. 20, (12), vis quaedam intelligenda est divina, qua fiet utcuique opera sua vel bona vel mala ad memoriam revocentur, et mentis intuitu mira celeritate cernantur, ut accuset vel excuset scientia conscientiam, atque ita simul et omnes, et singuli iudicentur. Sed, si vocaliter discuterentur merita singulorum, non possent omnes et singuli iudicari simul. Ergo videtur quod illa discussio non erit vocalis.

a. 2 arg. 4

Praeterea, sententia proportionaliter debet testimonio respondere. Sed testimonium et accusatio vel excusatio erit mentalis: unde Rom. 2, (15–16), testimonium illis reddente conscientia ipsorum, et infer se invicem cogitationum accusantium aut etiam defendentium, in die cum iudicabit Deus occulta hominum. Ergo videtur quod illa sententia et totum iudicium mentaliter compleatur.

a. 2 co.

Respondeo dicendum quod quid circa hanc quaestionem sit verum, pro certo definiri non potest. Tamen probabilius aestimatur quod totum illud iudicium, et quoad discussionem, et quoad accusationem malorum et commendationem bonorum, et quoad sententiam de utrisque, mentaliter perficietur. Si enim vocaliter singulorum facta narrarentur, inaestimabilis magnitudo temporis ad hoc exigeretur. Sicut etiam Augustinus dicit, XX de Civ. Dei: quod si liber, ex cuius scriptura omnes iudicabuntur, ut dicitur Apoc. 20, (12), carnaliter cogitetur, quis eius magnitudinem aut longitudinem valeat aestimare? Aut quanto tempore legi poterit liber in quo scriptae sunt universae vitae universorum? Non autem minus tempus requiritur ad narrandum ore tenus singulorum facta quam ad legendum, si essent in libro materiali scripta. Unde probabile est quod illa quae dicuntur Matth. 25, (34 sqq.), non vocaliter, sed mentaliter intelligenda sunt esse perficienda.

a. 2 ad 1

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod pro tanto dicit Augustinus quod incertum est per quot dies hoc iudicium tendatur, quia non est determinatum utrum mentaliter vel vocaliter perficiatur. Si enim vocaliter perficeretur, prolixum tempus ad hoc exigeretur. Si autem mentaliter, in momento fieri poterit.

a. 2 ad 2

Ad secundum dicendum quod, etiam si iudicium fiat mentaliter tantum, verbum Gregorii salvari potest. Quia etsi omnibus innotescent sua et aliorum facta, divina virtute hoc faciente, quae in Evangelio locutio dicitur; tamen illi qui fidem habuerunt, quam ex verbis Dei conceperunt, ex ipsis verbis iudicabuntur: quia, ut dicitur Rom, 2, (12), qui in lege peccaverunt, per legem iudicabuntur. Unde quodam speciali modo dicetur aliquid his qui fuerunt fideles, quod non dicetur his qui fuerunt infideles.

a. 2 ad 3

Ad tertium dicendum quod Christus corporaliter apparebit ut ab omnibus Iudex corporaliter cognoscatur: quod quidem subito fieri poterit. Sed locutio, quae tempore mensuratur, requireret immensam temporis prolixitatem, si vocali locutione iudicium perageretur.

a. 3 arg. 1

Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod tempus futuri iudicii non sit ignotum. Sicut enim sancti patres expectabant primum adventum, ita nos expectamus secundum. Sed sancti patres sciverunt tempus primi adventus: sicut patet per numerum hebdomadarum qui describitur Dan. 9, (24 sqq.). Unde et reprehenduntur Iudaei quod tempus adventus Christi non cognoverunt, ut patet Luc. 12, (56): hypocritae, faciem caeli et terrae nostis probare: hoc autem tempus quomodo non probatis? Ergo videtur quod etiam nobis esse debeat determinatum tempus secundi adventus, quo Deus ad iudicium veniet.

a. 3 arg. 2

Praeterea, per signa devenimus in cognitionem signatorum. Sea de futuro iudicio multa signa nobis proponuntur in Scriptura: ut patet Matth. 24, (3 sqq.) et Luc. 21, (7 sqq.) et Marc. 13, (3 sqq.). Ergo in cognitionem illius temporis possumus pervenire.

a. 3 arg. 3

Praeterea, Apostolus dicit, I Cor. 10, (11) nos sumus in quos fines saeculorum devenerunt. Et I Ioan. 2, (18): filioli, novissima hora est, etc. Cum ergo iam longum tempus transierit ex quo haec dicta sunt, videtur quod saltem nunc scire possumus quod ultimum iudicium sit propinquum.

a. 3 arg. 4

Praeterea, tempus iudicii non oportet esse occultum nisi propter hoc quod quilibet sollicitus se ad iudicium praeparet, dum determinate tempus ignoret. Sed eadem sollicitudo remaneret etiam si certum esset: quia cuique incertum est tempus suae mortis; et, sicut dicit Augustinus, in Epistola ad Hesychium, in quo quemque invenerit suus novissimus dies, in hoc eum comprehendet mundi novissimus dies. Ergo non est necessarium tempus iudicii esse occultum.

a. 3 s. c. 1

Sed contra: Est quod dicitur Marci 13, (32): de die illa vel hora nemo scit, nec angeli in caelo nec Filius, nisi Pater. Dicitur autem Filius nescire, inquantum nos scire non facit.

a. 3 arg. 5

Praeterea, I Thessal. 5, (2): dies Domini sicut fur in nocte, ita veniet. Ergo videtur, cum adventus furis in nocte sit omnino incertus, quod dies ultimi iudicii sit omnino incertus.

a. 3 co.

Respondeo dicendum quod Deus per scientiam suam est causa rerum. Utrumque autem creaturis communicat: dum et rebus tribuit virtutem agendi alias res, quarum sunt causae; et quibusdam etiam cognitionem rerum praebet. Sed in utroque aliqua sibi reservat: operatur enim quaedam in quibus nulla creatura ei cooperatur; et similiter cognoscit quaedam quae a nulla pura creatura cognoscuntur. Haec autem nulla alia magis esse debent quam illa quae soli divinae subiacent potestati, in quibus nulla creatura ei cooperatur. Et huiusmodi est finis mundi, in quo erit dies iudicii: non enim per aliquam causam creatam mundus finietur; sicut etiam mundus esse incoepit immediate a Deo: Unde decenter cognitio finis mundi soli Deo reservatur. Et hanc rationem videtur ipse Dominus assignare, Act. 1, (7): non est, inquit, vestrum nosse tempora vel momenta quae Pater posuit in sua potestate quasi diceret, quae soli potestati eius reservata sunt.

a. 3 ad 1

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod in primo adventu Christus venit occultus: secundum illud Isaiae 45, (15): vere tu es Deus absconditus Sanctus Israel, Salvator. Et ideo, ut a fidelibus cognosci posset, oportuit determinate tempus praedeterminare. Sed in secundo adventu veniet manifeste: ut dicitur in Psalmo (49, 3), Deus manifeste veniet, etc. Et ideo circa cognitionem adventus ipsius error esse non poterit. Et propter hoc non est simile.

a. 3 ad 2

Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut dicit Augustinus, in Epistola de Die Iudicii ad Hesychium, signa quae in Evangeliis ponuntur, non omnia pertinent ad secundum adventum, qui erit in fine: sed quaedam eorum pertinent ad tempus destructionis Ierusalem, quae iam praeteriit; quaedam vero, et plura eorum, pertinent ad adventum quo quotidie ad Ecclesiam suam venit, eam visitans spiritualiter, prout nos inhabitat per fidem et amorem.

Nec illa quae in Evangeliis vel Epistolis ponuntur ad ultimum adventum spectantia, ad hoc possunt valere ut determinate tempus iudicii possit cognosci. Quia illa pericula quae praenuntiantur, nuntiantia vicinum Christi adventum, etiam a tempore primitivae Ecclesiae fuerunt, quandoque intensius, quandoque remissius: unde et ipsi dies Apostolorum dicti sunt novissimi dies; ut patet Act. 2, (16 sqq.), ubi Petrus exponit illud Ioel 2, (28 sqq.), erit in novissimis diebus etc., pro tempore illo. Et tamen ex illo tempore tempus plurimum transivit: et quandoque plures, et quandoque pauciores tribulationes in Ecclesia fuerunt. Unde non potest determinari tempus quantum sit futurum, nec de mense nec de anno, nec de centum nec de mille annis, ut Augustinus in eodem libro dicit: etsi credantur in finem huiusmodi pericula magis abundare. Non potest tamen determinari quae sit illa quantitas periculorum quae immediate diem iudicii praecedet, vel Antichristi adventum: cum etiam circa tempora primitivae Ecclesiae fuerint persecutiones aliquae adeo graves, et corruptiones errorum adeo abundarent, quod ab aliquibus tunc vicinus expectaretur vel imminens Antichristi adventus, sicut dicitur in Ecclesiastica historia, et in libro Hieronymi de Viris illustribus.

a. 3 ad 3

Ad tertium dicendum quod ex hoc quod dicitur, novissima hora est, vel ex similibus locutionibus quae in Scriptura leguntur, non potest aliqua determinata quantitas temporis sciri. Non enim est dictum ad significandum aliquam brevem horam temporis: sed ad significandum novissimum statum mundi, qui est quasi novissima aetas; quae quanto temporis spatio duret, non est definitum, cum etiam nec senio, quod est ultima aetas hominis, sit aliquis certus terminus praefinitus, cum quandoque inveniatur durare quantum omnes praecedentes aetates vel plus; ut dicit Augustinus, in libro Octoginta trium quaestionum. Unde etiam Apostolus, II Thessal. 2, (2), excludit falsum intellectum quem quidam ex suis verbis conceperant, ut crederent diem Domini iam instare.

a. 3 ad 4

Ad quartum dicendum quod, etiam supposita mortis incertitudine, dupliciter ad vigilantiam valet incertitudo iudicii. Primo, ad hoc quod ignoratur utrum etiam tantum differatur quantum est hominis vita: ut sic ex duabus partibus incertitudo maiorem diligentiam faciat. Secundo, quantum ad hoc quod homo non gerit solum sollicitudinem de persona sua, sed de familia vel civitate vel regno aut tota Ecclesia, cui non determinatur tempus durationis secundum hominis vitam: et tamen oportet unumquemque horum hoc modo disponi ut dies Domini non inveniat imparatos.

a. 4 arg. 1

Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod iudicium non fiet iri valle Iosaphat, aut in loco circumstante. Quia ad minus oportet omnes iudicandos in terra stare; eos autem tantum elevari in nubibus quorum erit iudicare. Sed tota terra promissionis capere non posset multitudinem iudicandorum. Ergo non potest esse quod circa vallem illam sit iudicium.
B: (Ps 18:13) [b:Ps 18:13]

a. 4 arg. 2

Praeterea, Christo in humanitate datum est iudicium ut iuste iudicet qui iniuste iudicatus est. Sed ipse iniuste iudicatus est in praetorio Pilati, et sententiam iniusti iudicii in Golgotha suscepit. Ergo loca illa magis debent ad iudicium determinari.

a. 4 arg. 3

Praeterea, nubes fiunt ex resolutione vaporum. Sed tunc nulla erit evaporatio vel resolutio. Ergo non poterit esse quod iusti in nubibus obviam Christo in aera rapiantur. Et sic oportebit et bonos et malos esse in terra. Et ita locus multo amplior requiretur quam sit vallis illa.

a. 4 s. c. 1

Sed contra: Est quod dicitur Ioel 3, (2): congregabo omnes gentes, et educam eas in valle Iosaphat, et disceptabo ibi cum eis.

a. 4 arg. 4

Praeterea, Act. 1, (11) dicitur: quemadmodum vidistis eum ascendentem in caelum, ita veniet. Sed ipse ascendit de monte Oliveti, qui praeeminet valli Iosaphat. Ergo et circa loca illa ad iudicandum veniet.
B: (Ps 17:27)

a. 4 co.

Respondeo dicendum quod qualiter illud iudicium sit futurum, et quomodo homines ad iudicium conveniant, non potest multum per certitudinem sciri. Tamen probabiliter potest colligi ex Scripturis quod circa locum montis Oliveti descendet, sicut et inde ascendit: ut idem esse ostendatur qui ascendit et qui descendit.

a. 4 ad 1

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod magna multitudo iri parvo spatio comprehendi potest. Sufficit autem ponere quantumcumque spatium circa, locum illum ad capiendum multitudinem iudicandorum, dummodo ab illo spatio Christum videre possint, qui in aere eminens, et maxima claritate refulgens, a longinquo inspici poterit.

a. 4 ad 2

Ad secundum dicendum quod, quamvis Christus per hoc quod iniuste iudicatus est iudiciariam potestatem meruit, non tamen iudicabit iri forma infirmitatis, in qua iniuste iudicatus est: sed in forma gloriosa, in qua ad Patrem ascendit. Unde locus ascensionis magis competit iudicio quam locus ubi condemnatus est.

a. 4 ad 3

Ad tertium dicendum quod nubes hic appellantur, ut dicunt quidam, densitates lucis resplendentis a corporibus sanctorum, et non aliquae evaporationes ex terra et aqua.