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St. Thomas Aquinas

The Summa Theologica

(Benziger Bros. edition, 1947)
Translated by
Fathers of the English Dominican Province

 

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OF THE FORM OF THE JUDGE IN COMING TO THE JUDGMENT (THREE ARTICLES)


   We must now consider the form of the Judge in coming to the judgment. Under this head there are three points of inquiry:

    (1) Whether Christ will judge under the form or His humanity?

    (2) Whether He will appear under the form of His glorified humanity?

    (3) Whether His Godhead can be seen without joy?


 

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Whether Christ will judge under the form of His humanity?


  Objection 1: It would seem that Christ will not judge under the form of His humanity. For judgment requires authority in the judge. Now Christ has authority over the quick and the dead as God, for thus is He the Lord and Creator of all. Therefore He will judge under the form of His Godhead.

  Objection 2: Further, invincible power is requisite in a judge; wherefore it is written (Eccles. 7:6): "Seek not to be made a judge, unless thou have strength enough to extirpate iniquities." Now invincible power belongs to Christ as God. Therefore He will judge under the form of the Godhead.

  Objection 3: Further, it is written (Jn. 5:22,23): "The Father . . . hath given all judgment to the Son, that all men may honor the Son as they honor the Father." Now equal honor to that of the Father is not due to the Son in respect of His human nature. Therefore He will not judge under His human form.

  Objection 4: Further, it is written (Dan. 7:9): "I beheld till thrones were placed and the Ancient of days sat." Now the thrones signify judicial power, and God is called the Ancient by reason of His eternity, according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. x). Therefore it becomes the Son to judge as being eternal; and consequently not as man.

  Objection 5: Further, Augustine says (Tract. xix in Joan.) that "the resurrection of the soul is the work of the Word the Son of God, and the resurrection of the body is the work of the Word made the Son of man in the flesh." Now that last judgment regards the soul rather than the body. Therefore it becomes Christ to judge as God rather than as man.

  On the contrary, It is written (Jn. 5:27): "He hath given Him power to do judgment, because He is the Son of man."

   Further, it is written (Job 36:17): "Thy cause hath been judged as that of the wicked---by Pilate" according to a gloss---therefore, "cause and judgment thou shalt recover---that thou mayest judge justly," according to the gloss. Now Christ was judged by Pilate with regard to His human nature. Therefore He will judge under the human nature.

   Further, to Him it belongs to judge who made the law. Now Christ gave us the law of the Gospel while appearing in the human nature. Therefore He will judge under that same nature.

  I answer that, Judgment requires a certain authority in the judge. Wherefore it is written (Rm. 14:4): "Who art thou that judgest another man's servant?" Hence it is becoming that Christ should judge in respect of His having authority over men to whom chiefly the last judgment will be directed. Now He is our Lord, not only by reason of the Creation, since "the Lord He is God, He made us and not we ourselves" (Ps. 99:3), but also by reason of the Redemption, which pertains to Him in respect of His human nature. Wherefore "to this end Christ died and rose again, that He might be Lord both of the dead and of the living" (Rm. 14:9). But the goods of the Creation would not suffice us to obtain the reward of eternal life, without the addition of the boon of the Redemption, on account of the obstacle accruing to created nature through the sin of our first parent. Hence, since the last judgment is directed to the admission of some to the kingdom, and the exclusion of others therefrom, it is becoming that Christ should preside at that judgment under the form of His human nature, since it is by favor of that same nature's Redemption that man is admitted to the kingdom. In this sense it is stated (Acts 10:42) that "He . . . was appointed by God to be Judge of the living and of the dead." And forasmuch as by redeeming mankind He restored not only man but all creatures without exception---inasmuch as all creatures are bettered through man's restoration, according to Col. 1:20, "Making peace through the blood of His cross, both as to things on earth, and the things that are in heaven"---it follows that through His Passion Christ merited lordship and judicial power not over man alone, but over all creatures, according to Mt. 28:18, "All power is given to Me, in heaven and in earth" [*Cf. TP, Question [59]].

  Reply to Objection 1: Christ, in respect of His Divine nature, has authority of lordship over all creatures by right of creation; but in respect of His human nature He has authority of lordship merited through His Passion. The latter is secondary so to speak and acquired, while the former is natural and eternal.

  Reply to Objection 2: Although Christ as man has not of Himself invincible power resulting from the natural power of the human species, nevertheless there is also in His human nature an invincible power derived from His Godhead, whereby all things are subjected under His feet (1 Cor. 15:25-28; Heb. 2:8,9). Hence He will judge in His human nature indeed, but by the power of His Godhead.

  Reply to Objection 3: Christ would not have sufficed for the redemption of mankind, had He been a mere man. Wherefore from the very fact that He was able as man to redeem mankind, and thereby obtained judicial power, it is evident that He is God, and consequently is to be honored equally with the Father, not as man but as God.

  Reply to Objection 4: In that vision of Daniel the whole order of the judicial power is clearly expressed. This power is in God Himself as its first origin, and more especially in the Father Who is the fount of the entire Godhead; wherefore it is stated in the first place that the "Ancient of days sat." But the judicial power was transmitted from the Father to the Son, not only from eternity in respect of the Divine nature, but also in time in respect of the human nature wherein He merited it. Hence in the aforesaid vision it is further stated (Dan. 7:13,14): "Lo, one like the Son of man came with the clouds of heaven, and He came even to the Ancient of days . . . And He gave Him power and glory, and a kingdom."

  Reply to Objection 5: Augustine is speaking by a kind of appropriation, so as to trace the effects which Christ wrought in the human nature to causes somewhat similar to them. And since we are made to the image and likeness of God in respect of our soul, and are of the same species as the man Christ in respect of our body, he ascribes to the Godhead the effects wrought by Christ in our souls, and those which He wrought or will work in our bodies he ascribes to His flesh; although His flesh, as being the instrument of His Godhead, has also its effect on our souls as Damascene asserts (De Fide Orth. iii, 15), according to the saying of Heb. 9:14, that His "blood" hath cleansed "our conscience from dead works." And thus that "the Word was made flesh" is the cause of the resurrection of souls; wherefore also according to His human nature He is becomingly the Judge not only of bodily but also of spiritual goods [*Cf. TP, Question [56], Article [2], ad 1].


 

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Whether at the judgment Christ will appear in His glorified humanity?


  Objection 1: It would seem that at the judgment Christ will not appear in His glorified humanity. For a gloss [*St. Augustine, Tract. cxx in Joan.] on Jn. 19:37, "They shall look on him whom they pierced," says: "Because He will come in the flesh wherein He was crucified." Now He was crucified in the form of weakness. Therefore He will appear in the form of weakness and not in the form of glory.

  Objection 2: Further, it is stated (Mt. 24:30) that "the sign of the Son of man shall appear in heaven," namely, "the sign of the cross," as Chrysostom says (Hom. lxxvii in Matth.), for "Christ when coming to the judgment will show not only the scars of His wounds but even His most shameful death." Therefore it seems that He will not appear in the form of glory.

  Objection 3: Further, Christ will appear at the judgment under that form which can be gazed upon by all. Now Christ will not be visible to all, good and wicked, under the form of His glorified humanity: because the eye that is not glorified is seemingly unproportionate to see the clarity of a glorified body. Therefore He will not appear under a glorified form.

  Objection 4: Further, that which is promised as a reward to the righteous is not granted to the unrighteous. Now it is promised as a reward to the righteous that they shall see the glory of His humanity (Jn. 10:9): "He shall go in, and go out, and shall find pastures, i.e. refreshment in His Godhead and humanity," according to the commentary of Augustine [*De Spiritu et Anima, work of an unknown author. St. Thomas, De Anima, ascribes it to Alcherus, a Cistercian monk; see above Question [70], Article [2], ad 1] and Is. 33:17: "His eyes shall see the King in his beauty." Therefore He will not appear to all in His glorified form.

  Objection 5: Further, Christ will judge in the form wherein He was judged: wherefore a gloss [*St. Augustine, Tract. xix, in Joan.] on Jn. 5:21, "So the Son also giveth life to whom He will," says: "He will judge justly in the form wherein He was judged unjustly, that He may be visible to the wicked." Now He was judged in the form of weakness. Therefore He will appear in the same form at the judgment.

  On the contrary, It is written (Lk. 21:27): "Then they shall see the Son of man coming in a cloud with great power and majesty." Now majesty and power pertain to glory. Therefore He will appear in the form of glory.

   Further, he who judges should be more conspicuous than those who are judged. Now the elect who will be judged by Christ will have a glorified body. Much more therefore will the Judge appear in a glorified form.

   Further, as to be judged pertains to weakness, so to judge pertains to authority and glory. Now at His first coming when Christ came to be judged, He appeared in the form of weakness. Therefore at the second coming, when He will come to judge, He will appear in the form of glory.

  I answer that, Christ is called the mediator of God and men (1 Tim. 2:5) inasmuch as He satisfies for men and intercedes for them to the Father, and confers on men things which belong to the Father, according to Jn. 17:22, "The glory which Thou hast given Me, I have given to them." Accordingly then both these things belong to Him in that He communicates with both extremes: for in that He communicates with men, He takes their part with the Father, and in that He communicates with the Father, He bestows the Father's gifts on men. Since then at His first coming He came in order to make satisfaction for us to the Father, He came in the form of our weakness. But since at His second coming He will come in order to execute the Father's justice on men, He will have to show forth His glory which is in Him by reason of His communication with the Father: and therefore He will appear in the form of glory.

  Reply to Objection 1: He will appear in the same flesh, but not under the same form.

  Reply to Objection 2: The sign of the cross will appear at the judgment, to denote not a present but a past weakness: so as to show how justly those were condemned who scorned so great mercy, especially those who persecuted Christ unjustly. The scars which will appear in His body will not be due to weakness, but will indicate the exceeding power whereby Christ overcame His enemies by His Passion and infirmity. He will also show forth His most shameful death, not by bringing it sensibly before the eye, as though He suffered it there; but by the things which will appear then, namely the signs of His past Passion, He will recall men to the thought of His past death.

  Reply to Objection 3: A glorified body has it in its power to show itself or not to show itself to an eye that is not glorified, as stated above (Question [85], Article [2], ad 3). Hence Christ will be visible to all in His glorified form.

  Reply to Objection 4: Even as our friend's glory gives us pleasure, so the glory and power of one we hate is most displeasing to us. Hence as the sight of the glory of Christ's humanity will be a reward to the righteous, so will it be a torment to Christ's enemies: wherefore it is written (Is. 26:11): "Let the envious people see and be confounded and let fire" (i.e. envy) "devour Thy enemies."

  Reply to Objection 5: Form is taken there for human nature wherein He was judged and likewise will judge; but not for a quality of nature, namely of weakness, which will not be the same in Him when judging as when judged (Cf. ad 2).


 

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Whether the Godhead can be seen by the wicked without joy?


  Objection 1: It would seem that the Godhead can be seen by the wicked without joy. For there can be no doubt that the wicked will know with the greatest certainty that Christ is God. Therefore they will see His Godhead, and yet they will not rejoice in seeing Christ. Therefore it will be possible to see it without joy.

  Objection 2: Further, the perverse will of the wicked is not more adverse to Christ's humanity than to His Godhead. Now the fact that they will see the glory of His humanity will conduce to their punishment, as stated above (Article [2], ad 4). Therefore if they were to see His Godhead, there would be much more reason for them to grieve rather than rejoice.

  Objection 3: Further, the course of the affections is not a necessary sequel to that which is in the intellect: wherefore Augustine says (In Ps. 118: conc. 8): "The intellect precedes, the affections follow slowly or not at all." Now vision regards the intellect, whereas joy regards the affections. Therefore it will be possible to see the Godhead without joy.

  Objection 4: Further, whatever is received into "a thing is received according to the mode of the receiver and not of the received." But whatever is seen is, in a way, received into the seer. Therefore although the Godhead is in itself supremely enjoyable, nevertheless when seen by those who are plunged in grief, it will give no joy but rather displeasure.

  Objection 5: Further, as sense is to the sensible object, so is the intellect to the intelligible object. Now in the senses, "to the unhealthy palate bread is painful, to the healthy palate sweet," as Augustine says (Confess. vii), and the same happens with the other senses. Therefore since the damned have the intellect indisposed, it would seem that the vision of the uncreated light will give them pain rather than joy.

  On the contrary, It is written (Jn. 17:3): "This is eternal life: That they may know Thee, the . . . true God." Wherefore it is clear that the essence of bliss consists in seeing God. Now joy is essential to bliss. Therefore the Godhead cannot be seen without joy.

   Further, the essence of the Godhead is the essence of truth. Now it is delightful to every one to see the truth, wherefore "all naturally desire to know," as stated at the beginning of the Metaphysics. Therefore it is impossible to see the Godhead without joy.

   Further, if a certain vision is not always delightful, it happens sometimes to be painful. But intellective vision is never painful since "the pleasure we take in objects of understanding has no grief opposed to it," according to the Philosopher (Topic. ii). Since then the Godhead cannot be seen save by the intellect, it seems that the Godhead cannot be seen without joy.

  I answer that, In every object of appetite or of pleasure two things may be considered, namely the thing which is desired or which gives pleasure, and the aspect of appetibility or pleasurableness in that thing. Now according to Boethius (De Hebdom.) that which is can have something besides what it is, but 'being' itself has no admixture of aught else beside itself. Hence that which is desirable or pleasant can have an admixture of something rendering it undesirable or unpleasant; but the very aspect of pleasurableness has not and cannot have anything mixed with it rendering it unpleasant or undesirable. Now it is possible for things that are pleasurable, by participation of goodness which is the aspect of appetibility or pleasurableness, not to give pleasure when they are apprehended, but it is impossible for that which is good by its essence not to give pleasure when it is apprehended. Therefore since God is essentially His own goodness, it is impossible for the Godhead to be seen without joy.

  Reply to Objection 1: The wicked will know most clearly that Christ is God, not through seeing His Godhead, but on account of the most manifest signs of His Godhead.

  Reply to Objection 2: No one can hate the Godhead considered in itself, as neither can one hate goodness itself. But God is said to be hated by certain persons in respect of some of the effects of the Godhead, in so far as He does or commands something contrary to their will [*Cf. SS, Question [34], Article [1]]. Therefore the vision of the Godhead can be painful to no one.

  Reply to Objection 3: The saying of Augustine applies when the thing apprehended previously by the intellect is good by participation and not essentially, such as all creatures are; wherefore there may be something in them by reason of which the affections are not moved. In like manner God is known by wayfarers through His effects, and their intellect does not attain to the very essence of His goodness. Hence it is not necessary that the affections follow the intellect, as they would if the intellect saw God's essence which is His goodness.

  Reply to Objection 4: Grief denotes not a disposition but a passion. Now every passion is removed if a stronger contrary cause supervene, and does not remove that cause. Accordingly the grief of the damned would be done away if they saw God in His essence.

  Reply to Objection 5: The indisposition of an organ removes the natural proportion of the organ to the object that has a natural aptitude to please, wherefore the pleasure is hindered. But the indisposition which is in the damned does not remove the natural proportion whereby they are directed to the Divine goodness, since its image ever remains in them. Hence the comparison fails.


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Latin — Supplementum

pr.

Deinde considerandum est de forma iudicis venientis ad iudicium.

Circa quod quaeruntur tria.

Primo: utrum Christus in forma humanitatis sit iudicaturus.

Secundo: utrum apparebit in forma humanitatis gloriosa.

Tertio: utrum divinitas possit sine gaudio videri.

a. 1 arg. 1

Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Christus in forma servi non sit iudicaturus. Iudicium enim auctoritatem requirit in iudicante. Sed auctoritas super vivos et mortuos est in Christo secundum quod est Deus: sic enim est Dominus et Creator omnium. Ergo in forma divinitatis iudicabit.
B: (Phil 4:4) [b:Phil 4:4]

a. 1 arg. 2

Praeterea, in iudice requiritur potestas invincibilis: unde Eccli. 7, (6): noli quaerere fieri iudex, nisi valeas virtute irrumpere iniquitates. Sed virtus invincibilis convenit Christo secundum quod est Deus. Ergo in forma divinitatis iudicabit.
B: (Sir 30:24) [b:Sir 30:24] (Sir 30:25) [b:Sir 30:25]

a. 1 arg. 3

Praeterea, Ioan. 5, (22–23) dicitur: Pater omne iudicium dedit Filio, ut omnes honorificent Filium sicut honorificant Patrem. Sed honor aequalis non debetur Patri et Filio secundum humanam naturam. Ergo non iudicabit secundum formam humanam.

a. 1 arg. 4

Praeterea, Dan. 7, (9) dicitur: aspiciebam donec throni positi sunt, et Antiquus Dierum sedit. Throni autem iudiciariam potestatem designant; antiquitas autem de Deo dicitur ratione aeternitatis, ut Dionysius dicit, in libro de Div. Nom. Ergo iudicare convenit Filio prout est aeternus. Non ergo secundum quod homo.

a. 1 arg. 5

Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, et habetur in littera, quod per Dei Verbum fit animarum resurrectio, per Verbum factum in carne Filium hominis fit corporum resurrectio. Sed iudicium illud finale pertinet magis ad animam quam ad carnem. Ergo magis convenit iudicare Christo secundum quod est Deus, quam secundum quod est homo.
B: (Matt 5:5) [b:Matt 5:5]

a. 1 s. c. 1

Sed contra: Ioan. 5, (27) dicitur: potestatem dedit ei iudicium facere quia Filius hominis est.

a. 1 arg. 6

Praeterea, Iob (1.7) dicitur: causa tua quasi impii iudicata est: Glossa, a Pilato. Ideo iudicium causamque recipies: Glossa, ut iuste iudices. Sed Christus secundum humanam naturam est iudicatus a Pilato. Ergo secundum humanam naturam iudicabit.

a. 1 arg. 7

Praeterea, eius est iudicare cuius est legem condere. Sed Christus in humana natura apparens nobis legem Evangelii dedit. Ergo et secundum eandem naturam iudicabit.

a. 1 co.

Respondeo dicendum quod iudicium aliquod dominium in iudicando requirit: unde Rom. 14, (4), tu quis es, qui iudicas alienum servum? Et ideo secundum hoc Christo competit iudicare quod dominium super homines habet, de quibus principaliter erit finale iudicium. Ipse autem est noster Dominus non solum ratione creationis, quia Dominus ipse est Deus, ipse fecit nos et non ipsi nos: sed etiam ratione redemptionis, quod ei competit secundum humanam naturam; unde Rom. 14, (9): in hoc Christus mortuus est et rexurrexit, ut et vivorum et mortuorum dominetur. Ad praemium autem vitae aeternae nobis creationis bona non sufficerent, nisi redemptionis beneficium adderetur, propter impedimentum quod naturae creatae supervenit ex peccato primi parentis. Unde, cum finale iudicium ad hoc ordinetur ut aliqui admittantur ad Regnum et aliqui excludantur a Regno, conveniens est ut ipse Christus secundum humanam naturam, cuius redemptionis beneficio ad Regnum admittimur, illi iudicio praesideat. Et hoc est quod dicitur Act. 10, (42), quod ipse constitutus est a Deo iudex vivorum et mortuorum. Et quia per redemptionem humani generis non solum homines reparavit, sed universaliter totam creaturam secundum quod tota creatura reparato homine melioratur, ut habetur Coloss. 1, (20), pacificans per sanguinem crucis eius sive quae in terris sive quae in caelis sunt; ideo non solum super homines sed super universam creaturam Christus per suam Passionem dominium promeruit et potestatem iudiciariam: Matth. 28, (18), data est mihi omnis potestas in caelo et in terra.

a. 1 ad 1

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod in Christo secundum divinam naturam est auctoritas dominii respectu universalis creaturae ex iure creationis. Sed in Christo secundum humanam naturam est auctoritas dominii quam promeruit per Passionem: et est quasi auctoritas secundaria et acquisita. Sed prima est naturalis et aeterna.

a. 1 ad 2

Ad secundum dicendum quod, quamvis Christus secundum quod homo non habeat a se invincibilem potestatem ex naturali virtute humanae speciei, tamen ex dono divinitatis etiam in humana natura invincibilem habet potestatem, secundum quod omnia sunt subiecta pedibus eius, ut dicitur I Cor. 15, (26) et Heb. 2, (8). Et ideo iudicabit quidem in humana natura, sed ex divinitatis virtute.

a. 1 ad 3

Ad tertium dicendum quod Christus non suffecisset ad humani generis redemptionem si purus homo fuisset. Et ideo ex hoc ipso quod secundum humanam naturam genus humanum redimere potuit, ac per hoc iudiciariam potestatem consecutus est, manifeste ostenditur quod ipse est Deus, et ita aequaliter honorandus cum Patre, non inquantum homo, sed inquantum Deus.

a. 1 ad 4

Ad quartum dicendum quod in illa visione Danielis manifeste totus exprimitur ordo iudiciariae potestatis. Quae quidem sicut in prima origine est in ipso Deo, et specialius in Patre, qui est fons totius deitatis. Et ideo primo praemittitur quod Antiquus Dierum sedit. Sed a Patre iudiciaria potestas traducta est in Filium, non solum ab aeterno secundum divinam naturam, sed etiam in tempore secundum humanam, in qua eam meruit. Et ideo subiungitur (v. 13–14) in visione praedicta: ecce, cum nubibus caeli quasi Filius hominis veniebat, et usque ad Antiquum Dierum pervenit: et dedit ei potestatem et honorem et regnum.

a. 1 ad 5

Ad quintum dicendum quod Augustinus loquitur per appropriationem quandam: ut videlicet reducat effectus quos Christus in humana natura fecit, ad causas aliquo modo consimiles. Et quia secundum animam sumus ad imaginem et similitudinem Dei, secundum carnem autem sumus eiusdem speciei cum homine Christo, ideo ea quae in animabus nostris Christus fecit, divinitati attribuit; quae vero in carne nostra fecit vel facturus est, attribuit carni eius. Quamvis caro eius, inquantum est divinitatis organum, ut dicit Damascenus, habeat etiam effectum in animabus nostris: secundum id quod dicitur Heb. 9, (14), quod sanguis eius emundavit conscientias nostras ab operibus mortuis. Et sic etiam Verbum caro factum est causa resurrectionis animarum. Unde etiam secundum humanam naturam convenienter est iudex non solum corporalium, sed etiam spiritualium bonorum.

a. 2 arg. 1

Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Christus in iudicio non apparebit in forma humanitatis gloriosa Ioan. 19, (37): videbunt in quem transfixerunt: Glossa, quia in ea carne venturus est in qua crucifixus est. Sed crucifixus est in forma infirma. Ergo in forma infirmitatis apparebit, non in forma gloriosa.

a. 2 arg. 2

Praeterea, Matth. 24, (30) dicitur quod apparebit signum Filii hominis in caelo, idest signum crucis. Et Chrysostomus dicit quod veniet in iudicio Christus, non solum vulnerum cicatrices, sed etiam ipsam mortem exprobratissimam ostendens. Ergo videtur quod non apparebit in forma gloriosa.

a. 2 arg. 3

Praeterea, secundum hanc formam Christus in iudicio apparebit quae ab omnibus conspici possit. Sed Christus secundum formam humanitatis gloriosam non poterit videri ab omnibus bonis et malis: quia oculus non glorificatus non videtur esse proportionatus ad videndam claritatem gloriosi corporis. Ergo non apparebit in forma gloriosa.

a. 2 arg. 4

Praeterea, illud quod promittitur iustis in praemium; non conceditur iniustis. Sed videre gloriam humanitatis promittitur iustis in praenium: Ioan. 10, (9), ingredietur et egredietur et pascua inveniet, idest, refectionem in divinitate et humanitate: ut Augustinus exponit. Et Isaiae 33, (17): regem in decore suo videbunt. Ergo in iudicio non apparebit omnibus in forma gloriosa.

a. 2 arg. 5

Praeterea, secundum illam formam Christus iudicabit in qua iudicatus est. Unde super illud Ioan. 5, (21), sic et Filius quos vult glorificat, dicit Glossa: in qua forma iniuste iudicatus est, iuste iudicabit, ut possit ab impiis videri. Sed iudicatus est in forma infirmitatis. Ergo et in eadem in iudicio apparebit.

a. 2 s. c. 1

Sed contra: Est quod dicitur Luc. 21, (27): tunc videbunt Filium, hominis venientem in nube cum potestate magna et maiestate. Maiestas autem et potestas ad gloriam pertinent. Ergo in forma gloriosa apparebit.

a. 2 arg. 6

Praeterea, ille qui iudicat, debet eminere illis qui iudicantur. Sed electi, qui iudicabuntur a Christo, corpora gloriosa habebunt. Ergo multo fortius iudex in forma gloriosa apparebit.

a. 2 arg. 7

Praeterea, sicut iudicari est infirmitatis, ita iudicare est auctoritatis et gloriae. Sed in primo adventu, quo Christus venit ad hoc quod iudicaretur, in forma infirmitatis apparuit. Ergo in secundo adventu, in quo veniet ad hoc quod iudicet, apparebit manifeste in forma gloriosa.

a. 2 co.

Respondeo dicendum quod Christus dicitur Dei et hominum mediator inquantum pro hominibus satisfecit et interpellat apud Patrem; et ea quae sunt Patris hominibus communicat, secundum quod dicitur Ioan. 17, (22), claritatem quam dedisti mihi, dedi eis. Secundum hoc autem utrumque convenit ei quod cum utroque communicat extremorum: inquantum enim cum hominibus communicat, vices hominum gerit apud Patrem; inquantum vero cum Patre communicat, dona Patris transmittit ad homines. Quia ergo in primo adventu ad hoc venit ut pro nobis satisfaceret apud Patrem, in forma nostrae infirmitatis apparuit. Quia vero in secundo adventu ad hoc veniet ut iustitiam Patris in homines exequatur, gloriam demonstrare debebit quae inest ei ex communione ad Patrem. Et ideo in forma gloriosa apparebit.

a. 2 ad 1

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod in eadem carne apparebit, sed non similiter se habente.

a. 2 ad 2

Ad secundum dicendum quod signum crucis apparebit in iudicio, non ad indicium tunc exhistentis infirmitatis, sed praeteritae: ut per hoc iustior eorum condemnatio appareat qui tantam misericordiam neglexerunt, et eorum praecipue qui Christum iniuste persecuti sunt. Cicatrices autem quae in eius corpore apparebunt, non pertinebunt ad aliquam infirmitatem, sed erunt indicia maximae virtutis qua Christus per Passionis infirmitatem de hostibus triumphavit. Exprobratissimam etiam mortem ostendet, non sensibiliter eam oculis ingerens, ac si tunc eam pateretur: sed ex his quae apparebunt, scilicet indiciis praeteritae Passionis, homines in recogitationem praeteritae mortis adducet.

a. 2 ad 3

Ad tertium dicendum quod corpus gloriosum habet in potestate sua ut se demonstret vel non demonstret oculo non glorioso: ut patet ex his quae dicta sunt. Et ideo in forma gloriosa Christus ab omnibus poterit videri.
R: Q.. 85 a. 2[t:suppl q. 85 a. 2]

a. 2 ad 4

Ad quartum dicendum quod, sicut amici gloria est delectabilis, ita gloria et potestas eius qui odio habetur, maxime contristat. Et ideo, sicut visio gloriae humanitatis Christi erit iustis in praemium, ita inimicis Christi erit in supplicium. Unde Isaiae 26, (11): videant et confundantur zelantes populi, et ignis, scilicet invidiae, hostes tuos devoret.

a. 2 ad 5

Ad quintum dicendum quod forma accipitur ibi pro natura humana, in qua iudicatus est et etiam iudicabit: non autem pro qualitate naturae, quae non erit eadem in iudicante, scilicet infirma, quae in iudicato fuit.

a. 3 arg. 1

Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod divinitas a malis sine gaudio videri possit. Constat enim quod impii manifestissime cognoscent Christum esse Deum. Ergo divinitatem eius videbunt. Et tamen de visione Christi non gaudebunt. Ergo divinitas sine gaudio videri poterit.

a. 3 arg. 2

Praeterea, voluntas impiorum perversa non magis adversatur humanitati Christi quam eius divinitati. Sed hoc quod videbunt gloriam humanitatis, cedet eis in poenam, ut dictum est. Ergo multo fortius, si divinitatem eius viderent, magis contristarentur quam gauderent.
R: Q.. 90 a. 2[t:suppl q. 90 a. 2]

a. 3 arg. 3

Praeterea, ea quae sunt in affectu non de necessitate sequuntur ad ea quae sunt in intellectu: unde Augustinus dicit: praecedit intellectus, et sequitur tardus aut nullus affectus. Sed visio ad intellectum pertinet, gaudium autem ad affectum. Ergo poterit esse divinitatis visio sine gaudio.
R: Q.. 90 a. 2[t:suppl q. 90 a. 2]

a. 3 arg. 4

Praeterea, omne quod recipitur in aliquo, recipitur per modum recipientis, et non per modum recepti. Sed omne quod videtur, quodammodo in vidente recipitur. Ergo, quamvis in se divinitas sit delectabilissima, tamen visa ab iliis qui sunt tristitia absorpti, non delectabit, sed magis contristabit.

a. 3 arg. 5

Praeterea, sicut se habet sensus ad sensibile, ita intellectus ad intelligibile. Sed ita est in sensibus quod palato non sano poena est panis, qui sano est suavis, ut dicit Augustinus: et similiter accidit in aliis sensibus. Ergo, cum damnati habeant intellectum indispositum, videtur quod visio lucis increatae magis afferat eis poenam quam gaudium.

a. 3 s. c. 1

Sed contra: Est quod dicitur Ioan. 17, (3): haec est vita aeterna, ut cognoscant te, verum Deum; ex quo patet quod essentia beatitudinis in Dei visione consistit. Sed de ratione beatitudinis est gaudium. Ergo divinitas sine gaudio videri non poterit.

a. 3 arg. 6

Praeterea, ipsa essentia divinitatis est essentia veritatis. Sed unicuique est delectabile videre verum: nam omnes homines natura scire desiderant, ut dicitur in principio Metaphys. 4. Ergo divinitas sine gaudio videri non potest.

a. 3 arg. 7

Praeterea, si aliqua visio non semper est delectabilis, contingit eam quandoque esse tristabilem. Sed visio intellectiva nunquam est contristabilis: quia delectationi quae est in intelligendo non opponitur aliqua tristitia, ut dicit Philosophus. Cum ergo divinitas videri non possit nisi per intellectum, videtur quod divinitas sine gaudio videri non possit.

a. 3 co.

Respondeo dicendum quod in quolibet appetibili vel delectabili duo possunt considerari: scilicet id quod appetitur, vel quod est delectabile; et id quod est ratio appetibilitatis vel delectabilitatis in ipso. Sicut autem, secundum Boetium, in libro de Hebdomadibus, id quod est habere aliquid praeterquam quod ipsum est, potest; ipsum vero esse nihil aliud praeter se habet admixtum: ita id quod est appetibile vel delectabile potest habere aliquid aliud admixtum unde non sit delectabile vel appetibile; sed id quod est ratio delectabilitatis nihil habet admixtum, vel habere potest, propter quod non sit delectabilis vel appetibilis. Res igitur quae sunt delectabiles per participationem bonitatis, quae est ratio appetibilitatis et delectabilitatis, possunt apprehensae non delectare: sed id quod per essentiam suam est bonitas, impossibile est quod eius essentia apprehensa non delectet. Unde, cum Deus essentialiter sit ipsa bonitas, non potest sine gaudio videri.

a. 3 ad 1

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod impii manifeste cognoscent Christum esse Deum, non per hoc quod divinitatem eius videant, sed propter manifestissima divinitatis indicia.

a. 3 ad 2

Ad secundum dicendum quod divinitatem secundum quod est in se, nullus potest odio habere: sicut nec aliquis potest odio habere ipsam bonitatem. Sed quantum ad aliquos divinitatis effectus dicitur ab aliquibus odio haberi: inquantum scilicet aliquid agit vel praecipit quod est contrarium voluntati. Et ideo visio divinitatis nulli potest esse non delectabilis.

a. 3 ad 3

Ad tertium dicendum quod verbum Augustini est intelligendum quando id quod apprehenditur per intellectum praecedentem est bonum per participationem et non per essentiam, sicut sunt omnes creaturae: unde potest in eis esse aliquid quare affectus non moveatur. Similiter etiam in via Deus cognoscitur per effectus, et intellectus non attingit ad ipsam essentiam bonitatis eius. Unde non oportet quod affectus intellectum sequatur, sicut sequeretur si essentiam eius videret, quae est ipsa bonitas.

a. 3 ad 4

Ad quartum dicendum quod tristitia non nominat dispositionem, sed magis passionem. Omnis autem passio a contraria causa fortiori superveniente tollitur, et non eam tollit. Et ita tristitia damnatorum tolleretur si Deum per essentiam viderent.

a. 3 ad 5

Ad quintum dicendum quod per indispositionem organi tollitur proportio naturalis ipsius organi ad obiectum quod natum est delectare: et propter hoc delectatio impeditur. Sed indispositio quae est in damnatis non tollit naturalem proportionem qua sunt ordinati ad divinam bonitatem: cum imago semper in eis maneat. Et ideo non est simile.