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| Quia igitur principalis intentio huius sacrae doctrinae est Dei cognitionem tradere, et non solum secundum quod in se est, sed etiam secundum quod est principium rerum et finis earum, et specialiter rationalis creaturae, ut ex dictis est manifestum; ad huius doctrinae expositionem intendentes, primo tractabimus de Deo; secundo, de motu rationalis creaturae in Deum; tertio, de Christo, qui, secundum quod homo, via est nobis tendendi in Deum. Consideratio autem de Deo tripartita erit. Primo namque considerabimus ea quae ad essentiam divinam pertinent; secundo, ea quae pertinent ad distinctionem personarum; tertio, ea quae pertinent ad processum creaturarum ab ipso. | Because the chief aim of sacred doctrine is to teach the knowledge of
God, not only as He is in Himself, but also as He is the beginning of
things and their last end, and especially of rational creatures, as is
clear from what has been already said, therefore, in our endeavor to
expound this science, we shall treat: (1) Of God; (2) Of the rational
creature's advance towards God; (3) Of Christ, Who as man, is our way to
God. |
| In treating of God there will be a threefold division, for we shall consider: (1) Whatever concerns the Divine Essence; (2) Whatever concerns
the distinctions of Persons; (3) Whatever concerns the procession of
creatures from Him. | |
| Circa essentiam vero divinam, primo considerandum est an Deus sit; secundo, quomodo sit, vel potius quomodo non sit; tertio considerandum erit de his quae ad operationem ipsius pertinent, scilicet de scientia et de voluntate et potentia. | Concerning the Divine Essence, we must consider: (1) Whether God exists?
(2) The manner of His existence, or, rather, what is NOT the manner of
His existence; (3) Whatever concerns His operations—namely, His knowledge, will, power. |
| Circa primum quaeruntur tria. | Concerning the first, there are three points of inquiry: |
| Primo, utrum Deum esse sit per se notum. | (1) Whether the proposition "God exists" is self-evident? |
| Secundo, utrum sit demonstrabile. | (2) Whether it is demonstrable? |
| Tertio, an Deus sit. | (3) Whether God exists? |
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| Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Deum esse sit per se notum. Illa enim nobis dicuntur per se nota, quorum cognitio nobis naturaliter inest, sicut patet de primis principiis. Sed, sicut dicit Damascenus in principio libri sui, omnibus cognitio existendi Deum naturaliter est inserta. Ergo Deum esse est per se notum. | Objection 1: It seems that the existence of God is self-evident. Now those
things are said to be self-evident to us the knowledge of which is
naturally implanted in us, as we can see in regard to first principles.
But as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i, 1,3), "the knowledge of God is
naturally implanted in all." Therefore the existence of God is
self-evident. |
| Praeterea, illa dicuntur esse per se nota, quae statim, cognitis terminis, cognoscuntur, quod philosophus attribuit primis demonstrationis principiis, in I Poster., scito enim quid est totum et quid pars, statim scitur quod omne totum maius est sua parte. Sed intellecto quid significet hoc nomen Deus, statim habetur quod Deus est. Significatur enim hoc nomine id quo maius significari non potest, maius autem est quod est in re et intellectu, quam quod est in intellectu tantum, unde cum, intellecto hoc nomine Deus, statim sit in intellectu, sequitur etiam quod sit in re. Ergo Deum esse est per se notum. | Objection 2: Further, those things are said to be self-evident which are known as soon as the terms are known, which the Philosopher (1 Poster. iii) says is true of the first principles of demonstration. Thus, when the nature of a whole and of a part is known, it is at once recognized that every whole is greater than its part. But as soon as the signification of the word "God" is understood, it is at once seen that God exists. For by this word is signified that thing than which nothing greater can be conceived. But that which exists actually and mentally is greater than that which exists only mentally. Therefore, since as soon as the word "God" is understood it exists mentally, it also follows that it exists actually. Therefore the proposition "God exists" is self-evident. |
| Praeterea, veritatem esse est per se notum, quia qui negat veritatem esse, concedit veritatem esse, si enim veritas non est, verum est veritatem non esse. Si autem est aliquid verum, oportet quod veritas sit. Deus autem est ipsa veritas, Ioann. XIV, ego sum via, veritas et vita. Ergo Deum esse est per se notum. | Objection 3: Further, the existence of truth is self-evident. For whoever
denies the existence of truth grants that truth does not exist: and, if
truth does not exist, then the proposition "Truth does not exist" is
true: and if there is anything true, there must be truth. But God is
truth itself: "I am the way, the truth, and the life" (Jn. 14:6)
Therefore "God exists" is self-evident. |
| Sed contra, nullus potest cogitare oppositum eius quod est per se notum ut patet per philosophum, in IV Metaphys. et I Poster., circa prima demonstrationis principia. Cogitari autem potest oppositum eius quod est Deum esse, secundum illud Psalmi LII, dixit insipiens in corde suo, non est Deus. Ergo Deum esse non est per se notum. | On the contrary, No one can mentally admit the opposite of what is
self-evident; as the Philosopher (Metaph. iv, lect. vi) states concerning
the first principles of demonstration. But the opposite of the
proposition "God is" can be mentally admitted: "The fool said in his
heart, There is no God" (Ps. 52:1). Therefore, that God exists is not
self-evident. |
| Respondeo dicendum quod contingit aliquid esse per se notum dupliciter, uno modo, secundum se et non quoad nos; alio modo, secundum se et quoad nos. Ex hoc enim aliqua propositio est per se nota, quod praedicatum includitur in ratione subiecti, ut homo est animal, nam animal est de ratione hominis. Si igitur notum sit omnibus de praedicato et de subiecto quid sit, propositio illa erit omnibus per se nota, sicut patet in primis demonstrationum principiis, quorum termini sunt quaedam communia quae nullus ignorat, ut ens et non ens, totum et pars, et similia. Si autem apud aliquos notum non sit de praedicato et subiecto quid sit, propositio quidem quantum in se est, erit per se nota, non tamen apud illos qui praedicatum et subiectum propositionis ignorant. Et ideo contingit, ut dicit Boetius in libro de hebdomadibus, quod quaedam sunt communes animi conceptiones et per se notae, apud sapientes tantum, ut incorporalia in loco non esse. Dico ergo quod haec propositio, Deus est, quantum in se est, per se nota est, quia praedicatum est idem cum subiecto; Deus enim est suum esse, ut infra patebit. Sed quia nos non scimus de Deo quid est, non est nobis per se nota, sed indiget demonstrari per ea quae sunt magis nota quoad nos, et minus nota quoad naturam, scilicet per effectus. | I answer that, A thing can be self-evident in either of two ways: on the
one hand, self-evident in itself, though not to us; on the other,
self-evident in itself, and to us. A proposition is self-evident because
the predicate is included in the essence of the subject, as "Man is an
animal," for animal is contained in the essence of man. If, therefore the
essence of the predicate and subject be known to all, the proposition
will be self-evident to all; as is clear with regard to the first
principles of demonstration, the terms of which are common things that no
one is ignorant of, such as being and non-being, whole and part, and such
like. If, however, there are some to whom the essence of the predicate
and subject is unknown, the proposition will be self-evident in itself,
but not to those who do not know the meaning of the predicate and subject
of the proposition. Therefore, it happens, as Boethius says (Hebdom., the
title of which is: "Whether all that is, is good"), "that there are some
mental concepts self-evident only to the learned, as that incorporeal
substances are not in space." Therefore I say that this proposition, "God
exists," of itself is self-evident, for the predicate is the same as the
subject, because God is His own existence as will be hereafter shown
(Question [3], Article [4]). Now because we do not know the essence of God, the
proposition is not self-evident to us; but needs to be demonstrated by
things that are more known to us, though less known in their
nature—namely, by effects. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod cognoscere Deum esse in aliquo communi, sub quadam confusione, est nobis naturaliter insertum, inquantum scilicet Deus est hominis beatitudo, homo enim naturaliter desiderat beatitudinem, et quod naturaliter desideratur ab homine, naturaliter cognoscitur ab eodem. Sed hoc non est simpliciter cognoscere Deum esse; sicut cognoscere venientem, non est cognoscere Petrum, quamvis sit Petrus veniens, multi enim perfectum hominis bonum, quod est beatitudo, existimant divitias; quidam vero voluptates; quidam autem aliquid aliud. | Reply to Objection 1: To know that God exists in a general and confused way is
implanted in us by nature, inasmuch as God is man's beatitude. For man
naturally desires happiness, and what is naturally desired by man must be
naturally known to him. This, however, is not to know absolutely that God
exists; just as to know that someone is approaching is not the same as to
know that Peter is approaching, even though it is Peter who is
approaching; for many there are who imagine that man's perfect good which
is happiness, consists in riches, and others in pleasures, and others in
something else. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod forte ille qui audit hoc nomen Deus, non intelligit significari aliquid quo maius cogitari non possit, cum quidam crediderint Deum esse corpus. Dato etiam quod quilibet intelligat hoc nomine Deus significari hoc quod dicitur, scilicet illud quo maius cogitari non potest; non tamen propter hoc sequitur quod intelligat id quod significatur per nomen, esse in rerum natura; sed in apprehensione intellectus tantum. Nec potest argui quod sit in re, nisi daretur quod sit in re aliquid quo maius cogitari non potest, quod non est datum a ponentibus Deum non esse. | Reply to Objection 2: Perhaps not everyone who hears this word "God" understands
it to signify something than which nothing greater can be thought, seeing
that some have believed God to be a body. Yet, granted that everyone
understands that by this word "God" is signified something than which
nothing greater can be thought, nevertheless, it does not therefore
follow that he understands that what the word signifies exists actually,
but only that it exists mentally. Nor can it be argued that it actually
exists, unless it be admitted that there actually exists something than
which nothing greater can be thought; and this precisely is not admitted
by those who hold that God does not exist. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod veritatem esse in communi, est per se notum, sed primam veritatem esse, hoc non est per se notum quoad nos. | Reply to Objection 3: The existence of truth in general is self-evident but the
existence of a Primal Truth is not self-evident to us. |
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| Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Deum esse non sit demonstrabile. Deum enim esse est articulus fidei. Sed ea quae sunt fidei, non sunt demonstrabilia, quia demonstratio facit scire, fides autem de non apparentibus est, ut patet per apostolum, ad Hebr. XI. Ergo Deum esse non est demonstrabile. | Objection 1: It seems that the existence of God cannot be demonstrated. For it
is an article of faith that God exists. But what is of faith cannot be
demonstrated, because a demonstration produces scientific knowledge;
whereas faith is of the unseen (Heb. 11:1). Therefore it cannot be
demonstrated that God exists. |
| Praeterea, medium demonstrationis est quod quid est. Sed de Deo non possumus scire quid est, sed solum quid non est, ut dicit Damascenus. Ergo non possumus demonstrare Deum esse. | Objection 2: Further, the essence is the middle term of demonstration. But we
cannot know in what God's essence consists, but solely in what it does
not consist; as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i, 4). Therefore we cannot
demonstrate that God exists. |
| Praeterea, si demonstraretur Deum esse, hoc non esset nisi ex effectibus eius. Sed effectus eius non sunt proportionati ei, cum ipse sit infinitus, et effectus finiti; finiti autem ad infinitum non est proportio. Cum ergo causa non possit demonstrari per effectum sibi non proportionatum, videtur quod Deum esse non possit demonstrari. | Objection 3: Further, if the existence of God were demonstrated, this could
only be from His effects. But His effects are not proportionate to Him,
since He is infinite and His effects are finite; and between the finite
and infinite there is no proportion. Therefore, since a cause cannot be
demonstrated by an effect not proportionate to it, it seems that the
existence of God cannot be demonstrated. |
| Sed contra est quod apostolus dicit, ad Rom. I, invisibilia Dei per ea quae facta sunt, intellecta, conspiciuntur. Sed hoc non esset, nisi per ea quae facta sunt, posset demonstrari Deum esse, primum enim quod oportet intelligi de aliquo, est an sit. | On the contrary, The Apostle says: "The invisible things of Him are
clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made" (Rm. 1:20).
But this would not be unless the existence of God could be demonstrated
through the things that are made; for the first thing we must know of
anything is whether it exists. |
| Respondeo dicendum quod duplex est demonstratio. Una quae est per causam, et dicitur propter quid, et haec est per priora simpliciter. Alia est per effectum, et dicitur demonstratio quia, et haec est per ea quae sunt priora quoad nos, cum enim effectus aliquis nobis est manifestior quam sua causa, per effectum procedimus ad cognitionem causae. Ex quolibet autem effectu potest demonstrari propriam causam eius esse (si tamen eius effectus sint magis noti quoad nos), quia, cum effectus dependeant a causa, posito effectu necesse est causam praeexistere. Unde Deum esse, secundum quod non est per se notum quoad nos, demonstrabile est per effectus nobis notos. | I answer that, Demonstration can be made in two ways: One is through the
cause, and is called "a priori," and this is to argue from what is prior
absolutely. The other is through the effect, and is called a
demonstration "a posteriori"; this is to argue from what is prior
relatively only to us. When an effect is better known to us than its
cause, from the effect we proceed to the knowledge of the cause. And from
every effect the existence of its proper cause can be demonstrated, so
long as its effects are better known to us; because since every effect
depends upon its cause, if the effect exists, the cause must pre-exist.
Hence the existence of God, in so far as it is not self-evident to us,
can be demonstrated from those of His effects which are known to us. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Deum esse, et alia huiusmodi quae per rationem naturalem nota possunt esse de Deo, ut dicitur Rom. I non sunt articuli fidei, sed praeambula ad articulos, sic enim fides praesupponit cognitionem naturalem, sicut gratia naturam, et ut perfectio perfectibile. Nihil tamen prohibet illud quod secundum se demonstrabile est et scibile, ab aliquo accipi ut credibile, qui demonstrationem non capit. | Reply to Objection 1: The existence of God and other like truths about God,
which can be known by natural reason, are not articles of faith, but are
preambles to the articles; for faith presupposes natural knowledge, even
as grace presupposes nature, and perfection supposes something that can
be perfected. Nevertheless, there is nothing to prevent a man, who cannot
grasp a proof, accepting, as a matter of faith, something which in itself
is capable of being scientifically known and demonstrated. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod cum demonstratur causa per effectum, necesse est uti effectu loco definitionis causae, ad probandum causam esse, et hoc maxime contingit in Deo. Quia ad probandum aliquid esse, necesse est accipere pro medio quid significet nomen non autem quod quid est, quia quaestio quid est, sequitur ad quaestionem an est. Nomina autem Dei imponuntur ab effectibus, ut postea ostendetur, unde, demonstrando Deum esse per effectum, accipere possumus pro medio quid significet hoc nomen Deus. | Reply to Objection 2: When the existence of a cause is demonstrated from an
effect, this effect takes the place of the definition of the cause in
proof of the cause's existence. This is especially the case in regard to
God, because, in order to prove the existence of anything, it is
necessary to accept as a middle term the meaning of the word, and not its
essence, for the question of its essence follows on the question of its
existence. Now the names given to God are derived from His effects;
consequently, in demonstrating the existence of God from His effects, we
may take for the middle term the meaning of the word "God". |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod per effectus non proportionatos causae, non potest perfecta cognitio de causa haberi, sed tamen ex quocumque effectu potest manifeste nobis demonstrari causam esse, ut dictum est. Et sic ex effectibus Dei potest demonstrari Deum esse, licet per eos non perfecte possimus eum cognoscere secundum suam essentiam. | Reply to Objection 3: From effects not proportionate to the cause no perfect
knowledge of that cause can be obtained. Yet from every effect the
existence of the cause can be clearly demonstrated, and so we can
demonstrate the existence of God from His effects; though from them we
cannot perfectly know God as He is in His essence. |
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| Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non sit. Quia si unum contrariorum fuerit infinitum, totaliter destruetur aliud. Sed hoc intelligitur in hoc nomine Deus, scilicet quod sit quoddam bonum infinitum. Si ergo Deus esset, nullum malum inveniretur. Invenitur autem malum in mundo. Ergo Deus non est. | Objection 1: It seems that God does not exist; because if one of two
contraries be infinite, the other would be altogether destroyed. But the
word "God" means that He is infinite goodness. If, therefore, God
existed, there would be no evil discoverable; but there is evil in the
world. Therefore God does not exist. |
| Praeterea, quod potest compleri per pauciora principia, non fit per plura. Sed videtur quod omnia quae apparent in mundo, possunt compleri per alia principia, supposito quod Deus non sit, quia ea quae sunt naturalia, reducuntur in principium quod est natura; ea vero quae sunt a proposito, reducuntur in principium quod est ratio humana vel voluntas. Nulla igitur necessitas est ponere Deum esse. | Objection 2: Further, it is superfluous to suppose that what can be accounted
for by a few principles has been produced by many. But it seems that
everything we see in the world can be accounted for by other principles,
supposing God did not exist. For all natural things can be reduced to one
principle which is nature; and all voluntary things can be reduced to one
principle which is human reason, or will. Therefore there is no need to
suppose God's existence. |
| Sed contra est quod dicitur Exodi III, ex persona Dei, ego sum qui sum. | On the contrary, It is said in the person of God: "I am Who am." (Ex. 3:14) |
| Respondeo dicendum quod Deum esse quinque viis probari potest. | I answer that, The existence of God can be proved in five ways. |
| Prima autem et manifestior via est, quae sumitur ex parte motus. Certum est enim, et sensu constat, aliqua moveri in hoc mundo. Omne autem quod movetur, ab alio movetur. Nihil enim movetur, nisi secundum quod est in potentia ad illud ad quod movetur, movet autem aliquid secundum quod est actu. Movere enim nihil aliud est quam educere aliquid de potentia in actum, de potentia autem non potest aliquid reduci in actum, nisi per aliquod ens in actu, sicut calidum in actu, ut ignis, facit lignum, quod est calidum in potentia, esse actu calidum, et per hoc movet et alterat ipsum. Non autem est possibile ut idem sit simul in actu et potentia secundum idem, sed solum secundum diversa, quod enim est calidum in actu, non potest simul esse calidum in potentia, sed est simul frigidum in potentia. Impossibile est ergo quod, secundum idem et eodem modo, aliquid sit movens et motum, vel quod moveat seipsum. Omne ergo quod movetur, oportet ab alio moveri. Si ergo id a quo movetur, moveatur, oportet et ipsum ab alio moveri et illud ab alio. Hic autem non est procedere in infinitum, quia sic non esset aliquod primum movens; et per consequens nec aliquod aliud movens, quia moventia secunda non movent nisi per hoc quod sunt mota a primo movente, sicut baculus non movet nisi per hoc quod est motus a manu. Ergo necesse est devenire ad aliquod primum movens, quod a nullo movetur, et hoc omnes intelligunt Deum. | The first and more manifest way is the argument from motion. It is
certain, and evident to our senses, that in the world some things are in
motion. Now whatever is in motion is put in motion by another, for
nothing can be in motion except it is in potentiality to that towards
which it is in motion; whereas a thing moves inasmuch as it is in act.
For motion is nothing else than the reduction of something from
potentiality to actuality. But nothing can be reduced from potentiality
to actuality, except by something in a state of actuality. Thus that
which is actually hot, as fire, makes wood, which is potentially hot, to
be actually hot, and thereby moves and changes it. Now it is not possible
that the same thing should be at once in actuality and potentiality in
the same respect, but only in different respects. For what is actually
hot cannot simultaneously be potentially hot; but it is simultaneously
potentially cold. It is therefore impossible that in the same respect and
in the same way a thing should be both mover and moved, i.e. that it
should move itself. Therefore, whatever is in motion must be put in
motion by another. If that by which it is put in motion be itself put in
motion, then this also must needs be put in motion by another, and that
by another again. But this cannot go on to infinity, because then there
would be no first mover, and, consequently, no other mover; seeing that
subsequent movers move only inasmuch as they are put in motion by the
first mover; as the staff moves only because it is put in motion by the
hand. Therefore it is necessary to arrive at a first mover, put in motion
by no other; and this everyone understands to be God. |
| Secunda via est ex ratione causae efficientis. Invenimus enim in istis sensibilibus esse ordinem causarum efficientium, nec tamen invenitur, nec est possibile, quod aliquid sit causa efficiens sui ipsius; quia sic esset prius seipso, quod est impossibile. Non autem est possibile quod in causis efficientibus procedatur in infinitum. Quia in omnibus causis efficientibus ordinatis, primum est causa medii, et medium est causa ultimi, sive media sint plura sive unum tantum, remota autem causa, removetur effectus, ergo, si non fuerit primum in causis efficientibus, non erit ultimum nec medium. Sed si procedatur in infinitum in causis efficientibus, non erit prima causa efficiens, et sic non erit nec effectus ultimus, nec causae efficientes mediae, quod patet esse falsum. Ergo est necesse ponere aliquam causam efficientem primam, quam omnes Deum nominant. | The second way is from the nature of the efficient cause. In the world
of sense we find there is an order of efficient causes. There is no case
known (neither is it, indeed, possible) in which a thing is found to be
the efficient cause of itself; for so it would be prior to itself, which
is impossible. Now in efficient causes it is not possible to go on to
infinity, because in all efficient causes following in order, the first
is the cause of the intermediate cause, and the intermediate is the cause
of the ultimate cause, whether the intermediate cause be several, or only
one. Now to take away the cause is to take away the effect. Therefore, if
there be no first cause among efficient causes, there will be no
ultimate, nor any intermediate cause. But if in efficient causes it is
possible to go on to infinity, there will be no first efficient cause,
neither will there be an ultimate effect, nor any intermediate efficient
causes; all of which is plainly false. Therefore it is necessary to admit
a first efficient cause, to which everyone gives the name of God. |
| Tertia via est sumpta ex possibili et necessario, quae talis est. Invenimus enim in rebus quaedam quae sunt possibilia esse et non esse, cum quaedam inveniantur generari et corrumpi, et per consequens possibilia esse et non esse. Impossibile est autem omnia quae sunt, talia esse, quia quod possibile est non esse, quandoque non est. Si igitur omnia sunt possibilia non esse, aliquando nihil fuit in rebus. Sed si hoc est verum, etiam nunc nihil esset, quia quod non est, non incipit esse nisi per aliquid quod est; si igitur nihil fuit ens, impossibile fuit quod aliquid inciperet esse, et sic modo nihil esset, quod patet esse falsum. Non ergo omnia entia sunt possibilia, sed oportet aliquid esse necessarium in rebus. Omne autem necessarium vel habet causam suae necessitatis aliunde, vel non habet. Non est autem possibile quod procedatur in infinitum in necessariis quae habent causam suae necessitatis, sicut nec in causis efficientibus, ut probatum est. Ergo necesse est ponere aliquid quod sit per se necessarium, non habens causam necessitatis aliunde, sed quod est causa necessitatis aliis, quod omnes dicunt Deum. | The third way is taken from possibility and necessity, and runs thus. We
find in nature things that are possible to be and not to be, since they
are found to be generated, and to corrupt, and consequently, they are
possible to be and not to be. But it is impossible for these always to
exist, for that which is possible not to be at some time is not.
Therefore, if everything is possible not to be, then at one time there
could have been nothing in existence. Now if this were true, even now
there would be nothing in existence, because that which does not exist
only begins to exist by something already existing. Therefore, if at one
time nothing was in existence, it would have been impossible for anything
to have begun to exist; and thus even now nothing would be in
existence—which is absurd. Therefore, not all beings are merely
possible, but there must exist something the existence of which is
necessary. But every necessary thing either has its necessity caused by
another, or not. Now it is impossible to go on to infinity in necessary
things which have their necessity caused by another, as has been already
proved in regard to efficient causes. Therefore we cannot but postulate
the existence of some being having of itself its own necessity, and not
receiving it from another, but rather causing in others their necessity.
This all men speak of as God. |
| Quarta via sumitur ex gradibus qui in rebus inveniuntur. Invenitur enim in rebus aliquid magis et minus bonum, et verum, et nobile, et sic de aliis huiusmodi. Sed magis et minus dicuntur de diversis secundum quod appropinquant diversimode ad aliquid quod maxime est, sicut magis calidum est, quod magis appropinquat maxime calido. Est igitur aliquid quod est verissimum, et optimum, et nobilissimum, et per consequens maxime ens, nam quae sunt maxime vera, sunt maxime entia, ut dicitur II Metaphys. Quod autem dicitur maxime tale in aliquo genere, est causa omnium quae sunt illius generis, sicut ignis, qui est maxime calidus, est causa omnium calidorum, ut in eodem libro dicitur. Ergo est aliquid quod omnibus entibus est causa esse, et bonitatis, et cuiuslibet perfectionis, et hoc dicimus Deum. | The fourth way is taken from the gradation to be found in things. Among
beings there are some more and some less good, true, noble and the like.
But "more" and "less" are predicated of different things, according as
they resemble in their different ways something which is the maximum, as
a thing is said to be hotter according as it more nearly resembles that
which is hottest; so that there is something which is truest, something
best, something noblest and, consequently, something which is uttermost
being; for those things that are greatest in truth are greatest in being,
as it is written in Metaph. ii. Now the maximum in any genus is the cause
of all in that genus; as fire, which is the maximum heat, is the cause of
all hot things. Therefore there must also be something which is to all
beings the cause of their being, goodness, and every other perfection;
and this we call God. |
| Quinta via sumitur ex gubernatione rerum. Videmus enim quod aliqua quae cognitione carent, scilicet corpora naturalia, operantur propter finem, quod apparet ex hoc quod semper aut frequentius eodem modo operantur, ut consequantur id quod est optimum; unde patet quod non a casu, sed ex intentione perveniunt ad finem. Ea autem quae non habent cognitionem, non tendunt in finem nisi directa ab aliquo cognoscente et intelligente, sicut sagitta a sagittante. Ergo est aliquid intelligens, a quo omnes res naturales ordinantur ad finem, et hoc dicimus Deum. | The fifth way is taken from the governance of the world. We see that
things which lack intelligence, such as natural bodies, act for an end,
and this is evident from their acting always, or nearly always, in the
same way, so as to obtain the best result. Hence it is plain that not
fortuitously, but designedly, do they achieve their end. Now whatever
lacks intelligence cannot move towards an end, unless it be directed by
some being endowed with knowledge and intelligence; as the arrow is shot
to its mark by the archer. Therefore some intelligent being exists by
whom all natural things are directed to their end; and this being we call
God. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut dicit Augustinus in Enchiridio, Deus, cum sit summe bonus, nullo modo sineret aliquid mali esse in operibus suis, nisi esset adeo omnipotens et bonus, ut bene faceret etiam de malo. Hoc ergo ad infinitam Dei bonitatem pertinet, ut esse permittat mala, et ex eis eliciat bona. | Reply to Objection 1: As Augustine says (Enchiridion xi): "Since God is the
highest good, He would not allow any evil to exist in His works, unless
His omnipotence and goodness were such as to bring good even out of
evil." This is part of the infinite goodness of God, that He should allow
evil to exist, and out of it produce good. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod, cum natura propter determinatum finem operetur ex directione alicuius superioris agentis, necesse est ea quae a natura fiunt, etiam in Deum reducere, sicut in primam causam. Similiter etiam quae ex proposito fiunt, oportet reducere in aliquam altiorem causam, quae non sit ratio et voluntas humana, quia haec mutabilia sunt et defectibilia; oportet autem omnia mobilia et deficere possibilia reduci in aliquod primum principium immobile et per se necessarium, sicut ostensum est. | Reply to Objection 2: Since nature works for a determinate end under the direction of a higher agent, whatever is done by nature must needs be
traced back to God, as to its first cause. So also whatever is done
voluntarily must also be traced back to some higher cause other than
human reason or will, since these can change or fail; for all things that
are changeable and capable of defect must be traced back to an immovable
and self-necessary first principle, as was shown in the body of the
Article. |