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| We next consider those things that pertain absolutely to the will of God. In the appetitive part of the soul there are found in ourselves both the passions of the soul, as joy, love, and the like; and the habits of the moral virtues, as justice, fortitude and the like. Hence we shall first consider the love of God, and secondly His justice and mercy. About the first there are four points of inquiry: | |
| (1) Whether love exists in God? | |
| (2) Whether He loves all things? | |
| (3) Whether He loves one thing more than another? | |
| (4) Whether He loves more the better things? |
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| Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod amor non sit in Deo. Nulla enim passio est in Deo. Amor est passio. Ergo amor non est in Deo. | Objection 1: It seems that love does not exist in God. For in God there are no passions. Now love is a passion. Therefore love is not in God. |
| Praeterea, amor, ira, tristitia, et huiusmodi, contra se dividuntur. Sed tristitia et ira non dicuntur de Deo nisi metaphorice. Ergo nec amor. | Objection 2: Further, love, anger, sorrow and the like, are mutually divided against one another. But sorrow and anger are not attributed to God, unless by metaphor. Therefore neither is love attributed to Him. |
| Praeterea, Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom., amor est vis unitiva et concretiva. Hoc autem in Deo locum habere non potest, cum sit simplex. Ergo in Deo non est amor. | Objection 3: Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv): "Love is a uniting and binding force." But this cannot take place in God, since He is simple. Therefore love does not exist in God. |
| Sed contra est quod dicitur I Ioan. IV, Deus caritas est. | On the contrary, It is written: "God is love" (Jn. 4:16). |
| Respondeo dicendum quod necesse est ponere amorem in Deo. Primus enim motus voluntatis, et cuiuslibet appetitivae virtutis, est amor. Cum enim actus voluntatis, et cuiuslibet appetitivae virtutis tendat in bonum et malum, sicut in propria obiecta; bonum autem principalius et per se est obiectum voluntatis et appetitus, malum autem secundario et per aliud, inquantum scilicet opponitur bono, oportet naturaliter esse priores actus voluntatis et appetitus qui respiciunt bonum, his qui respiciunt malum; ut gaudium quam tristitia, et amor quam odium. Semper enim quod est per se, prius est eo quod est per aliud. Rursus, quod est communius, naturaliter est prius, unde et intellectus per prius habet ordinem ad verum commune, quam ad particularia quaedam vera. Sunt autem quidam actus voluntatis et appetitus, respicientes bonum sub aliqua speciali conditione, sicut gaudium et delectatio est de bono praesenti et habito; desiderium autem et spes, de bono nondum adepto. Amor autem respicit bonum in communi, sive sit habitum, sive non habitum. Unde amor naturaliter est primus actus voluntatis et appetitus. Et propter hoc, omnes alii motus appetitivi praesupponunt amorem, quasi primam radicem. Nullus enim desiderat aliquid, nisi bonum amatum, neque aliquis gaudet, nisi de bono amato. Odium etiam non est nisi de eo quod contrariatur rei amatae. Et similiter tristitiam, et cetera huiusmodi, manifestum est in amorem referri, sicut in primum principium. Unde in quocumque est voluntas vel appetitus, oportet esse amorem, remoto enim primo, removentur alia. Ostensum est autem in Deo esse voluntatem. Unde necesse est in eo ponere amorem. | I answer that, We must needs assert that in God there is love: because love is the first movement of the will and of every appetitive faculty. For since the acts of the will and of every appetitive faculty tend towards good and evil, as to their proper objects: and since good is essentially and especially the object of the will and the appetite, whereas evil is only the object secondarily and indirectly, as opposed to good; it follows that the acts of the will and appetite that regard good must naturally be prior to those that regard evil; thus, for instance, joy is prior to sorrow, love to hate: because what exists of itself is always prior to that which exists through another. Again, the more universal is naturally prior to what is less so. Hence the intellect is first directed to universal truth; and in the second place to particular and special truths. Now there are certain acts of the will and appetite that regard good under some special condition, as joy and delight regard good present and possessed; whereas desire and hope regard good not as yet possessed. Love, however, regards good universally, whether possessed or not. Hence love is naturally the first act of the will and appetite; for which reason all the other appetite movements presuppose love, as their root and origin. For nobody desires anything nor rejoices in anything, except as a good that is loved: nor is anything an object of hate except as opposed to the object of love. Similarly, it is clear that sorrow, and other things like to it, must be referred to love as to their first principle. Hence, in whomsoever there is will and appetite, there must also be love: since if the first is wanting, all that follows is also wanting. Now it has been shown that will is in God (Question [19], Article [1]), and hence we must attribute love to Him. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod vis cognitiva non movet, nisi mediante appetitiva. Et sicut in nobis ratio universalis movet mediante ratione particulari, ut dicitur in III de anima; ita appetitus intellectivus, qui dicitur voluntas, movet in nobis mediante appetitu sensitivo. Unde proximum motivum corporis in nobis est appetitus sensitivus. Unde semper actum appetitus sensitivi concomitatur aliqua transmutatio corporis; et maxime circa cor, quod est primum principium motus in animali. Sic igitur actus appetitus sensitivi, inquantum habent transmutationem corporalem annexam, passiones dicuntur, non autem actus voluntatis. Amor igitur et gaudium et delectatio, secundum quod significant actus appetitus sensitivi, passiones sunt, non autem secundum quod significant actus appetitus intellectivi. Et sic ponuntur in Deo. Unde dicit philosophus, in VII Ethic., quod Deus una et simplici operatione gaudet. Et eadem ratione, sine passione amat. | Reply to Objection 1: The cognitive faculty does not move except through the medium of the appetitive: and just as in ourselves the universal reason moves through the medium of the particular reason, as stated in De Anima iii, 58,75, so in ourselves the intellectual appetite, or the will as it is called, moves through the medium of the sensitive appetite. Hence, in us the sensitive appetite is the proximate motive-force of our bodies. Some bodily change therefore always accompanies an act of the sensitive appetite, and this change affects especially the heart, which, as the Philosopher says (De part. animal. iii, 4), is the first principle of movement in animals. Therefore acts of the sensitive appetite, inasmuch as they have annexed to them some bodily change, are called passions; whereas acts of the will are not so called. Love, therefore, and joy and delight are passions; in so far as they denote acts of the intellective appetite, they are not passions. It is in this latter sense that they are in God. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii): "God rejoices by an operation that is one and simple," and for the same reason He loves without passion. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod in passionibus sensitivi appetitus, est considerare aliquid quasi materiale, scilicet corporalem transmutationem; et aliquid quasi formale, quod est ex parte appetitus. Sicut in ira, ut dicitur in I de anima, materiale est accensio sanguinis circa cor, vel aliquid huiusmodi; formale vero, appetitus vindictae. Sed rursus, ex parte eius quod est formale, in quibusdam horum designatur aliqua imperfectio; sicut in desiderio, quod est boni non habiti; et in tristitia, quae est mali habiti. Et eadem ratio est de ira, quae tristitiam supponit. Quaedam vero nullam imperfectionem designant, ut amor et gaudium. Cum igitur nihil horum Deo conveniat secundum illud quod est materiale in eis, ut dictum est; illa quae imperfectionem important etiam formaliter, Deo convenire non possunt nisi metaphorice, propter similitudinem effectus, ut supra dictum est. Quae autem imperfectionem non important, de Deo proprie dicuntur, ut amor et gaudium, tamen sine passione, ut dictum est. | Reply to Objection 2: In the passions of the sensitive appetite there may be distinguished a certain material element—namely, the bodily change—and a certain formal element, which is on the part of the appetite. Thus in anger, as the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 15,63,64), the material element is the kindling of the blood about the heart; but the formal, the appetite for revenge. Again, as regards the formal element of certain passions a certain imperfection is implied, as in desire, which is of the good we have not, and in sorrow, which is about the evil we have. This applies also to anger, which supposes sorrow. Certain other passions, however, as love and joy, imply no imperfection. Since therefore none of these can be attributed to God on their material side, as has been said (ad 1); neither can those that even on their formal side imply imperfection be attributed to Him; except metaphorically, and from likeness of effects, as already show (Question [3], Article [2], ad 2; Question [19], Article [11]). Whereas, those that do not imply imperfection, such as love and joy, can be properly predicated of God, though without attributing passion to Him, as said before (Question [19], Article [11]). |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod actus amoris semper tendit in duo, scilicet in bonum quod quis vult alicui; et in eum cui vult bonum. Hoc enim est proprie amare aliquem, velle ei bonum. Unde in eo quod aliquis amat se, vult bonum sibi. Et sic illud bonum quaerit sibi unire, inquantum potest. Et pro tanto dicitur amor vis unitiva, etiam in Deo, sed absque compositione, quia illud bonum quod vult sibi, non est aliud quam ipse, qui est per suam essentiam bonus, ut supra ostensum est. In hoc vero quod aliquis amat alium, vult bonum illi. Et sic utitur eo tanquam seipso, referens bonum ad illum, sicut ad seipsum. Et pro tanto dicitur amor vis concretiva, quia alium aggregat sibi habens se ad eum sicut ad seipsum. Et sic etiam amor divinus est vis concretiva, absque compositione quae sit in Deo, inquantum aliis bona vult. | Reply to Objection 3: An act of love always tends towards two things; to the good that one wills, and to the person for whom one wills it: since to love a person is to wish that person good. Hence, inasmuch as we love ourselves, we wish ourselves good; and, so far as possible, union with that good. So love is called the unitive force, even in God, yet without implying composition; for the good that He wills for Himself, is no other than Himself, Who is good by His essence, as above shown (Question [6], Articles [1],3). And by the fact that anyone loves another, he wills good to that other. Thus he puts the other, as it were, in the place of himself; and regards the good done to him as done to himself. So far love is a binding force, since it aggregates another to ourselves, and refers his good to our own. And then again the divine love is a binding force, inasmuch as God wills good to others; yet it implies no composition in God. |
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| Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non omnia amet. Quia, secundum Dionysium, IV cap. de Div. Nom., amor amantem extra se ponit, et eum quodammodo in amatum transfert. Inconveniens autem est dicere quod Deus, extra se positus, in alia transferatur. Ergo inconveniens est dicere quod Deus alia a se amet. | Objection 1: It seems that God does not love all things. For according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv, 1), love places the lover outside himself, and causes him to pass, as it were, into the object of his love. But it is not admissible to say that God is placed outside of Himself, and passes into other things. Therefore it is inadmissible to say that God loves things other than Himself. |
| Praeterea, amor Dei aeternus est. Sed ea quae sunt alia a Deo, non sunt ab aeterno nisi in Deo. Ergo Deus non amat ea nisi in seipso. Sed secundum quod sunt in eo, non sunt aliud ab eo. Ergo Deus non amat alia a seipso. | Objection 2: Further, the love of God is eternal. But things apart from God are not from eternity; except in God. Therefore God does not love anything, except as it exists in Himself. But as existing in Him, it is no other than Himself. Therefore God does not love things other than Himself. |
| Praeterea, duplex est amor, scilicet concupiscentiae, et amicitiae. Sed Deus creaturas irrationales non amat amore concupiscentiae, quia nullius extra se eget, nec etiam amore amicitiae, quia non potest ad res irrationales haberi, ut patet per philosophum, in VIII Ethic. Ergo Deus non omnia amat. | Objection 3: Further, love is twofold—the love, namely, of desire, and the love of friendship. Now God does not love irrational creatures with the love of desire, since He needs no creature outside Himself. Nor with the love of friendship; since there can be no friendship with irrational creatures, as the Philosopher shows (Ethic. viii, 2). Therefore God does not love all things. |
| Praeterea, in Psalmo dicitur, odisti omnes qui operantur iniquitatem. Nihil autem simul odio habetur et amatur. Ergo Deus non omnia amat. | Objection 4: Further, it is written (Ps. 5:7): "Thou hatest all the workers of iniquity." Now nothing is at the same time hated and loved. Therefore God does not love all things. |
| Sed contra est quod dicitur Sap. XI, diligis omnia quae sunt, et nihil odisti eorum quae fecisti. | On the contrary, It is said (Wis. 11:25): "Thou lovest all things that are, and hatest none of the things which Thou hast made." |
| Respondeo dicendum quod Deus omnia existentia amat. Nam omnia existentia, inquantum sunt, bona sunt, ipsum enim esse cuiuslibet rei quoddam bonum est, et similiter quaelibet perfectio ipsius. Ostensum est autem supra quod voluntas Dei est causa omnium rerum et sic oportet quod intantum habeat aliquid esse, aut quodcumque bonum, inquantum est volitum a Deo. Cuilibet igitur existenti Deus vult aliquod bonum. Unde, cum amare nil aliud sit quam velle bonum alicui, manifestum est quod Deus omnia quae sunt, amat. Non tamen eo modo sicut nos. Quia enim voluntas nostra non est causa bonitatis rerum, sed ab ea movetur sicut ab obiecto, amor noster, quo bonum alicui volumus, non est causa bonitatis ipsius, sed e converso bonitas eius, vel vera vel aestimata, provocat amorem, quo ei volumus et bonum conservari quod habet, et addi quod non habet, et ad hoc operamur. Sed amor Dei est infundens et creans bonitatem in rebus. | I answer that, God loves all existing things. For all existing things, in so far as they exist, are good, since the existence of a thing is itself a good; and likewise, whatever perfection it possesses. Now it has been shown above (Question [19], Article [4]) that God's will is the cause of all things. It must needs be, therefore, that a thing has existence, or any kind of good, only inasmuch as it is willed by God. To every existing thing, then, God wills some good. Hence, since to love anything is nothing else than to will good to that thing, it is manifest that God loves everything that exists. Yet not as we love. Because since our will is not the cause of the goodness of things, but is moved by it as by its object, our love, whereby we will good to anything, is not the cause of its goodness; but conversely its goodness, whether real or imaginary, calls forth our love, by which we will that it should preserve the good it has, and receive besides the good it has not, and to this end we direct our actions: whereas the love of God infuses and creates goodness. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod amans sic fit extra se in amatum translatus, inquantum vult amato bonum, et operatur per suam providentiam, sicut et sibi. Unde et Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom., audendum est autem et hoc pro veritate dicere, quod et ipse omnium causa, per abundantiam amativae bonitatis, extra seipsum fit ad omnia existentia providentiis. | Reply to Objection 1: A lover is placed outside himself, and made to pass into the object of his love, inasmuch as he wills good to the beloved; and works for that good by his providence even as he works for his own. Hence Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv, 1): "On behalf of the truth we must make bold to say even this, that He Himself, the cause of all things, by His abounding love and goodness, is placed outside Himself by His providence for all existing things." |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod, licet creaturae ab aeterno non fuerint nisi in Deo, tamen per hoc quod ab aeterno in Deo fuerunt, ab aeterno Deus cognovit res in propriis naturis, et eadem ratione amavit. Sicut et nos per similitudines rerum, quae in nobis sunt, cognoscimus res in seipsis existentes. | Reply to Objection 2: Although creatures have not existed from eternity, except in God, yet because they have been in Him from eternity, God has known them eternally in their proper natures; and for that reason has loved them, even as we, by the images of things within us, know things existing in themselves. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod amicitia non potest haberi nisi ad rationales creaturas, in quibus contingit esse redamationem, et communicationem in operibus vitae, et quibus contingit bene evenire vel male, secundum fortunam et felicitatem, sicut et ad eas proprie benevolentia est. Creaturae autem irrationales non possunt pertingere ad amandum Deum, neque ad communicationem intellectualis et beatae vitae, qua Deus vivit. Sic igitur Deus, proprie loquendo, non amat creaturas irrationales amore amicitiae, sed amore quasi concupiscentiae; inquantum ordinat eas ad rationales creaturas, et etiam ad seipsum; non quasi eis indigeat, sed propter suam bonitatem et nostram utilitatem. Concupiscimus enim aliquid et nobis et aliis. | Reply to Objection 3: Friendship cannot exist except towards rational creatures, who are capable of returning love, and communicating one with another in the various works of life, and who may fare well or ill, according to the changes of fortune and happiness; even as to them is benevolence properly speaking exercised. But irrational creatures cannot attain to loving God, nor to any share in the intellectual and beatific life that He lives. Strictly speaking, therefore, God does not love irrational creatures with the love of friendship; but as it were with the love of desire, in so far as He orders them to rational creatures, and even to Himself. Yet this is not because He stands in need of them; but only on account of His goodness, and of the services they render to us. For we can desire a thing for others as well as for ourselves. |
| Ad quartum dicendum quod nihil prohibet unum et idem secundum aliquid amari, et secundum aliquid odio haberi. Deus autem peccatores, inquantum sunt naturae quaedam, amat, sic enim et sunt, et ab ipso sunt. Inquantum vero peccatores sunt, non sunt, sed ab esse deficiunt, et hoc in eis a Deo non est. Unde secundum hoc ab ipso odio habentur. | Reply to Objection 4: Nothing prevents one and the same thing being loved under one aspect, while it is hated under another. God loves sinners in so far as they are existing natures; for they have existence and have it from Him. In so far as they are sinners, they have not existence at all, but fall short of it; and this in them is not from God. Hence under this aspect, they are hated by Him. |
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| Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod Deus aequaliter diligat omnia. Dicitur enim Sap. VI, aequaliter est ei cura de omnibus. Sed providentia Dei, quam habet de rebus, est ex amore quo amat res. Ergo aequaliter amat omnia. | Objection 1: It seems that God loves all things equally. For it is said: "He hath equally care of all" (Wis. 6:8). But God's providence over things comes from the love wherewith He loves them. Therefore He loves all things equally. |
| Praeterea, amor Dei est eius essentia. Sed essentia Dei magis et minus non recipit. Ergo nec amor eius. Non igitur quaedam aliis magis amat. | Objection 2: Further, the love of God is His essence. But God's essence does not admit of degree; neither therefore does His love. He does not therefore love some things more than others. |
| Praeterea, sicut amor Dei se extendit ad res creatas, ita et scientia et voluntas. Sed Deus non dicitur scire quaedam magis quam alia, neque magis velle. Ergo nec magis quaedam aliis diligit. | Objection 3: Further, as God's love extends to created things, so do His knowledge and will extend. But God is not said to know some things more than others; nor will one thing more than another. Neither therefore does He love some things more than others. |
| Sed contra est quod dicit Augustinus, super Ioann., omnia diligit Deus quae fecit; et inter ea magis diligit creaturas rationales; et de illis eas amplius, quae sunt membra unigeniti sui; et multo magis ipsum unigenitum suum. | On the contrary, Augustine says (Tract. in Joan. cx): "God loves all things that He has made, and amongst them rational creatures more, and of these especially those who are members of His only-begotten Son Himself." |
| Respondeo dicendum quod, cum amare sit velle bonum alicui, duplici ratione potest aliquid magis vel minus amari. Uno modo, ex parte ipsius actus voluntatis, qui est magis vel minus intensus. Et sic Deus non magis quaedam aliis amat, quia omnia amat uno et simplici actu voluntatis, et semper eodem modo se habente. Alio modo, ex parte ipsius boni quod aliquis vult amato. Et sic dicimur aliquem magis alio amare, cui volumus maius bonum; quamvis non magis intensa voluntate. Et hoc modo necesse est dicere quod Deus quaedam aliis magis amat. Cum enim amor Dei sit causa bonitatis rerum, ut dictum est, non esset aliquid alio melius, si Deus non vellet uni maius bonum quam alteri. | I answer that, Since to love a thing is to will it good, in a twofold way anything may be loved more, or less. In one way on the part of the act of the will itself, which is more or less intense. In this way God does not love some things more than others, because He loves all things by an act of the will that is one, simple, and always the same. In another way on the part of the good itself that a person wills for the beloved. In this way we are said to love that one more than another, for whom we will a greater good, though our will is not more intense. In this way we must needs say that God loves some things more than others. For since God's love is the cause of goodness in things, as has been said (Article [2]), no one thing would be better than another, if God did not will greater good for one than for another. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod dicitur Deo aequaliter esse cura de omnibus, non quia aequalia bona sua cura omnibus dispenset; sed quia ex aequali sapientia et bonitate omnia administrat. | Reply to Objection 1: God is said to have equally care of all, not because by His care He deals out equal good to all, but because He administers all things with a like wisdom and goodness. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de intensione amoris ex parte actus voluntatis, qui est divina essentia. Bonum autem quod Deus creaturae vult, non est divina essentia. Unde nihil prohibet illud intendi vel remitti. | Reply to Objection 2: This argument is based on the intensity of love on the part of the act of the will, which is the divine essence. But the good that God wills for His creatures, is not the divine essence. Therefore there is no reason why it may not vary in degree. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod intelligere et velle significant solum actus, non autem in sua significatione includunt aliqua obiecta, ex quorum diversitate possit dici Deus magis vel minus scire aut velle; sicut circa amorem dictum est. | Reply to Objection 3: To understand and to will denote the act alone, and do not include in their meaning objects from the diversity of which God may be said to know or will more or less, as has been said with respect to God's love. |
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| Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non semper magis diligat meliora. Manifestum est enim quod Christus est melior toto genere humano, cum sit Deus et homo. Sed Deus magis dilexit genus humanum quam Christum, quia dicitur Rom. VIII, proprio filio suo non pepercit, sed pro nobis omnibus tradidit illum. Ergo Deus non semper magis diligit meliora. | Objection 1: It seems that God does not always love more the better things. For it is manifest that Christ is better than the whole human race, being God and man. But God loved the human race more than He loved Christ; for it is said: "He spared not His own Son, but delivered Him up for us all" (Rm. 8:32). Therefore God does not always love more the better things. |
| Praeterea, Angelus est melior homine, unde in Psalmo VIII dicitur de homine, minuisti eum paulo minus ab Angelis. Sed Deus plus dilexit hominem quam Angelum, dicitur enim Hebr. II, nusquam Angelos apprehendit, sed semen Abrahae apprehendit. Ergo Deus non semper magis diligit meliora. | Objection 2: Further, an angel is better than a man. Hence it is said of man: "Thou hast made him a little less than the angels" (Ps. 8:6). But God loved men more than He loved the angels, for it is said: "Nowhere doth He take hold of the angels, but of the seed of Abraham He taketh hold" (Heb. 2:16). Therefore God does not always love more the better things. |
| Praeterea, Petrus fuit melior Ioanne, quia plus Christum diligebat. Unde dominus, sciens hoc esse verum, interrogavit Petrum, dicens, Simon Ioannis, diligis me plus his? Sed tamen Christus plus dilexit Ioannem quam Petrum, ut enim dicit Augustinus, super illud Ioan. XXI, Simon Ioannis diligis me? Hoc ipso signo Ioannes a ceteris discipulis discernitur; non quod solum eum, sed quod plus eum ceteris diligebat. Non ergo semper magis diligit meliora. | Objection 3: Further, Peter was better than John, since he loved Christ more. Hence the Lord, knowing this to be true, asked Peter, saying: "Simon, son of John, lovest thou Me more than these?" Yet Christ loved John more than He loved Peter. For as Augustine says, commenting on the words, "Simon, son of John, lovest thou Me?": "By this very mark is John distinguished from the other disciples, not that He loved him only, but that He loved him more than the rest." Therefore God does not always love more the better things. |
| Praeterea, melior est innocens poenitente; cum poenitentia sit secunda tabula post naufragium, ut dicit Hieronymus. Sed Deus plus diligit poenitentem quam innocentem, quia plus de eo gaudet, dicitur enim Luc. XV, dico vobis quod maius gaudium erit in caelo super uno peccatore poenitentiam agente, quam super nonaginta novem iustis, qui non indigent poenitentia. Ergo Deus non semper magis diligit meliora. | Objection 4: Further, the innocent man is better than the repentant, since repentance is, as Jerome says (Cap. 3 in Isa.), "a second plank after shipwreck." But God loves the penitent more than the innocent; since He rejoices over him the more. For it is said: "I say to you that there shall be joy in heaven upon the one sinner that doth penance, more than upon ninety-nine just who need not penance" (Lk. 15:7). Therefore God does not always love more the better things. |
| Praeterea, melior est iustus praescitus, quam peccator praedestinatus. Sed Deus plus diligit peccatorem praedestinatum, quia vult ei maius bonum, scilicet vitam aeternam. Ergo Deus non semper magis diligit meliora. | Objection 5: Further, the just man who is foreknown is better than the predestined sinner. Now God loves more the predestined sinner, since He wills for him a greater good, life eternal. Therefore God does not always love more the better things. |
| Sed contra, unumquodque diligit sibi simile; ut patet per illud quod habetur Eccli. XIII, omne animal diligit sibi simile. Sed intantum aliquid est melius, inquantum est Deo similius. Ergo meliora magis diliguntur a Deo. | On the contrary, Everything loves what is like it, as appears from (Ecclus. 13:19): "Every beast loveth its like." Now the better a thing is, the more like is it to God. Therefore the better things are more loved by God. |
| Respondeo dicendum quod necesse est dicere, secundum praedicta, quod Deus magis diligat meliora. Dictum est enim quod Deum diligere magis aliquid, nihil aliud est quam ei maius bonum velle, voluntas enim Dei est causa bonitatis in rebus. Et sic, ex hoc sunt aliqua meliora, quod Deus eis maius bonum vult. Unde sequitur quod meliora plus amet. | I answer that, It must needs be, according to what has been said before, that God loves more the better things . For it has been shown (Articles [2],3), that God's loving one thing more than another is nothing else than His willing for that thing a greater good: because God's will is the cause of goodness in things; and the reason why some things are better than others, is that God wills for them a greater good. Hence it follows that He loves more the better things. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Deus Christum diligit, non solum plus quam totum humanum genus, sed etiam magis quam totam universitatem creaturarum, quia scilicet ei maius bonum voluit, quia dedit ei nomen, quod est super omne nomen, ut verus Deus esset. Nec eius excellentiae deperiit ex hoc quod Deus dedit eum in mortem pro salute humani generis, quinimo ex hoc factus est victor gloriosus; factus enim est principatus super humerum eius, ut dicitur Isaiae IX. | Reply to Objection 1: God loves Christ not only more than He loves the whole human race, but more than He loves the entire created universe: because He willed for Him the greater good in giving Him "a name that is above all names," in so far as He was true God. Nor did anything of His excellence diminish when God delivered Him up to death for the salvation of the human race; rather did He become thereby a glorious conqueror: "The government was placed upon His shoulder," according to Is. 9:6. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod naturam humanam assumptam a Dei verbo in persona Christi, secundum praedicta, Deus plus amat quam omnes Angelos, et melior est, maxime ratione unionis. Sed loquendo de humana natura communiter, eam angelicae comparando, secundum ordinem ad gratiam et gloriam, aequalitas invenitur; cum eadem sit mensura hominis et Angeli, ut dicitur Apoc. XXI; ita tamen quod quidam Angeli quibusdam hominibus, et quidam homines quibusdam Angelis, quantum ad hoc, potiores inveniuntur. Sed quantum ad conditionem naturae, Angelus est melior homine. Nec ideo naturam humanam assumpsit Deus, quia hominem absolute plus diligeret, sed quia plus indigebat. Sicut bonus paterfamilias aliquid pretiosius dat servo aegrotanti, quod non dat filio sano. | Reply to Objection 2: God loves the human nature assumed by the Word of God in the person of Christ more than He loves all the angels; for that nature is better, especially on the ground of the union with the Godhead. But speaking of human nature in general, and comparing it with the angelic, the two are found equal, in the order of grace and of glory: since according to Rev 21:17, the measure of a man and of an angel is the same. Yet so that, in this respect, some angels are found nobler than some men, and some men nobler than some angels. But as to natural condition an angel is better than a man. God therefore did not assume human nature because He loved man, absolutely speaking, more; but because the needs of man were greater; just as the master of a house may give some costly delicacy to a sick servant, that he does not give to his own son in sound health. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod haec dubitatio de Petro et Ioanne multipliciter solvitur. Augustinus namque refert hoc ad mysterium, dicens quod vita activa, quae significatur per Petrum, plus diligit Deum quam vita contemplativa, quae significatur per Ioannem, quia magis sentit praesentis vitae angustias, et aestuantius ab eis liberari desiderat, et ad Deum ire. Contemplativam vero vitam Deus plus diligit, quia magis eam conservat; non enim finitur simul cum vita corporis, sicut vita activa. | Reply to Objection 3: This doubt concerning Peter and John has been solved in various ways. Augustine interprets it mystically, and says that the active life, signified by Peter, loves God more than the contemplative signified by John, because the former is more conscious of the miseries of this present life, and therefore the more ardently desires to be freed from them, and depart to God. God, he says, loves more the contemplative life, since He preserves it longer. For it does not end, as the active life does, with the life of the body. |
| Quidam vero dicunt quod Petrus plus dilexit Christum in membris; et sic etiam a Christo plus fuit dilectus; unde ei Ecclesiam commendavit. Ioannes vero plus dilexit Christum in seipso; et sic etiam plus ab eo fuit dilectus; unde ei commendavit matrem. Alii vero dicunt quod incertum est quis horum plus Christum dilexerit amore caritatis, et similiter quem Deus plus dilexerit in ordine ad maiorem gloriam vitae aeternae. Sed Petrus dicitur plus dilexisse, quantum ad quandam promptitudinem vel fervorem, Ioannes vero plus dilectus, quantum ad quaedam familiaritatis indicia, quae Christus ei magis demonstrabat, propter eius iuventutem et puritatem. Alii vero dicunt quod Christus plus dilexit Petrum, quantum ad excellentius donum caritatis, Ioannem vero plus, quantum ad donum intellectus. Unde simpliciter Petrus fuit melior, et magis dilectus, sed Ioannes secundum quid. Praesumptuosum tamen videtur hoc diiudicare, quia, ut dicitur Prov. XVI, spirituum ponderator est dominus, et non alius. | Some say that Peter loved Christ more in His members, and therefore was loved more by Christ also, for which reason He gave him the care of the Church; but that John loved Christ more in Himself, and so was loved more by Him; on which account Christ commended His mother to his care. Others say that it is uncertain which of them loved Christ more with the love of charity, and uncertain also which of them God loved more and ordained to a greater degree of glory in eternal life. Peter is said to have loved more, in regard to a certain promptness and fervor; but John to have been more loved, with respect to certain marks of familiarity which Christ showed to him rather than to others, on account of his youth and purity. While others say that Christ loved Peter more, from his more excellent gift of charity; but John more, from his gifts of intellect. Hence, absolutely speaking, Peter was the better and more beloved; but, in a certain sense, John was the better, and was loved the more. However, it may seem presumptuous to pass judgment on these matters; since "the Lord" and no other "is the weigher of spirits" (Prov. 16:2). |
| Ad quartum dicendum quod poenitentes et innocentes se habent sicut excedentia et excessa. Nam sive sint innocentes, sive poenitentes, illi sunt meliores et magis dilecti, qui plus habent de gratia. Ceteris tamen paribus, innocentia dignior est et magis dilecta. Dicitur tamen Deus plus gaudere de poenitente quam de innocente, quia plerumque poenitentes cautiores, humiliores et ferventiores resurgunt. Unde Gregorius dicit ibidem, quod dux in praelio eum militem plus diligit, qui post fugam conversus, fortiter hostem premit, quam qui nunquam fugit, nec unquam fortiter fecit. | Reply to Objection 4: The penitent and the innocent are related as exceeding and exceeded. For whether innocent or penitent, those are the better and better loved who have most grace. Other things being equal, innocence is the nobler thing and the more beloved. God is said to rejoice more over the penitent than over the innocent, because often penitents rise from sin more cautious, humble, and fervent. Hence Gregory commenting on these words (Hom. 34 in Ev.) says that, "In battle the general loves the soldier who after flight returns and bravely pursues the enemy, more than him who has never fled, but has never done a brave deed." |
| Vel, alia ratione, quia aequale donum gratiae plus est, comparatum poenitenti, qui meruit poenam, quam innocenti, qui non meruit. Sicut centum marcae maius donum est, si dentur pauperi, quam si dentur regi. | Or it may be answered that gifts of grace, equal in themselves, are more as conferred on the penitent, who deserved punishment, than as conferred on the innocent, to whom no punishment was due; just as a hundred pounds [marcoe] are a greater gift to a poor man than to a king. |
| Ad quintum dicendum quod, cum voluntas Dei sit causa bonitatis in rebus, secundum illud tempus pensanda est bonitas eius qui amatur a Deo, secundum quod dandum est ei ex bonitate divina aliquod bonum. Secundum ergo illud tempus quo praedestinato peccatori dandum est ex divina voluntate maius bonum, melior est; licet secundum aliquod aliud tempus, sit peior; quia et secundum aliquod tempus, non est nec bonus neque malus. | Reply to Objection 5: Since God's will is the cause of goodness in things, the goodness of one who is loved by God is to be reckoned according to the time when some good is to be given to him by divine goodness. According therefore to the time, when there is to be given by the divine will to the predestined sinner a greater good, the sinner is better; although according to some other time he is the worse; because even according to some time he is neither good nor bad. |