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| Deinde considerandum est de actione Angelorum in homines. Et primo, quantum possint eos immutare sua virtute naturali; secundo, quomodo mittantur a Deo ad ministerium hominum; tertio, quomodo custodiant homines. | We now consider the action of the angels on man, and inquire: (1) How far they can change them by their own natural power; (2) How they are sent by God to the ministry of men; (3) How they guard and protect men. |
| Circa primum quaeruntur quatuor. | Under the first head there are four points of inquiry: |
| Primo, utrum Angelus possit illuminare intellectum hominis. | (1) Whether an angel can enlighten the human intellect? |
| Secundo, utrum possit immutare affectum eius. | (2) Whether he can change man's will? |
| Tertio, utrum possit immutare imaginationem eius. | (3) Whether he can change man's imagination? |
| Quarto, utrum possit immutare sensum eius. | (4) Whether he can change man's senses? |
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| Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Angelus non possit illuminare hominem. Homo enim illuminatur per fidem, unde Dionysius, in Eccles. Hier., illuminationem attribuit Baptismo, qui est fidei sacramentum. Sed fides immediate est a Deo; secundum illud ad Ephes. II, gratia estis salvati per fidem, et non ex vobis; Dei enim donum est. Ergo homo non illuminatur ab Angelo, sed immediate a Deo. | Objection 1: It would seem that an angel cannot enlighten man. For man is enlightened by faith; hence Dionysius (Eccl. Hier. iii) attributes enlightenment to baptism, as "the sacrament of faith." But faith is immediately from God, according to Eph. 2:8: "By grace you are saved through faith, and that not of yourselves, for it is the gift of God." Therefore man is not enlightened by an angel; but immediately by God. |
| Praeterea, super illud Rom. I, Deus illis manifestavit, dicit Glossa quod non solum ratio naturalis ad hoc profuit ut divina hominibus manifestarentur, sed etiam Deus illis revelavit per opus suum, scilicet per creaturam. Sed utrumque est a Deo immediate, scilicet ratio naturalis, et creatura. Ergo Deus immediate illuminat hominem. | Objection 2: Further, on the words, "God hath manifested it to them" (Rm. 1:19), the gloss observes that "not only natural reason availed for the manifestation of Divine truths to men, but God also revealed them by His work," that is, by His creature. But both are immediately from God—that is, natural reason and the creature. Therefore God enlightens man immediately. |
| Praeterea, quicumque illuminatur, cognoscit suam illuminationem. Sed homines non percipiunt se ab Angelis illuminari. Ergo non illuminantur ab eis. | Objection 3: Further, whoever is enlightened is conscious of being enlightened. But man is not conscious of being enlightened by angels. Therefore he is not enlightened by them. |
| Sed contra est quod Dionysius probat, in IV cap. Cael. Hier., quod revelationes divinorum perveniunt ad homines mediantibus Angelis. Huiusmodi autem revelationes sunt illuminationes, ut supra dictum est. Ergo homines illuminantur per Angelos. | On the contrary, Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv) that the revelation of Divine things reaches men through the ministry of the angels. But such revelation is an enlightenment as we have stated (Question [106], Article [1]; Question [107], Article [2]). Therefore men are enlightened by the angels. |
| Respondeo dicendum quod, cum divinae providentiae ordo habeat ut actionibus superiorum inferiora subdantur, ut supra dictum est; sicut inferiores Angeli illuminantur per superiores, ita homines qui sunt Angelis inferiores, per eos illuminantur. | I answer that, Since the order of Divine Providence disposes that lower things be subject to the actions of higher, as explained above (Question [109], Article [2]); as the inferior angels are enlightened by the superior, so men, who are inferior to the angels, are enlightened by them. |
| Sed modus utriusque illuminationis quodammodo est similis, et quodammodo diversus. Dictum est enim supra quod illuminatio, quae est manifestatio divinae veritatis, secundum duo attenditur, scilicet secundum quod intellectus inferior confortatur per actionem intellectus superioris; et secundum quod proponuntur intellectui inferiori species intelligibiles quae sunt in superiori, ut capi possint ab inferiori. Et hoc quidem in Angelis fit, secundum quod superior Angelus veritatem universalem conceptam dividit secundum capacitatem inferioris Angeli, ut supra dictum est. | The modes of each of these kinds of enlightenment are in one way alike and in another way unlike. For, as was shown above (Question [106], Article [1]), the enlightenment which consists in making known Divine truth has two functions; namely, according as the inferior intellect is strengthened by the action of the superior intellect, and according as the intelligible species which are in the superior intellect are proposed to the inferior so as to be grasped thereby. This takes place in the angels when the superior angel divides his universal concept of the truth according to the capacity of the inferior angel, as explained above (Question [106], Article [1]). |
| Sed intellectus humanus non potest ipsam intelligibilem veritatem nudam capere, quia connaturale est ei ut intelligat per conversionem ad phantasmata, ut supra dictum est. Et ideo intelligibilem veritatem proponunt Angeli hominibus sub similitudinibus sensibilium; secundum illud quod dicit Dionysius, I cap. Cael. Hier., quod impossibile est aliter nobis lucere divinum radium, nisi varietate sacrorum velaminum circumvelatum. Ex alia vero parte, intellectus humanus, tanquam inferior, fortificatur per actionem intellectus angelici. Et secundum haec duo attenditur illuminatio qua homo illuminatur ab Angelo. | The human intellect, however, cannot grasp the universal truth itself unveiled; because its nature requires it to understand by turning to the phantasms, as above explained (Question [84], Article [7]). So the angels propose the intelligible truth to men under the similitudes of sensible things, according to what Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. i), that, "It is impossible for the divine ray to shine on us, otherwise than shrouded by the variety of the sacred veils." On the other hand, the human intellect as the inferior, is strengthened by the action of the angelic intellect. And in these two ways man is enlightened by an angel. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ad fidem duo concurrunt. Primo quidem habitus intellectus, quo disponitur ad obediendum voluntati tendenti in divinam veritatem, intellectus enim assentit veritati fidei, non quasi convictus ratione, sed quasi imperatus a voluntate; nullus enim credit nisi volens, ut Augustinus dicit. Et quantum ad hoc, fides est a solo Deo. Secundo requiritur ad fidem, quod credibilia proponantur credenti. Et hoc quidem fit per hominem, secundum quod fides est ex auditu, ut dicitur Rom. X; sed per Angelos principaliter, per quos hominibus revelantur divina. Unde Angeli operantur aliquid ad illuminationem fidei. Et tamen homines illuminantur ab Angelis non solum de credendis, sed etiam de agendis. | Reply to Objection 1: Two dispositions concur in the virtue of faith; first, the habit of the intellect whereby it is disposed to obey the will tending to Divine truth. For the intellect assents to the truth of faith, not as convinced by the reason, but as commanded by the will; hence Augustine says, "No one believes except willingly." In this respect faith comes from God alone. Secondly, faith requires that what is to be believed be proposed to the believer; which is accomplished by man, according to Rm. 10:17, "Faith cometh by hearing"; principally, however, by the angels, by whom Divine things are revealed to men. Hence the angels have some part in the enlightenment of faith. Moreover, men are enlightened by the angels not only concerning what is to be believed; but also as regards what is to be done. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod ratio naturalis, quae est immediate a Deo, potest per Angelum confortari, ut dictum est. Et similiter ex speciebus a creaturis acceptis, tanto altior elicitur intelligibilis veritas, quanto intellectus humanus fuerit fortior. Et sic per Angelum adiuvatur homo, ut ex creaturis perfectius in divinam cognitionem deveniat. | Reply to Objection 2: Natural reason, which is immediately from God, can be strengthened by an angel, as we have said above. Again, the more the human intellect is strengthened, so much higher an intelligible truth can be elicited from the species derived from creatures. Thus man is assisted by an angel so that he may obtain from creatures a more perfect knowledge of God. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod operatio intellectualis, et illuminatio, dupliciter possunt considerari. Uno modo, ex parte rei intellectae, et sic quicumque intelligit vel illuminatur, cognoscit se intelligere vel illuminari; quia cognoscit rem sibi esse manifestam. Alio modo, ex parte principii, et sic non quicumque intelligit aliquam veritatem, cognoscit quid sit intellectus, qui est principium intellectualis operationis. Et similiter non quicumque illuminatur ab Angelo, cognoscit se ab Angelo illuminari. | Reply to Objection 3: Intellectual operation and enlightenment can be understood in two ways. First, on the part of the object understood; thus whoever understands or is enlightened, knows that he understands or is enlightened, because he knows that the object is made known to him. Secondly, on the part of the principle; and thus it does not follow that whoever understands a truth, knows what the intellect is, which is the principle of the intellectual operation. In like manner not everyone who is enlightened by an angel, knows that he is enlightened by him. |
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| Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Angeli possint immutare voluntatem hominis. Quia super illud Heb. I, qui facit Angelos suos spiritus, et ministros suos flammam ignis, dicit Glossa quod ignis sunt, dum spiritu fervent, et vitia nostra urunt. Sed hoc non esset, nisi voluntatem immutarent. Ergo Angeli possunt immutare voluntatem. | Objection 1: It would seem that the angels can change the will of man. For, upon the text, "Who maketh His angels spirits and His ministers a flame of fire" (Heb. 1:7), the gloss notes that "they are fire, as being spiritually fervent, and as burning away our vices." This could not be, however, unless they changed the will. Therefore the angels can change the will. |
| Praeterea, Beda dicit quod Diabolus non est immissor malarum cogitationum, sed incensor. Damascenus autem ulterius dicit quod etiam est immissor, dicit enim in II libro, quod omnis malitia et immundae passiones ex Daemonibus excogitatae sunt, et immittere homini sunt concessi. Et pari ratione, Angeli boni immittunt et incendunt bonas cogitationes. Sed hoc non possent facere, nisi immutarent voluntatem. Ergo immutant voluntatem. | Objection 2: Further, Bede says (Super Matth. xv, 11), that, "the devil does not send wicked thoughts, but kindles them." Damascene, however, says that he also sends them; for he remarks that "every malicious act and unclean passion is contrived by the demons and put into men" (De Fide Orth. ii, 4); in like manner also the good angels introduce and kindle good thoughts. But this could only be if they changed the will. Therefore the will is changed by them. |
| Praeterea, Angelus, sicut est dictum, illuminat intellectum hominis mediantibus phantasmatibus. Sed sicut phantasia, quae deservit intellectui, potest immutari ab Angelo; ita et appetitus sensitivus qui deservit voluntati, quia et ipse etiam est vis utens organo corporali. Ergo sicut illuminat intellectum, ita potest immutare voluntatem. | Objection 3: Further, the angel, as above explained, enlightens the human intellect by means of the phantasms. But as the imagination which serves the intellect can be changed by an angel, so can the sensitive appetite which serves the will, because it also is a faculty using a corporeal organ. Therefore as the angel enlightens the mind, so can he change the will. |
| Sed contra est quod immutare voluntatem est proprium Dei; secundum illud Prov. XXI, cor regis in manu domini; quocumque voluerit, vertet illud. | On the contrary, To change the will belongs to God alone, according to Prov. 21:1: "The heart of the king is in the hand of the Lord, whithersoever He will He shall turn it." |
| Respondeo dicendum quod voluntas potest immutari dupliciter. Uno modo, ab interiori. Et sic cum motus voluntatis non sit aliud quam inclinatio voluntatis in rem volitam, solius Dei est sic immutare voluntatem, qui dat naturae intellectuali virtutem talis inclinationis. Sicut enim inclinatio naturalis non est nisi a Deo qui dat naturam; ita inclinatio voluntaria non est nisi a Deo, qui causat voluntatem. | I answer that, The will can be changed in two ways. First, from within; in which way, since the movement of the will is nothing but the inclination of the will to the thing willed, God alone can thus change the will, because He gives the power of such an inclination to the intellectual nature. For as the natural inclination is from God alone Who gives the nature, so the inclination of the will is from God alone, Who causes the will. |
| Alio modo movetur voluntas ab exteriori. Et hoc in Angelo est quidem uno modo tantum, scilicet a bono apprehenso per intellectum. Unde secundum quod aliquis est causa quod aliquid apprehendatur ut bonum ad appetendum, secundum hoc movet voluntatem. Et sic etiam solus Deus efficaciter potest movere voluntatem; Angelus autem et homo per modum suadentis, ut supra dictum est. | Secondly, the will is moved from without. As regards an angel, this can be only in one way—by the good apprehended by the intellect. Hence in as far as anyone may be the cause why anything be apprehended as an appetible good, so far does he move the will. In this way also God alone can move the will efficaciously; but an angel and man move the will by way of persuasion, as above explained (Question [106], Article [2]). |
| Sed praeter hunc modum, etiam aliter movetur in hominibus voluntas ab exteriori, scilicet ex passione existente circa appetitum sensitivum; sicut ex concupiscentia vel ira inclinatur voluntas ad aliquid volendum. Et sic etiam Angeli, inquantum possunt concitare huiusmodi passiones, possunt voluntatem movere. Non tamen ex necessitate, quia voluntas semper remanet libera ad consentiendum vel resistendum passioni. | In addition to this mode the human will can be moved from without in another way; namely, by the passion residing in the sensitive appetite: thus by concupiscence or anger the will is inclined to will something. In this manner the angels, as being able to rouse these passions, can move the will, not however by necessity, for the will ever remains free to consent to, or to resist, the passion. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ministri Dei, vel homines vel Angeli, dicuntur urere vitia, et inflammare ad virtutes, per modum persuasionis. | Reply to Objection 1: Those who act as God's ministers, either men or angels, are said to burn away vices, and to incite to virtue by way of persuasion. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod Daemones non possunt immittere cogitationes, interius eas causando, cum usus cogitativae virtutis subiaceat voluntati. Dicitur tamen Diabolus incensor cogitationum, inquantum incitat ad cogitandum, vel ad appetendum cogitata, per modum persuadentis, vel passionem concitantis. Et hoc ipsum incendere Damascenus vocat immittere, quia talis operatio interius fit. Sed bonae cogitationes attribuuntur altiori principio, scilicet Deo; licet Angelorum ministerio procurentur. | Reply to Objection 2: The demon cannot put thoughts in our minds by causing them from within, since the act of the cogitative faculty is subject to the will; nevertheless the devil is called the kindler of thoughts, inasmuch as he incites to thought, by the desire of the things thought of, by way of persuasion, or by rousing the passions. Damascene calls this kindling "a putting in" because such a work is accomplished within. But good thoughts are attributed to a higher principle, namely, God, though they may be procured by the ministry of the angels. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod intellectus humanus, secundum praesentem statum, non potest intelligere nisi convertendo se ad phantasmata; sed voluntas humana potest aliquid velle ex iudicio rationis, non sequendo passionem appetitus sensitivi. Unde non est simile. | Reply to Objection 3: The human intellect in its present state can understand only by turning to the phantasms; but the human will can will something following the judgment of reason rather than the passion of the sensitive appetite. Hence the comparison does not hold. |
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| Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod Angelus non possit immutare imaginationem hominis. Phantasia enim, ut dicitur in libro de anima, est motus factus a sensu secundum actum. Sed si fieret per immutationem Angeli, non fieret a sensu secundum actum. Ergo est contra rationem phantasiae, quae est actus imaginativae virtutis, ut sit per immutationem Angeli. | Objection 1: It would seem that an angel cannot change man's imagination. For the phantasy, as is said De Anima iii, is "a motion caused by the sense in act." But if this motion were caused by an angel, it would not be caused by the sense in act. Therefore it is contrary to the nature of the phantasy, which is the act of the imaginative faculty, to be changed by an angel. |
| Praeterea, formae quae sunt in imaginatione, cum sint spirituales, sunt nobiliores formis quae sunt in materia sensibili. Sed Angelus non potest imprimere formas in materia sensibili, ut dictum est. Ergo non potest imprimere formas in imaginatione. Et ita non potest eam immutare. | Objection 2: Further, since the forms in the imagination are spiritual, they are nobler than the forms existing in sensible matter. But an angel cannot impress forms upon sensible matter (Question [110], Article [2]). Therefore he cannot impress forms on the imagination, and so he cannot change it. |
| Praeterea, secundum Augustinum, XII super Gen. ad Litt., commixtione alterius spiritus fieri potest ut ea quae ipse scit, per huiusmodi imagines ei cui miscetur ostendat, sive intelligenti, sive ut ab alio intellecta pandantur. Sed non videtur quod Angelus possit misceri imaginationi humanae; neque quod imaginatio possit capere intelligibilia, quae Angelus cognoscit. Ergo videtur quod Angelus non possit mutare imaginationem. | Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 12): "One spirit by intermingling with another can communicate his knowledge to the other spirit by these images, so that the latter either understands it himself, or accepts it as understood by the other." But it does not seem that an angel can be mingled with the human imagination, nor that the imagination can receive the knowledge of an angel. Therefore it seems that an angel cannot change the imagination. |
| Praeterea, in visione imaginaria homo adhaeret similitudinibus rerum quasi ipsis rebus. Sed in hoc est quaedam deceptio. Cum ergo Angelus bonus non possit esse causa deceptionis, videtur quod non possit causare imaginariam visionem, imaginationem immutando. | Objection 4: Further, in the imaginative vision man cleaves to the similitudes of the things as to the things themselves. But in this there is deception. So as a good angel cannot be the cause of deception, it seems that he cannot cause the imaginative vision, by changing the imagination. |
| Sed contra est quod ea quae apparent in somnis, videntur imaginaria visione. Sed Angeli revelant aliqua in somnis; ut patet Matth. I et II, de Angelo qui Ioseph in somnis apparuit. Ergo Angelus potest imaginationem movere. | On the contrary, Those things which are seen in dreams are seen by imaginative vision. But the angels reveal things in dreams, as appears from Mt. 1:20;[2]:13,[19] in regard to the angel who appeared to Joseph in dreams. Therefore an angel can move the imagination. |
| Respondeo dicendum quod Angelus, tam bonus quam malus, virtute naturae suae potest movere imaginationem hominis. Quod quidem sic considerari potest. Dictum est enim supra quod natura corporalis obedit Angelo ad motum localem. Illa ergo quae ex motu locali aliquorum corporum possunt causari, subsunt virtuti naturali Angelorum. Manifestum est autem quod apparitiones imaginariae causantur interdum in nobis ex locali mutatione corporalium spirituum et humorum. Unde Aristoteles, in Lib. de Somn. et Vig., assignans causam apparitionis somniorum, dicit quod, cum animal dormit, descendente plurimo sanguine ad principium sensitivum, simul descendunt motus, idest impressiones relictae ex sensibilium motionibus, quae in spiritibus sensualibus conservantur, et movent principium sensitivum, ita quod fit quaedam apparitio, ac si tunc principium sensitivum a rebus ipsis exterioribus mutaretur. Et tanta potest esse commotio spirituum et humorum, quod huiusmodi apparitiones etiam vigilantibus fiant; sicut patet in phreneticis, et in aliis huiusmodi. Sicut igitur hoc fit per naturalem commotionem humorum; et quandoque etiam per voluntatem hominis, qui voluntarie imaginatur quod prius senserat, ita etiam hoc potest fieri virtute Angeli boni vel mali, quandoque quidem cum alienatione a corporeis sensibus, quandoque autem absque tali alienatione. | I answer that, Both a good and a bad angel by their own natural power can move the human imagination. This may be explained as follows. For it was said above (Question [110], Article [3]), that corporeal nature obeys the angel as regards local movement, so that whatever can be caused by the local movement of bodies is subject to the natural power of the angels. Now it is manifest that imaginative apparitions are sometimes caused in us by the local movement of animal spirits and humors. Hence Aristotle says (De Somn. et Vigil.) [*De Insomniis iii.], when assigning the cause of visions in dreams, that "when an animal sleeps, the blood descends in abundance to the sensitive principle, and movements descend with it," that is, the impressions left from the movements are preserved in the animal spirits, "and move the sensitive principle"; so that a certain appearance ensues, as if the sensitive principle were being then changed by the external objects themselves. Indeed, the commotion of the spirits and humors may be so great that such appearances may even occur to those who are awake, as is seen in mad people, and the like. So, as this happens by a natural disturbance of the humors, and sometimes also by the will of man who voluntarily imagines what he previously experienced, so also the same may be done by the power of a good or a bad angel, sometimes with alienation from the bodily senses, sometimes without such alienation. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod primum principium phantasiae est a sensu secundum actum, non enim possumus imaginari quae nullo modo sensimus, vel secundum totum vel secundum partem; sicut caecus natus non potest imaginari colorem. Sed aliquando imaginatio informatur, ut actus phantastici motus consurgat, ab impressionibus interius conservatis, ut dictum est. | Reply to Objection 1: The first principle of the imagination is from the sense in act. For we cannot imagine what we have never perceived by the senses, either wholly or partly; as a man born blind cannot imagine color. Sometimes, however, the imagination is informed in such a way that the act of the imaginative movement arises from the impressions preserved within. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod Angelus transmutat imaginationem, non quidem imprimendo aliquam formam imaginariam nullo modo per sensum prius acceptam (non enim posset facere quod caecus imaginaretur colores), sed hoc facit per motum localem spirituum et humorum, ut dictum est. | Reply to Objection 2: An angel changes the imagination, not indeed by the impression of an imaginative form in no way previously received from the senses (for he cannot make a man born blind imagine color), but by local movement of the spirits and humors, as above explained. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod commixtio illa spiritus angelici ad imaginationem humanam, non est per essentiam, sed per effectum quem praedicto modo in imaginatione facit; cui demonstrat quae ipse novit, non tamen eo modo quo ipse novit. | Reply to Objection 3: The commingling of the angelic spirit with the human imagination is not a mingling of essences, but by reason of an effect which he produces in the imagination in the way above stated; so that he shows man what he [the angel] knows, but not in the way he knows. |
| Ad quartum dicendum quod Angelus causans aliquam imaginariam visionem, quandoque quidem simul intellectum illuminat, ut cognoscat quid per huiusmodi similitudines significetur, et tunc nulla est deceptio. Quandoque vero per operationem Angeli solummodo similitudines rerum apparent in imaginatione, nec tamen tunc causatur deceptio ab Angelo, sed ex defectu intellectus eius cui talia apparent. Sicut nec Christus fuit causa deceptionis in hoc quod multa turbis in parabolis proposuit, quae non exposuit eis. . | Reply to Objection 4: An angel causing an imaginative vision, sometimes enlightens the intellect at the same time, so that it knows what these images signify; and then there is not deception. But sometimes by the angelic operation the similitudes of things only appear in the imagination; but neither then is deception caused by the angel, but by the defect in the intellect to whom such things appear. Thus neither was Christ a cause of deception when He spoke many things to the people in parables, which He did not explain to them. |
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| Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Angelus non possit immutare sensum humanum. Operatio enim sensitiva est operatio vitae. Huiusmodi autem operatio non est a principio extrinseco. Non ergo operatio sensitiva potest causari ab Angelo. | Objection 1: It seems that an angel cannot change the human senses. For the sensitive operation is a vital operation. But such an operation does not come from an extrinsic principle. Therefore the sensitive operation cannot be caused by an angel. |
| Praeterea, virtus sensitiva est nobilior quam nutritiva. Sed Angelus, ut videtur, non potest mutare virtutem nutritivam; sicut nec alias formas naturales. Ergo neque virtutem sensitivam immutare potest. | Objection 2: Further, the sensitive operation is nobler than the nutritive. But the angel cannot change the nutritive power, nor other natural forms. Therefore neither can he change the sensitive power. |
| Praeterea, sensus naturaliter movetur a sensibili. Sed Angelus non potest immutare naturae ordinem, ut supra dictum est. Ergo Angelus non potest immutare sensum, sed semper sensus a sensibili immutatur. | Objection 3: Further, the senses are naturally moved by the sensible objects. But an angel cannot change the order of nature (Question [110], Article [4]). Therefore an angel cannot change the senses; but these are changed always by the sensible object. |
| Sed contra est quod Angeli qui subverterunt Sodomam, percusserunt Sodomitas caecitate (vel aorasia), ut ostium domus invenire non possent, ut dicitur Gen. XIX. Et simile legitur IV Reg. VI, de Syris quos Elisaeus duxit in Samariam. | On the contrary, The angels who overturned Sodom, "struck the people of Sodom with blindness or {aorasia}, so that they could not find the door" (Gn. 19:11). [*It is worth noting that these are the only two passages in the Greek version where the word {aorasia} appears. It expresses, in fact, the effect produced on the people of Sodom—namely, dazzling (French version, "eblouissement"), which the Latin "caecitas" (blindness) does not necessarily imply.] The same is recorded of the Syrians whom Eliseus led into Samaria (4 Kgs. 6:18). |
| Respondeo dicendum quod sensus immutatur dupliciter. Uno modo, ab exteriori; sicut cum mutatur a sensibili. Alio modo, ab interiori, videmus enim quod, perturbatis spiritibus et humoribus immutatur sensus; lingua enim infirmi, quia plena est cholerico humore, omnia sentit ut amara; et simile contingit in aliis sensibus. Utroque autem modo Angelus potest immutare sensum hominis sua naturali virtute. Potest enim Angelus opponere exterius sensui sensibile aliquod, vel a natura formatum, vel aliquod de novo formando; sicut facit dum corpus assumit, ut supra dictum est. Similiter etiam potest interius commovere spiritus et humores, ut supra dictum est, ex quibus sensus diversimode immutentur. | I answer that, The senses may be changed in a twofold manner; from without, as when affected by the sensible object: and from within, for we see that the senses are changed when the spirits and humors are disturbed; as for example, a sick man's tongue, charged with choleric humor, tastes everything as bitter, and the like with the other senses. Now an angel, by his natural power, can work a change in the senses both ways. For an angel can offer the senses a sensible object from without, formed by nature or by the angel himself, as when he assumes a body, as we have said above (Question [51], Article [2]). Likewise he can move the spirits and humors from within, as above remarked, whereby the senses are changed in various ways. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod principium sensitivae operationis non potest esse absque principio interiori, quod est potentia sensitiva, sed illud interius principium potest multipliciter ab exteriori principio commoveri, ut dictum est. | Reply to Objection 1: The principle of the sensitive operation cannot be without the interior principle which is the sensitive power; but this interior principle can be moved in many ways by the exterior principle, as above explained. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod etiam per commotionem interiorem spirituum et humorum, potest Angelus aliquid operari ad immutandum actum potentiae nutritivae. Et similiter potentiae appetitivae, et sensitivae, et cuiuscumque potentiae corporali organo utentis. | Reply to Objection 2: By the interior movement of the spirits and humors an angel can do something towards changing the act of the nutritive power, and also of the appetitive and sensitive power, and of any other power using a corporeal organ. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod praeter ordinem totius creaturae Angelus facere non potest, sed praeter ordinem alicuius particularis naturae facere potest, cum tali ordini non subdatur. Et sic quodam singulari modo potest sensum immutare, praeter modum communem. | Reply to Objection 3: An angel can do nothing outside the entire order of creatures; but he can outside some particular order of nature, since he is not subject to that order; thus in some special way an angel can work a change in the senses outside the common mode of nature. |