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| Consequenter considerandum est de actione corporalis creaturae; et fato, quod aliquibus corporibus attribuitur. Circa actiones corporales quaeruntur sex. | We have now to consider the action of the corporeal creature; and fate, which is ascribed to certain bodies. Concerning corporeal actions there are six points of inquiry: |
| Primo, utrum aliquod corpus sit activum. | (1) Whether a body can be active? |
| Secundo, utrum in corporibus sint aliquae seminales rationes. | (2) Whether there exist in bodies certain seminal virtues? |
| Tertio, utrum corpora caelestia sint causa eorum quae hic per inferiora corpora fiunt. | (3) Whether the heavenly bodies are the causes of what is done here by the inferior bodies? |
| Quarto, utrum sint causa humanorum actuum. | (4) Whether they are the cause of human acts? |
| Quinto, utrum eorum actionibus Daemones subdantur. | (5) Whether demons are subject to their influence? |
| Sexto, utrum caelestia corpora imponant necessitatem his quae eorum actionibus subduntur. | (6) Whether the heavenly bodies impose necessity on those things which are subject to their influence? |
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| Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod nullum corpus sit activum. Dicit enim Augustinus quod in rebus invenitur aliquid actum et non agens, sicut sunt corpora; aliquid agens et non actum, sicut Deus; aliquid agens et actum, sicut substantiae spirituales. | Objection 1: It would seem that no bodies are active. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v, 9): "There are things that are acted upon, but do not act; such are bodies: there is one Who acts but is not acted upon; this is God: there are things that both act and are acted upon; these are the spiritual substances." |
| Praeterea, omne agens, excepto primo agente, in suo opere indiget subiecto quod sit susceptibile suae actionis. Sed infra substantiam corporalem non est substantia quae sit susceptibilis suae actionis, quia haec substantia tenet infimum gradum in entibus. Ergo substantia corporalis non est activa. | Objection 2: Further, every agent except the first agent requires in its work a subject susceptible of its action. But there is not substance below the corporeal substance which can be susceptible of the latter's action; since it belongs to the lowest degree of beings. Therefore corporeal substance is not active. |
| Praeterea, omnis substantia corporalis concluditur quantitate. Sed quantitas impedit substantiam a motu et actione, quia comprehendit eam, et mergitur in ea, sicut impeditur aer nubilosus a perceptione luminis. Et huius signum est, quod quanto magis accreverit quantitas corporis, tanto est ponderosius et gravius ad hoc quod moveatur. Ergo nulla substantia corporalis est activa. | Objection 3: Further, every corporeal substance is limited by quantity. But quantity hinders substance from movement and action, because it surrounds it and penetrates it: just as a cloud hinders the air from receiving light. A proof of this is that the more a body increases in quantity, the heavier it is and the more difficult to move. Therefore no corporeal substance is active. |
| Praeterea, omne agens habet virtutem agendi ex propinquitate ad primum activum. Sed a primo activo, quod est simplicissimum, remotissima sunt corpora, quae sunt maxime composita. Ergo nullum corpus est agens. | Objection 4: Further, the power of action in every agent is according to its propinquity to the first active cause. But bodies, being most composite, are most remote from the first active cause, which is most simple. Therefore no bodies are active. |
| Praeterea, si aliquod corpus est agens, aut agit ad formam substantialem; aut ad formam accidentalem. Sed non ad formam substantialem, quia non invenitur in corporibus principium actionis nisi aliqua qualitas activa, quae est accidens; accidens autem non potest esse causa formae substantialis, cum causa sit potior quam effectus. Similiter etiam neque ad formam accidentalem, quia accidens non se extendit ultra suum subiectum, ut Augustinus dicit IX de Trin. Ergo nullum corpus est activum. | Objection 5: Further, if a body is an agent, the term of its action is either a substantial, or an accidental form. But it is not a substantial form; for it is not possible to find in a body any principle of action, save an active quality, which is an accident; and an accident cannot be the cause of a substantial form, since the cause is always more excellent than the effect. Likewise, neither is it an accidental form, for "an accident does not extend beyond its subject," as Augustine says (De Trin. ix, 4). Therefore no bodies are active. |
| Sed contra est quod Dionysius, XV cap. Cael. Hier., inter ceteras proprietates corporei ignis, dicit quod ad susceptas materias manifestat sui ipsius magnitudinem activus et potens. | On the contrary, Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. xv) that among other qualities of corporeal fire, "it shows its greatness in its action and power on that of which it lays hold." |
| Respondeo dicendum quod sensibiliter apparet aliqua corpora esse activa. Sed circa corporum actiones tripliciter aliqui erraverunt. Fuerunt enim aliqui qui totaliter corporibus actiones subtraxerunt. Et haec est opinio Avicebron in libro fontis vitae, ubi per rationes quae tactae sunt, probare nititur quod nullum corpus agit, sed omnes actiones quae videntur esse corporum, sunt actiones cuiusdam virtutis spiritualis quae penetrat per omnia corpora; ita quod ignis, secundum eum, non calefacit, sed virtus spiritualis penetrans per ipsum. Et videtur haec opinio derivata esse ab opinione Platonis. Nam Plato posuit omnes formas quae sunt in materia corporali, esse participatas et determinatas et contractas ad hanc materiam; formas vero separatas esse absolutas et quasi universales; et ideo illas formas separatas dicebat esse causas formarum quae sunt in materia. Secundum hoc ergo quod forma quae est in materia corporali, determinata est ad hanc materiam individuatam per quantitatem, ponebat Avicebron quod a quantitate, prout est individuationis principium, retinetur et arcetur forma corporalis, ne possit se extendere per actionem in aliam materiam; sed solum forma spiritualis et immaterialis, quae non est coarctata per quantitatem, potest effluere per actionem in aliud. | I answer that, It is apparent to the senses that some bodies are active. But concerning the action of bodies there have been three errors. For some denied all action to bodies. This is the opinion of Avicebron in his book on The Fount of Life, where, by the arguments mentioned above, he endeavors to prove that no bodies act, but that all the actions which seem to be the actions of bodies, are the actions of some spiritual power that penetrates all bodies: so that, according to him, it is not fire that heats, but a spiritual power which penetrates, by means of the fire. And this opinion seems to be derived from that of Plato. For Plato held that all forms existing in corporeal matter are participated thereby, and determined and limited thereto; and that separate forms are absolute and as it were universal; wherefore he said that these separate forms are the causes of forms that exist in matter. Therefore inasmuch as the form which is in corporeal matter is determined to this matter individualized by quantity, Avicebron held that the corporeal form is held back and imprisoned by quantity, as the principle of individuality, so as to be unable by action to extend to any other matter: and that the spiritual and immaterial form alone, which is not hedged in by quantity, can issue forth by acting on something else. |
| Sed ista ratio non concludit quod forma corporalis non sit agens, sed quod non sit agens universale. Secundum enim quod participatur aliquid, secundum hoc est necessarium quod participetur id quod est proprium ei, sicut quantum participatur de lumine, tantum participatur de ratione visibilis. Agere autem, quod nihil est aliud quam facere aliquid actu, est per se proprium actus, inquantum est actus, unde et omne agens agit sibi simile. Sic ergo ex hoc quod aliquid est forma non determinata per materiam quantitati subiectam, habet quod sit agens indeterminatum et universale, ex hoc vero quod est determinata ad hanc materiam, habet quod sit agens contractum et particulare. Unde si esset forma ignis separata, ut Platonici posuerunt, esset aliquo modo causa omnis ignitionis. Sed haec forma ignis quae est in hac materia corporali, est causa huius ignitionis quae est ab hoc corpore in hoc corpus. Unde et fit talis actio per contactum duorum corporum. | But this does not prove that the corporeal form is not an agent, but that it is not a universal agent. For in proportion as a thing is participated, so, of necessity, must that be participated which is proper thereto; thus in proportion to the participation of light is the participation of visibility. But to act, which is nothing else than to make something to be in act, is essentially proper to an act as such; wherefore every agent produces its like. So therefore to the fact of its being a form not determined by matter subject to quantity, a thing owes its being an agent indeterminate and universal: but to the fact that it is determined to this matter, it owes its being an agent limited and particular. Wherefore if the form of fire were separate, as the Platonists supposed, it would be, in a fashion, the cause of every ignition. But this form of fire which is in this corporeal matter, is the cause of this ignition which passes from this body to that. Hence such an action is effected by the contact of two bodies. |
| Sed tamen haec opinio Avicebron superexcedit opinionem Platonis. Nam Plato ponebat solum formas substantiales separatas; accidentia vero reducebat ad principia materialia quae sunt magnum et parvum, quae ponebat esse prima contraria, sicut et alii rarum et densum. Et ideo tam Plato quam Avicenna, in aliquo ipsum sequens, ponebant quod agentia corporalia agunt secundum formas accidentales, disponendo materiam ad formam substantialem; sed ultima perfectio, quae est per introductionem formae substantialis est a principio immateriali. Et haec est secunda opinio de actione corporum, de qua supra dictum est, cum de creatione ageretur. | But this opinion of Avicebron goes further than that of Plato. For Plato held only substantial forms to be separate; while he referred accidents to the material principles which are "the great" and "the small," which he considered to be the first contraries, by others considered to the "the rare" and "the dense." Consequently both Plato and Avicenna, who follows him to a certain extent, held that corporeal agents act through their accidental forms, by disposing matter for the substantial form; but that the ultimate perfection attained by the introduction of the substantial form is due to an immaterial principle. And this is the second opinion concerning the action of bodies; of which we have spoken above when treating of the creation (Question [45], Article [8]). |
| Tertia vero opinio fuit Democriti, qui ponebat actionem esse per effluxionem atomorum a corpore agente, et passionem esse per receptionem eorundem in poris corporis patientis. Quam opinionem improbat Aristoteles in I de Generat. Sequeretur enim quod corpus non pateretur per totum, et quod quantitas corporis agentis diminueretur ex hoc quod agit, quae sunt manifeste falsa. | The third opinion is that of Democritus, who held that action takes place through the issue of atoms from the corporeal agent, while passion consists in the reception of the atoms in the pores of the passive body. This opinion is disproved by Aristotle (De Gener. i, 8,9). For it would follow that a body would not be passive as a whole, and the quantity of the active body would be diminished through its action; which things are manifestly untrue. |
| Dicendum est ergo quod corpus agit secundum quod est actu, in aliud corpus secundum quod est in potentia. | We must therefore say that a body acts forasmuch as it is in act, on a body forasmuch as it is in potentiality. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod dictum Augustini est intelligendum de tota natura corporali simul accepta, quae non habet aliquam inferiorem naturam infra se, in quam agat, sicut natura spiritualis in corporalem, et natura increata in creatam. Sed tamen unum corpus est infra alterum, inquantum est in potentia ad id quod habet aliud in actu. | Reply to Objection 1: This passage of Augustine is to be understood of the whole corporeal nature considered as a whole, while thus has no nature inferior to it, on which it can act; as the spiritual nature acts on the corporeal, and the uncreated nature on the created. Nevertheless one body is inferior to another, forasmuch as it is in potentiality to that which the other has in act. |
| Et per hoc patet solutio ad secundum. Sciendum est tamen quod, cum Avicebron sic argumentatur, est aliquid quod est movens non motum, scilicet primus factor rerum, ergo, ex opposito, est aliquid quod est motum et patiens tantum, quod concedendum est. Sed hoc est materia prima, quae est potentia pura, sicut Deus est actus purus. Corpus autem componitur ex potentia et actu, et ideo est agens et patiens. | From this follows the solution of the second objection. But it must be observed, when Avicebron argues thus, "There is a mover who is not moved, to wit, the first maker of all; therefore, on the other hand, there exists something moved which is purely passive," that this is to be conceded. But this latter is primary matter, which is a pure potentiality, just as God is pure act. Now a body is composed of potentiality and act; and therefore it is both active and passive. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod quantitas non impedit formam corporalem omnino ab actione, sicut dictum est, sed impedit eam ne sit agens universale, inquantum forma individuatur prout est in materia quantitati subiecta. Signum tamen quod inducitur de ponderositate corporum, non est ad propositum. Primo quidem, quia additio quantitatis non est causa gravitatis; ut probatur in IV de caelo et mundo. Secundo, quia falsum est quod ponderositas facit tardiorem motum, immo quanto aliquid est gravius, tanto magis movetur motu proprio. Tertio, quia actio non fit per motum localem, ut Democritus posuit; sed per hoc quod aliquid reducitur de potentia in actum. | Reply to Objection 3: Quantity does not entirely hinder the corporeal form from action, as stated above; but from being a universal agent, forasmuch as a form is individualized through being in matter subject to quantity. The proof taken from the weight of bodies is not to the purpose. First, because addition of quantity does not cause weight; as is proved (De Coelo et Mundo iv, 2). Secondly, it is false that weight retards movement; on the contrary, the heavier a thing, the greater its movement, if we consider the movement proper thereto. Thirdly, because action is not effected by local movement, as Democritus held: but by something being reduced from potentiality to act. |
| Ad quartum dicendum quod corpus non est id quod maxime distat a Deo, participat enim aliquid de similitudine divini esse, secundum formam quam habet. Sed id quod maxime distat a Deo, est materia prima; quae nullo modo est agens, cum sit in potentia tantum. | Reply to Objection 4: A body is not that which is most distant from God; for it participates something of a likeness to the Divine Being, forasmuch as it has a form. That which is most distant from God is primary matter; which is in no way active, since it is a pure potentiality. |
| Ad quintum dicendum quod corpus agit et ad formam accidentalem, et ad formam substantialem. Qualitas enim activa, ut calor, etsi sit accidens, agit tamen in virtute formae substantialis, sicut eius instrumentum; et ideo potest agere ad formam substantialem; sicut et calor naturalis, inquantum est instrumentum animae, agit ad generationem carnis. Ad accidens vero agit propria virtute. Nec est contra rationem accidentis, quod excedat suum subiectum in agendo, sed quod excedat in essendo, nisi forsan quis imaginetur idem accidens numero defluere ab agente in patiens, sicut Democritus ponebat fieri actionem per defluxum atomorum. | Reply to Objection 5: The term of a body's action is both an accidental form and a substantial form. For the active quality, such as heat, although itself an accident, acts nevertheless by virtue of the substantial form, as its instrument: wherefore its action can terminate in a substantial form; thus natural heat, as the instrument of the soul, has an action terminating in the generation of flesh. But by its own virtue it produces an accident. Nor is it against the nature of an accident to surpass its subject in acting, but it is to surpass it in being; unless indeed one were to imagine that an accident transfers its identical self from the agent to the patient; thus Democritus explained action by an issue of atoms. |
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| Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod in materia corporali non sint aliquae rationes seminales. Ratio enim importat aliquid secundum esse spirituale. Sed in materia corporali non est aliquid spiritualiter, sed materialiter tantum, secundum scilicet modum eius in quo est. Ergo in materia corporali non sunt seminales rationes. | Objection 1: It would seem that there are no seminal virtues in corporeal matter. For virtue [ratio] implies something of a spiritual order. But in corporeal matter nothing exists spiritually, but only materially, that is, according to the mode of that in which it is. Therefore there are no seminal virtues in corporeal matter. |
| Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, III de Trin., quod Daemones quaedam opera faciunt adhibendo occultis motibus quaedam semina, quae in elementis cognoscunt. Sed ea quae per motum localem adhibentur, sunt corpora, non rationes. Ergo inconvenienter dicitur quod sunt in corporali materia seminales rationes. | Objection 2: Further, Augustine (De Trin. iii, 8,9) says that demons produce certain results by employing with a hidden movement certain seeds, which they know to exist in matter. But bodies, not virtues, can be employed with local movement. Therefore it is unreasonable to say that there are seminal virtues in corporeal matter. |
| Praeterea, semen est principium activum. Sed in materia corporali non est aliquod principium activum, cum materiae non competat agere, ut dictum est. Ergo in materia corporali non sunt seminales rationes. | Objection 3: Further, seeds are active principles. But there are no active principles in corporeal matter; since, as we have said above, matter is not competent to act (Article [1], ad 2,4). Therefore there are no seminal virtues in corporeal matter. |
| Praeterea, in materia corporali dicuntur esse quaedam causales rationes, quae videntur sufficere ad rerum productionem. Sed seminales rationes sunt aliae a causalibus, quia praeter seminales rationes fiunt miracula, non autem praeter causales. Ergo inconvenienter dicitur quod seminales rationes sunt in materia corporali. | Objection 4: Further, there are said to be certain "causal virtues" (Augustine, De Gen. ad lit. v, 4) which seem to suffice for the production of things. But seminal virtues are not causal virtues: for miracles are outside the scope of seminal virtues, but not of causal virtues. Therefore it is unreasonable to say that there are seminal virtues in corporeal matter. |
| . | On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 8): "Of all the things which are generated in a corporeal and visible fashion, certain seeds lie hidden in the corporeal things of this world." |
| Respondeo dicendum quod denominationes consueverunt fieri a perfectiori, ut dicitur in II de anima. In tota autem natura corporea perfectiora sunt corpora viva, unde et ipsum nomen naturae translatum est a rebus viventibus ad omnes res naturales. Nam ipsum nomen naturae, ut philosophus dicit in V Metaphys., primo impositum fuit ad significandum generationem viventium, quae nativitas dicitur, et quia viventia generantur ex principio coniuncto, sicut fructus ex arbore, et foetus ex matre, cui colligatur, consequenter tractum est nomen naturae ad omne principium motus quod est in eo quod movetur. Manifestum est autem quod principium activum et passivum generationis rerum viventium sunt semina ex quibus viventia generantur. Et ideo convenienter Augustinus omnes virtutes activas et passivas quae sunt principia generationum et motuum naturalium, seminales rationes vocat. | I answer that, It is customary to name things after what is more perfect, as the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 4). Now in the whole corporeal nature, living bodies are the most perfect: wherefore the word "nature" has been transferred from living things to all natural things. For the word itself, "nature," as the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, Did. iv, 4), was first applied to signify the generation of living things, which is called "nativity": and because living things are generated from a principle united to them, as fruit from a tree, and the offspring from the mother, to whom it is united, consequently the word "nature" has been applied to every principle of movement existing in that which is moved. Now it is manifest that the active and passive principles of the generation of living things are the seeds from which living things are generated. Therefore Augustine fittingly gave the name of "seminal virtues" [seminales rationes] to all those active and passive virtues which are the principles of natural generation and movement. |
| Huiusmodi autem virtutes activae et passivae in multiplici ordine considerari possunt. Nam primo quidem, ut Augustinus dicit VI super Gen. ad Litt., sunt principaliter et originaliter in ipso verbo Dei, secundum rationes ideales. Secundo vero, sunt in elementis mundi, ubi simul a principio productae sunt, sicut in universalibus causis. Tertio vero modo, sunt in iis quae ex universalibus causis secundum successiones temporum producuntur, sicut in hac planta et in hoc animali, tanquam in particularibus causis. Quarto modo, sunt in seminibus quae ex animalibus et plantis producuntur. Quae iterum comparantur ad alios effectus particulares, sicut primordiales causae universales ad primos effectus productos. | These active and passive virtues may be considered in several orders. For in the first place, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. vi, 10), they are principally and originally in the Word of God, as "typal ideas." Secondly, they are in the elements of the world, where they were produced altogether at the beginning, as in "universal causes." Thirdly, they are in those things which, in the succession of time, are produced by universal causes, for instance in this plant, and in that animal, as in "particular causes." Fourthly, they are in the "seeds" produced from animals and plants. And these again are compared to further particular effects, as the primordial universal causes to the first effects produced. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod huiusmodi virtutes activae et passivae rerum naturalium, etsi non possint dici rationes secundum quod sunt in materia corporali; possunt tamen dici rationes per comparationem ad suam originem, secundum quod deducuntur a rationibus idealibus. | Reply to Objection 1: These active and passive virtues of natural things, thought not called "virtues" [rationes] by reason of their being in corporeal matter, can nevertheless be so called in respect of their origin, forasmuch as they are the effect of the typal ideas [rationes ideales]. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod huiusmodi virtutes activae vel passivae sunt in aliquibus partibus corporalibus; quae dum adhibentur per motum localem ad aliquos effectus complendos, dicuntur semina adhiberi per Daemones. | Reply to Objection 2: These active and passive virtues are in certain parts of corporeal things: and when they are employed with local movement for the production of certain results, we speak of the demons as employing seeds. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod semen maris est principium activum in generatione animalis. Sed potest etiam dici semen id quod est ex parte feminae, quod est principium passivum. Et sic sub semine comprehendi possunt vires activae et passivae. | Reply to Objection 3: The seed of the male is the active principle in the generation of an animal. But that can be called seed also which the female contributes as the passive principle. And thus the word "seed" covers both active and passive principles. |
| Ad quartum dicendum quod ex verbis Augustini de huiusmodi rationibus seminalibus loquentis, satis accipi potest quod ipsae rationes seminales sunt etiam rationes causales, sicut et semen est quaedam causa, dicit enim in III de Trin., quod sicut matres gravidae sunt foetibus, sic ipse mundus est gravidus causis nascentium. Sed tamen rationes ideales possunt dici causales, non autem proprie loquendo seminales, quia semen non est principium separatum, et praeter huiusmodi rationes non fiunt miracula. Similiter etiam neque praeter virtutes passivas creaturae inditas, ut ex ea fieri possit quidquid Deus mandaverit. Sed praeter virtutes activas naturales, et potentias passivas quae ordinantur ad huiusmodi virtutes activas, dicuntur fieri miracula, dum dicitur quod fiunt praeter rationes seminales. | Reply to Objection 4: From the words of Augustine when speaking of these seminal virtues, it is easy to gather that they are also causal virtues, just as seed is a kind of cause: for he says (De Trin. iii, 9) that, "as a mother is pregnant with the unborn offspring, so is the world itself pregnant with the causes of unborn things." Nevertheless, the "typal ideas" can be called "causal virtues," but not, strictly speaking, "seminal virtues," because seed is not a separate principle; and because miracles are not wrought outside the scope of causal virtues. Likewise neither are miracles wrought outside the scope of the passive virtues so implanted in the creature, that the latter can be used to any purpose that God commands. But miracles are said to be wrought outside the scope of the natural active virtues, and the passive potentialities which are ordered to such active virtues, and this is what is meant when we say that they are wrought outside the scope of seminal virtues. |
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| Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod corpora caelestia non sint causa eorum quae hic in inferioribus corporibus fiunt. Dicit enim Damascenus, nos autem dicimus quoniam ipsa, scilicet corpora caelestia, non sunt causa alicuius eorum quae fiunt, neque corruptionis eorum quae corrumpuntur, signa autem sunt magis imbrium et aeris transmutationis. | Objection 1: It would seem that the heavenly bodies are not the cause of what is produced in bodies here below. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 7): "We say that they"—namely, the heavenly bodies—"are not the cause of generation or corruption: they are rather signs of storms and atmospheric changes." |
| Praeterea, ad faciendum aliquid, sufficit agens et materia. Sed in istis inferioribus invenitur materia patiens, inveniuntur etiam contraria agentia, scilicet calidum et frigidum et huiusmodi. Ergo non est necessarium, ad causandum ea quae hic inferius fiunt, causalitatem caelestibus corporibus attribuere. | Objection 2: Further, for the production of anything, an agent and matter suffice. But in things here below there is passive matter; and there are contrary agents—heat and cold, and the like. Therefore for the production of things here below, there is no need to ascribe causality to the heavenly bodies. |
| Praeterea, agens agit sibi simile. Sed videmus quod omnia quae fiunt hic inferius, fiunt per hoc quod calefiunt et frigidantur, et humectantur et desiccantur, et aliis huiusmodi qualitatibus alterantur, quae non inveniuntur in corporibus caelestibus. Ergo corpora caelestia non sunt causa eorum quae hic fiunt. | Objection 3: Further, the agent produces its like. Now it is to be observed that everything which is produced here below is produced through the action of heat and cold, moisture and dryness, and other such qualities, which do not exist in heavenly bodies. Therefore the heavenly bodies are not the cause of what is produced here below. |
| Praeterea, sicut Augustinus dicit V de Civ. Dei, nihil est magis corporeum quam corporis sexus. Sed corporis sexus non causatur ex corporibus caelestibus, cuius signum esse videtur, quod duorum geminorum sub una constellatione natorum, unus est masculus et alter est femina. Ergo corpora caelestia non sunt causa rerum corporalium quae hic fiunt. | Objection 4: Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v, 6): "Nothing is more corporeal than sex." But sex is not caused by the heavenly bodies: a sign of this is that of twins born under the same constellation, one may be male, the other female. Therefore the heavenly bodies are not the cause of things produced in bodies here below. |
| Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, III de Trin., quod corpora crassiora et inferiora per subtiliora et potentiora quodam ordine reguntur. Et Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom., quod lumen solis ad generationem sensibilium corporum confert, et ad vitam ipsa movet, et nutrit et auget et perficit. | On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 4): "Bodies of a grosser and inferior nature are ruled in a certain order by those of a more subtle and powerful nature." And Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv) says that "the light of the sun conduces to the generation of sensible bodies, moves them to life, gives them nourishment, growth, and perfection." |
| Respondeo dicendum quod, cum omnis multitudo ab unitate procedat; quod autem immobile est, uno modo se habet, quod vero movetur, multiformiter, considerandum est, in tota natura, quod omnis motus ab immobili procedit. Et ideo quanto aliqua sunt immobiliora, tanto sunt magis causa eorum quae sunt magis mobilia. Corpora autem caelestia sunt inter alia corpora magis immobilia, non enim moventur nisi motu locali. Et ideo motus horum inferiorum corporum qui sunt varii et multiformes, reducuntur in motum corporis caelestis, sicut in causam. | I answer that, Since every multitude proceeds from unity; and since what is immovable is always in the same way of being, whereas what is moved has many ways of being: it must be observed that throughout the whole of nature, all movement proceeds from the immovable. Therefore the more immovable certain things are, the more are they the cause of those things which are most movable. Now the heavenly bodies are of all bodies the most immovable, for they are not moved save locally. Therefore the movements of bodies here below, which are various and multiform, must be referred to the movement of the heavenly bodies, as to their cause. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod dictum Damasceni intelligendum est, quod corpora caelestia non sunt prima causa generationis et corruptionis eorum quae hic fiunt; sicut dicebant illi qui ponebant corpora caelestia esse deos. | Reply to Objection 1: These words of Damascene are to be understood as denying that the heavenly bodies are the first cause of generation and corruption here below; for this was affirmed by those who held that the heavenly bodies are gods. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod principia activa in istis inferioribus corporibus non inveniuntur nisi qualitates activae elementorum, quae sunt calidum et frigidum et huiusmodi. Et si sic esset quod formae substantiales inferiorum corporum non diversificarentur nisi secundum huiusmodi accidentia, quorum principia rarum et densum antiqui naturales posuerunt; non oporteret super haec inferiora corpora aliquod principium activum ponere, sed ipsa sufficerent ad agendum. Sed recte considerantibus apparet quod huiusmodi accidentia se habent sicut materiales dispositiones ad formas substantiales naturalium corporum. Materia autem non sufficit ad agendum. Et ideo oportet super has materiales dispositiones ponere aliquod principium activum. | Reply to Objection 2: The active principles of bodies here below are only the active qualities of the elements, such as hot and cold and the like. If therefore the substantial forms of inferior bodies were not diversified save according to accidents of that kind, the principles of which the early natural philosophers held to be the "rare" and the "dense"; there would be no need to suppose some principle above these inferior bodies, for they would be of themselves sufficient to act. But to anyone who considers the matter aright, it is clear that those accidents are merely material dispositions in regard to the substantial forms of natural bodies. Now matter is not of itself sufficient to act. And therefore it is necessary to suppose some active principle above these material dispositions. |
| Unde Platonici posuerunt species separatas, secundum quarum participationem inferiora corpora substantiales formas consequuntur. Sed hoc non videtur sufficere. Quia species separatae semper eodem modo se haberent, cum ponantur immobiles, et sic sequeretur quod non esset aliqua variatio circa generationem et corruptionem inferiorum corporum; quod patet esse falsum. | This is why the Platonists maintained the existence of separate species, by participation of which the inferior bodies receive their substantial forms. But this does not seem enough. For the separate species, since they are supposed to be immovable, would always have the same mode of being: and consequently there would be no variety in the generation and corruption of inferior bodies: which is clearly false. |
| Unde secundum philosophum, in II de Gen., necesse est ponere aliquod principium activum mobile, quod per sui praesentiam et absentiam causet varietatem circa generationem et corruptionem inferiorum corporum. Et huiusmodi sunt corpora caelestia. Et ideo quidquid in istis inferioribus generat, movet ad speciem sicut instrumentum caelestis corporis; secundum quod dicitur in II Physic., quod homo generat hominem, et sol. | Therefore it is necessary, as the Philosopher says (De Gener. ii, 10), to suppose a movable principle, which by reason of its presence or absence causes variety in the generation and corruption of inferior bodies. Such are the heavenly bodies. Consequently whatever generates here below, moves to the production of the species, as the instrument of a heavenly body: thus the Philosopher says (Phys. ii, 2) that "man and the sun generate man." |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod corpora caelestia inferioribus corporibus non sunt similia similitudine speciei; sed inquantum sua universali virtute continent in se quidquid in inferioribus corporibus generatur; secundum quem modum dicimus etiam omnia esse Deo similia. | Reply to Objection 3: The heavenly bodies have not a specific likeness to the bodies here below. Their likeness consists in this, that by reason of their universal power, whatever is generated in inferior bodies, is contained in them. In this way also we say that all things are like God. |
| Ad quartum dicendum quod actiones corporum caelestium diversimode recipiuntur in inferioribus corporibus secundum diversam materiae dispositionem. Contingit autem quandoque quod materia conceptus humani non est disposita totaliter ad masculinum sexum; unde partim formatur in masculum, partim in feminam. Unde ad hoc introducitur ab Augustino, ad repellendum scilicet divinationem quae fit per astra, quia effectus astrorum variantur etiam in rebus corporeis, secundum diversam materiae dispositionem. | Reply to Objection 4: The actions of heavenly bodies are variously received in inferior bodies, according to the various dispositions of matter. Now it happens at times that the matter in the human conception is not wholly disposed to the male sex; wherefore it is formed sometimes into a male, sometimes into a female. Augustine quotes this as an argument against divination by stars: because the effects of the stars are varied even in corporeal things, according to the various dispositions of matter. |
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| Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod corpora caelestia sint causa humanorum actuum. Corpora enim caelestia, cum moveantur a spiritualibus substantiis, sicut supra dictum est, agunt in virtute earum quasi instrumenta. Sed illae substantiae spirituales sunt superiores animabus nostris. Ergo videtur quod possint imprimere in animas nostras, et sic causare actus humanos. | Objection 1: It would seem that the heavenly bodies are the cause of human actions. For since the heavenly bodies are moved by spiritual substances, as stated above (Question [110], Article [3]), they act by virtue thereof as their instruments. But those spiritual substances are superior to our souls. Therefore it seems that they can cause impressions on our souls, and thereby cause human actions. |
| Praeterea, omne multiforme reducitur in aliquod uniforme principium. Sed actus humani sunt varii et multiformes. Ergo videtur quod reducantur in uniformes motus caelestium corporum, sicut in sua principia. | Objection 2: Further, every multiform is reducible to a uniform principle. But human actions are various and multiform. Therefore it seems that they are reducible to the uniform movements of heavenly bodies, as to their principles. |
| Praeterea, astrologi frequenter vera annuntiant de eventibus bellorum, et aliis humanis actibus, quorum principia sunt intellectus et voluntas. Quod facere non possent secundum caelestia corpora, nisi essent humanorum actuum causa. Sunt ergo corpora caelestia humanorum actuum causa. | Objection 3: Further, astrologers often foretell the truth concerning the outcome of wars, and other human actions, of which the intellect and will are the principles. But they could not do this by means of the heavenly bodies, unless these were the cause of human actions. Therefore the heavenly bodies are the cause of human actions. |
| Sed contra est quod Damascenus dicit, quod corpora caelestia humanorum actuum nequaquam sunt causa. | On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 7) that "the heavenly bodies are by no means the cause of human actions." |
| Respondeo dicendum quod corpora caelestia in corpora quidem imprimunt directe et per se, sicut iam dictum est. In vires autem animae quae sunt actus organorum corporeorum, directe quidem, sed per accidens, quia necesse est huiusmodi actus harum potentiarum impediri secundum impedimenta organorum, sicut oculus turbatus non bene videt. Unde si intellectus et voluntas essent vires corporeis organis alligatae, sicut posuerunt aliqui, dicentes quod intellectus non differt a sensu; ex necessitate sequeretur quod corpora caelestia essent causa electionum et actuum humanorum. Et ex hoc sequeretur quod homo naturali instinctu ageretur ad suas actiones, sicut cetera animalia, in quibus non sunt nisi vires animae corporeis organis alligatae, nam illud quod fit in istis inferioribus ex impressione corporum caelestium, naturaliter agitur. Et ita sequeretur quod homo non esset liberi arbitrii, sed haberet actiones determinatas, sicut et ceterae res naturales. Quae manifeste sunt falsa, et conversationi humanae contraria. Sciendum est tamen quod indirecte et per accidens impressiones corporum caelestium ad intellectum et voluntatem pertingere possunt; inquantum scilicet tam intellectus quam voluntas aliquo modo ab inferioribus viribus accipiunt, quae organis corporeis alligantur. Sed circa hoc diversimode se habent intellectus et voluntas. Nam intellectus ex necessitate accipit ab inferioribus viribus apprehensivis, unde turbata vi imaginativa vel cogitativa vel memorativa, ex necessitate turbatur actio intellectus. Sed voluntas non ex necessitate sequitur inclinationem appetitus inferioris, licet enim passiones quae sunt in irascibili et concupiscibili, habeant quandam vim ad inclinandam voluntatem; tamen in potestate voluntatis remanet sequi passiones, vel eas refutare. Et ideo impressio caelestium corporum, secundum quam immutari possunt inferiores vires, minus pertingit ad voluntatem, quae est proxima causa humanorum actuum, quam ad intellectum. | I answer that, The heavenly bodies can directly and of themselves act on bodies, as stated above (Article [3]). They can act directly indeed on those powers of the soul which are the acts of corporeal organs, but accidentally: because the acts of such powers must needs be hindered by obstacles in the organs; thus an eye when disturbed cannot see well. Wherefore if the intellect and will were powers affixed to corporeal organs, as some maintained, holding that intellect does not differ from sense; it would follow of necessity that the heavenly bodies are the cause of human choice and action. It would also follow that man is led by natural instinct to his actions, just as other animals, in which there are powers other than those which are affixed to corporeal organs: for whatever is done here below in virtue of the action of heavenly bodies, is done naturally. It would therefore follow that man has no free-will, and that he would have determinate actions, like other natural things. All of which is manifestly false, and contrary to human habit. It must be observed, however, that indirectly and accidentally, the impressions of heavenly bodies can reach the intellect and will, forasmuch, namely, as both intellect and will receive something from the inferior powers which are affixed to corporeal organs. But in this the intellect and will are differently situated. For the intellect, of necessity, receives from the inferior apprehensive powers: wherefore if the imaginative, cogitative, or memorative powers be disturbed, the action of the intellect is, of necessity, disturbed also. The will, on the contrary, does not, of necessity, follow the inclination of the inferior appetite; for although the passions in the irascible and concupiscible have a certain force in inclining the will; nevertheless the will retains the power of following the passions or repressing them. Therefore the impressions of the heavenly bodies, by virtue of which the inferior powers can be changed, has less influence on the will, which is the proximate cause of human actions, than on the intellect. |
| Ponere igitur caelestia corpora esse causam humanorum actuum, est proprium illorum qui dicunt intellectum non differre a sensu. Unde quidam eorum dicebant quod talis est voluntas in hominibus, qualem in diem inducit pater virorum deorumque. Quia ergo constat intellectum et voluntatem non esse actus organorum corporeorum, impossibile est quod corpora caelestia sint causa humanorum actuum. | To maintain therefore that heavenly bodies are the cause of human actions is proper to those who hold that intellect does not differ from sense. Wherefore some of these said that "such is the will of men, as is the day which the father of men and of gods brings on" (Odyssey xviii 135). Since, therefore, it is manifest that intellect and will are not acts of corporeal organs, it is impossible that heavenly bodies be the cause of human actions. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod spirituales substantiae quae caelestia corpora movent, in corporalia quidem agunt mediantibus caelestibus corporibus, sed in intellectum humanum agunt immediate illuminando. Voluntatem autem immutare non possunt, ut supra habitum est. | Reply to Objection 1: The spiritual substances, that move the heavenly bodies, do indeed act on corporeal things by means of the heavenly bodies; but they act immediately on the human intellect by enlightening it. On the other hand, they cannot compel the will, as stated above (Question [111], Article [2]). |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut multiformitas corporalium motuum reducitur sicut in causam in uniformitatem motuum caelestium; ita multiformitas actuum qui sunt ab intellectu et voluntate, reducitur in principium uniforme quod est intellectus et voluntas divina. | Reply to Objection 2: Just as the multiformity of corporeal movements is reducible to the uniformity of the heavenly movement as to its cause: so the multiformity of actions proceeding from the intellect and the will is reduced to a uniform principle which is the Divine intellect and will. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod plures hominum sequuntur passiones, quae sunt motus sensitivi appetitus, ad quas cooperari possunt corpora caelestia, pauci autem sunt sapientes, qui huiusmodi passionibus resistant. Et ideo astrologi ut in pluribus vera possunt praedicere, et maxime in communi. Non autem in speciali, quia nihil prohibet aliquem hominem per liberum arbitrium passionibus resistere. Unde et ipsi astrologi dicunt quod sapiens homo dominatur astris, inquantum scilicet dominatur suis passionibus. | Reply to Objection 3: The majority of men follow their passions, which are movements of the sensitive appetite, in which movements of the heavenly bodies can cooperate: but few are wise enough to resist these passions. Consequently astrologers are able to foretell the truth in the majority of cases, especially in a general way. But not in particular cases; for nothing prevents man resisting his passions by his free-will. Wherefore the astrologers themselves are wont to say that "the wise man is stronger than the stars" [*Ptolemy, Centiloquium, prop. 5], forasmuch as, to wit, he conquers his passions. |
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| Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod corpora caelestia possint imprimere in ipsos Daemones. Daemones enim secundum certa augmenta lunae aliquos homines vexant, qui et propter hoc lunatici dicuntur; ut patet Matth. IV et XVII. Sed hoc non esset, nisi corporibus caelestibus subiacerent. Ergo Daemones subiacent actionibus caelestium corporum. | Objection 1: It would seem that heavenly bodies can act on the demons. For the demons, according to certain phases of the moon, can harass men, who on that account are called lunatics, as appears from Mt. 4:24 and 17:14. But this would not be if they were not subject to the heavenly bodies. Therefore the demons are subject to them. |
| Praeterea, necromantici observant certas constellationes ad invocandos Daemones. Non autem per corpora caelestia invocarentur, si non eis subiacerent. Ergo Daemones subiacent actionibus caelestium corporum. | Objection 2: Further, necromancers observe certain constellations in order to invoke the demons. But these would not be invoked through the heavenly bodies unless they were subject to them. Therefore they are subject to them. |
| Praeterea, corpora caelestia virtuosiora sunt quam corpora inferiora. Sed quibusdam inferioribus corporibus Daemones arcentur, scilicet herbis et lapidibus et animantibus, et quibusdam sonis certis ac vocibus, et figurationibus atque figmentis, ut a Porphyrio dictum Augustinus introducit in X de Civ. Dei. Ergo multo magis Daemones subduntur actioni caelestium corporum. | Objection 3: Further, heavenly bodies are more powerful than inferior bodies. But the demons are confined to certain inferior bodies, namely, "herbs, stones, animals, and to certain sounds and words, forms and figures," as Porphyry says, quoted by Augustine (De Civ. Dei x, 11). Much more therefore are the demons subject to the action of heavenly bodies. |
| Sed contra est quod Daemones sunt superiores ordine naturae quam corpora caelestia. Agens autem est superius patiente, ut Augustinus dicit XII super Gen. ad Litt. Ergo Daemones non subiiciuntur actioni corporum caelestium. | On the contrary, The demons are superior in the order of nature, to the heavenly bodies. But the "agent is superior to the patient," as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 16). Therefore the demons are not subject to the action of heavenly bodies. |
| Respondeo dicendum quod circa Daemones fuit triplex opinio. Prima Peripateticorum, qui posuerunt Daemones non esse; sed ea quae attribuuntur Daemonibus, secundum artem necromanticam, fiunt virtute caelestium corporum. Et hoc est quod Augustinus, X de Civ. Dei, introducit dictum a Porphyrio, quod fabricantur in terra ab hominibus potestates idoneae siderum variis effectibus exequendis. Sed haec positio est manifeste falsa. Experimento enim scitur multa per Daemones fieri, ad quae nullo modo virtus caelestium corporum sufficeret; puta quod arreptitii loquuntur lingua ignota, quod recitant versus et auctoritates quas nunquam sciverunt, quod necromantici faciunt statuas loqui et moveri, et similia. | I answer that, There have been three opinions about the demons. In the first place the Peripatetics denied the existence of demons; and held that what is ascribed to the demons, according to the necromantic art, is effected by the power of the heavenly bodies. This is what Augustine (De Civ. Dei x, 11) relates as having been held by Porphyry, namely, that "on earth men fabricate certain powers useful in producing certain effects of the stars." But this opinion is manifestly false. For we know by experience that many things are done by demons, for which the power of heavenly bodies would in no way suffice: for instance, that a man in a state of delirium should speak an unknown tongue, recite poetry and authors of whom he has no previous knowledge; that necromancers make statues to speak and move, and other like things. |
| Ex quibus Platonici moti fuerunt ut ponerent Daemones esse animalia corpore aerea, animo passiva; ut ab Apuleio dictum Augustinus introducit VIII de Civ. Dei. Et haec est secunda opinio, secundum quam dici posset quod Daemones hoc modo subduntur corporibus caelestibus, sicut et de hominibus dictum est. Sed haec opinio ex superioribus patet esse falsa, dicimus enim Daemones esse substantias intellectuales corporibus non unitas. Unde patet quod non subduntur actioni caelestium corporum, nec per se nec per accidens, nec directe nec indirecte. | For this reason the Platonists were led to hold that demons are "animals with an aerial body and a passive soul," as Apuleius says, quoted by Augustine (De Civ. Dei viii, 16). And this is the second of the opinions mentioned above: according to which it could be said that demons are subject to heavenly bodies in the same way as we have said man is subject thereto (Article [4]). But this opinion is proved to be false from what we have said above (Question [51], Article [1]): for we hold that demons are spiritual substances not united to bodies. Hence it is clear that they are subject to the action of heavenly bodies neither essentially nor accidentally, neither directly nor indirectly. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod hoc quod Daemones secundum certa augmenta lunae homines vexant, contingit propter duo. Primo quidem, ad hoc quod infament creaturam Dei, scilicet lunam, ut Hieronymus et Chrysostomus dicunt. Secundo quia, cum non possint operari nisi mediantibus naturalibus virtutibus, ut supra dictum est; in suis operibus considerant corporum aptitudines ad effectus intentos. Manifestum est autem quod cerebrum humidissimum est omnium partium corporis, ut Aristoteles dicit, et ideo maxime subiicitur operationi lunae, quae ex sua proprietate habet movere humorem. In cerebro autem perficiuntur vires animales, et ideo Daemones secundum certa augmenta lunae perturbant hominis phantasiam, quando considerant cerebrum ad hoc esse dispositum. | Reply to Objection 1: That demons harass men, according to certain phases of the moon, happens in two ways. Firstly, they do so in order to "defame God's creature," namely, the moon; as Jerome (In Matt. iv, 24) and Chrysostom (Hom. lvii in Matt.) say. Secondly, because as they are unable to effect anything save by means of the natural forces, as stated above (Question [114], Article [4], ad 2) they take into account the aptitude of bodies for the intended result. Now it is manifest that "the brain is the most moist of all the parts of the body," as Aristotle says [*De Part. Animal. ii, 7: De Sens. et Sensato ii: De Somn. et Vigil. iii]: wherefore it is the most subject to the action of the moon, the property of which is to move what is moist. And it is precisely in the brain that animal forces culminate: wherefore the demons, according to certain phases of the moon, disturb man's imagination, when they observe that the brain is thereto disposed. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod Daemones advocati in certis constellationibus, propter duo veniunt. Primo quidem, ut homines in hunc errorem inducant, quod credant aliquod numen esse in stellis. Secundo, quia considerant secundum aliquas certas constellationes materiam corporalem magis esse dispositam ad effectus pro quibus advocantur. | Reply to Objection 2: Demons when summoned through certain constellations, come for two reasons. Firstly, in order to lead man into the error of believing that there is some Divine power in the stars. Secondly, because they consider that under certain constellations corporeal matter is better disposed for the result for which they are summoned. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit XXI de Civ. Dei, Daemones alliciuntur per varia genera lapidum, herbarum, lignorum, animalium, carminum, rituum, non ut animalia cibis, sed ut spiritus signis; inquantum scilicet haec eis exhibentur in signum divini honoris, cuius ipsi sunt cupidi. | Reply to Objection 3: As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxi, 6), the "demons are enticed through various kinds of stones, herbs, trees, animals, songs, rites, not as an animal is enticed by food, but as a spirit by signs"; that is to say, forasmuch as these things are offered to them in token of the honor due to God, of which they are covetous. |
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| Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod corpora caelestia imponant necessitatem iis quae eorum actioni subduntur. Causa enim sufficienti posita, necesse est effectum poni. Sed corpora caelestia sunt sufficiens causa suorum effectuum. Cum igitur corpora caelestia, cum suis motibus et dispositionibus, ponantur sicut ex necessitate entia; videtur quod effectus eorum ex necessitate consequantur. | Objection 1: It would seem that heavenly bodies impose necessity on things subject to their action. For given a sufficient cause, the effect follows of necessity. But heavenly bodies are a sufficient cause of their effects. Since, therefore, heavenly bodies, with their movements and dispositions, are necessary beings; it seems that their effects follow of necessity. |
| Praeterea, effectus agentis ex necessitate sequitur in materia, quando virtus agentis tanta fuerit quod possit sibi subiicere totaliter materiam. Sed tota materia inferiorum corporum subiicitur virtuti caelestium corporum, tanquam excellentiori. Ergo ex necessitate effectus caelestium corporum recipitur in materia corporali. | Objection 2: Further, an agent's effect results of necessity in matter, when the power of the agent is such that it can subject the matter to itself entirely. But the entire matter of inferior bodies is subject to the power of heavenly bodies, since this is a higher power than theirs. Therefore the effect of the heavenly bodies is of necessity received in corporeal matter. |
| Praeterea, si effectus caelestis corporis non ex necessitate proveniat, hoc est propter aliquam causam impedientem. Sed quamlibet causam corpoream quae impedire posset effectum caelestis corporis, necesse est reduci in aliquod caeleste principium, cum caelestia corpora sint causa omnium quae hic fiunt. Ergo, cum et illud caeleste principium sit necessarium, sequitur quod necesse sit impediri effectum alterius corporis caelestis. Et sic omnia quae hic contingunt, ex necessitate eveniunt. | Objection 3: Further, if the effect of the heavenly body does not follow of necessity, this is due to some hindering cause. But any corporeal cause, that might possibly hinder the effect of a heavenly body, must of necessity be reducible to some heavenly principle: since the heavenly bodies are the causes of all that takes place here below. Therefore, since also that heavenly principle is necessary, it follows that the effect of the heavenly body is necessarily hindered. Consequently it would follow that all that takes place here below happens of necessity. |
| Sed contra est quod philosophus dicit, in libro de Somn. et Vigil., quod neque eorum quae in corporibus sunt signorum caelestium, velut aquarum et ventorum, inconveniens est multa non evenire. Sic ergo non omnes effectus caelestium corporum ex necessitate eveniunt. | On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Somn. et Vigil. [*De Divin. per Somn. ii]): "It is not incongruous that many of the signs observed in bodies, of occurrences in the heavens, such as rain and wind, should not be fulfilled." Therefore not all the effects of heavenly bodies take place of necessity. |
| Respondeo dicendum quod ista quaestio partim quidem absoluta est, secundum praemissa; partim autem difficultatem habet. Ostensum enim est quod, quamvis ex impressione corporum caelestium fiant aliquae inclinationes in natura corporali, voluntas tamen non ex necessitate sequitur has inclinationes. Et ideo nihil prohibet per voluntariam actionem impediri effectum caelestium corporum, non solum in ipso homine, sed etiam in aliis rebus ad quas hominum operatio se extendit. | I answer that, This question is partly solved by what was said above (Article [4]); and in part presents some difficulty. For it was shown that although the action of heavenly bodies produces certain inclinations in corporeal nature, the will nevertheless does not of necessity follow these inclinations. Therefore there is nothing to prevent the effect of heavenly bodies being hindered by the action of the will, not only in man himself, but also in other things to which human action extends. |
| Sed nullum tale principium invenitur in rebus naturalibus, quod habeat libertatem sequendi vel non sequendi impressiones caelestes. Unde videtur quod in talibus, ad minus, omnia ex necessitate proveniant, secundum antiquam quorundam rationem, qui, supponentes omne quod est causam habere, et quod, posita causa, ex necessitate ponitur effectus, concludebant, quod omnia ex necessitate contingant. Quam quidem opinionem repellit Aristoteles in VI Metaphys., secundum duo quae ipsi supponunt. Primo enim, non est verum quod, posita quacumque causa, necesse sit effectum poni. | But in natural things there is no such principle, endowed with freedom to follow or not to follow the impressions produced by heavenly agents. Wherefore it seems that in such things at least, everything happens of necessity; according to the reasoning of some of the ancients who supposing that everything that is, has a cause; and that, given the cause, the effect follows of necessity; concluded that all things happen of necessity. This opinion is refuted by Aristotle (Metaph. vi, Did. v, 3) as to this double supposition. |
| Sunt enim quaedam causae quae ordinantur ad suos effectus non ex necessitate, sed ut in pluribus, quae quandoque deficiunt in minori parte. Sed quia huiusmodi causae non deficiunt in minori parte, nisi propter aliquam causam impedientem, videtur adhuc praedictum inconveniens non vitari, quia et ipsum impedimentum talis causae ex necessitate contingit. | For in the first place it is not true that, given any cause whatever, the effect must follow of necessity. For some causes are so ordered to their effects, as to produce them, not of necessity, but in the majority of cases, and in the minority to fail in producing them. But that such cases do fail in the minority of cases is due to some hindering cause; consequently the above-mentioned difficulty seems not to be avoided, since the cause in question is hindered of necessity. |
| Et ideo, secundo, oportet dicere quod omne quod est per se, habet causam, quod autem est per accidens, non habet causam, quia non est vere ens, cum non sit vere unum. Album enim causam habet, similiter et musicum; sed album musicum non habet causam, quia non est vere ens, neque vere unum. Manifestum est autem quod causa impediens actionem alicuius causae ordinatae ad suum effectum ut in pluribus, concurrit ei interdum per accidens, unde talis concursus non habet causam, inquantum est per accidens. Et propter hoc, id quod ex tali concursu sequitur, non reducitur in aliquam causam praeexistentem, ex qua ex necessitate sequatur. Sicut quod aliquod corpus terrestre ignitum in superiori parte aeris generetur et deorsum cadat, habet causam aliquam virtutem caelestem, et similiter etiam quod in superficie terrae sit aliqua materia combustibilis, potest reduci in aliquod caeleste principium. Sed quod ignis cadens huic materiae occurrat et comburat eam, non habet causam aliquod caeleste corpus, sed est per accidens. Et sic patet quod non omnes effectus caelestium corporum sunt ex necessitate. | Therefore we must say, in the second place, that everything that is a being "per se," has a cause; but what is accidentally, has not a cause, because it is not truly a being, since it is not truly one. For (that a thing is) "white" has a cause, likewise (that a man is) "musical" has not a cause, but (that a being is) "white-musical" has not a cause, because it is not truly a being, nor truly one. Now it is manifest that a cause which hinders the action of a cause so ordered to its effect as to produce it in the majority of cases, clashes sometimes with this cause by accident: and the clashing of these two causes, inasmuch as it is accidental, has no cause. Consequently what results from this clashing of causes is not to be reduced to a further pre-existing cause, from which it follows of necessity. For instance, that some terrestrial body take fire in the higher regions of the air and fall to the earth, is caused by some heavenly power: again, that there be on the surface of the earth some combustible matter, is reducible to some heavenly principle. But that the burning body should alight on this matter and set fire to it, is not caused by a heavenly body, but is accidental. Consequently not all the effects of heavenly bodies result of necessity. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod corpora caelestia sunt causa inferiorum effectuum mediantibus causis particularibus inferioribus, quae deficere possunt in minori parte. | Reply to Objection 1: The heavenly bodies are causes of effects that take place here below, through the means of particular inferior causes, which can fail in their effects in the minority of cases. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod virtus corporis caelestis non est infinita. Unde requirit determinatam dispositionem in materia ad inducendum suum effectum, et quantum ad distantiam loci, et quantum ad alias conditiones. Et ideo sicut distantia loci impedit effectum caelestis corporis (non enim sol eundem caloris effectum habet in Dacia, quem habet in Aethiopia); ita et grossities materiae, vel frigiditas aut caliditas, aut alia huiusmodi dispositio, impedire potest effectum corporis caelestis. | Reply to Objection 2: The power of a heavenly body is not infinite. Wherefore it requires a determinate disposition in matter, both as to local distance and as to other conditions, in order to produce its effect. Therefore as local distance hinders the effect of a heavenly body (for the sun has not the same effect in heat in Dacia as in Ethiopia); so the grossness of matter, its low or high temperature or other such disposition, can hinder the effect of a heavenly body. |
| [33287] I q. 115 a. 6 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod licet causa impediens effectum alterius causae, reducatur in aliquod caeleste corpus sicut in causam; tamen concursus duarum causarum, cum sit per accidens, non reducitur in causam caelestem, ut dictum est. | Reply to Objection 3: Although the cause that hinders the effect of another cause can be reduced to a heavenly body as its cause; nevertheless the clashing of two causes, being accidental, is not reduced to the causality of a heavenly body, as stated above. |