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Deinde considerandum est de effectu passionis Christi.
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Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod passio Christi non causaverit nostram salutem per modum meriti. Passionum enim principia non sunt in nobis. Nullus autem meretur vel laudatur nisi per id cuius principium est in ipso. Ergo passio Christi nihil est operata per modum meriti. | Objection 1: It would seem that Christ's Passion did not bring about our salvation by way of merit. For the sources of our sufferings are not within us. But no one merits or is praised except for that whose principle lies within him. Therefore Christ's Passion wrought nothing by way of merit. |
Praeterea, Christus ab initio suae conceptionis meruit et sibi et nobis, ut supra dictum est. Sed superfluum est iterum mereri id quod alias meruerat. Ergo Christus per suam passionem non meruit nostram salutem. | Objection 2: Further, from the beginning of His conception Christ merited for Himself and for us, as stated above (Question [9], Article [4]; Question [34], Article [3]). But it is superfluous to merit over again what has been merited before. Therefore by His Passion Christ did not merit our salvation. |
Praeterea, radix merendi est caritas. Sed caritas Christi non fuit magis augmentata in passione quam ante. Ergo non magis meruit salutem nostram patiendo quam ante fecerat. | Objection 3: Further, the source of merit is charity. But Christ's charity was not made greater by the Passion than it was before. Therefore He did not merit our salvation by suffering more than He had already. |
Sed contra est quod, super illud Philipp. II, propter quod et Deus exaltavit illum etc., dicit Augustinus, humilitas passionis claritatis est meritum, claritas humilitatis est praemium. Sed ipse clarificatus est non solum in seipso, sed etiam in suis fidelibus, ut ipse dicit, Ioan. XVII. Ergo videtur quod ipse meruit salutem suorum fidelium. | On the contrary, on the words of Phil. 2:9, "Therefore God exalted Him," etc., Augustine says (Tract. civ in Joan.): "The lowliness" of the Passion "merited glory; glory was the reward of lowliness." But He was glorified, not merely in Himself, but likewise in His faithful ones, as He says Himself (Jn. 17:10). Therefore it appears that He merited the salvation of the faithful. |
Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, Christo data est gratia non solum sicut singulari personae, sed inquantum est caput Ecclesiae, ut scilicet ab ipso redundaret ad membra. Et ideo opera Christi hoc modo se habent tam ad se quam ad sua membra, sicut se habent opera alterius hominis in gratia constituti ad ipsum. Manifestum est autem quod quicumque in gratia constitutus propter iustitiam patitur, ex hoc ipso meretur sibi salutem, secundum illud Matth. V, beati qui persecutionem patiuntur propter iustitiam. Unde Christus non solum per suam passionem sibi, sed etiam omnibus suis membris meruit salutem. | I answer that, As stated above (Question [7], Articles [1],9; Question [8], Articles [1],5), grace was bestowed upon Christ, not only as an individual, but inasmuch as He is the Head of the Church, so that it might overflow into His members; and therefore Christ's works are referred to Himself and to His members in the same way as the works of any other man in a state of grace are referred to himself. But it is evident that whosoever suffers for justice's sake, provided that he be in a state of grace, merits his salvation thereby, according to Mt. 5:10: "Blessed are they that suffer persecution for justice's sake." Consequently Christ by His Passion merited salvation, not only for Himself, but likewise for all His members. |
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod passio inquantum huiusmodi, habet principium ab exteriori. Sed secundum quod eam aliquis voluntarie sustinet, habet principium ab interiori. | Reply to Objection 1: Suffering, as such, is caused by an outward principle: but inasmuch as one bears it willingly, it has an inward principle. |
Ad secundum dicendum quod Christus a principio suae conceptionis meruit nobis salutem aeternam, sed ex parte nostra erant impedimenta quaedam, quibus impediebamur consequi effectum praecedentium meritorum. Unde, ad removendum illa impedimenta, oportuit Christum pati, ut supra dictum est. | Reply to Objection 2: From the beginning of His conception Christ merited our eternal salvation; but on our side there were some obstacles, whereby we were hindered from securing the effect of His preceding merits: consequently, in order to remove such hindrances, "it was necessary for Christ to suffer," as stated above (Question [46], Article [3]). |
Ad tertium dicendum quod passio Christi habuit aliquem effectum quem non habuerunt praecedentia merita, non propter maiorem caritatem, sed propter genus operis, quod erat conveniens tali effectui, ut patet ex rationibus supra inductis de convenientia passionis Christi. | Reply to Objection 3: Christ's Passion has a special effect, which His preceding merits did not possess, not on account of greater charity, but because of the nature of the work, which was suitable for such an effect, as is clear from the arguments brought forward above all the fittingness of Christ's Passion (Question [46], Articles, 3,4). |
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Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod passio Christi non causaverit nostram salutem per modum satisfactionis. Eiusdem enim videtur esse satisfacere cuius est peccare, sicut patet in aliis poenitentiae partibus; eiusdem enim est conteri et confiteri cuius est peccare. Sed Christus non peccavit, secundum illud I Pet. II, qui peccatum non fecit. Ergo ipse non satisfecit propria passione. | Objection 1: It would seem that Christ's Passion did not bring about our salvation by way of atonement. For it seems that to make the atonement devolves on him who commits the sin; as is clear in the other parts of penance, because he who has done the wrong must grieve over it and confess it. But Christ never sinned, according to 1 Pt. 2:22: "Who did no sin." Therefore He made no atonement by His personal suffering. |
Praeterea, nulli satisfit per maiorem offensam. Sed maxima offensa fuit perpetrata in Christi passione, quia gravissime peccaverunt qui eum occiderunt, ut supra dictum est. Ergo videtur quod per passionem Christi non potuit Deo satisfieri. | Objection 2: Further, no atonement is made to another by committing a graver offense. But in Christ's Passion the gravest of all offenses was perpetrated, because those who slew Him sinned most grievously, as stated above (Question [47], Article [6]). Consequently it seems that atonement could not be made to God by Christ's Passion. |
Praeterea, satisfactio importat aequalitatem quandam ad culpam, cum sit actus iustitiae. Sed passio Christi non videtur esse aequalis omnibus peccatis humani generis, quia Christus non est passus secundum divinitatem, sed secundum carnem, secundum illud I Pet. IV, Christo igitur passo in carne; anima autem, in qua est peccatum, potior est quam caro. Non ergo Christus sua passione satisfecit pro peccatis nostris. | Objection 3: Further, atonement implies equality with the trespass, since it is an act of justice. But Christ's Passion does not appear equal to all the sins of the human race, because Christ did not suffer in His Godhead, but in His flesh, according to 1 Pt. 4:1: "Christ therefore having suffered in the flesh." Now the soul, which is the subject of sin, is of greater account than the flesh. Therefore Christ did not atone for our sins by His Passion. |
Sed contra est quod ex persona eius dicitur in Psalmo, quae non rapui, tunc exsolvebam. Non autem exsolvit qui perfecte non satisfecit. Ergo videtur quod Christus patiendo satisfecerit perfecte pro peccatis nostris. | On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 68:5) in Christ's person: "Then did I pay that which I took not away." But he has not paid who has not fully atoned. Therefore it appears that Christ by His suffering has fully atoned for our sins. |
Respondeo dicendum quod ille proprie satisfacit pro offensa qui exhibet offenso id quod aeque vel magis diligit quam oderit offensam. Christus autem, ex caritate et obedientia patiendo, maius aliquid Deo exhibuit quam exigeret recompensatio totius offensae humani generis. Primo quidem, propter magnitudinem caritatis ex qua patiebatur. Secundo, propter dignitatem vitae suae, quam pro satisfactione ponebat, quae erat vita Dei et hominis. Tertio, propter generalitatem passionis et magnitudinem doloris assumpti, ut supra dictum est. Et ideo passio Christi non solum sufficiens, sed etiam superabundans satisfactio fuit pro peccatis humani generis, secundum illud I Ioan. II, ipse est propitiatio pro peccatis nostris, non pro nostris autem tantum, sed etiam pro totius mundi. | I answer that, He properly atones for an offense who offers something which the offended one loves equally, or even more than he detested the offense. But by suffering out of love and obedience, Christ gave more to God than was required to compensate for the offense of the whole human race. First of all, because of the exceeding charity from which He suffered; secondly, on account of the dignity of His life which He laid down in atonement, for it was the life of one who was God and man; thirdly, on account of the extent of the Passion, and the greatness of the grief endured, as stated above (Question [46], Article [6]). And therefore Christ's Passion was not only a sufficient but a superabundant atonement for the sins of the human race; according to 1 Jn. 2:2: "He is the propitiation for our sins: and not for ours only, but also for those of the whole world." |
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod caput et membra sunt quasi una persona mystica. Et ideo satisfactio Christi ad omnes fideles pertinet sicut ad sua membra. Inquantum etiam duo homines sunt unum in caritate, unus pro alio satisfacere potest, ut infra patebit. Non autem est similis ratio de confessione et contritione, quia satisfactio consistit in actu exteriori, ad quem assumi possunt instrumenta; inter quae computantur etiam amici. | Reply to Objection 1: The head and members are as one mystic person; and therefore Christ's satisfaction belongs to all the faithful as being His members. Also, in so far as any two men are one in charity, the one can atone for the other as shall be shown later (XP, Question [13], Article [2]). But the same reason does not hold good of confession and contrition, because atonement consists in an outward action, for which helps may be used, among which friends are to be computed. |
Ad secundum dicendum quod maior fuit caritas Christi patientis quam malitia crucifigentium. Et ideo plus potuit Christus satisfacere sua passione quam crucifixores offendere occidendo, in tantum quod passio Christi sufficiens fuit, et superabundans, ad satisfaciendum pro peccatis crucifigentium ipsum. | Reply to Objection 2: Christ's love was greater than His slayers' malice: and therefore the value of His Passion in atoning surpassed the murderous guilt of those who crucified Him: so much so that Christ's suffering was sufficient and superabundant atonement for His murderer's crime. |
Ad tertium dicendum quod dignitas carnis Christi non est aestimanda solum secundum carnis naturam, sed secundum personam assumentem, inquantum scilicet erat caro Dei, ex quo habebat dignitatem infinitam. | Reply to Objection 3: The dignity of Christ's flesh is not to be estimated solely from the nature of flesh, but also from the Person assuming it---namely, inasmuch as it was God's flesh, the result of which was that it was of infinite worth. |
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Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod passio Christi non fuerit operata per modum sacrificii. Veritas enim debet respondere figurae. Sed in sacrificiis veteris legis, quae erant figurae Christi, nunquam offerebatur caro humana, quinimmo haec sacrificia nefanda habebantur, secundum illud Psalmi, effuderunt sanguinem innocentem, sanguinem filiorum suorum et filiarum, quas sacrificaverunt sculptilibus Chanaan. Ergo videtur quod passio Christi sacrificium dici non possit. | Objection 1: It would seem that Christ's Passion did not operate by way of sacrifice. For the truth should correspond with the figure. But human flesh was never offered up in the sacrifices of the Old Law, which were figures of Christ: nay, such sacrifices were reputed as impious, according to Ps. 105:38: "And they shed innocent blood: the blood of their sons and of their daughters, which they sacrificed to the idols of Chanaan." It seems therefore that Christ's Passion cannot be called a sacrifice. |
Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, in X de Civ. Dei, quod sacrificium visibile invisibilis sacrificii sacramentum, idest sacrum signum, est. Sed passio Christi non est signum, sed magis significatum per alia signa. Ergo videtur quod passio Christi non sit sacrificium. | Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei x) that "a visible sacrifice is a sacrament---that is, a sacred sign---of an invisible sacrifice." Now Christ's Passion is not a sign, but rather the thing signified by other signs. Therefore it seems that Christ's Passion is not a sacrifice. |
Praeterea, quicumque offert sacrificium, aliquid sacrum facit, ut ipsum nomen sacrificii demonstrat. Illi autem qui Christum occiderunt, non fecerunt aliquod sacrum, sed magnam malitiam perpetraverunt. Ergo passio Christi magis fuit maleficium quam sacrificium. | Objection 3: Further, whoever offers sacrifice performs some sacred rite, as the very word "sacrifice" shows. But those men who slew Christ did not perform any sacred act, but rather wrought a great wrong. Therefore Christ's Passion was rather a malefice than a sacrifice. |
Sed contra est quod apostolus dicit, Ephes. V, tradidit semetipsum pro nobis oblationem et hostiam Deo in odorem suavitatis. | On the contrary, The Apostle says (Eph. 5:2): "He delivered Himself up for us, an oblation and a sacrifice to God for an odor of sweetness." |
Respondeo dicendum quod sacrificium proprie dicitur aliquid factum in honorem proprie Deo debitum, ad eum placandum. Et inde est quod Augustinus dicit, in X de Civ. Dei, verum sacrificium est omne opus quod agitur ut sancta societate Deo inhaereamus, relatum scilicet ad illum finem boni quo veraciter beati esse possumus. Christus autem, ut ibidem subditur, seipsum obtulit in passione pro nobis, et hoc ipsum opus, quod voluntarie passionem sustinuit, fuit Deo maxime acceptum, utpote ex caritate proveniens. Unde manifestum est quod passio Christi fuit verum sacrificium. Et, sicut ipse postea subdit in eodem libro, huius veri sacrificii multiplicia variaque signa erant sacrificia prisca sanctorum, cum hoc unum per multa figuraretur, tanquam verbis multis res una diceretur, ut sine fastidio multum commendaretur; et, cum quatuor considerentur in omni sacrificio, ut Augustinus dicit in IV de Trin., scilicet cui offeratur, a quo offeratur, quid offeratur, pro quibus offeratur, idem ipse qui unus verusque mediator per sacrificium pacis reconciliat nos Deo, unum cum illo maneret cui offerebat, unum in se faceret pro quibus offerebat, unus ipse esset qui offerebat, et quod offerebat. | I answer that, A sacrifice properly so called is something done for that honor which is properly due to God, in order to appease Him: and hence it is that Augustine says (De Civ. Dei x): "A true sacrifice is every good work done in order that we may cling to God in holy fellowship, yet referred to that consummation of happiness wherein we can be truly blessed." But, as is added in the same place, "Christ offered Himself up for us in the Passion": and this voluntary enduring of the Passion was most acceptable to God, as coming from charity. Therefore it is manifest that Christ's Passion was a true sacrifice. Moreover, as Augustine says farther on in the same book, "the primitive sacrifices of the holy Fathers were many and various signs of this true sacrifice, one being prefigured by many, in the same way as a single concept of thought is expressed in many words, in order to commend it without tediousness": and, as Augustine observe, (De Trin. iv), "since there are four things to be noted in every sacrifice---to wit, to whom it is offered, by whom it is offered, what is offered, and for whom it is offered---that the same one true Mediator reconciling us with God through the peace-sacrifice might continue to be one with Him to whom He offered it, might be one with them for whom He offered it, and might Himself be the offerer and what He offered." |
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, licet veritas respondeat figurae quantum ad aliquid, non tamen quantum ad omnia, quia oportet quod veritas figuram excedat. Et ideo convenienter figura huius sacrificii, quo caro Christi offertur pro nobis, fuit caro, non hominum, sed aliorum animalium significantium carnem Christi. Quae est perfectissimum sacrificium. Primo quidem quia, ex eo quod est humanae naturae caro, congrue pro hominibus offertur, et ab eis sumitur sub sacramento. Secundo quia, ex eo quod erat passibilis et mortalis, apta erat immolationi. Tertio quia, ex hoc quod erat sine peccato, efficax erat ad emundanda peccata. Quarto quia, ex eo quod erat caro ipsius offerentis, erat Deo accepta propter caritatem suam carnem offerentis. Unde Augustinus dicit, in IV de Trin., quid tam congruenter ab hominibus sumeretur quod pro eis offerretur, quam humana caro? Et quid tam aptum huic immolationi quam caro mortalis? Et quid tam mundum pro mundandis vitiis mortalium quam sine contagione carnalis concupiscentiae caro nata in utero et ex utero virginali? Et quid tam grate offerri et suscipi posset quam caro sacrificii nostri, corpus effectum sacerdotis nostri? | Reply to Objection 1: Although the truth answers to the figure in some respects, yet it does not in all, since the truth must go beyond the figure. Therefore the figure of this sacrifice, in which Christ's flesh is offered, was flesh right fittingly, not the flesh of men, but of animals, as denoting Christ's. And this is a most perfect sacrifice. First of all, since being flesh of human nature, it is fittingly offered for men, and is partaken of by them under the Sacrament. Secondly, because being passible and mortal, it was fit for immolation. Thirdly, because, being sinless, it had virtue to cleanse from sins. Fourthly, because, being the offerer's own flesh, it was acceptable to God on account of His charity in offering up His own flesh. Hence it is that Augustine says (De Trin. iv): "What else could be so fittingly partaken of by men, or offered up for men, as human flesh? What else could be so appropriate for this immolation as mortal flesh? What else is there so clean for cleansing mortals as the flesh born in the womb without fleshly concupiscence, and coming from a virginal womb? What could be so favorably offered and accepted as the flesh of our sacrifice, which was made the body of our Priest?" |
Ad secundum dicendum quod Augustinus ibi loquitur de sacrificiis visibilibus figuralibus. Et tamen ipsa passio Christi, licet sit aliquid significatum per alia sacrificia figuralia, est tamen signum alicuius rei observandae a nobis, secundum illud I Pet. IV, Christo igitur passo in carne, et vos eadem cogitatione armamini, quia qui passus est in carne, desiit a peccatis; ut iam non hominum desideriis, sed voluntati Dei, quod reliquum est in carne vivat temporis. | Reply to Objection 2: Augustine is speaking there of visible figurative sacrifices: and even Christ's Passion, although denoted by other figurative sacrifices, is yet a sign of something to be observed by us, according to 1 Pt. 4:1: "Christ therefore, having suffered in the flesh, be you also armed with the same thought: for he that hath suffered in the flesh hath ceased from sins: that now he may live the rest of his time in the flesh, not after the desires of men, but according to the will of God." |
Ad tertium dicendum quod passio Christi ex parte occidentium ipsum fuit maleficium, sed ex parte ipsius ex caritate patientis fuit sacrificium. Unde hoc sacrificium ipse Christus obtulisse dicitur, non autem illi qui eum occiderunt. | Reply to Objection 3: Christ's Passion was indeed a malefice on His slayers' part; but on His own it was the sacrifice of one suffering out of charity. Hence it is Christ who is said to have offered this sacrifice, and not the executioners. |
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Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod passio Christi non fuerit operata nostram salutem per modum redemptionis. Nullus enim emit vel redimit quod suum esse non desiit. Sed homines nunquam desierunt esse Dei, secundum illud Psalmi, domini est terra et plenitudo eius, orbis terrarum et universi qui habitant in eo. Ergo videtur quod Christus non redemerit nos sua passione. | Objection 1: It would seem that Christ's Passion did not effect our salvation by way of redemption. For no one purchases or redeems what never ceased to belong to him. But men never ceased to belong to God according to Ps. 23:1: "The earth is the Lord's and the fulness thereof: the world and all they that dwell therein." Therefore it seems that Christ did not redeem us by His Passion. |
Praeterea, sicut Augustinus dicit, XIII de Trin., Diabolus a Christo iustitia superandus fuit. Sed hoc exigit iustitia, ut ille qui invasit dolose rem alienam, debeat privari, quia fraus et dolus nemini debet patrocinari, ut etiam iura humana dicunt. Cum ergo Diabolus creaturam Dei, scilicet hominem, dolose deceperit et sibi subiugaverit, videtur quod non debuit homo per modum redemptionis ab eius eripi potestate. | Objection 2: Further, as Augustine says (De Trin. xiii): "The devil had to be overthrown by Christ's justice." But justice requires that the man who has treacherously seized another's property shall be deprived of it, because deceit and cunning should not benefit anyone, as even human laws declare. Consequently, since the devil by treachery deceived and subjugated to himself man, who is God's creature, it seems that man ought not to be rescued from his power by way of redemption. |
Praeterea, quicumque emit aut redimit aliquid, pretium solvit ei qui possidebat. Sed Christus non solvit sanguinem suum, qui dicitur esse pretium redemptionis nostrae, Diabolo, qui nos captivos tenebat. Non ergo Christus sua passione nos redemit. | Objection 3: Further, whoever buys or redeems an object pays the price to the holder. But it was not to the devil, who held us in bondage, that Christ paid His blood as the price of our redemption. Therefore Christ did not redeem us by His Passion. |
Sed contra est quod dicitur I Pet. I, non corruptibilibus auro vel argento redempti estis de vana vestra conversatione paternae traditionis, sed pretioso sanguine, quasi agni immaculati et incontaminati, Christi. Et Galat. III dicitur, Christus nos redemit de maledicto legis, factus pro nobis maledictum. Dicitur autem pro nobis factus maledictum, inquantum pro nobis passus est in ligno, ut supra dictum est. Ergo per passionem suam nos redemit. | On the contrary, It is written (1 Pt. 1:18): "You were not redeemed with corruptible things as gold or silver from your vain conversation of the tradition of your fathers: but with the precious blood of Christ, as of a lamb unspotted and undefiled." And (Gal. 3:13): "Christ hath redeemed us from the curse of the law, being made a curse for us." Now He is said to be a curse for us inasmuch as He suffered upon the tree, as stated above (Question [46], Article [4]). Therefore He did redeem us by His Passion. |
Respondeo dicendum quod per peccatum dupliciter homo obligatus erat. Primo quidem, servitute peccati, quia qui facit peccatum, servus est peccati, ut dicitur Ioan. VIII; et II Pet. II, a quo quis superatus est, huic et servus addictus est. Quia igitur Diabolus hominem superaverat inducendo eum ad peccatum, homo servituti Diaboli addictus erat. Secundo, quantum ad reatum poenae, quo homo erat obligatus secundum Dei iustitiam. Et haec est servitus quaedam, ad servitutem enim pertinet quod aliquis patiatur quod non vult, cum liberi hominis sit uti seipso ut vult. | I answer that, Man was held captive on account of sin in two ways: first of all, by the bondage of sin, because (Jn. 8:34): "Whosoever committeth sin is the servant of sin"; and (2 Pt. 2:19): "By whom a man is overcome, of the same also he is the slave." Since, then, the devil had overcome man by inducing him to sin, man was subject to the devil's bondage. Secondly, as to the debt of punishment, to the payment of which man was held fast by God's justice: and this, too, is a kind of bondage, since it savors of bondage for a man to suffer what he does not wish, just as it is the free man's condition to apply himself to what he wills. |
Igitur, quia passio Christi fuit sufficiens et superabundans satisfactio pro peccato et reatu generis humani, eius passio fuit quasi quoddam pretium, per quod liberati sumus ab utraque obligatione. Nam ipsa satisfactio qua quis satisfacit sive pro se sive pro alio, pretium quoddam dicitur quo se redimit a peccato et poena, secundum illud Dan. IV, peccata tua eleemosynis redime. Christus autem satisfecit, non quidem pecuniam dando aut aliquid huiusmodi, sed dando id quod fuit maximum, seipsum, pro nobis. Et ideo passio Christi dicitur esse nostra redemptio. | Since, then, Christ's Passion was a sufficient and a superabundant atonement for the sin and the debt of the human race, it was as a price at the cost of which we were freed from both obligations. For the atonement by which one satisfies for self or another is called the price, by which he ransoms himself or someone else from sin and its penalty, according to Dan. 4:24: "Redeem thou thy sins with alms." Now Christ made satisfaction, not by giving money or anything of the sort, but by bestowing what was of greatest price---Himself---for us. And therefore Christ's Passion is called our redemption. |
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod homo dicitur esse Dei dupliciter. Uno modo, inquantum subiicitur potestati eius. Et hoc modo nunquam homo desiit Dei esse, secundum illud Dan. IV, dominatur excelsus in regno hominum, et cuicumque voluerit, dabit illud. Alio modo, per unionem caritatis ad eum, secundum quod dicitur Rom. VIII, si quis spiritum Christi non habet, hic non est eius. Primo igitur modo, nunquam homo desiit esse Dei. Secundo modo, desiit esse Dei per peccatum. Et ideo, inquantum fuit a peccato liberatus, Christo passo satisfaciente, dicitur per passionem Christi esse redemptus. | Reply to Objection 1: Man is said to belong to God in two ways. First of all, in so far as he comes under God's power: in which way he never ceased to belong to God; according to Dan. 4:22: "The Most High ruleth over the kingdom of men, and giveth it to whomsoever he will." Secondly, by being united to Him in charity, according to Rm. 8:9: "If any man have not the Spirit of Christ, he is none of His." In the first way, then, man never ceased to belong to God, but in the second way he did cease because of sin. And therefore in so far as he was delivered from sin by the satisfaction of Christ's Passion, he is said to be redeemed by the Passion of Christ. |
Ad secundum dicendum quod homo peccando obligatus erat et Deo et Diabolo. Quantum enim ad culpam, Deum offenderat, et Diabolo se subdiderat, ei consentiens. Unde ratione culpae non erat factus servus Dei, sed potius, a Dei servitute recedens, Diaboli servitutem incurrerat, Deo iuste hoc permittente propter offensam in se commissam. Sed quantum ad poenam, principaliter homo erat Deo obligatus, sicut summo iudici, Diabolo autem tanquam tortori, secundum illud Matth. V, ne forte tradat te adversarius tuus iudici, et iudex tradat te ministro, idest Angelo poenarum crudeli, ut Chrysostomus dicit. Quamvis igitur Diabolus iniuste, quantum in ipso erat, hominem, sua fraude deceptum, sub servitute teneret, et quantum ad culpam et quantum ad poenam, iustum tamen erat hoc hominem pati, Deo hoc permittente quantum ad culpam, et ordinante quantum ad poenam. Et ideo per respectum ad Deum iustitia exigebat quod homo redimeretur, non autem per respectum ad Diabolum. | Reply to Objection 2: Man by sinning became the bondsman both of God and of the devil. Through guilt he had offended God, and put himself under the devil by consenting to him; consequently he did not become God's servant on account of his guilt, but rather, by withdrawing from God's service, he, by God's just permission, fell under the devil's servitude on account of the offense perpetrated. But as to the penalty, man was chiefly bound to God as his sovereign judge, and to the devil as his torturer, according to Mt. 5:25: "Lest perhaps the adversary deliver thee to the judge, and the judge deliver thee to the officer"---that is, "to the relentless avenging angel," as Chrysostom says (Hom. xi). Consequently, although, after deceiving man, the devil, so far as in him lay, held him unjustly in bondage as to both sin and penalty, still it was just that man should suffer it. God so permitting it as to the sin and ordaining it as to the penalty. And therefore justice required man's redemption with regard to God, but not with regard to the devil. |
Ad tertium dicendum quod, quia redemptio requirebatur ad hominis liberationem per respectum ad Deum, non autem per respectum ad Diabolum; non erat pretium solvendum Diabolo, sed Deo. Et ideo Christus sanguinem suum, qui est pretium nostrae redemptionis, non dicitur obtulisse Diabolo, sed Deo. | Reply to Objection 3: Because, with regard to God, redemption was necessary for man's deliverance, but not with regard to the devil, the price had to be paid not to the devil, but to God. And therefore Christ is said to have paid the price of our redemption---His own precious blood---not to the devil, but to God. |
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Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod esse redemptorem non sit proprium Christi. Dicitur enim in Psalmo, redemisti me, domine Deus veritatis. Sed esse dominum Deum veritatis convenit toti Trinitati. Non ergo est proprium Christo. | Objection 1: It would seem that it is not proper to Christ to be the Redeemer, because it is written (Ps. 30:6): "Thou hast redeemed me, O Lord, the God of Truth." But to be the Lord God of Truth belongs to the entire Trinity. Therefore it is not proper to Christ. |
Praeterea, ille dicitur redimere qui dat pretium redemptionis. Sed Deus pater dedit filium suum redemptionem pro peccatis nostris, secundum illud Psalmi, redemptionem misit dominus populo suo; Glossa, idest Christum, qui dat redemptionem captivis. Ergo non solum Christus, sed etiam Deus pater nos redemit. | Objection 2: Further, he is said to redeem who pays the price of redemption. But God the Father gave His Son in redemption for our sins, as is written (Ps. 110:9): "The Lord hath sent redemption to His people," upon which the gloss adds, "that is, Christ, who gives redemption to captives." Therefore not only Christ, but the Father also, redeemed us. |
Praeterea, non solum passio Christi, sed etiam aliorum sanctorum, proficua fuit ad nostram salutem, secundum illud Coloss. I, gaudeo in passionibus pro vobis, et adimpleo ea quae desunt passionum Christi in carne mea pro corpore eius, quod est Ecclesia. Ergo non solum Christus debet dici redemptor, sed etiam alii sancti. | Objection 3: Further, not only Christ's Passion, but also that of other saints conduced to our salvation, according to Col. 1:24: "I now rejoice in my sufferings for you, and fill up those things that are wanting of the sufferings of Christ, in my flesh for His body, which is the Church." Therefore the title of Redeemer belongs not only to Christ, but also to the other saints. |
Sed contra est quod dicitur Galat. III, Christus nos redemit de maledicto legis, factus pro nobis maledictum. Sed solus Christus factus est pro nobis maledictum. Ergo solus Christus debet dici noster redemptor. | On the contrary, It is written (Gal. 3:13): "Christ redeemed us from the curse of the Law, being made a curse for us." But only Christ was made a curse for us. Therefore only Christ ought to be called our Redeemer. |
Respondeo dicendum quod ad hoc quod aliquis redimat, duo requiruntur, scilicet actus solutionis, et pretium solutum. Si enim aliquis solvat pro redemptione alicuius rei pretium, si non est suum, sed alterius, non dicitur ipse redimere principaliter, sed magis ille cuius est pretium. Pretium autem redemptionis nostrae est sanguis Christi, vel vita eius corporalis quae est in sanguine, quam ipse Christus exsolvit. Unde utrumque istorum ad Christum pertinet immediate inquantum est homo, sed ad totam Trinitatem sicut ad causam primam et remotam, cuius erat et ipsa vita Christi sicut primi auctoris, et a qua inspiratum fuit ipsi homini Christo ut pateretur pro nobis. Et ideo esse immediate redemptorem est proprium Christi inquantum est homo, quamvis ipsa redemptio possit attribui toti Trinitati sicut primae causae. | I answer that, For someone to redeem, two things are required---namely, the act of paying and the price paid. For if in redeeming something a man pays a price which is not his own, but another's, he is not said to be the chief redeemer, but rather the other is, whose price it is. Now Christ's blood or His bodily life, which "is in the blood," is the price of our redemption (Lev. 17:11,14), and that life He paid. Hence both of these belong immediately to Christ as man; but to the Trinity as to the first and remote cause, to whom Christ's life belonged as to its first author, and from whom Christ received the inspiration of suffering for us. Consequently it is proper to Christ as man to be the Redeemer immediately; although the redemption may be ascribed to the whole Trinity as its first cause. |
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Glossa sic exponit, tu, Deus veritatis, redemisti me in Christo clamante, in manus tuas, domine, commendo spiritum meum. Et sic redemptio immediate pertinet ad hominem Christum, principaliter autem ad Deum. | Reply to Objection 1: A gloss explains the text thus: "Thou, O Lord God of Truth, hast redeemed me in Christ, crying out, 'Lord, into Thy hands I commend my spirit.'" And so redemption belongs immediately to the Man-Christ, but principally to God. |
Ad secundum dicendum quod pretium redemptionis nostrae homo Christus solvit immediate, sed de mandato patris sicut primordialis auctoris. | Reply to Objection 2: The Man-Christ paid the price of our redemption immediately, but at the command of the Father as the original author. |
Ad tertium dicendum quod passiones sanctorum proficiunt Ecclesiae, non quidem per modum redemptionis, sed per modum exhortationis et exempli, secundum illud II Cor. I, sive tribulamur pro vestra exhortatione et salute. | Reply to Objection 3: The sufferings of the saints are beneficial to the Church, as by way, not of redemption, but of example and exhortation, according to 2 Cor. 1:6: "Whether we be in tribulation, it is for your exhortation and salvation." |
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Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod passio Christi non fuerit operata nostram salutem per modum efficientiae. Causa enim efficiens nostrae salutis est magnitudo divinae virtutis, secundum illud Isaiae LIX, ecce, non est abbreviata manus eius, ut salvare non possit. Christus autem crucifixus est ex infirmitate, ut dicitur II Cor. XIII. Non ergo passio Christi efficienter operata est salutem nostram. | Objection 1: It would seem that Christ's Passion did not bring about our salvation efficiently. For the efficient cause of our salvation is the greatness of the Divine power, according to Is. 59:1: "Behold the hand of the Lord is not shortened that it cannot save." But "Christ was crucified through weakness," as it is written (2 Cor. 13:4). Therefore, Christ's Passion did not bring about our salvation efficiently. |
Praeterea, nullum agens corporale efficienter agit nisi per contactum, unde etiam et Christus tangendo mundavit leprosum, ut ostenderet carnem suam salutiferam virtutem habere, sicut Chrysostomus dicit. Sed passio Christi non potuit contingere omnes homines. Ergo non potuit efficienter operari omnium hominum salutem. | Objection 2: Further, no corporeal agency acts efficiently except by contact: hence even Christ cleansed the leper by touching him "in order to show that His flesh had saving power," as Chrysostom [*Theophylact, Enarr. in Luc.] says. But Christ's Passion could not touch all mankind. Therefore it could not efficiently bring about the salvation of all men. |
Praeterea, non videtur eiusdem esse operari per modum meriti, et per modum efficientiae, quia ille qui meretur, expectat effectum ab alio. Sed passio Christi operata est nostram salutem per modum meriti. Non ergo per modum efficientiae. | Objection 3: Further, it does not seem to be consistent for the same agent to operate by way of merit and by way of efficiency, since he who merits awaits the result from someone else. But it was by way of merit that Christ's Passion accomplished our salvation. Therefore it was not by way of efficiency. |
Sed contra est quod dicitur I Cor. I, quod verbum crucis his qui salvi fiunt est virtus Dei. Sed virtus Dei efficienter operatur nostram salutem. Ergo passio Christi in cruce efficienter operata est nostram salutem. | On the contrary, It is written (1 Cor. 1:18) that "the word of the cross to them that are saved . . . is the power of God." But God's power brings about our salvation efficiently. Therefore Christ's Passion on the cross accomplished our salvation efficiently. |
Respondeo dicendum quod duplex est efficiens, principale, et instrumentale. Efficiens quidem principale humanae salutis Deus est. Quia vero humanitas Christi est divinitatis instrumentum, ut supra dictum est, ex consequenti omnes actiones et passiones Christi instrumentaliter operantur, in virtute divinitatis, ad salutem humanam. Et secundum hoc, passio Christi efficienter causat salutem humanam. | I answer that, There is a twofold efficient agency---namely, the principal and the instrumental. Now the principal efficient cause of man's salvation is God. But since Christ's humanity is the "instrument of the Godhead," as stated above (Question [43], Article [2]), therefore all Christ's actions and sufferings operate instrumentally in virtue of His Godhead for the salvation of men. Consequently, then, Christ's Passion accomplishes man's salvation efficiently. |
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod passio Christi, relata ad Christi carnem, congruit infirmitati assumptae, relata vero ad divinitatem, consequitur ex ea infinitam virtutem, secundum illud I Cor. I, quod infirmum est Dei, fortius est hominibus; quia scilicet ipsa infirmitas Christi, inquantum est Dei, habet virtutem excedentem omnem virtutem humanam. | Reply to Objection 1: Christ's Passion in relation to His flesh is consistent with the infirmity which He took upon Himself, but in relation to the Godhead it draws infinite might from It, according to 1 Cor. 1:25: "The weakness of God is stronger than men"; because Christ's weakness, inasmuch as He is God, has a might exceeding all human power. |
Ad secundum dicendum quod passio Christi, licet sit corporalis, habet tamen spiritualem virtutem ex divinitate unita. Et ideo per spiritualem contactum efficaciam sortitur, scilicet per fidem et fidei sacramenta, secundum illud apostoli, quem proposuit propitiatorem per fidem in sanguine eius. | Reply to Objection 2: Christ's Passion, although corporeal, has yet a spiritual effect from the Godhead united: and therefore it secures its efficacy by spiritual contact---namely, by faith and the sacraments of faith, as the Apostle says (Rm. 3:25): "Whom God hath proposed to be a propitiation, through faith in His blood." |
Ad tertium dicendum quod passio Christi, secundum quod comparatur ad divinitatem eius, agit per modum efficientiae; inquantum vero comparatur ad voluntatem animae Christi, agit per modum meriti; secundum vero quod consideratur in ipsa carne Christi, agit per modum satisfactionis, inquantum per eam liberamur a reatu poenae; per modum vero redemptionis, inquantum per eam liberamur a servitute culpae; per modum autem sacrificii, inquantum per eam reconciliamur Deo, ut infra dicetur. | Reply to Objection 3: Christ's Passion, according as it is compared with His Godhead, operates in an efficient manner: but in so far as it is compared with the will of Christ's soul it acts in a meritorious manner: considered as being within Christ's very flesh, it acts by way of satisfaction, inasmuch as we are liberated by it from the debt of punishment; while inasmuch as we are freed from the servitude of guilt, it acts by way of redemption: but in so far as we are reconciled with God it acts by way of sacrifice, as shall be shown farther on (Question [49]). |