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St. Thomas Aquinas

The Summa Theologica

(Benziger Bros. edition, 1947)
Translated by
Fathers of the English Dominican Province

 

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OF CONFESSION, AS REGARDS ITS NECESSITY (SIX ARTICLES)


   We must now consider confession, about which there are six points for our consideration: (1) The necessity of confession; (2) Its nature; (3) Its minister; (4) Its quality; (5) Its effect; (6) The seal of confession.

   Under the first head there are six points of inquiry:

    (1) Whether confession is necessary for salvation?

    (2) Whether confession is according to the natural law?

    (3) Whether all are bound to confession?

    (4) Whether it is lawful to confess a sin of which one is not guilty?

    (5) Whether one is bound to confess at once?

    (6) Whether one can be dispensed from confessing to another man?


 

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Whether confession is necessary for salvation?


  Objection 1: It would seem that confession is not necessary for salvation. For the sacrament of Penance is ordained for the sake of the remission of sin. But sin is sufficiently remitted by the infusion of grace. Therefore confession is not necessary in order to do penance for one's sins.

  Objection 2: Further, we read of some being forgiven their sins without confession, e.g. Peter, Magdalen and Paul. But the grace that remits sins is not less efficacious now than it was then. Therefore neither is it necessary for salvation now that man should confess.

  Objection 3: Further, a sin which is contracted from another, should receive its remedy from another. Therefore actual sin, which a man has committed through his own act, must take its remedy from the man himself. Now Penance is ordained against such sins. Therefore confession is not necessary for salvation.

  Objection 4: Further, confession is necessary for a judicial sentence, in order that punishment may be inflicted in proportion to the offense. Now a man is able to inflict on himself a greater punishment than even that which might be inflicted on him by another. Therefore it seems that confession is not necessary for salvation.

  On the contrary, Boethius says (De Consol. i): "If you want the physician to be of assistance to you, you must make your disease known to him." But it is necessary for salvation that man should take medicine for his sins. Therefore it is necessary for salvation that man should make his disease known by means of confession.

   Further, in a civil court the judge is distinct from the accused. Therefore the sinner who is the accused ought not to be his own judge, but should be judged by another and consequently ought to confess to him.

  I answer that, Christ's Passion, without whose power, neither original nor actual sin is remitted, produces its effect in us through the reception of the sacraments which derive their efficacy from it. Wherefore for the remission of both actual and original sin, a sacrament of the Church is necessary, received either actually, or at least in desire, when a man fails to receive the sacrament actually, through an unavoidable obstacle, and not through contempt. Consequently those sacraments which are ordained as remedies for sin which is incompatible with salvation, are necessary for salvation: and so just as Baptism, whereby original sin is blotted out, is necessary for salvation, so also is the sacrament of Penance. And just as a man through asking to be baptized, submits to the ministers of the Church, to whom the dispensation of that sacrament belongs, even so, by confessing his sin, a man submits to a minister of the Church, that, through the sacrament of Penance dispensed by him, he may receive the pardon of his sins: nor can the minister apply a fitting remedy, unless he be acquainted with the sin, which knowledge he acquires through the penitent's confession. Wherefore confession is necessary for the salvation of a man who has fallen into a mortal actual sin.

  Reply to Objection 1: The infusion of grace suffices for the remission of sin; but after the sin has been forgiven, the sinner still owes a debt of temporal punishment. Moreover, the sacraments of grace are ordained in order that man may receive the infusion of grace, and before he receives them, either actually or in his intention, he does not receive grace. This is evident in the case of Baptism, and applies to Penance likewise. Again, the penitent expiates his temporal punishment by undergoing the shame of confession, by the power of the keys to which he submits, and by the enjoined satisfaction which the priest moderates according to the kind of sins made known to him in confession. Nevertheless the fact that confession is necessary for salvation is not due to its conducing to the satisfaction for sins, because this punishment to which one remains bound after the remission of sin, is temporal, wherefore the way of salvation remains open, without such punishment being expiated in this life: but it is due to its conducing to the remission of sin, as explained above.

  Reply to Objection 2: Although we do not read that they confessed, it may be that they did; for many things were done which were not recorded in writing. Moreover Christ has the power of excellence in the sacraments; so that He could bestow the reality of the sacrament without using the things which belong to the sacrament.

  Reply to Objection 3: The sin that is contracted from another, viz. original sin, can be remedied by an entirely extrinsic cause, as in the case of infants: whereas actual sin, which a man commits of himself, cannot be expiated, without some operation on the part of the sinner. Nevertheless man is not sufficient to expiate his sin by himself, though he was sufficient to sin by himself, because sin is finite on the part of the thing to which it turns, in which respect the sinner returns to self; while, on the part of the aversion, sin derives infinity, in which respect the remission of sin must needs begin from someone else, because "that which is last in order of generation is first in the order of intention" (Ethic. iii). Consequently actual sin also must needs take its remedy from another.

  Reply to Objection 4: Satisfaction would not suffice for the expiation of sin's punishment, by reason of the severity of the punishment which is enjoined in satisfaction, but it does suffice as being a part of the sacrament having the sacramental power; wherefore it ought to be imposed by the dispensers of the sacraments, and consequently confession is necessary.


 

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Whether confession is according to the natural law?


  Objection 1: It would seem that confession is according to the natural law. For Adam and Cain were bound to none but the precepts of the natural law, and yet they are reproached for not confessing their sin. Therefore confession of sin is according to the natural law.

  Objection 2: Further, those precepts which are common to the Old and New Law are according to the natural law. But confession was prescribed in the Old Law, as may be gathered from Is. 43:26: "Tell, if thou hast anything to justify thyself." Therefore it is according to the natural law.

  Objection 3: Further, Job was subject only to the natural law. But he confessed his sins, as appears from his words (Job 31:33) "If, as a man, I have hid my sin." Therefore confession is according to the natural law.

  On the contrary, Isidore says (Etym. v.) that the natural law is the same in all. But confession is not in all in the same way. Therefore it is not according to the natural law. Further, confession is made to one who has the keys. But the keys of the Church are not an institution of the natural law; neither, therefore, is confession.

  I answer that, The sacraments are professions of faith, wherefore they ought to be proportionate to faith. Now faith surpasses the knowledge of natural reason, whose dictate is therefore surpassed by the sacraments. And since "the natural law is not begotten of opinion, but a product of a certain innate power," as Tully states (De Inv. Rhet. ii), consequently the sacraments are not part of the natural law, but of the Divine law which is above nature. This latter, however, is sometimes called natural, in so far as whatever a thing derives from its Creator is natural to it, although, properly speaking, those things are said to be natural which are caused by the principles of nature. But such things are above nature as God reserves to Himself; and these are wrought either through the agency of nature, or in the working of miracles, or in the revelation of mysteries, or in the institution of the sacraments. Hence confession, which is of sacramental necessity, is according to Divine, but not according to natural law.

  Reply to Objection 1: Adam is reproached for not confessing his sin before God: because the confession which is made to God by the acknowledgment of one's sin, is according to the natural law. whereas here we are speaking of confession made to a man. We may also reply that in such a case confession of one's sin is according to the natural law, namely when one is called upon by the judge to confess in a court of law, for then the sinner should not lie by excusing or denying his sin, as Adam and Cain are blamed for doing. But confession made voluntarily to a man in order to receive from God the forgiveness of one's sins, is not according to the natural law.

  Reply to Objection 2: The precepts of the natural law avail in the same way in the law of Moses and in the New Law. But although there was a kind of confession in the law of Moses, yet it was not after the same manner as in the New Law, nor as in the law of nature; for in the law of nature it was sufficient to acknowledge one's sin inwardly before God; while in the law of Moses it was necessary for a man to declare his sin by some external sign, as by making a sin-offering, whereby the fact of his having sinned became known to another man; but it was not necessary for him to make known what particular sin he had committed, or what were its circumstances, as in the New Law.

  Reply to Objection 3: Job is speaking of the man who hides his sin by denying it or excusing himself when he is accused thereof, as we may gather from a gloss [*Cf. Gregory, Moral. xxii, 9] on the passage.


 

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Whether all are bound to confession?


  Objection 1: It would seem that not all are bound to confession, for Jerome says on Is. 3:9 ("They have proclaimed abroad"), "their sin," etc.: "Penance is the second plank after shipwreck." But some have not suffered shipwreck after Baptism. Therefore Penance is not befitting them, and consequently neither is confession which is a part of Penance.

  Objection 2: Further, it is to the judge that confession should be made in any court. But some have no judge over them. Therefore they are not bound to confession.

  Objection 3: Further, some have none but venial sins. Now a man is not bound to confess such sins. Therefore not everyone is bound to confession.

  On the contrary, Confession is condivided with satisfaction and contrition. Now all are bound to contrition and satisfaction. Therefore all are bound to confession also.

   Further, this appears from the Decretals (De Poenit. et Remiss. xii), where it is stated that "all of either sex are bound to confess their sins as soon as they shall come to the age of discretion."

  I answer that, We are bound to confession on two counts: first, by the Divine law, from the very fact that confession is a remedy, and in this way not all are bound to confession, but those only who fall into mortal sin after Baptism; secondly, by a precept of positive law, and in this way all are bound by the precept of the Church laid down in the general council (Lateran iv, Can. 21) under Innocent III, both in order that everyone may acknowledge himself to be a sinner, because "all have sinned and need the grace of God" (Rm. 3:23); and that the Eucharist may be approached with greater reverence; and lastly, that parish priests may know their flock, lest a wolf may hide therein.

  Reply to Objection 1: Although it is possible for a man, in this mortal life, to avoid shipwreck, i.e. mortal sin, after Baptism, yet he cannot avoid venial sins, which dispose him to shipwreck, and against which also Penance is ordained; wherefore there is still room for Penance, and consequently for confession, even in those who do not commit mortal sins.

  Reply to Objection 2: All must acknowledge Christ as their judge, to Whom they must confess in the person of His vicar; and although the latter may be the inferior if the penitent be a prelate, yet he is the superior, in so far as the penitent is a sinner, while the confessor is the minister of Christ.

  Reply to Objection 3: A man is bound to confess his venial sins, not in virtue of the sacrament, but by the institution of the Church, and that, when he has no other sins to confess. We may also, with others, answer that the Decretal quoted above does not bind others than those who have mortal sins to confess. This is evident from the fact that it orders all sins to be confessed, which cannot apply to venial sins, because no one can confess all his venial sins. Accordingly, a man who has no mortal sins to confess, is not bound to confess his venial sins, but it suffices for the fulfillment of the commandment of the Church that he present himself before the priest, and declare himself to be unconscious of any mortal sin: and this will count for his confession.


 

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Whether it is lawful for a man to confess a sin which he has not committed?


  Objection 1: It would seem that it is lawful for a man to confess a sin which he has not committed. For, as Gregory says (Regist. xii), "it is the mark of a good conscience to acknowledge a fault where there is none." Therefore it is the mark of a good conscience to accuse oneself of those sins which one has not committed.

  Objection 2: Further, by humility a man deems himself worse than another, who is known to be a sinner, and in this he is to be praised. But it is lawful for a man to confess himself to be what he thinks he is. Therefore it is lawful to confess having committed a more grievous sin than one has.

  Objection 3: Further, sometimes one doubts about a sin, whether it be mortal or venial, in which case, seemingly, one ought to confess it as mortal. Therefore a person must sometimes confess a sin which he has not committed.

  Objection 4: Further, satisfaction originates from confession. But a man can do satisfaction for a sin which he has not committed. Therefore he can also confess a sin which he has not done.

  On the contrary, Whosoever says he has done what he did not, tells an untruth. But no one ought to tell an untruth in confession, since every untruth is a sin. Therefore no one should confess a sin which he has not committed.

   Further, in the public court of justice, no one should be accused of a crime which cannot be proved by means of proper witnesses. Now the witness, in the tribunal of Penance, is the conscience. Therefore a man ought not to accuse himself of a sin which is not on his conscience.

  I answer that, The penitent should, by his confession, make his state known to his confessor. Now he who tells the priest something other than what he has on his conscience, whether it be good or evil, does not make his state known to the priest, but hides it; wherefore his confession is unavailing: and in order for it to be effective his words must agree with his thoughts, so that his words accuse him only of what is on his conscience.

  Reply to Objection 1: To acknowledge a fault where there is none, may be understood in two ways: first, as referring to the substance of the act, and then it is untrue; for it is a mark, not of a good, but of an erroneous conscience, to acknowledge having done what one has not done. Secondly, as referring to the circumstances of the act, and thus the saying of Gregory is true, because a just man fears lest, in any act which is good in itself, there should be any defect on his part. thus it is written (Job 9:28): "I feared all my works." Wherefore it is also the mark of a good conscience that a man should accuse himself in words of this fear which he holds in his thoughts.

   From this may be gathered the Reply to the Second Objection, since a just man, who is truly humble, deems himself worse not as though he had committed an act generically worse, but because he fears lest in those things which he seems to do well, he may by pride sin more grievously.

  Reply to Objection 3: When a man doubts whether a certain sin be mortal, he is bound to confess it, so long as he remains in doubt, because he sins mortally by committing or omitting anything, while doubting of its being a mortal sin, and thus leaving the matter to chance; and, moreover, he courts danger, if he neglect to confess that which he doubts may be a mortal sin. He should not, however, affirm that it was a mortal sin, but speak doubtfully, leaving the verdict to the priest, whose business it is to discern between what is leprosy and what is not.

  Reply to Objection 4: A man does not commit a falsehood by making satisfaction for a sin which he did not commit, as when anyone confesses a sin which he thinks he has not committed. And if he mentions a sin that he has not committed, believing that he has, he does not lie; wherefore he does not sin, provided his confession thereof tally with his conscience.


 

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Whether one is bound to confess at once?


  Objection 1: It would seem that one is bound to confess at once. For Hugh of St. Victor says (De Sacram. ii): "The contempt of confession is inexcusable, unless there be an urgent reason for delay." But everyone is bound to avoid contempt. Therefore everyone is bound to confess as soon as possible.

  Objection 2: Further, everyone is bound to do more to avoid spiritual disease than to avoid bodily disease. Now if a man who is sick in body were to delay sending for the physician, it would be detrimental to his health. Therefore it seems that it must needs be detrimental to a man's health if he omits to confess immediately to a priest if there be one at hand.

  Objection 3: Further, that which is due always, is due at once. But man owes confession to God always. Therefore he is bound to confess at once.

  On the contrary, A fixed time both for confession and for receiving the Eucharist is determined by the Decretals (Cap. Omnis utriusque sexus: De Poenit. et Remiss.). Now a man does not sin by failing to receive the Eucharist before the fixed time. Therefore he does not sin if he does not confess before that time.

   Further, it is a mortal sin to omit doing what a commandment bids us to do. If therefore a man is bound to confess at once, and omits to do so, with a priest at hand, he would commit a mortal sin; and in like manner at any other time, and so on, so that he would fall into many mortal sins for the delay in confessing one, which seems unreasonable.

  I answer that, As the purpose of confessing is united to contrition, a man is bound to have this purpose when he is bound to have contrition, viz. when he calls his sins to mind, and chiefly when he is in danger of death, or when he is so circumstanced that unless his sin be forgiven, he must fall into another sin: for instance, if a priest be bound to say Mass, and a confessor is at hand, he is bound to confess or, if there be no confessor, he is bound at least to contrition and to have the purpose of confessing.

   But to actual confession a man is bound in two ways. First, accidentally, viz. when he is bound to do something which he cannot do without committing a mortal sin, unless he go to confession first: for then he is bound to confess; for instance, if he has to receive the Eucharist, to which no one can approach, after committing a mortal sin, without confessing first, if a priest be at hand, and there be no urgent necessity. Hence it is that the Church obliges all to confess once a year; because she commands all to receive Holy Communion once a year, viz. at Easter, wherefore all must go to confession before that time.

   Secondly, a man is bound absolutely to go to confession; and here the same reason applies to delay of confession as to delay of Baptism, because both are necessary sacraments. Now a man is not bound to receive Baptism as soon as he makes up his mind to be baptized; and so he would not sin mortally, if he were not baptized at once: nor is there any fixed time beyond which, if he defer Baptism, he would incur a mortal sin. Nevertheless the delay of Baptism may amount to a mortal sin, or it may not, and this depends on the cause of the delay, since, as the Philosopher says (Phys. viii, text. 15), the will does not defer doing what it wills to do, except for a reasonable cause. Wherefore if the cause of the delay of Baptism has a mortal sin connected with it, e.g. if a man put off being baptized through contempt, or some like motive, the delay will be a mortal sin, but otherwise not: and the same seems to apply to confession which is not more necessary than Baptism. Moreover, since man is bound to fulfill in this life those things that are necessary for salvation, therefore, if he be in danger of death, he is bound, even absolutely, then and there to make his confession or to receive Baptism. For this reason too, James proclaimed at the same time the commandment about making confession and that about receiving Extreme Unction (James 5:14,16). Therefore the opinion seems probable of those who say that a man is not bound to confess at once, though it is dangerous to delay.

   Others, however, say that a contrite man is bound to confess at once, as soon as he has a reasonable and proper opportunity. Nor does it matter that the Decretal fixes the time limit to an annual confession, because the Church does not favor delay, but forbids the neglect involved in a further delay. Wherefore by this Decretal the man who delays is excused, not from sin in the tribunal of conscience; but from punishment in the tribunal of the Church; so that such a person would not be deprived of proper burial if he were to die before that time. But this seems too severe, because affirmative precepts bind, not at once, but at a fixed time; and this, not because it is most convenient to fulfill them then (for in that case if a man were not to give alms of his superfluous goods, whenever he met with a man in need, he would commit a mortal sin, which is false), but because the time involves urgency. Consequently, if he does not confess at the very first opportunity, it does not follow that he commits a mortal sin, even though he does not await a better opportunity. unless it becomes urgent for him to confess through being in danger of death. Nor is it on account of the Church's indulgence that he is not bound to confess at once, but on account of the nature of an affirmative precept, so that before the commandment was made, there was still less obligation.

   Others again say that secular persons are not bound to confess before Lent, which is the time of penance for them; but that religious are bound to confess at once, because, for them, all time is a time for penance. But this is not to the point; for religious have no obligations besides those of other men, with the exception of such as they are bound to by vow.

  Reply to Objection 1: Hugh is speaking of those who die without this sacrament.

  Reply to Objection 2: It is not necessary for bodily health that the physician be sent for at once, except when there is necessity for being healed: and the same applies to spiritual disease.

  Reply to Objection 3: The retaining of another's property against the owner's will is contrary to a negative precept, which binds always and for always, and therefore one is always bound to make immediate restitution. It is not the same with the fulfillment of an affirmative precept, which binds always, but not for always, wherefore one is not bound to fulfill it at once.


 

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Whether one can be dispensed from confession?


  Objection 1: It would seem that one can be dispensed from confessing his sins to a man. For precepts of positive law are subject to dispensation by the prelates of the Church. Now such is confession, as appears from what was said above (Article [3]). Therefore one may be dispensed from confession.

  Objection 2: Further, a man can grant a dispensation in that which was instituted by a man. But we read of confession being instituted, not by God, but by a man (James 5:16): "Confess your sins, one to another." Now the Pope has the power of dispensation in things instituted by the apostles, as appears in the matter of bigamists. Therefore he can also dispense a man from confessing.

  On the contrary, Penance, whereof confession is a part, is a necessary sacrament, even as Baptism is. Since therefore no one can be dispensed from Baptism, neither can one be dispensed from confession.

  I answer that, The ministers of the Church are appointed in the Church which is founded by God. Wherefore they need to be appointed by the Church before exercising their ministry, just as the work of creation is presupposed to the work of nature. And since the Church is founded on faith and the sacraments, the ministers of the Church have no power to publish new articles of faith, or to do away with those which are already published, or to institute new sacraments, or to abolish those that are instituted, for this belongs to the power of excellence, which belongs to Christ alone, Who is the foundation of the Church. Consequently, the Pope can neither dispense a man so that he may be saved without Baptism, nor that he be saved without confession, in so far as it is obligatory in virtue of the sacrament. He can, however, dispense from confession, in so far as it is obligatory in virtue of the commandment of the Church; so that a man may delay confession longer than the limit prescribed by the Church.

  Reply to Objection 1: The precepts of the Divine law do not bind less than those of the natural law: wherefore, just as no dispensation is possible from the natural law, so neither can there be from positive Divine law.

  Reply to Objection 2: The precept about confession was not instituted by a man first of all, though it was promulgated by James: it was instituted by God, and although we do not read it explicitly, yet it was somewhat foreshadowed in the fact that those who were being prepared by John's Baptism for the grace of Christ, confessed their sins to him, and that the Lord sent the lepers to the priests, and though they were not priests of the New Testament, yet the priesthood of the New Testament was foreshadowed in them.


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Latin — Supplementum

pr.

Deinde considerandum est de confessione. De qua sex sunt consideranda: primo, de confessionis necessitate; secundo, de eius quidditate; tertio, de ipsius ministro; quarto, de qualitate eius; quinto; de eius effectu; sexto, de eius sigillo.

Circa primum quaeruntur sex.

Primo: utrum confessio sit necessaria ad salutem.

Secundo: utrum confessio sit de iure naturali.

Tertio: utrum omnes ad confessionem teneantur.

Quarto: utrum aliquis possit confiteri peccatum quod non habet.

Quinto: utrum statim homines peccatum confiteri teneantur.

Sexto: utrum possit cum aliquo dispensari ne homini confiteatur.

a. 1 arg. 1

Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod confessio non sit necessaria ad salutem. Sacramentum enim poenitentiae propter remissionem culpae ordinatum est. Sed culpa per gratiae infusionem sufficienter remittitur. Ergo ad poenitentiam de peccato agendam non est necessaria confessio.

a. 1 arg. 2

Praeterea, aliquibus est peccatum remissum sine hoc quod confessi legantur: sicut patet de Petro et Magdalena, et de Paulo. Sed non est minoris efficaciae gratia remittens peccatum nunc quam tunc fuerit. Ergo nec nunc de necessitate salutis est quod homo confiteatur.
B: (Isa 43:26) [b:Isa 43:26]

a. 1 arg. 3

Praeterea, peccatum quod ex alio contractum est, ex alio debet habere medicinam. Ergo peccatum actuale, quod ex proprio motu quilibet commisit, oportet ex seipso tantum habere medicinam. Sed contra tale peccatum ordinatur poenitentia. Ergo confessio non est de necessitate poenitentiae.
B: (Job 31:33) [b:Job 31:33]

a. 1 arg. 4

Praeterea, confessio ad hoc exigitur in iudicio ut secundum quantitatem culpae poena infligatur. Sed homo potest poenam sibi ipsi infligere maiorem quam etiam ab alio sibi infligatur. Ergo videtur quod confessio non sit de necessitate salutis.

a. 1 s. c. 1

Sed contra: Boetius, in libro de Consolatione: si operam medicantis expectas, oportet quod morbum detegas. Sed de necessitate salutis est quod homo de peccatis medicinam accipiat. Ergo et de necessitate salutis est quod morbum per confessionem detegat.

a. 1 arg. 5

Praeterea, in iudicio saeculari non est idem iudex et reus. Sed iudicium spirituale est ordinatius. Ergo peccator, qui est reus, non debet esse sui ipsius iudex, sed ab alio iudicari. Et ita oportet quod ei confiteatur.

a. 1 co.

Respondeo dicendum quod passio Christi, sine cuius virtute nec originale nec actuale peccatum dimittitur, in nobis operatur per sacramentorum susceptionem, quae ex ipsa efficaciam habent. Et ideo ad culpae remissionem, et actualis et originalis, requiritur sacramentum Ecclesiae, vel actu susceptum; vel saltem, voto, quando articulus necessitatis, non contemptus, sacramentum excludit. Et per consequens illa sacramenta quae ordinantur contra culpam, cum qua salus esse non potest, sunt de necessitate salutis. Et ideo, sicut baptismus, quo deletur originale, est de necessitate salutis, ita et poenitentiae sacramentum. Sicut autem aliquis per hoc quod baptismum petit se ministris Ecclesiae subiicit, ad quos pertinet dispensatio sacramenti; ita etiam per hoc quod confitetur peccatum suum se ministro Ecclesiae subiicit, ut per sacramentum poenitentiae, ab eo dispensatum, remissionem consequatur. Qui congruum remedium adhibere non potest nisi peccatum cognoscat: quod fit per confessionem peccantis. Et ideo confessio est de necessitate salutis eius qui in peccatum actuale mortale cecidit.

a. 1 ad 1

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod gratiae infusio sufficit ad culpae remissionem, sed post culpam remissam adhuc est peccator debitor poenae temporalis. Sed ad gratiae infusionem consequendam ordinata sunt gratiae sacramenta: ante quorum susceptionem vel actu vel proposito aliquis gratiam non consequitur, sicut in baptismo patet. Et similiter est de confessione. Et ulterius per confessionis erubescentiam; et vim clavium, quibus se confitens subiicit; et satisfactionem iniunctam, quam sacerdos moderatur secundum qualitatem criminum sibi per confessionem innotescentium; poena temporalis expiatur.

Sed tamen ex hoc quod operatur confessio ad poenae remissionem, non habet quod sit de necessitate salutis. Quia poena ista est temporalis, ad quam post culpae remissionem aliquis remanet ligatus: unde sine hoc quod in praesenti via expiaretur, esset via salutis. Sed habet quod sit de necessitate salutis ex hoc quod ad remissionem culpae modo praedicto operatur.

a. 1 ad 2

Ad secundum dicendum quod, etsi non legatur eorum confessio, potuit tamen fieri: multa enim facta sunt quae non sunt scripta. Et praeterea Christus habet potestatem excellentiae in sacramentis. Unde sine his quae ad sacramentum pertinent, potuit rem sacramenti conferre.

a. 1 ad 3

Ad tertium dicendum quod peccatum quod ex altero contractum est, scilicet originale, potest omnino ab extrinseco remedium habere, ut in parvulis patet: sed peccatum actuale, quod ex seipso quisque commisit, non potest expiari nisi aliquid cooperetur ille qui peccavit. Sed tamen non sufficit ad peccatum expiandum ex seipso, sicut sufficienter peccatum commisit: eo quod peccatum ex parte conversionis est finitum, ex qua parte peccator in ipsum inducitur, sed ex parte aversionis habet infinitatem; ex qua parte oportet quod peccati remissio incipiat, quia quod est ultimum in generatione est primum in resolutione, ut dicitur in III Ethic. Et ideo oportet quod etiam peccatum actuale ex alio medicinam habeat.

a. 1 ad 4

Ad quartum dicendum quod satisfactio non sufficeret ad expiandam poenam peccati ex quantitate poenae quae in satisfactione imponitur: sed sufficit inquantum est pars sacramenti virtutem sacramentalem habens. Et ideo oportet quod per dispensatores sacramentorum imponatur. Et ideo necessaria est confessio.

a. 2 arg. 1

Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod confessio sit de iure naturali. Adam enim et Cain non tenebantur nisi ad praecepta legis naturae, sed reprehenduntur de hoc quod peccatum suum non sunt confessi. Ergo confessio peccati est de iure naturali.
B: (Isa 3:9) [b:Isa 3:9]

a. 2 arg. 2

Praeterea, praecepta illa quae manent in veteri lege et nova, sunt de iure naturali. Sed confessio fuit in veteri lege: ut dicitur Isaiae 43: narra, si quid habes, ut iustificeris. Ergo est de iure naturali.

a. 2 arg. 3

Praeterea, Iob non erat subiectus nisi legi naturali. Sed ipse peccata confitebatur: quod patet per hoc quod ipse de se dicit, Iob 31: si abscondi ut homo peccatum meum. Ergo est de iure naturali.

a. 2 s. c. 1

Sed contra: Isidorus dicit quod ius naturale est idem apud omnes. Sed confessio non est eodem modo apud omnes. Ergo non est de iure naturali.

a. 2 arg. 4

Praeterea, confessio fit ei qui habet claves. Sed claves Ecclesiae non sunt de iure naturali institutae. Ergo nec confessio.

a. 2 co.

Respondeo dicendum quod sacramenta sunt quaedam fidei protestationes: unde oportet ea fidei esse proportionata. Fides autem est supra cognitionem rationis naturalis. Unde et sacramenta sunt supra rationis naturalis dictamen. Et quia ius naturale est quod non opinio genuit, sed innata quaedam vis inseruit, ut Tullius dicit; ideo sacramenta non sunt, de iure naturali, sed de iure divino, quod est supra naturale. Et quandoque etiam naturale dicitur, secundum quod cuilibet rei illud est naturale quod ei a suo Creatore imponitur: tamen proprie dicuntur naturalia quae ex principiis naturae causantur. Supra autem naturam sunt quae ipse Deus sibi reservat sine naturae ministerio operanda: sive in operationibus miraculorum, sive in revelationibus mysteriorum, sive in institutionibus sacramentorum. Et sic confessio quae necessitatem sacramentalem habet, non de iure naturali est, sed de divino.
B: (Rom 3:23) [b:Rom 3:23]

a. 2 ad 1

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Adam vituperatur ex hoc quod peccatum suum coram Deo non recognovit: confessio enim quae fit Deo per recognitionem peccati, est de iure naturali. Nunc autem loquimur de confessione quae fit homini.

Vel dicendum quod confiteri peccatum in casu est de iure naturali: scilicet cum quis in iudicio constitutus a iudice interrogatur; tunc enim non debet mentiri peccatum excusando vel negando, de quo Adam et Cain vituperantur. Sed confessio quae fit homini sponte ad remissionem peccatorum consequendam a Deo, non est de iure naturali.

a. 2 ad 2

Ad secundum dicendum quod praecepta legis naturae manent eodem modo in lege Moysi et in nova lege. Sed confessio, quamvis aliqualiter esset in lege Moysi, non tamen eodem modo sicut in lege nova, nec sicut in lege naturae. In lege autem naturae sufficiebat recognitio peccati interior apud Deum. Sed in lege Moysi oportebat aliquo signo exteriori peccatum protestari, sicut per oblationem hostiae pro peccato, ex quo et homini innotescere poterat eum peccasse. Non autem oportebat ut speciale peccatum a se commissum manifestaret, aut peccati circumstantias: sicut in nova lege oportet.

a. 2 ad 3

Ad tertium dicendum quod Iob loquitur de illa absconsione peccati quam facit deprehensus peccatum negando aut excusando: ut ex Glossa ibidem haberi potest.

a. 3 arg. 1

Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod non omnes ad confessionem teneantur. Quia, sicut dicit Hieronymus, poenitentia est secunda tabula: post naufragium. Sed aliqui post baptismum naufragium non sunt passi. Ergo eis non competit poenitentia. Et sic nec confessio, quae est poenitentiae pars.

a. 3 arg. 2

Praeterea, confessio facienda est iudici in quolibet foro. Sed aliqui sunt qui non habent hominem iudicem supra se. Ergo nec tenentur ad confessionem.

a. 3 arg. 3

Praeterea, aliquis est qui non habet peccata nisi venialia. Sed de illis non tenetur homo confiteri. Ergo non quilibet tenetur ad confessionem.

a. 3 s. c. 1

Sed contra: Confessio contra satisfactionem et contritionem dividitur. Sed omnes tenentur ad contritionem et satisfactionem. Ergo et omnes tenentur ad confessionem.

a. 3 arg. 4

Praeterea, hoc patet per Decretalem de Poenitentia et Remissione, ubi dicitur quod omnes utriusque sexus, cum ad annos discretionis pervenerint, tenentur peccata confiteri.

a. 3 co.

Respondeo dicendum quod ad confessionem dupliciter obligamur. Uno modo, ex iure divino: ex hoc ipso quod est medicina. Et secundum hoc non omnes tenentur ad confessionem, sed illi tantum qui peccatum mortale incurrunt post baptismum.

Alio modo, ex praecepto iuris positivi. Et sic tenentur omnes ex institutione Ecclesiae edita in Concilio Generali sub Innocentio III. Tum ut quilibet peccatorem se cognosceret: quia omnes peccaverunt et egent gratia Dei. Tum ut cum maiori reverentia ad Eucharistiam accedatur. Tum ut ecclesiarum rectoribus sui subditi innotescant: ne lupus inter gregem lateat.

a. 3 ad 1

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, quamvis homo in hac mortali vita post baptismum naufragium evadere possit, quod est per peccatum mortale; non tamen evadere potest venialia, quibus ad naufragium disponitur, contra quae etiam poenitentia ordinatur. Et ideo manet poenitentiae locus etiam in illis qui non mortaliter peccant: et per consequens confessionis.

a. 3 ad 2

Ad secundum dicendum quod nullus est qui non habeat iudicem Christum, cui per suum vicarium confiteri debet. Qui quamvis eo inferior sit inquantum ipse praelatus est, tamen est eo superior inquantum peccator est ipse, et ille Christi minister.
B: (Job 9:28) [b:Job 9:28]

a. 3 ad 3

Ad tertium dicendum quod ex vi sacramenti non tenetur aliquis venialia confiteri: sed ex institutione Ecclesiae, quando non habet alia quae confiteatur.

Vel potest dici, secundum quosdam, quod ex Decretali praedicta non obligantur nisi illi qui habent peccata mortalia: quod patet ex hoc quod dicit quod debet omnia peccata confiteri, quod de venialibus intelligi non potest, quia nullus omnia confiteri potest. Et secundum hoc, ille qui non habet mortalia, non tenetur ad confessionem venialium, sed sufficit ad praeceptum Ecclesiae implendum ut se sacerdoti repraesentet, et se ostendat absque conscientia mortalis esse: et hoc ei pro confessione reputatur.

a. 4 arg. 1

Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod aliquis licite possit confiteri peccatum quod non habet. Quia, ut dicit Gregorius, bonarum mentium est ibi culpam agnoscere ubi culpa non est. Ergo ad bonam mentem pertinet ut de illis culpis se accuset quas non commisit.

a. 4 arg. 2

Praeterea, aliquis per humilitatem reputat se deteriorem aliquo qui est manifestus peccator, et in hoc est commendandus. Sed quod corde quis aestimat, licet ore confiteri. Ergo licite potest confiteri se habere gravius peccatum quam habeat.

a. 4 arg. 3

Praeterea, aliquis aliquando dubitat de peccato aliquo utrum sit mortale vel veniale. Et talis debet de illo, ut videtur, confiteri ut de mortali. Ergo aliquis debet confiteri aliquando peccatum quod non habet.

a. 4 arg. 4

Praeterea, satisfactio ex confessione ordinatur. Sed aliquis potest satisfacere de peccato quod non commisit. Ergo etiam potest confiteri peccatum quod non fecit.

a. 4 s. c. 1

Sed contra: Quicumque dicit se fecisse quod non fecit, mentitur. Sed nullus in confessione mentiri debet: cum omne mendacium sit peccatum. Ergo nullus debet confiteri peccatum quod non fecit.

a. 4 arg. 5

Praeterea, in iudicio exteriori non debet aliquod crimen alicui impingi quod non potest per testes idoneos probari. Sed testis in foro poenitentiae est conscientia. Ergo aliquis non debet se accusare de peccato quod conscientia non habet.

a. 4 co.

Respondeo dicendum quod per confessionem debet poenitens se confessori sub manifestare. Ille autem qui aliud sacerdoti de se loquitur quam sua conscientia habeat, sive in bonum sive in malum, non se sacerdoti manifestat, sed magis occultat; Et ideo non est idonea confessio: sed ad hoc quod sit idonea, requiritur quod os cordi concordet, ut solum hoc os accuset quod conscientia tenet.

a. 4 ad 1

Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod agnoscere culpam ubi non est, potest esse dupliciter.

Uno modo, ut intelligatur quantum ad substantiam actus. Et sic non est verum. Non enim ad bonam mentem pertinet, sed ad errantem, ut se actum aliquem commisisse agnoscat quem non commisit. Alio modo, quantum ad conditionem actus. Et sic verum est quod Gregorius dicit, quod iustus in actu qui de se bonus videtur, formidat ne aliquis defectus ex parte sua fuerit: et sic dicitur Iob 9: verebar omnia opera mea. Et ideo ad bonam mentem etiam pertinet ut hanc formidinem, quam corde tenet, lingua accuset.
B: (Jas 5:14) [b:Jas 5:14] (Jas 5:16) [b:Jas 5:16]

a. 4 ad 2

Et per hoc etiam patet solutio ad secundum. Quia iustus, qui est vere humilis, non reputat se deteriorem quantum ad perpetrationem actus qui sit peior ex genere: sed timet ne in his quae bene agere videtur, per superbiam gravius delinquat.

a. 4 ad 3

Ad tertium dicendum quod, quando aliquis dubitat de aliquo peccato an sit mortale, tenetur illud confiteri, dubitatione manente. Quia qui aliquid committit vel omittit in quo dubitat esse peccatum mortale, peccat mortaliter, discrimini se committens. Et similiter periculo se committit qui de hoc quod dubitat esse mortale, negligit confiteri. Non tamen debet asserere illud mortale esse: sed cum dubitatione loqui, et iudicium sacerdotis expectare, cuius est discernere inter lepram et lepram.

a. 4 ad 4

Ad quartum dicendum quod ex hoc quod homo satisfacit pro peccato quod non commisit, non incurrit mendacium, sicut cum quis confitetur peccatum quod non credit se fecisse. Si autem dicat peccatum quod non fecit, dum credit se fecisse, non mentitur. Et ideo non peccat si eo modo dicat sicut est in corde suo.

a. 5 arg. 1

Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod statim teneatur confiteri. Dicit enim Hugo de Sancto Victore: si necessitas non est quae praetendatur, contemptus non excusatur. Sed quilibet tenetur vitare contemptum. Ergo quilibet tenetur statim confiteri cum potest.

a. 5 arg. 2

Praeterea, quilibet tenetur plus facere ad evadendum morbum spiritualem quam ad evadendum morbum corporalem. Sed aliquis infirmus corporaliter non sine detrimento salutis medicum requirere tardat. Ergo videtur quod non possit esse sine detrimento salutis quod aliquis sacerdoti cuius copiam habet, non statim de peccato confiteatur.
B: (Jas 5:16) [b:Jas 5:16]

a. 5 arg. 3

Praeterea, illud quod sine termino debetur, statim debetur. Sed sine termino debet homo confessionem Deo. Ergo tenetur ad statim.

a. 5 s. c. 1

Sed contra: In Decretali simul datur tempus determinatum de confessione et de Eucharistiae perceptione. Sed aliquis non peccat si non percipiat Eucharistiam ante tempus a iure determinatum. Ergo non peccat si ante tempus illud non confiteatur.

a. 5 arg. 4

Praeterea, quicumque illud omittit ad quod ex praecepto tenetur, peccat mortaliter. Si ergo aliquis non statim confitetur quando habet copiam sacerdotis, si ad statim confitendum tenetur, peccaret mortaliter; et eadem ratione alio tempore; et sic deinceps. Et ita multa peccata mortalia homo incurreret pro una poenitentiae dilatione. Quod videtur inconveniens.

a. 5 co.

Respondeo dicendum quod, cum propositum confitendi sit annexum contritioni, tunc tenetur aliquis ad hoc propositum quando ad contritionem tenetur: scilicet quando peccata memoriae occurrunt, praecipue cum in periculo mortis existit, aut in aliquo articulo in quo sine peccati remissione oporteat eum peccatum incurrere; sicut, cum tenetur ad celebrandum, si desit copia sacerdotis, saltem conteri tenetur et habere propositum confitendi.

Sed ad confessionem actualiter faciendam obligatur aliquis dupliciter. Uno modo, per accidens: scilicet quando ad aliquid tenetur quod non potest sine peccato facere non confessus. Tunc enim confiteri tenetur: sicut si debeat Eucharistiam percipere, ad quam nullus post peccatum mortale nisi confessus accedere debet, copia, sacerdotis oblata et necessitate non urgente. Et inde venit obligatio qua Ecclesia omnes obligat ad semel in anno confitendum, quia instituit, ut semel in anno, scilicet in Paschate, omnes sacram communionem accipiant: et ideo ante tempus illud omnes confiteri tenentur.

Alio modo obligatur aliquis ad confessionem per se. Et sic videtur esse eadem ratio de confessione et de baptismo differendo; quia utrumque est sacramentum necessitatis. Ad baptismum autem percipiendum non tenetur aliquis statim postquam habet propositum baptismi, ita quod peccet mortaliter nisi statim baptizerut; nec est aliquod tempus determinatum ultra quod si baptismum differat, peccatum mortale incurrat; sed potest contingere quod in dilatione baptismi erit peccatum mortale vel non erit. Et hoc pensandum est ex causa dilationis: quia, sicut dicit Philosophus, VIII Physic., voluntas non retardat facere opus volitum nisi propter aliquam causam rationabilem. Unde, si causa dilationis baptismi mortale peccatum annexum habeat, utpote si propter contemptum vel aliquod huiusmodi baptismum differat, dilatio erit peccatum mortale: alias non. Et ideo idem videtur esse de confessione, quae non est maioris necessitatis quam baptismus.

Et quia ea quae sunt de necessitate salutis tenetur homo in hac vita implere, ideo, si periculum mortis immineat, etiam per se loquendo, obligatur aliquis ad confessionem faciendam tunc vel baptismum suscipiendum. Et propter hoc etiam Iacobus simul praeceptum edidit de confessione facienda, et extrema unctione percipienda.

Et ideo videtur probabilis illorum opinio qui dicunt quod non tenetur homo ad statim confitendum: quamvis periculosum, sit differre.

Alii autem dicunt quod tenetur contritus ad statim confitendum, debita opportunitate oblata, secundum rectam rationem. Nec obstat quod Decretalis terminum praefigat, ut semel in anno confiteatur: quia Ecclesia non indulget dilationi, sed prohibet negligentiam in maiori dilatione. Unde per decretalem illam non excusatur a culpa dilationis quantum ad forum conscientiae: sed excusatur a poena quantum ad forum Ecclesiae, ut non privetur debita sepultura si morte praeventus fuerit ante tempus illud. Sed hoc videtur nimis durum. Quia praecepta affirmativa non obligant ad statim, sed ad tempus determinatum; non quidem ex hoc quod tunc commode impleri possunt, quia tunc, si non daret aliquis eleemosynam de superfluo quandocumque pauper offerretur, peccaret mortaliter, quod falsum est; sed ex hoc quod tempus necessitatem urgentem adducit. Et ideo non oportet quod, si statim oblata opportunitate non confiteatur, etiam si maior opportunitas non expectetur, aliquis peccet mortaliter: sed quando ex articulo temporis necessitas confessionis inducitur. Nec hoc est ex indulgentia Ecclesiae quod non teneatur ad statim, sed ex natura praecepti affirmativi. Unde ante Ecclesiae statutum etiam minus debebatur.

Quidam vero dicunt quod saeculares non tenentur ante quadragesimale tempus confiteri, quod est eis poenitentiae tempus: sed religiosi tenentur ad statim quia totum tempus est eis poenitentiae tempus. Sed hoc nihil est: quia religiosi non tenentur ad alia quam alii homines, nisi ad quae ex voto se obligaverunt.

a. 5 ad 1

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Hugo loquitur de illis qui sine sacramento decedunt.

a. 5 ad 2

Ad secundum dicendum quod non est de necessitate salutis corporalis quod statim medicum quaerat, nisi quando necessitas curationis incumbit. Et similiter est de morbo spirituali.

a. 5 ad 3

Ad tertium dicendum quod retentio rei alienae invito domino contrariatur praecepto negativo, quod obligat semper et ad semper. Et ideo tenetur semper ad statim reddendum secus autem est de impletione praecepti affirmativi, quod obligat semper sed non ad semper. Unde non tenetur aliquis ad statim implendum.

a. 6 arg. 1

Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod possit cum aliquo dispensari ne confiteatur homini. Praecepta enim quae sunt de iure positivo, subiacent dispensationi praelatorum Ecclesiae. Sed confessio est huiusmodi, ut ex dictis patet. Ergo potest dispensari cum aliquo ut non confiteatur.
R: Q.. 6 a. 3[t:suppl q. 6 a. 3]

a. 6 arg. 2

Praeterea, illud quod ab homine institutum est, potest etiam ab homine dispensationem recipere. Sed confessio non legitur a Deo instituta, sed ab homine, Iac. 5: confitemini alterutrum peccata vestra. Habet autem Papa potestatem dispensandi in his quae per Apostolos instituta sunt: sicut patet de bigamis. Ergo etiam potest cum aliquo dispensari ne confiteatur.

a. 6 s. c. 1

Sed contra, poenitentia, cuius pars est confessio, est sacramentum necessitatis, sicut et baptismus. Cum ergo in baptismo nullus dispensare possit, nec in confessione aliquis dispensare poterit.

a. 6 co.

Respondeo dicendum quod ministri Ecclesiae instituuntur in Ecclesia divinitus fundata. Et ideo institutio Ecclesiae praesupponitur ad operationem ministrorum: sicut opus creationis praesupponitur ad opus naturae. Et quia Ecclesia fundatur in fide et sacramentis, ideo ad ministros novos articulos fidei edere aut editos removere, aut nova sacramenta instituere aut instituta removere, non pertinet: sed hoc est potestatis excellentiae, quae soli debetur Christo, qui est Ecclesiae fundamentum. Et ideo, sicut Papa non potest dispensare ut aliquis sine baptismo salvetur, ita nec quod salvetur sine confessione, secundum quod obligat ex ipsa vi sacramenti. Sed potest dispensare in confessione secundum quod obligat de praecepto Ecclesiae, ut possit ad diutius confessionem differre quam ab Ecclesia institutum sit.

a. 6 ad 1

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod praecepta iuris divini non minus obligant quam praecepta iuris naturalis. Unde, sicut non potest dispensari in iure naturali, ita nec in iure positivo divino.

a. 6 ad 2

Ad secundum dicendum quod praeceptum de confessione non est ab homine primo institutum, quamvis sit a Iacobo promulgatum: sed a Deo institutionem habuit, quamvis expressa ipsius institutio non legatur. Tamen quaedam praefiguratio ipsius invenitur: et in hoc quod Ioanni confitebantur peccata qui baptismo ipsius ad gratiam Christi praeparabantur; et in hoc quod Dominus sacerdotibus leprosos transmisit, qui, quamvis non essent novi Testamenti sacerdotes, tamen in eis novi Testamenti sacerdotium significabatur.