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Thomas Aquinas / Texts and commentaries
 

St. Thomas Aquinas

The Summa Theologica

(Benziger Bros. edition, 1947)
Translated by
Fathers of the English Dominican Province

 

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Question: 5  [<< | >>]


OF THE EFFECT OF CONTRITION (THREE ARTICLES)


   We must now consider the effect of contrition: under which head there are three points of inquiry:

    (1) Whether the remission of sin is the effect of contrition?

    (2) Whether contrition can take away the debt of punishment entirely?

    (3) Whether slight contrition suffices to blot out great sins?


 

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Whether the forgiveness of sin is the effect of contrition?


  Objection 1: It would seem that the forgiveness of sin is not the effect of contrition. For God alone forgives sins. But we are somewhat the cause of contrition, since it is an act of our own. Therefore contrition is not the cause of forgiveness.

  Objection 2: Further, contrition is an act of virtue. Now virtue follows the forgiveness of sin: because virtue and sin are not together in the soul. Therefore contrition is not the cause of the forgiveness of sin.

  Objection 3: Further, nothing but sin is an obstacle to receiving the Eucharist. But the contrite should not go to Communion before going to confession. Therefore they have not yet received the forgiveness of their sins.

  On the contrary, a gloss on Ps. 50:19, "A sacrifice to God is an afflicted spirit," says: "A hearty contrition is the sacrifice by which sins are loosed."

   Further, virtue and vice are engendered and corrupted by the same causes, as stated in Ethic. ii, 1,2. Now sin is committed through the heart's inordinate love. Therefore it is destroyed by sorrow caused by the heart's ordinate love; and consequently contrition blots out sin.

  I answer that, Contrition can be considered in two ways, either as part of a sacrament, or as an act of virtue, and in either case it is the cause of the forgiveness of sin, but not in the same way. Because, as part of a sacrament, it operates primarily as an instrument for the forgiveness of sin, as is evident with regard to the other sacraments (cf. Sent. iv, D, 1, Question [1], Article [4]: TP, Question [62], Article [1]); while, as an act of virtue, it is the quasi-material cause of sin's forgiveness. For a disposition is, as it were, a necessary condition for justification, and a disposition is reduced to a material cause, if it be taken to denote that which disposes matter to receive something. It is otherwise in the case of an agent's disposition to act, because this is reduced to the genus of efficient cause.

  Reply to Objection 1: God alone is the principal efficient cause of the forgiveness of sin: but the dispositive cause can be from us also, and likewise the sacramental cause, since the sacramental forms are words uttered by us, having an instrumental power of conferring grace whereby sins are forgiven.

  Reply to Objection 2: The forgiveness of sin precedes virtue and the infusion of grace, in one way, and, in another, follows: and in so far as it follows, the act elicited by the virtue can be a cause of the forgiveness of sin.

  Reply to Objection 3: The dispensation of the Eucharist belongs to the ministers of the Church: wherefore a man should not go to Communion until his sin has been forgiven through the ministers of the Church, although his sin may be forgiven him before God.


 

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Whether contrition can take away the debt of punishment entirely?


  Objection 1: It would seem that contrition cannot take away the debt of punishment entirely. For satisfaction and confession are ordained for man's deliverance from the debt of punishment. Now no man is so perfectly contrite as not to be bound to confession and satisfaction. Therefore contrition is never so great as to blot out the entire debt of punishment.

  Objection 2: Further, in Penance the punishment should in some way compensate for the sin. Now some sins are accomplished by members of the body. Therefore, since it is for the due compensation for sin that "by what things a man sinneth, by the same also he is tormented" (Wis. 11:17), it seems that the punishment for suchlike sins can never be remitted by contrition.

  Objection 3: Further, the sorrow of contrition is finite. Now an infinite punishment is due for some, viz. mortal, sins. Therefore contrition can never be so great as to remit the whole punishment.

  On the contrary, The affections of the heart are more acceptable to God than external acts. Now man is absolved from both punishment and guilt by means of external actions; and therefore he is also by means of the heart's affections, such as contrition is.

   Further, we have an example of this in the thief, to whom it was said (Lk. 23:43): "This day shalt thou be with Me in paradise," on account of his one act of repentance.

   As to whether the whole debt of punishment is always taken away by contrition, this question has already been considered above (Sent. iv, D, 14, Question [2], Articles [1],2; TP, Question [86], Article [4]), where the same question was raised with regard to Penance.

  I answer that, The intensity of contrition may be regarded in two ways. First, on the part of charity, which causes the displeasure, and in this way it may happen that the act of charity is so intense that the contrition resulting therefrom merits not only the removal of guilt, but also the remission of all punishment. Secondly, on the part of the sensible sorrow, which the will excites in contrition: and since this sorrow is also a kind of punishment, it may be so intense as to suffice for the remission of both guilt and punishment.

  Reply to Objection 1: A man cannot be sure that his contrition suffices for the remission of both punishment and guilt: wherefore he is bound to confess and to make satisfaction, especially since his contrition would not be true contrition, unless he had the purpose of confessing united thereto: which purpose must also be carried into effect, on account of the precept given concerning confession.

  Reply to Objection 2: Just as inward joy redounds into the outward parts of the body, so does interior sorrow show itself in the exterior members: wherefore it is written (Prov. 17:22): "A sorrowful spirit drieth up the bones."

  Reply to Objection 3: Although the sorrow of contrition is finite in its intensity, even as the punishment due for mortal sin is finite; yet it derives infinite power from charity, whereby it is quickened, and so it avails for the remission of both guilt and punishment.


 

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Whether slight contrition suffices to blot out great sins?


  Objection 1: It would seem that slight contrition does not suffice to blot out great sins. For contrition is the remedy for sin. Now a bodily remedy, that heals a lesser bodily infirmity, does not suffice to heal a greater. Therefore the least contrition does not suffice to blot out very great sins.

  Objection 2: Further, it was stated above (Question [3], Article [3]) that for greater sins one ought to have greater contrition. Now contrition does not blot out sin, unless it fulfills the requisite conditions. Therefore the least contrition does not blot out all sins.

  On the contrary, Every sanctifying grace blots out every mortal sin, because it is incompatible therewith. Now every contrition is quickened by sanctifying grace. Therefore, however slight it be, it blots out all sins.

  I answer that, As we have often said (Question [1], Article [2], ad 1; Question [3], Article [1]; Question [4], Article [1]), contrition includes a twofold sorrow. One is in the reason, and is displeasure at the sin committed. This can be so slight as not to suffice for real contrition, e.g. if a sin were less displeasing to a man, than separation from his last end ought to be; just as love can be so slack as not to suffice for real charity. The other sorrow is in the senses, and the slightness of this is no hindrance to real contrition, because it does not, of itself, belong essentially to contrition, but is connected with it accidentally: nor again is it under our control. Accordingly we must say that sorrow, however slight it be, provided it suffice for true contrition, blots out all sin.

  Reply to Objection 1: Spiritual remedies derive infinite efficacy from the infinite power which operates in them: wherefore the remedy which suffices for healing a slight sin, suffices also to heal a great sin. This is seen in Baptism which looses great and small: and the same applies to contrition provided it fulfill the necessary conditions.

  Reply to Objection 2: It follows of necessity that a man grieves more for a greater sin than for a lesser, according as it is more repugnant to the love which causes his sorrow. But if one has the same degree of sorrow for a greater sin, as another has for a lesser, this would suffice for the remission of the sin.


This document converted to HTML on Fri Jan 02 19:10:49 1998.

Latin — Supplementum

pr.

Deinde considerandum est de effectu contritionis.

Circa quod tria quaeruntur.

Primo: utrum peccati remissio sit contritionis effectus.

Secundo: utrum contritio possit totaliter tollere reatum poenae.

Tertio: utrum parva contritio sufficiat ad deletionem magnorum peccatorum.

a. 1 arg. 1

Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod peccati remissio non sit contritionis effectus. Solus enim Deus peccata remittit. Sed contritionis nos sumus aliqualiter causa: quia actus noster est. Ergo contritio non est causa remissionis culpae.

a. 1 arg. 2

Praeterea, contritio est actus virtutis. Sed virtus sequitur culpae remissionem: quia virtus et culpa non sunt simul in anima. Ergo contritio non est causa remissionis culpae.
B: (Wis 11:17) [b:Wis 11:17]

a. 1 arg. 3

Praeterea, nihil impedit a perceptione Eucharistiae nisi culpa. Sed contritus ante confessionem non debet accedere ad Eucharistiam. Ergo nondum est consecutus remissionem culpae.

a. 1 s. c. 1

Sed contra est quod dicitur in Glossa, super illud Psalmi, sacrificium Deo spiritus contribulatus, etc.: contritio cordis est sacrificium in quo peccata solvuntur.

a. 1 arg. 4

Praeterea, virtus et vitium eisdem causis corrumpuntur et generantur, ut dicitur in II Ethic. Sed per inordinatum amorem cordis peccatum committitur: ergo per dolorem ex amore caritatis ordinato causatum peccatum solvitur. Et sic peccatum contritio delet.
B: (Luke 23:43) [b:Luke 23:43]

a. 1 co.

Respondeo dicendum quod contritio potest dupliciter considerari: vel inquantum est pars sacramenti; vel inquantum est actus virtutis. Et utroque modo est causa remissionis peccati, sed diversimode. Quia, inquantum est pars sacramenti, primo operatur ad remissionem peccati instrumentaliter: sicut et de aliis sacramentis in I distinctione patuit. Inquantum autem est actus virtutis, sic est quasi causa materialis remissionis peccati: eo quod dispositio est quasi necessitas ad iustificationem; dispositio autem reducitur ad causam materialem, si accipiatur dispositio quae disponit materiam ad recipiendum. Secus autem est de dispositione agentis ad agendum: quia illa reducitur ad genus causae efficientis.

a. 1 ad 1

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod solus Deus est causa efficiens principalis remissionis peccati: sed causa dispositiva potest etiam esse ex nobis. Et similiter etiam causa sacramentalis: quia formae sacramentorum verba sunt a nobis prolata, quae habent virtutem instrumentalem gratiam inducendi, qua peccata remittuntur.

a. 1 ad 2

Ad secundum dicendum quod peccati remissio uno modo praecedit virtutem et gratiae infusionem, et alio modo sequitur. Et secundum hoc quod sequitur, actus a virtute elicitus potest esse causa aliqua remissionis peccati.

a. 1 ad 3

Ad tertium dicendum quod dispensatio Eucharistiae pertinet ad ministros Ecclesiae. Et ideo ante remissionem peccati per ministros Ecclesiae non debet aliquis ad Eucharistiam accedere, quamvis sit sibi culpa quoad Deum remissa.
B: (Prov 17:22) [b:Prov 17:22]

a. 2 arg. 1

Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod contritio non possit totaliter tollere reatum poenae. Quia satisfactio et confessio ordinantur ad liberationem a reatu poenae. Sed nullus ita perfecte conteritur quin oporteat eum confiteri et satisfacere. Ergo contritio nunquam est tanta quod totaliter deleat reatum totum.

a. 2 arg. 2

Praeterea, in poenitentia oportet esse quaedam recompensatio poenae ad culpam. Sed aliqua culpa per membra corporis exercetur. Ergo, cum oporteat ad debitam poenae recompensationem ut per quae peccat quis, per haec et torqueatur, videtur quod nunquam possit poena talis peccati per contritionem absolvi.

a. 2 arg. 3

Praeterea, dolor contritionis est finitus. Sed pro aliquo peccato, scilicet mortali, debetur poena infinita. Ergo nunquam potest esse tanta contritio quod totam poenam deleat.

a. 2 s. c. 1

Sed contra est quod Deus plus affectum cordis acceptat quam etiam exteriorem actum. Sed per exteriores actus absolvitur homo a poena et culpa. Ergo et similiter per cordis affectum, qui est contritio.

a. 2 arg. 4

Praeterea, exemplum huius de Latrone habetur, cui dictum est, hodie mecum eris in Paradiso, propter unicum poenitentiae actum.

Utrum autem totus reatus per contritionem semper tollatur, supra, dist. 14, quaesitum est, ubi hoc ipsum de poenitentia quaerebatur.

a. 2 co.

Respondeo dicendum quod intensio contritionis potest attendi dupliciter. Uno modo, ex parte caritatis, quae displicentiam causat. Et sic contingit tantum intendi paritatem in actu quod contritio inde sequens merebitur non solum culpae amotionem, sed etiam absolutionem ab omni poena. Alio modo, ex parte doloris sensibilis, quem voluntas in contritione excitat. Et quia illa etiam poena quaedam est, tantum potest intendi quod sufficiat ad deletionem culpae et poenae.

a. 2 ad 1

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod aliquis non potest esse certus quod contritio sua sit sufficiens ad deletionem poenae et culpae. Et ideo tenetur confiteri et satisfacere: maxime cum contritio vera non fuerit nisi propositum confitendi habuisset annexum. Quod debet ad effectum reduci, etiam propter praeceptum quod est de confessione datum.

a. 2 ad 2

Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut gaudium interius redundat etiam ad exteriores corporis partes, ita etiam dolor interior ad exteriora membra derivatur. Unde dicitur Prov. 17: spiritus tristis exsiccat ossa.

a. 2 ad 3

Ad tertium dicendum quod dolor contritionis, quamvis sit finitus quantum ad intensionem, sicut etiam poena peccato mortali debita finita est, habet tamen infinitam virtutem ex caritate, qua informatur. Et secundum hoc potest valere ad deletionem culpae et poenae.

a. 3 arg. 1

Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod contritio parva non sufficiat ad deletionem magnorum peccatorum. Quia contritio est medicina peccati. Sed corporalis medicina quae sanat corporalem morbum minorem, non sufficit ad sanandum maiorem. Ergo minima contritio non sufficit ad delendum maxima peccata.

a. 3 arg. 2

Praeterea, supra dictum est quod oportet de maioribus peccatis magis conteri. Sed contritio non delet peccatum nisi sit secundum quod oportet. Ergo minima contritio non delet omnia peccata.
R: Q.. 3 a. 3[t:suppl q. 3 a. 3]

a. 3 s. c. 1

Sed contra, quaelibet gratia gratum faciens delet omnem culpam mortalem, quae simul stare cum ea non potest. Sed quaelibet contritio est gratia gratum faciente informata. Ergo, quantumcumque sit parva, delet omnem culpam.

a. 3 co.

Respondeo dicendum quod contritio, ut saepe dictum est, habet duplicem dolorem. Unum rationis, qui est displicentia peccati commissi. Et hic potest esse adeo parvus quod non sufficiet ad rationem contritionis, ut si minus displiceret ei peccatum quam debeat displicere separatio a fine: sicut etiam amor potest esse ita remissus quod non sufficit ad rationem caritatis. Alium dolorem habet in sensu. Et parvitas huius non impedit rationem contritionis: quia non se habet essentialiter ad contritionem, sed quasi ex accidenti ei adiungitur. Et iterum non est in potestate nostra.

Sic ergo dicendum quod, quantumcumque parvus sit dolor dummodo ad contritionis rationem sufficiat, omnem culpam delet.
R: Q.. 1 a. 2[t:suppl q. 1 a. 2] Q.. 3 a. 1[t:suppl q. 3 a. 1] Q.. 4 a. 1[t:suppl q. 4 a. 1]

a. 3 ad 1

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod medicinae spirituales habent efficaciam infinitam ex virtute infinita quae in eis operatur. Et ideo illa medicina quae sufficit ad curationem parvi peccati, sufficit etiam ad curationem magni: sicut patet de baptismo, quo et magna et parva solvuntur. Et similiter est de contritione: dummodo ad rationem contritionis pertingat.

a. 3 ad 2

Ad secundum dicendum quod hoc sequitur ex necessitate, quod unus homo plus doleat de maiori peccato quam de minori, secundum quod magis repugnat amori, qui dolorem causat. Sed si unus alius haberet tantum de dolore pro maiori quantum ipse habet de minori, sufficeret ad remissionem culpae.