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St. Thomas Aquinas

The Summa Theologica

(Benziger Bros. edition, 1947)
Translated by
Fathers of the English Dominican Province

 

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OF THE MEANS OF MAKING SATISFACTION (THREE ARTICLES)


   We must now consider the means of making satisfaction, under which head there are three points of inquiry:

    (1) Whether satisfaction must be made by means of penal works?

    (2) Whether the scourges whereby God punishes man in this life, are satisfactory?

    (3) Whether the works of satisfaction are suitably reckoned, by saying that there are three, viz. almsdeeds, fasting, and prayer?


 

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Whether satisfaction must be made by means of penal works?


  Objection 1: It would seem that satisfaction need not be made by means of penal works. For satisfaction should make compensation for the offense committed against God. Now, seemingly, no compensation is given to God by penal works, for God does not delight in our sufferings, as appears from Tobias 3:22. Therefore satisfaction need not be made by means of penal works.

  Objection 2: Further, the greater the charity from which a work proceeds, the less penal is that work, for "charity hath no pain [*Vulg.: 'Perfect charity casteth out fear, because fear hath pain']" according to 1 Jn. 4:18. If therefore works of satisfaction need to be penal, the more they proceed from charity, the less satisfactory will they be: which is false.

  Objection 3: Further, "Satisfaction," as Anselm states (Cur Deus homo i) "consists in giving due honor to God." But this can be done by other means than penal works. Therefore satisfaction needs not to be made by means of penal works.

  On the contrary, Gregory says (Hom. in Evang. xx): "It is just that the sinner, by his repentance, should inflict on himself so much the greater suffering, as he has brought greater harm on himself by his sin."

   Further, the wound caused by sin should be perfectly healed by satisfaction. Now punishment is the remedy for sins, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 3). Therefore satisfaction should be made by means of penal works.

  I answer that, As stated above (Question [12], Article [3]), satisfaction regards both the past offense, for which compensation is made by its means, and also future sin wherefrom we are preserved thereby: and in both respects satisfaction needs to be made by means of penal works. For compensation for an offense implies equality, which must needs be between the offender and the person whom he offends. Now equalization in human justice consists in taking away from one that which he has too much of, and giving it to the person from whom something has been taken. And, although nothing can be taken away from God, so far as He is concerned, yet the sinner, for his part, deprives Him of something by sinning as stated above (Question [12], Articles [3],4). Consequently, in order that compensation be made, something by way of satisfaction that may conduce to the glory of God must be taken away from the sinner. Now a good work, as such, does not deprive the agent of anything, but perfects him: so that the deprivation cannot be effected by a good work unless it be penal. Therefore, in order that a work be satisfactory it needs to be good that it may conduce to God's honor, and it must be penal, so that something may be taken away from the sinner thereby.

   Again punishment preserves from future sin, because a man does not easily fall back into sin when he has had experience of the punishment. Wherefore, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 3) punishments are medicinal.

  Reply to Objection 1: Though God does not delight in our punishments as such, yet He does, in so far as they are just, and thus they can be satisfactory.

  Reply to Objection 2: Just as, in satisfaction, we have to note the penality of the work, so, in merit, we must observe its difficulty. Now if the difficulty of the work itself be diminished, other things being equal, the merit is also diminished; but if the difficulty be diminished on the part of the promptitude of the will, this does not diminish the merit, but increases it; and, in like manner, diminution of the penality of a work, on account of the will being made more prompt by charity, does not lessen the efficacy of satisfaction, but increases it.

  Reply to Objection 3: That which is due for sin is compensation for the offense, and this cannot be done without punishment of the sinner. It is of this debt that Anselm speaks.


 

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Whether the scourges of the present life are satisfactory?


  Objection 1: It would seem that the scourges whereby we are punished by God in this life, cannot be satisfactory. For nothing but what is meritorious can be satisfactory, as is clear from what has been said (Question [14], Article [2]). But we do not merit except by what is in our own power. Since therefore the scourges with which God punishes us are not in our power, it seems that they cannot be satisfactory.

  Objection 2: Further, only the good make satisfaction. But these scourges are inflicted on the wicked also, and are deserved by them most of all. Therefore they cannot be satisfactory.

  Objection 3: Further, satisfaction regards past sins. But these scourges are sometimes inflicted on those who have no sins, as in the case of Job. Therefore it seems that they are not satisfactory.

  On the contrary, It is written (Rm. 5:3,4): "Tribulation worketh patience, and patience trial, i.e. deliverance from sin," as a gloss explains it.

   Further, Ambrose says (Super Ps. 118): "Although faith," i.e. the consciousness of sin, "be lacking, the punishment satisfies." Therefore the scourges of this life are satisfactory.

  I answer that, Compensation for a past offense can be enforced either by the offender or by another. When it is enforced by another, such compensation is of a vindictive rather than of a satisfactory nature, whereas when it is made by the offender, it is also satisfactory. Consequently, if the scourges, which are inflicted by God on account of sin, become in some way the act of the sufferer they acquire a satisfactory character. Now they become the act of the sufferer in so far as he accepts them for the cleansing of his sins, by taking advantage of them patiently. If, however, he refuse to submit to them patiently, then they do not become his personal act in any way, and are not of a satisfactory, but merely of a vindictive character.

  Reply to Objection 1: Although these scourges are not altogether in our power, yet in some respect they are, in so far as we use them patiently. In this way man makes a virtue of necessity, so that such things can become both meritorious and satisfactory.

  Reply to Objection 2: As Augustine observes (De Civ. Dei i, 8), even as "the same fire makes gold glisten and straw reek," so by the same scourges are the good cleansed and the wicked worsened on account of their impatience. Hence, though the scourges are common to both, satisfaction is only on the side of the good.

  Reply to Objection 3: These scourges always regard past guilt, not always the guilt of the person, but sometimes the guilt of nature. For had there not been guilt in human nature, there would have been no punishment. But since guilt preceded in nature, punishment is inflicted by God on a person without the person's fault, that his virtue may be meritorious, and that he may avoid future sin. Moreover, these two things are necessary in satisfaction. For the work needs to be meritorious, that honor may be given to God, and it must be a safeguard of virtue, that we may be preserved from future sins.


 

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Whether the works of satisfaction are suitably enumerated?


  Objection 1: It would seem that the works of satisfaction are unsuitably enumerated by saying that there are three, viz. almsdeeds, fasting, and prayer. For a work of satisfaction should be penal. But prayer is not penal, since it is a remedy against penal sorrow, and is a source of pleasure, wherefore it is written (James 5:13): "Is any of you sad? Let him pray. Is he cheerful in mind? Let him sing." Therefore prayer should not be reckoned among the works of satisfaction.

  Objection 2: Further, every sin is either carnal or spiritual. Now, as Jerome says on Mk. 9:28, "This kind" of demons "can go out by nothing, but by prayer and fasting: Diseases of the body are healed by fasting, diseases of the mind, by prayer." Therefore no other work of satisfaction is necessary.

  Objection 3: Further, satisfaction is necessary in order for us to be cleansed from our sins. But almsgiving cleanses from all sins, according to Lk. 11:41: "Give alms, and behold all things are clean unto you." Therefore the other two are in excess.

  Objection 4: On the other hand, it seems that there should be more. For contrary heals contrary. But there are many more than three kinds of sin. Therefore more works of satisfaction should be enumerated.

  Objection 5: Further, pilgrimages and scourgings are also enjoined as works of satisfaction, and are not included among the above. Therefore they are not sufficiently enumerated.

  I answer that, Satisfaction should be of such a nature as to involve something taken away from us for the honor of God. Now we have but three kinds of goods, bodily, spiritual, and goods of fortune, or external goods. By alms-deeds we deprive ourselves of some goods of fortune, and by fasting we retrench goods of the body. As to goods of the soul, there is no need to deprive ourselves of any of them, either in whole or in part, since thereby we become acceptable to God, but we should submit them entirely to God, which is done by prayer.

   This number is shown to be suitable in so far as satisfaction uproots the causes of sin, for these are reckoned to be three (1 Jn. 2:16), viz. "concupiscence of the flesh," "concupiscence of the eyes," and "pride of life." Fasting is directed against concupiscence of the "flesh," alms-deeds against concupiscence of the "eyes," and "prayer" against "pride of life," as Augustine says (Enarr. in Ps. 42).

   This number is also shown to be suitable in so far as satisfaction does not open a way to the suggestions of sin, because every sin is committed either against God, and this is prevented by "prayer," or against our neighbor, and this is remedied by "alms-deeds," or against ourselves, and this is forestalled by "fasting."

  Reply to Objection 1: According to some, prayer is twofold. There is the prayer of contemplatives whose "conversation is in heaven": and this, since it is altogether delightful, is not a work of satisfaction. The other is a prayer which pours forth sighs for sin; this is penal and a part of satisfaction.

   It may also be replied, and better, that every prayer has the character of satisfaction, for though it be sweet to the soul it is painful to the body, since, as Gregory says (Super Ezech., Hom. xiv), "doubtless, when our soul's love is strengthened, our body's strength is weakened"; hence we read (Gn. 32:25) that the sinew of Jacob's thigh shrank through his wrestling with the angel.

  Reply to Objection 2: Carnal sin is twofold; one which is completed in carnal delectation, as gluttony and lust. and, another which is completed in things relating to the flesh, though it be completed in the delectation of the soul rather than of the flesh, as covetousness. Hence such like sins are between spiritual and carnal sins, so that they need a satisfaction proper to them, viz. almsdeeds.

  Reply to Objection 3: Although each of these three, by a kind of likeness, is appropriated to some particular kind of sin because it is reasonable that, whereby a man sins, in that he should be punished, and that satisfaction should cut out the very root of the sin committed, yet each of them can satisfy for any kind of sin. Hence if a man is unable to perform one of the above, another is imposed on him, chiefly almsdeeds, which can take the place of the others, in so far as in those to whom a man gives alms he purchases other works of satisfaction thereby. Consequently even if almsgiving washes all sins away, it does not follow that other works are in excess.

  Reply to Objection 4: Though there are many kinds of sins, all are reduced to those three roots or to those three kinds of sin, to which, as we have said, the aforesaid works of satisfaction correspond.

  Reply to Objection 5: Whatever relates to affliction of the body is all referred to fasting, and whatever is spent for the benefit of one's neighbor is a kind of alms, and whatever act of worship is given to God becomes a kind of prayer, so that even one work can be satisfactory in several ways.


This document converted to HTML on Fri Jan 02 19:10:49 1998.

Latin — Supplementum

pr.

Deinde considerandum est de his per quae satisfactio fit.

Circa quod quaeruntur tria.

Primo: utrum satisfactionem oporteat fieri per opera poenalia.

Secundo: utrum flagella, quibus a Deo in hac vita homo punitur, sint satisfactoria.

Tertio: utrum convenienter enumerentur opera satisfactoria, cum dicitur quod sunt tria, scilicet eleemosyna, ieiunium et oratio.

a. 1 arg. 1

Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod satisfactionem non oporteat fieri per opera poenalia. Quia per satisfactionem oportet fieri recompensationem ad divinam offensam. Sed nulla recompensatio videtur fieri per opera poenalia: quia Deus non delectatur in poenis nostris. Ergo non oportet satisfactionem per opera poenalia fieri.

a. 1 arg. 2

Praeterea, quanto aliquod opus ex maiori caritate procedit, tanto minus est poenale: quia, caritas poenam non habet, I Ioan. 4. Si ergo oportet opera satisfactoria esse poenalia, quanto magis sunt ex caritate facta, minus erunt satisfactoria. Quod falsum est.

a. 1 arg. 3

Praeterea, satisfacere, ut dicit Anselmus, est honorem debitum Deo impendere. Sed hoc etiam aliis quam operibus poenalibus fieri potest. Ergo satisfactionem non oportet poenalibus operibus fieri.

a. 1 s. c. 1

Sed contra: Est quod Gregorius dicit: iustum est ut peccator tanto maiora sibi inferat lamenta per poenitentiam, quanto maiora intulit damna per culpam.
B: (Rom 5:3) [b:Rom 5:3] (Rom 5:4) [b:Rom 5:4]

a. 1 arg. 4

Praeterea, per satisfactionem oportet peccati vulnus sanari perfecte. Sed peccatorum medicinae sunt poenae: ut Philosophus dicit, II Ethic. 3. Ergo oportet quod per poenalia opera satisfactio fiat.
B: (Ps 118) [b:Ps 118]

a. 1 co.

Respondeo dicendum quod satisfactio respectum habet et ad praeteritam offensam, pro qua recompensatio fit per satisfactionem; et etiam ad futuram culpam, a qua per eam praeservamur. Et quantum ad utrumque exigit quod satisfactio per opera poenalia fiat. Recompensatio enim offensae importat adaequationem quam oportet esse eius qui offendit ad eum in quem offensa commissa est. Adaequatio autem in humana iustitia autenditur per subtractionem ab uno qui plus habuit iusto, et additionem ad alterum cui subtractum est aliquid. Deo autem quamvis, quantum ex parte sua est, nihil subtrahi possit, tamen peccator, quantum in ipso est, aliquid ei subtraxit peccando, ut dictum est. Unde oportet, ad hoc quod recompensatio fiat, quod aliquid subtrahatur de peccante per satisfactionem quod in honorem Dei cedat. Opus autem bonum, ex hoc quod est huiusmodi, non subtrahit aliquid ab operante, sed magis perficit ipsum. Unde subtractio non potest fieri per opus bonum nisi poenale sit. Et ideo, ad hoc quod aliquod opus sit satisfactorium, oportet quod, sit bonum, ut in honorem Dei sit; et poenale, ut aliquid peccatori subtrahatur.

Similiter etiam poena a culpa futura praeservat; quia non facile homo ad peccata redit ex quo poenam expertus est. Unde, secundum Philosophum, poenae medicinae sunt.

a. 1 ad 1

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, quamvis Deus non delectetur in poenis ut sunt poenae, delectatur tamen in eis ut sunt iustae. Et sic satisfactoriae esse possunt.

a. 1 ad 2

Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut in satisfactione consideratur poenalitas, ita in merito consideratur difficultas. Diminutio autem difficultatis ex parte ipsius actus diminuit, ceteris paribus, meritum: sed diminutio difficultatis ex promptitudine voluntatis non diminuit meritum, sed auget. Et similiter diminutio poenalitatis ex promptitudine voluntatis, quod facit caritas, non diminuit efficaciam satisfactionis, sed auget.

a. 1 ad 3

Ad tertium dicendum quod debitum pro peccato est recompensatio offensae, quae sine poena peccantis non fit. Et de tali debito Anselmus intelligit.

a. 2 arg. 1

Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod flagella quibus a Deo in hac vita punimur, non possint satisfactoria esse. Nihil enim potest esse satisfactorium nisi quod est meritorium, ut ex dictis patet. Sed non meremur nisi per ea quae in nobis sunt. Cum ergo flagella quibus a Deo punimur, non sint in nobis, videtur quod satisfactoria esse non possunt.
B: (Jas 5:13) [b:Jas 5:13]

a. 2 arg. 2

Praeterea, satisfactio tantum bonorum est. Sed huiusmodi flagella in malis inducuntur, et praecipue eis debentur. Ergo non possunt esse satisfactoria.
B: (Mark 9:28) [b:Mark 9:28]

a. 2 arg. 3

Praeterea, satisfactio respicit peccata praeterita. Sed aliquando ista flagella infliguntur illis qui peccata non habent: sicut de Iob patet. Ergo videtur quod non sint satisfactoria.
B: (Luke 11:41) [b:Luke 11:41]

a. 2 s. c. 1

Sed contra: Est quod dicitur Rom. 5: tribulatio patientiam operatur, patientia autem probationem: idest a peccato purgationem, ut Glossa ibidem dicit. Ergo flagella peccata purgant. Et sic sunt satisfactoria.

a. 2 arg. 4

Praeterea, Ambrosius dicit: etsi fides, idest peccati conscientia, desit, poena satisfacit. Ergo huiusmodi flagella sunt satisfactoria.

a. 2 co.

Respondeo dicendum quod recompensatio offensae praeteritae potest fieri et ab eo qui offendit, et ab alio. Quando autem fit ab alio, talis recompensatio vindicationis magis quam satisfactionis rationem habet: quando autem fit ab ipso qui offendit, etiam rationem satisfactionis habet. Unde, si flagella quae pro peccatis a Deo infliguntur, fiant aliquo modo ipsius patientis, rationem satisfactionis accipiunt. Fiunt autem ipsius inquantum ea acceptat ad purgationem peccatorum, eis utens patienter. Si autem omnino eis per impatientiam dissentiat, tunc non efficiuntur aliquo modo ipsius. Et ideo non habent rationem satisfactionis, sed vindicationis tantum.

a. 2 ad 1

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, quamvis illa flagella non sint omnino in potestate nostra, tamen quantum ad aliquid sunt, ut scilicet eis patienter utamur. Et sic homo facit de necessitate virtutem. Unde et meritoria et satisfactoria esse possunt.
B: (Ps 42) [b:Ps 42] (1John 2:16) [b:1John 2:16]

a. 2 ad 2

Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut ex eodem igne, ut Gregorius dicit, aurum rutilat et palea fumat, ita etiam eisdem flagellis et boni purgantur, et mali magis infitiuntur per impatientiam. Et ideo, quamvis flagella sint communia, tamen satisfactio tantum est bonorum.

a. 2 ad 3

Ad tertium dicendum quod flagella respectum habent ad culpam praeteritam semper: sed non semper ad culpam personae, sed ad culpam naturae. Si enim in humana natura nulla culpa praecessisset, nulla poena fuisset. Sed quia culpa in natura praecessit, personae alicui divinitus poena infertur sine culpa personae, ad meritum virtutis et cautelam peccati sequentis. Et haec duo etiam necessaria sunt in satisfactione. Oportet enim esse opus meritorium, ut honor Deo exhibeatur; et oportet esse virtutum custodiam, ut a futuris peccatis praeservemur.

a. 3 arg. 1

Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter enumerentur opera satisfactoria, cum dicitur quod sunt tria: eleemosyna, ieiunium et oratio. Quia opus satisfactorium debet esse poenale. Sed oratio poenam non habet, cum sit contra poenae tristitiam medicina, sed delectationem: unde dicitur Iac. 5: tristatur aliquis in vobis? Oret et psallat. Ergo non debet computari inter opera satisfactoria.

a. 3 arg. 2

Praeterea, omne peccatum; vel est carnale vel spirituale. Sed, sicut dicit Hieronymus, ieiunio sanantur pestes corporis, oratione pestes mentis. Ergo non debet esse aliquod aliud opiis satisfactorium.

a. 3 arg. 3

Praeterea, satisfactio est necessaria ad emundationem peccatorum. Sed eleemosyna ab omnibus peccatis emundat, Luc. 11: date eleemosynam, et omnia munda sunt vobis. Ergo alia duo sunt superflua.

a. 3 s. c. 1

Sed contra: Videtur quod debeant esse plura. Quia contraria contrariis curantur. Sed multo plura sunt peccatorum genera quam tria. Ergo debent plura satisfactionis opera computari.

a. 3 arg. 4

Praeterea, peregrinationes etiam iniunguntur pro satisfactione, et disciplinae sive flagelliones, quae non computantur sub aliquo horum. Ergo debent plura satisfactionis opera computari.

a. 3 co.

Respondeo dicendum quod satisfactio debet esse talis per quam aliquid nobis subtrahamus ad honorem Dei. Nos autem non habemus nisi tria bona: scilicet bona animae, et bona corporis, et bona fortunae, scilicet exteriora. Ex bonis quidem fortunae subtrahimus nobis aliquid per eleemosynam: sed ex bonis corporalibus per ieiunium. Ex bonis autem animae non oportet quod aliquid subtrahamus nobis quantum ad essentiam vel quantum ad diminutionem ipsorum, quia per ea efficimur Deo accepti: sed per hoc quod ea submittimus Deo totaliter. Et hoc fit per orationem.

Competit etiam iste numerus ex parte illa qua satisfactio peccatorum causas excidit. Quia radices peccatorum tres ponuntur, I Ioan. 2: scilicet concupiscentia carnism et concupiscentia oculorum, et superbia vitae. Et contra concupiscentiam carnis ordinatur ieiunium; contra concupiscentiam oculorum ordinatur eleemosyna; contra superbiam vitae ordinatur oratio; ut Augustinus dicit, super Matthaeum.

Competit etiam quantum ad hoc quod satisfactio peccatorum est suggestionibus aditum non indulgere; Quia omne peccatum vel in Deum committimus: et contra hoc ordinatur oratio. Vel in proximum: et contra hoc eleemosyna. Vel in nos ipsos: et contra hoc ordinatur ieiunium.

a. 3 ad 1

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, secundum quosdam, duplex est oratio. Quaedam quae est contemplativorum, quorum conversatio in caelis est. Et talis, quia totaliter est delectabilis, non est satisfactoria. Alia est quae pro peccatis gemitus fundit. Et talis habet poenam; et est satisfactionis pars.

Vel dicendum melius quod quaelibet oratio habet rationem satisfactionis, quia, quamvis habeat suavitatem spiritus, habet tamen afflictionem carnis: quia, ut dicit Gregorius, super Ezech., dum crescit in nobis fortitudo amoris intimi, infirmamur procul dubio fortitudine carnis. Unde etiam nervus femoris Iacob ex lucta angeli emarcuisse legitur in Genesi.

a. 3 ad 2

Ad secundum dicendum quod peccatum carnale dicitur dupliciter. Uno modo, quod in ipsa delectatione carnis completur: ut gula et luxuria. Alio modo, quod completur in his quae ad carnem ordinantur, quamvis non in delectatione carnis, sed in delectatione animae magis: ut avaritia. Unde talia peccata sunt quasi media inter spiritualia et carnalia. Et ideo oportet quod eis etiam aliqua satisfactio respondeat propria, scilicet eleemosyna.

a. 3 ad 3

Ad tertium dicendum quod, quamvis singula istorum per quandam convenientiam singulis peccatis approprientur, quia congruum est ut in quo quis peccaverit, in hoc puniatur, et quod peccati commissi per satisfactionem radix abscindatur; tamen quodlibet horum pro quolibet peccato satisfacere potest. Unde ei qui non potest unum ex his perficere, iniungatur aliud. Et praecipue eleemosyna aliorum vices supplere potest: inquantum alia satisfactionis opera per eleemosynam quisque sibi mercatur quodammodo in illis quibus eleemosynam tribuit. Unde non oportet quod, si eleemosyna omnia mundat peccata, quod propter hoc aliae satisfactiones superfluant.

a. 3 ad 4

Ad quartum dicendum quod, quamvis sint multa peccata in specie, tamen omnia ad illas tres radices, vel ad illa tria peccatorum genera quibus diximus dictas satisfactiones respondere, reducuntur.

a. 3 ad 5

Ad quintum dicendum quod quidquid ad afflictionem corporis pertinet, totum ad ieiunium refertur; et quidquid in proximi utilitate expenditur, totum eleemosynae rationem habet; et similiter quaecumque latria exhibeatur Deo, orationis accipit rationem. Et ideo etiam unum opus potest habere plures rationes satisfaciendi.