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St. Thomas Aquinas

The Summa Theologica

(Benziger Bros. edition, 1947)
Translated by
Fathers of the English Dominican Province

 

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OF THE IMPEDIMENT TO MARRIAGE, ARISING FROM A SOLEMN VOW (THREE ARTICLES)


   We must next consider the impediments which supervene to marriage. We shall consider (1) the impediment which affects an unconsummated marriage, namely a solemn vow: (2) the impediment which affects a consummated marriage, namely fornication. Under the first head there are three points of inquiry:

    (1) Whether either party after the marriage has been consummated can enter religion without the other's consent?

    (2) Whether they can enter religion before the consummation of the marriage?

    (3) Whether the wife can take another husband if her former husband has entered religion before the consummation of the marriage?


 

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Whether one party after the marriage has been consummated can enter religion without the other's consent?


  Objection 1: It would seem that even after the marriage has been consummated one consort can enter religion without the other's consent. For the Divine law ought to be more favorable to spiritual things than human law. Now human law has allowed this. Therefore much more should the Divine law permit it.

  Objection 2: Further, the lesser good does not hinder the greater. But the married state is a lesser good than the religious state, according to 1 Cor. 7:38. Therefore marriage ought not to hinder a man from being able to enter religion.

  Objection 3: Further, in every form of religious life there is a kind of spiritual marriage. Now it is lawful to pass from a less strict religious order to one that is stricter. Therefore it is also allowable to pass from a less strict---namely a carnal---marriage to a stricter marriage, namely that of the religious life, even without the wife's consent.

  On the contrary, Married persons are forbidden (1 Cor. 7:5) to abstain from the use of marriage even for a time without one another's consent, in order to have time for prayer.

   Further, no one can lawfully do that which is prejudicial to another without the latter's consent. Now the religious vow taken by one consort is prejudicial to the other, since the one has power over the other's body. Therefore one of them cannot take a religious vow without the other's consent.

  I answer that, No one can make an offering to God of what belongs to another. Wherefore since by a consummated marriage the husband's body already belongs to his wife, he cannot by a vow of continence offer it to God without her consent.

  Reply to Objection 1: Human law considers marriage merely as fulfilling an office of nature: whereas the Divine law considers it as a sacrament, by reason of which it is altogether indissoluble. Hence the comparison fails.

  Reply to Objection 2: It is not unreasonable that a greater good be hindered by a lesser which is contrary to it, just as good is hindered by evil.

  Reply to Objection 3: In every form of religious life marriage is contracted with one person, namely Christ; to Whom, however, a person contracts more obligations in one religious order than in another. But in carnal marriage and religious marriage the contract is not with the same person: wherefore that comparison fails.


 

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Whether before the marriage has been consummated one consort can enter religion without the other's consent?


  Objection 1: It would seem that even before the marriage has been consummated one consort cannot enter religion without the other's consent. For the indissolubility of marriage belongs to the sacrament of matrimony, inasmuch, namely, as it signifies the union of Christ with the Church. Now marriage is a true sacrament before its consummation, and after consent has been expressed in words of the present. Therefore it cannot be dissolved by one of them entering religion.

  Objection 2: Further, by virtue of the consent expressed in words of the present, the one consort has given power over his body to the other. Therefore the one can forthwith ask for the marriage debt, and the other is bound to pay: and so the one cannot enter religion without the other's consent.

  Objection 3: Further, it is said (Mt. 19:6): "What God hath joined together let no man put asunder." But the union which precedes marital intercourse was made by God. Therefore it cannot be dissolved by the will of man.

  On the contrary, According to Jerome [*Prolog. in Joan.] our Lord called John from his wedding.

  I answer that, Before marital intercourse there is only a spiritual bond between husband and wife, but afterwards there is a carnal bond between them. Wherefore, just as after marital intercourse marriage is dissolved by carnal death, so by entering religion the bond which exists before the consummation of the marriage is dissolved, because religious life is a kind of spiritual death, whereby a man dies to the world and lives to God.

  Reply to Objection 1: Before consummation marriage signifies the union of Christ with the soul by grace, which is dissolved by a contrary spiritual disposition, namely mortal sin. But after consummation it signifies the union of Christ with the Church, as regards the assumption of human nature into the unity of person, which union is altogether indissoluble.

  Reply to Objection 2: Before consummation the body of one consort is not absolutely delivered into the power of the other, but conditionally, provided neither consort meanwhile seek the fruit of a better life. But by marital intercourse the aforesaid delivery is completed, because then each of them enters into bodily possession of the power transferred to him. Wherefore also before consummation they are not bound to pay the marriage debt forthwith after contracting marriage by words of the present, but a space of two months is allowed them for three reasons. First that they may deliberate meanwhile about entering religion; secondly, to prepare what is necessary for the solemnization of the wedding. thirdly, lest the husband think little of a gift he has not longed to possess (cap. Institutum, caus. xxvi, qu. ii).

  Reply to Objection 3: The marriage union, before consummation, is indeed perfect as to its primary being, but is not finally perfect as to its second act which is operation. It is like bodily possession and consequently is not altogether indissoluble.


 

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Whether the wife may take another husband if her husband has entered religion before the consummation of the marriage?


  Objection 1: It would seem that the wife may not take another husband, if her husband has entered religion before the consummation of the marriage. For that which is consistent with marriage does not dissolve the marriage tie. Now the marriage tie still remains between those who equally take religious vows. Therefore by the fact that one enters religion, the other is not freed from the marriage tie. But as long as she remains tied to one by marriage, she cannot marry another. Therefore, etc.

  Objection 2: Further, after entering religion and before making his profession the husband can return to the world. If then the wife can marry again when her husband enters religion, he also can marry again when he returns to the world: which is absurd.

  Objection 3: Further, by a new decree (cap. Non solum, de regular. et transeunt.) a profession, if made before the expiry of a year, is accounted void. Therefore if he return to his wife after making such a profession, she is bound to receive him. Therefore neither by her husband's entry into religion, nor by his taking a vow, does the wife receive the power to marry again.

  On the contrary, No one can bind another to those things which belong to perfection. Now continence is of those things that belong to perfection. Therefore a wife is not bound to continence on account of her husband entering religion, and consequently she can marry.

  I answer that, Just as bodily death of the husband dissolves the marriage tie in such a way that the wife may marry whom she will, according to the statement of the Apostle (1 Cor. 7:39); so too after the husband's spiritual death by entering religion, she can marry whom she will.

  Reply to Objection 1: When both consorts take a like vow of continence, neither renounces the marriage tie, wherefore it still remains: but when only one takes the vow, then for his own part he renounces the marriage tie, wherefore the other is freed therefrom.

  Reply to Objection 2: A person is not accounted dead to the world by entering religion until he makes his profession, and consequently his wife is bound to wait for him until that time.

  Reply to Objection 3: We must judge of a profession thus made before the time fixed by law, as of a simple vow. Wherefore just as when the husband has taken a simple vow his wife is not bound to pay him the marriage debt, and yet has not the power to marry again, so is it in this case.


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Latin — Supplementum

pr.

Deinde considerandum est de impedimentis quae superveniunt matrimonio. Et primo, de impedimento quod supervenit matrimonio, scilicet de voto solemni; secundo, de impedimento quod supervenit matrimonio consummato, scilicet de fornicatione.

Circa primum quaeruntur tria.

Primo: utrum alter coniugum, altero invito, post carnalem copulam possit religionem intrare.

Secundo: utrum ante carnalem copulam possit intrare.

Tertio: utrum mulier possit nubere alteri, viro ante carnalem copulam religionem ingresso.

a. 1 arg. 1

Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod alter coniugum, etiam post carnalem copulam, possit, altero invito, ad religionem transire. Quia lex divina magis debet spiritualibus favere quam lex humana. Sed. lex humana hoc permisit. Ergo multo fortius lex divina permittere debuit.
B: (Rom 12:14) [b:Rom 12:14]

a. 1 arg. 2

Praeterea, minus bonum non impedit maius bonum. Sed matrimonii status est minus bonum quam status religionis, ut patet I Cor. 7. Ergo per matrimonium non debet homo impediri quin possit ad religionem transire.

a. 1 arg. 3

Praeterea, in qualibet religione fit quoddam spirituale matrimonium. Sed licet de leviori religione ad arctiorem transire. Ergo licet de matrimonio leviori, scilicet carnali, ad arctius, scilicet matrimonium religionis, transire, etiam invita uxore.
B: (1Cor 5:5) [b:1Cor 5:5]

a. 1 s. c. 1

Sed contra: Est quod dicitur I Cor. 7, ut nec etiam ad tempus vacent orationi coniuges sine mutuo consensu, a matrimonio abstinentes.
B: (1Cor 5:5) [b:1Cor 5:5]

a. 1 arg. 4

Praeterea, nullus potest facere licite quod est in praeiudicium alterius, sine eius voluntate. Sed votum religionis emissum ab uno coniugum est in praeiudicium alterius: quia unus habet potestatem corporis alterius. Ergo unus sine consensu alterius non potest votum religionis emittere.
B: (Matt 18:17) [b:Matt 18:17]

a. 1 co.

Respondeo dicendum quod nullus potest facere oblationem Deo de alieno. Unde, cum per matrimonium iam consummatum sit corpus viri factum uxoris, non potest sine consensu eius Deo ipsum offerre per continentiae votum.

a. 1 ad 1

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod lex humana considerabat matrimonium solum inquantum est in officium naturae. Sed lex divina secundum quod est sacramentum, ex quo habet omnimodam indivisibilitatem. Et ideo non est simile.

a. 1 ad 2

Ad secundum dicendum quod non est inconveniens maius bonum impediri per minus bonum quod habet contrarietatem ad ipsum: sicut etiam bonum per malum impeditur.

a. 1 ad 3

Ad tertium dicendum quod in qualibet religione contrahitur matrimonium ad unam personam, scilicet ad Christum, cui tamen ad plura obligatur aliquis in una religione quam in alia. Sed matrimonium materiale et religionis non fiunt ad unam personam. Et ideo non est simile.

a. 2 arg. 1

Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod nec etiam ante carnalem copulam. Indivisibilitas enim matrimonii pertinet ad matrimonii sacramentum, inquantum scilicet significat perpetuam coniunctionem: Christi ad Ecclesiam. Sed ante carnalem copulam, post consensum per verba de praesenti expressum, est verum matrimonii sacramentum. Ergo non potest fieri divisio per hoc quod alter ad religionem intrat.

a. 2 arg. 2

Praeterea, in ipso consensu per verba de praesenti expresso unus coniugum in alterum potestatem sui corporis transfert. Ergo statim potest exigere debitum, et alter tenetur reddere. Et ita non potest unus, invito altero, ad religionem transire.
B: (Rom 12:17) [b:Rom 12:17]

a. 2 arg. 3

Praeterea, Matth. 19: quos Deus coniunxit, homo non separet. Sed coniunctio quae est ante carnalem copulam divinitus facta est. Ergo non potest separari humana voluntate.
B: (Acts 5:1-10) [b:Acts 5:1-10]

a. 2 s. c. 1

Sed contra est quod, secundum Hieronymum, Dominus Ioannem vocavit de nuptiis.

a. 2 co.

Respondeo dicendum quod ante carnalem copulam est inter coniuges tantum vinculum spirituale, sed postea etiam est inter eos vinculum carnale. Et ideo, sicut post carnalem copulam matrimonium solvitur per mortem carnalem, ita per ingressum religionis ante copulam carnalem solvitur: quia religio est quaedam mors spiritualis, qua aliquis, saeculo moriens, vivit Deo.

a. 2 ad 1

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod matrimonium ante carnalem copulam significat illam coniunctionem quae est Christi ad animam per gratiam, quae quidem solvitur per dispositionem spiritualem contrariam, scilicet per peccatum. Sed per carnalem copulam significat coniunctionem ad Ecclesiam quantum ad assumptionem humanae naturae in unitate personae, quae omnino est indivisibilis.

a. 2 ad 2

Ad secundum dicendum quod ante carnalem copulam non est omnino translatum corpus unius sub potestate alterius, sed sub conditione si interea alter ad frugem melioris vitae non convolet. Sed per carnalem copulam completur dicta translatio: quia tunc intrat uterque in corporalem possessionem sibi traditae potestatis. Unde etiam ante carnalem copulam non statim tenetur reddere debitum post matrimonium contractum per verba de praesenti, sed datur ei tempus duorum mensium, propter tria. Primo, ut interim possit deliberare de transeundo ad religionem. Secundo, ut praeparentur quae sunt necessaria ad solemnitatem nuptiarum. Tertio, ne vilem habeat maritus datam quam non suspiravit dilatam.

a. 2 ad 3

Ad tertium dicendum quod coniunctio matrimonialis ante carnalem copulam est quidem perfecta quantum ad esse primum, sed non consummata quantum ad actum secundum, qui est operatio, et similatur possessioni corporali. Et ideo non omnimodam indivisibilitatem habet.

a. 3 arg. 1

Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod mulier non possit nubere alteri, viro ante carnalem copulam religionem ingresso. Quia illud quod cum matrimonio stare potest, non solvit matrimoniale vinculum. Sed adhuc manet vinculum matrimoniale inter eos qui pari voto religionem intrant. Ergo ex hoc quod unus intrat religionem, alter non absolvitur a vinculo matrimoniali. Sed quandiu manet vinculum matrimoniale ad unum, non potest nubere alteri. Ergo, etc.

a. 3 arg. 2

Praeterea, vir post ingressum religionis potest ante professionem redire ad saeculum. Si ergo mulier posset alteri nubere, viro intrante religionem, et ipse posset alteram ducere rediens ad saeculum. Quod est absurdum.
B: (Matt 16:19) [b:Matt 16:19]

a. 3 arg. 3

Praeterea, per Decretalem novam professio ante annum emissa pro nulla reputatur. Ergo, si post talem professionem ad uxorem redeat, tenetur eum recipere. Ergo neque per introitum viri in religionem, neque per votum, datur mulieri potestas nubendi alteri.

a. 3 s. c. 1

Sed contra, nullus potest alterum obligare ad ea quae sunt perfectionis. Sed continentia est de his quae ad perfectionem pertinent. Ergo mulier non arctatur ad continentiam ex hoc quod vir religionem ingreditur. Et sic potest nubere.

a. 3 co.

Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut mors corporalis viri hoc modo vinculum matrimoniale solvit ut mulier nubat cui vult, secundum Apostoli sententiam; ita etiam post mortem spiritualem viri per religionis ingressum poterit cui voluerit nubere.

a. 3 ad 1

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, quando uterque pari voto continentiam vovet, tunc neuter coniugali vinculo abrenuntiat, et ideo adhuc manet. Sed quando unus tantum vovet, tunc, quantum est in se, abrenuntiat vinculo coniugali. Et ideo alter absolvitur a vinculo illo.

a. 3 ad 2

Ad secundum dicendum quod non intelligitur mortuus saeculo per religionis ingressum quousque professionem emiserit. Et ideo usque ad tempus illud tenetur eum uxor sua expectare.

a. 3 ad 3

Ad tertium dicendum quod de professione sic emissa ante tempus determinatum a iure est idem iudicium quod de voto simplici. Unde, sicut post votum simplex viri mulier ei debitum reddere non tenetur, tamen ipsa non haberet potestatem alteri nubere, ita et hic.