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St. Thomas Aquinas

The Summa Theologica

(Benziger Bros. edition, 1947)
Translated by
Fathers of the English Dominican Province

 

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OF GOD'S MERCY AND JUSTICE TOWARDS THE DAMNED (FIVE ARTICLES)


   We must next consider God's justice and mercy towards the damned: under which head there are five points of inquiry:

    (1) Whether by Divine justice an eternal punishment is inflicted on sinners?

    (2) Whether by God's mercy all punishment both of men and of demons comes to an end?

    (3) Whether at least the punishment of men comes to an end?

    (4) Whether at least the punishment of Christians has an end?

    (5) Whether there is an end to the punishment of those who have performed works of mercy?


 

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Whether by Divine justice an eternal punishment is inflicted on sinners? [*Cf. FS, Question [87], Articles [3],4]


  Objection 1: It would seem that an eternal punishment is not inflicted on sinners by Divine justice. For the punishment should not exceed the fault: "According to the measure of the sin shall the measure also of the stripes be" (Dt. 25:2). Now fault is temporal. Therefore the punishment should not be eternal.

  Objection 2: Further, of two mortal sins one is greater than the other. and therefore one should receive a greater punishment than the other. But no punishment is greater than eternal punishment, since it is infinite. Therefore eternal punishment is not due to every sin; and if it is not due to one, it is due to none, since they are not infinitely distant from one another.

  Objection 3: Further, a just judge does not punish except in order to correct, wherefore it is stated (Ethic. ii, 3) that "punishments are a kind of medicine." Now, to punish the wicked eternally does not lead to their correction, nor to that of others, since then there will be no one in future who can be corrected thereby. Therefore eternal punishment is not inflicted for sins according to Divine justice.

  Objection 4: Further, no one wishes that which is not desirable for its own sake, except on account of some advantage. Now God does not wish punishment for its own sake, for He delights not in punishments [*The allusion is to Wis. 1:13: "Neither hath He pleasure in the destruction of the living," as may be gathered from FS, Question [87], Article [3], Objection [3]]. Since then no advantage can result from the perpetuity of punishment, it would seem that He ought not to inflict such a punishment for sin.

  Objection 5: Further, "nothing accidental lasts for ever" (De Coelo et Mundo i). But punishment is one of those things that happen accidentally, since it is contrary to nature. Therefore it cannot be everlasting.

  Objection 6: Further, the justice of God would seem to require that sinners should be brought to naught: because on account of ingratitude a person deserves to lose all benefits. and among other benefits of God there is "being" itself. Therefore it would seem just that the sinner who has been ungrateful to God should lose his being. But if sinners be brought to naught, their punishment cannot be everlasting. Therefore it would seem out of keeping with Divine justice that sinners should be punished for ever.

  On the contrary, It is written (Mt. 25:46): "These," namely the wicked, "shall go into everlasting punishment."

   Further, as reward is to merit, so is punishment to guilt. Now, according to Divine justice, an eternal reward is due to temporal merit: "Every one who seeth the Son and believeth in Him hath [Vulg.: 'that everyone . . . may have'] life everlasting." Therefore according to Divine justice an everlasting punishment is due to temporal guilt.

   Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 5), punishment is meted according to the dignity of the person sinned against, so that a person who strikes one in authority receives a greater punishment than one who strikes anyone else. Now whoever sins mortally sins against God, Whose commandments he breaks, and Whose honor he gives another, by placing his end in some one other than God. But God's majesty is infinite. Therefore whoever sins mortally deserves infinite punishment; and consequently it seems just that for a mortal sin a man should be punished for ever.

  I answer that, Since punishment is measured in two ways, namely according to the degree of its severity, and according to its length of time, the measure of punishment corresponds to the measure of fault, as regards the degree of severity, so that the more grievously a person sins the more grievously is he punished: "As much as she hath glorified herself and lived in delicacies, so much torment and sorrow give ye to her" (Apoc. 18:7). The duration of the punishment does not, however, correspond with the duration of the fault, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxi, 11), for adultery which is committed in a short space of time is not punished with a momentary penalty even according to human laws [*Cf. FS, Question [87], Article [3], ad 1]. But the duration of punishment regards the disposition of the sinner: for sometimes a person who commits an offense in a city is rendered by his very offense worthy of being cut off entirely from the fellowship of the citizens, either by perpetual exile or even by death: whereas sometimes he is not rendered worthy of being cut off entirely from the fellowship of the citizens. wherefore in order that he may become a fitting member of the State, his punishment is prolonged or curtailed, according as is expedient for his amendment, so that he may live in the city in a becoming and peaceful manner. So too, according to Divine justice, sin renders a person worthy to be altogether cut off from the fellowship of God's city, and this is the effect of every sin committed against charity, which is the bond uniting this same city together. Consequently, for mortal sin which is contrary to charity a person is expelled for ever from the fellowship of the saints and condemned to everlasting punishment, because as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxi, 11), "as men are cut off from this perishable city by the penalty of the first death, so are they excluded from that imperishable city by the punishment of the second death." That the punishment inflicted by the earthly state is not deemed everlasting is accidental, either because man endures not for ever, or because the state itself comes to an end. Wherefore if man lived for ever, the punishment of exile or slavery, which is pronounced by human law, would remain in him for ever. On the other hand, as regards those who sin in such a way as not to deserve to be entirely cut off from the fellowship of the saints, such as those who sin venially, their punishment will be so much the shorter or longer according as they are more or less fit to be cleansed, through sin clinging to them more or less: this is observed in the punishments of this world and of purgatory according to Divine justice.

   We find also other reasons given by the saints why some are justly condemned to everlasting punishment for a temporal sin. One is because they sinned against an eternal good by despising eternal life. This is mentioned by Augustine (De Civ. Dei. xii, 12): "He is become worthy of eternal evil, who destroyed in himself a good which could be eternal." Another reason is because man sinned in his own eternity [*Cf. FS, Question [87], Article [3], ad 1]; wherefore Gregory says (Dial. iv), it belongs to the great justice of the judge that those should never cease to be punished, who in this life never ceased to desire sin. And if it be objected that some who sin mortally propose to amend their life at some time, and that these accordingly are seemingly not deserving of eternal punishment, it must be replied according to some that Gregory speaks of the will that is made manifest by the deed. For he who falls into mortal sin of his own will puts himself in a state whence he cannot be rescued, except God help him: wherefore from the very fact that he is willing to sin, he is willing to remain in sin for ever. For man is "a wind that goeth," namely to sin, "and returneth not by his own power" (Ps. 77:39). Thus if a man were to throw himself into a pit whence he could not get out without help, one might say that he wished to remain there for ever, whatever else he may have thought himself. Another and a better answer is that from the very fact that he commits a mortal sin, he places his end in a creature; and since the whole of life is directed to its end, it follows that for this very reason he directs the whole of his life to that sin, and is willing to remain in sin forever, if he could do so with impunity. This is what Gregory says on Job 41:23, "He shall esteem the deep as growing old" (Moral. xxxiv): "The wicked only put an end to sinning because their life came to an end: they would indeed have wished to live for ever, that they might continue in sin for ever for they desire rather to sin than to live." Still another reason may be given why the punishment of mortal sin is eternal: because thereby one offends God Who is infinite. Wherefore since punishment cannot be infinite in intensity, because the creature is incapable of an infinite quality, it must needs be infinite at least in duration. And again there is a fourth reason for the same: because guilt remains for ever, since it cannot be remitted without grace, and men cannot receive grace after death; nor should punishment cease so long as guilt remains.

  Reply to Objection 1: Punishment has not to be equal to fault as to the amount of duration as is seen to be the case also with human laws. We may also reply with Gregory (Dial. xliv) that although sin is temporal in act, it is eternal in will.

  Reply to Objection 2: The degree of intensity in the punishment corresponds to the degree of gravity in the sin; wherefore mortal sins unequal in gravity will receive a punishment unequal in intensity but equal in duration.

  Reply to Objection 3: The punishments inflicted on those who are not altogether expelled from the society of their fellow-citizens are intended for their correction: whereas those punishments, whereby certain persons are wholly banished from the society of their fellow-citizens, are not intended for their correction; although they may be intended for the correction and tranquillity of the others who remain in the state. Accordingly the damnation of the wicked is for the correction of those who are now in the Church; for punishments are intended for correction, not only when they are being inflicted, but also when they are decreed.

  Reply to Objection 4: The everlasting punishment of the wicked will not be altogether useless. For they are useful for two purposes. First, because thereby the Divine justice is safeguarded which is acceptable to God for its own sake. Hence Gregory says (Dial. iv): "Almighty God on account of His loving kindness delights not in the torments of the unhappy, but on account of His justice. He is for ever unappeased by the punishment of the wicked." Secondly, they are useful, because the elect rejoice therein, when they see God's justice in them, and realize that they have escaped them. Hence it is written (Ps. 57:12): "The just shall rejoice when he shall see the revenge," etc., and (Is. 66:24): "They," namely the wicked, "shall be a loathsome sight* to all flesh," namely to the saints, as a gloss says. [*"Ad satietatem visionis," which St. Thomas takes to signify being satiated with joy; Cf. Question [94], Article [3]]. Gregory expresses himself in the same sense (Dial. iv): "The wicked are all condemned to eternal punishment, and are punished for their own wickedness. Yet they will burn to some purpose, namely that the just may all both see in God the joys they receive, and perceive in them the torments they have escaped: for which reason they will acknowledge themselves for ever the debtors of Divine grace the more that they will see how the evils which they overcame by its assistance are punished eternally."

  Reply to Objection 5: Although the punishment relates to the soul accidentally, it relates essentially to the soul infected with guilt. And since guilt will remain in the soul for ever, its punishment also will be everlasting.

  Reply to Objection 6: Punishment corresponds to fault, properly speaking, in respect of the inordinateness in the fault, and not of the dignity in the person offended: for if the latter were the case, a punishment of infinite intensity would correspond to every sin. Accordingly, although a man deserves to lose his being from the fact that he has sinned against God the author of his being, yet, in view of the inordinateness of the act itself, loss of being is not due to him, since being is presupposed to merit and demerit, nor is being lost or corrupted by the inordinateness of sin [*Cf. FS, Question [85], Article [1]]: and consequently privation of being cannot be the punishment due to any sin.


 

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Whether by God's mercy all punishment of the damned, both men and demons, comes to an end?


  Objection 1: It would seem that by God's mercy all punishment of the damned, both men and demons, comes to an end. For it is written (Wis. 11:24): "Thou hast mercy upon all, O Lord, because Thou canst do all things." But among all things the demons also are included, since they are God's creatures. Therefore also their punishment will come to an end.

  Objection 2: Further, "God hath concluded all in sin [Vulg.: 'unbelief'], that He may have mercy on all" (Rm. 11:32). Now God has concluded the demons under sin, that is to say, He permitted them to be concluded. Therefore it would seem that in time He has mercy even on the demons.

  Objection 3: Further, as Anselm says (Cur Deus Homo ii), "it is not just that God should permit the utter loss of a creature which He made for happiness." Therefore, since every rational creature was created for happiness, it would seem unjust for it to be allowed to perish altogether.

  On the contrary, It is written (Mt. 25:41): "Depart from Me, you cursed, into everlasting fire, which is prepared for the devil and his angels." Therefore they will be punished eternally.

   Further, just as the good angels were made happy through turning to God, so the bad angels were made unhappy through turning away from God. Therefore if the unhappiness of the wicked angels comes at length to an end, the happiness of the good will also come to an end, which is inadmissible.

  I answer that, As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxi) Origen [*Cf. FP, Question [64], Article [2]] "erred in maintaining that the demons will at length, through God's mercy, be delivered from their punishment." But this error has been condemned by the Church for two reasons. First because it is clearly contrary to the authority of Holy Writ (Apoc. 20:9,10): "The devil who seduced them was cast into the pool of fire and brimstone, where both the beasts and the false prophets [*Vulg.: 'the beast and false prophet,' etc.] shall be tormented day and night for ever and ever," which is the Scriptural expression for eternity. Secondly, because this opinion exaggerated God's mercy in one direction and depreciated it in another. For it would seem equally reasonable for the good angels to remain in eternal happiness, and for the wicked angels to be eternally punished. Wherefore just as he maintained that the demons and the souls of the damned are to be delivered at length from their sufferings, so he maintained that the angels and the souls of the blessed will at length pass from their happy state to the unhappiness of this life.

  Reply to Objection 1: God, for His own part, has mercy on all. Since, however, His mercy is ruled by the order of His wisdom, the result is that it does not reach to certain people who render themselves unworthy of that mercy, as do the demons and the damned who are obstinate in wickedness. And yet we may say that even in them His mercy finds a place, in so far as they are punished less than they deserve condignly, but not that they are entirely delivered from punishment.

  Reply to Objection 2: In the words quoted the distribution (of the predicate) regards the genera and not the individuals: so that the statement applies to men in the state of wayfarer, inasmuch as He had mercy both on Jews and on Gentiles, but not on every Gentile or every Jew.

  Reply to Objection 3: Anselm means that it is not just in the sense of becoming God's goodness, and is speaking of the creature generically. For it becomes not the Divine goodness that a whole genus of creature fail of the end for which it was made: wherefore it is unbecoming for all men or all angels to be damned. But there is no reason why some men or some angels should perish for ever, because the intention of the Divine will is fulfilled in the others who are saved.


 

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Whether God's mercy suffers at least men to be punished eternally?


  Objection 1: It would seem that God's mercy does not suffer at least men to be punished eternally. For it is written (Gn. 6:3): "My spirit shall not remain in man for ever because he is flesh"; where "spirit" denotes indignation, as a gloss observes. Therefore, since God's indignation is not distinct from His punishment, man will not be punished eternally.

  Objection 2: Further, the charity of the saints in this life makes them pray for their enemies. Now they will have more perfect charity in that life. Therefore they will pray then for their enemies who are damned. But the prayers of the saints cannot be in vain, since they are most acceptable to God. Therefore at the saints' prayers the Divine mercy will in time deliver the damned from their punishment.

  Objection 3: Further, God's foretelling of the punishment of the damned belongs to the prophecy of commination. Now the prophecy of commination is not always fulfilled: as appears from what was said of the destruction of Nineve (Jonas 3); and yet it was not destroyed as foretold by the prophet, who also was troubled for that very reason (Jonas 4:1). Therefore it would seem that much more will the threat of eternal punishment be commuted by God's mercy for a more lenient punishment, when this will be able to give sorrow to none but joy to all.

  Objection 4: Further, the words of Ps. 76:8 are to the point, where it is said: "Will God then be angry for ever? [*Vulg.: 'Will God then cast off for ever?']" But God's anger is His punishment. Therefore, etc.

  Objection 5: Further, a gloss on Is. 14:19, "But thou art cast out," etc. says: "Even though all souls shall have rest at last, thou never shalt": and it refers to the devil. Therefore it would seem that all human souls shall at length have rest from their pains.

  On the contrary, It is written (Mt. 25:46) of the elect conjointly with the damned: "These shall go into everlasting punishment: but the just, into life everlasting." But it is inadmissible that the life of the just will ever have an end. Therefore it is inadmissible that the punishment of the damned will ever come to an end.

   Further, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii) "death is to men what their fall was to the angels." Now after their fall the angels could not be restored [*Cf. FP, Question [64], Article [2]]. Therefore neither can man after death: and thus the punishment of the damned will have no end.

  I answer that, As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxi, 17,18), some evaded the error of Origen by asserting that the demons are punished everlastingly, while holding that all men, even unbelievers, are at length set free from punishment. But this statement is altogether unreasonable. For just as the demons are obstinate in wickedness and therefore have to be punished for ever, so too are the souls of men who die without charity, since "death is to men what their fall was to the angels," as Damascene says.

  Reply to Objection 1: This saying refers to man generically, because God's indignation was at length removed from the human race by the coming of Christ. But those who were unwilling to be included or to remain in this reconciliation effected by Christ, perpetuated the Divine anger in themselves, since no other way of reconciliation is given to us save that which is through Christ.

  Reply to Objection 2: As Augustine (De Civ. Dei xxi, 24) and Gregory (Moral. xxxiv) say, the saints in this life pray for their enemies, that they may be converted to God, while it is yet possible for them to be converted. For if we knew that they were foreknown to death, we should no more pray for them than for the demons. And since for those who depart this life without grace there will be no further time for conversion, no prayer will be offered for them, neither by the Church militant, nor by the Church triumphant. For that which we have to pray for them is, as the Apostle says (2 Tim. 2:25,26), that "God may give them repentance to know the truth, and they may recover themselves from the snares of the devil."

  Reply to Objection 3: A punishment threatened prophetically is only then commuted when there is a change in the merits of the person threatened. Hence: "I will suddenly speak against a nation and against a kingdom, to root out and to pull down and to destroy it. If that nation . . . shall repent of their evil, I also will repent of the evil that I have thought to do to them" (Jer. 18:7). Therefore, since the merits of the damned cannot be changed, the threatened punishment will ever be fulfilled in them. Nevertheless the prophecy of commination is always fulfilled in a certain sense, because as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei. xxi, 24): "Nineve has been overthrown, that was evil, and a good Nineve is built up, that was not: for while the walls and the houses remained standing, the city was overthrown in its wicked ways."

  Reply to Objection 4: These words of the Psalm refer to the vessels of mercy, which have not made themselves unworthy of mercy, because in this life (which may be called God's anger on account of its unhappiness) He changes vessels of mercy into something better. Hence the Psalm continues (Ps. 76:11): "This is the change of the right hand of the most High." We may also reply that they refer to mercy as granting a relaxation but not setting free altogether if it be referred also to the damned. Hence the Psalm does not say: "Will He from His anger shut up His mercies?" but "in His anger," because the punishment will not be done away entirely; but His mercy will have effect by diminishing the punishment while it continues.

  Reply to Objection 5: This gloss is speaking not absolutely but on an impossible supposition in order to throw into relief the greatness of the devil's sin, or of Nabuchodonosor's.


 

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Whether the punishment of Christians is brought to an end by the mercy of God?


  Objection 1: It would seem that at least the punishment of Christians is brought to an end by the mercy of God. "For he that believeth and is baptized shall be saved" (Mk. 16:16). Now this applies to every Christian. Therefore all Christians will at length be saved.

  Objection 2: Further, it is written (Jn. 6:55): "He that eateth My body and drinketh My blood hath eternal life." Now this is the meat and drink whereof Christians partake in common. Therefore all Christians will be saved at length.

  Objection 3: Further, "If any man's work burn, he shall suffer loss: but he himself shall be saved, yet so as by fire" (1 Cor. 3:15), where it is a question of those who have the foundation of the Christian faith. Therefore all such persons will be saved in the end.

  On the contrary, It is written (1 Cor. 6:9): "The unjust shall not possess the kingdom of God." Now some Christians are unjust. Therefore Christians will not all come to the kingdom of God, and consequently they will be punished for ever.

   Further, it is written (2 Pt. 2:21): "It had been better for them not to have known the way of justice, than after they have known it, to turn back from that holy commandment which was delivered to them." Now those who know not the way of truth will be punished for ever. Therefore Christians who have turned back after knowing it will also be punished for ever.

  I answer that, According to Augustine (De Civ. Dei xxi, 20,21), there have been some who predicted a delivery from eternal punishment not for all men, but only for Christians. although they stated the matter in different ways. For some said that whoever received the sacraments of faith would be immune from eternal punishment. But this is contrary to the truth, since some receive the sacraments of faith, and yet have not faith, without which "it is impossible to please God" (Heb. 11:6). Wherefore others said that those alone will be exempt from eternal punishment who have received the sacraments of faith, and professed the Catholic faith. But against this it would seem to be that at one time some people profess the Catholic faith, and afterwards abandon it, and these are deserving not of a lesser but of a greater punishment, since according to 2 Pt. 2:21, "it had been better for them not to have known the way of justice than, after they have known it, to turn back." Moreover it is clear that heresiarchs who renounce the Catholic faith and invent new heresies sin more grievously than those who have conformed to some heresy from the first. And therefore some have maintained that those alone are exempt from eternal punishment, who persevere to the end in the Catholic faith, however guilty they may have been of other crimes. But this is clearly contrary to Holy Writ, for it is written (James 2:20): "Faith without works is dead," and (Mt. 7:21) "Not every one that saith to Me, Lord, Lord, shall enter into the kingdom of heaven: but he that doth the will of My Father Who is in heaven": and in many other passages Holy Scripture threatens sinners with eternal punishment. Consequently those who persevere in the faith unto the end will not all be exempt from eternal punishment, unless in the end they prove to be free from other crimes.

  Reply to Objection 1: Our Lord speaks there of formed faith [*Cf. SS, Question [4], Article [3]] "that worketh by love [Vulg.: 'charity'; Gal. 5:6]": wherein whosoever dieth shall be saved. But to this faith not only is the error of unbelief opposed, but also any mortal sin whatsoever.

  Reply to Objection 2: The saying of our Lord refers not to those who partake only sacramentally, and who sometimes by receiving unworthily "eat and drink judgment" to themselves (1 Cor. 11:29), but to those who eat spiritually and are incorporated with Him by charity, which incorporation is the effect of the sacramental eating, in those who approach worthily [*Cf. TP, Question [80], Articles [1],2,3]. Wherefore, so far as the power of the sacrament is concerned, it brings us to eternal life, although sin may deprive us of that fruit, even after we have received worthily.

  Reply to Objection 3: In this passage of the Apostle the foundation denotes formed faith, upon which whosoever shall build venial sins [*Cf. FS, Question [89], Article [2]] "shall suffer loss," because he will be punished for them by God; yet "he himself shall be saved" in the end "by fire," either of temporal tribulation, or of the punishment of purgatory which will be after death.


 

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Whether all those who perform works of mercy will be punished eternally?


  Objection 1: It would seem that all who perform works of mercy will not be punished eternally, but only those who neglect those works. For it is written (James 2:13): "Judgment without mercy to him that hath not done mercy"; and (Mt. 5:7): "Blessed are the merciful for they shall obtain mercy."

  Objection 2: Further, (Mt. 25:35-46) we find a description of our Lord's discussion with the damned and the elect. But this discussion is only about works of mercy. Therefore eternal punishment will be awarded only to such as have omitted to practice works of mercy: and consequently the same conclusion follows as before.

  Objection 3: Further, it is written (Mt. 6:12): "Forgive us our debts, as we also forgive our debtors," and further on (Mt. 6:14): "For if you will forgive men their offenses, your heavenly Father will forgive you also your offenses." Therefore it would seem that the merciful, who forgive others their offenses, will themselves obtain the forgiveness of their sins, and consequently will not be punished eternally.

  Objection 4: Further, a gloss of Ambrose on 1 Tim. 4:8, "Godliness is profitable to all things," says: "The sum total of a Christian's rule of life consists in mercy and godliness. Let a man follow this, and though he should suffer from the inconstancy of the flesh, without doubt he will be scourged, but he will not perish: whereas he who can boast of no other exercise but that of the body will suffer everlasting punishment." Therefore those who persevere in works of mercy, though they be shackled with fleshly sins, will not be punished eternally: and thus the same conclusion follows as before.

  On the contrary, It is written (1 Cor. 6:9,10): "Neither fornicators . . . nor adulterers," etc. "shall possess the kingdom of God." Yet many are such who practice works of mercy. Therefore the merciful will not all come to the eternal kingdom: and consequently some of them will be punished eternally.

   Further, it is written (James 2:10): "Whosoever shall keep the whole law, but offend in one point, is become guilty of all." Therefore whoever keeps the law as regards the works of mercy and omits other works, is guilty of transgressing the law, and consequently will be punished eternally.

  I answer that, As Augustine says in the book quoted above (De Civ. Dei xxi, 22), some have maintained that not all who have professed the Catholic faith will be freed from eternal punishment, but only those who persevere in works of mercy, although they be guilty of other crimes. But this cannot stand, because without charity nothing can be acceptable to God, nor does anything profit unto eternal life in the absence of charity. Now it happens that certain persons persevere in works of mercy without having charity. Wherefore nothing profits them to the meriting of eternal life, or to exemption from eternal punishment, as may be gathered from 1 Cor. 13:3. Most evident is this in the case of those who lay hands on other people's property, for after seizing on many things, they nevertheless spend something in works of mercy. We must therefore conclude that all whosoever die in mortal sin, neither faith nor works of mercy will free them from eternal punishment, not even after any length of time whatever.

  Reply to Objection 1: Those will obtain mercy who show mercy in an ordinate manner. But those who while merciful to others are neglectful of themselves do not show mercy ordinately, rather do they strike at themselves by their evil actions. Wherefore such persons will not obtain the mercy that sets free altogether, even if they obtain that mercy which rebates somewhat their due punishment.

  Reply to Objection 2: The reason why the discussion refers only to the works of mercy is not because eternal punishment will be inflicted on none but those who omit those works, but because eternal punishment will be remitted to those who after sinning have obtained forgiveness by their works of mercy, making unto themselves "friends of the mammon of iniquity" (Lk. 16:9).

  Reply to Objection 3: Our Lord said this to those who ask that their debt be forgiven, but not to those who persist in sin. Wherefore the repentant alone will obtain by their works of mercy the forgiveness that sets them free altogether.

  Reply to Objection 4: The gloss of Ambrose speaks of the inconstancy that consists in venial sin, from which a man will be freed through the works of mercy after the punishment of purgatory, which he calls a scourging. Or, if he speaks of the inconstancy of mortal sin, the sense is that those who while yet in this life fall into sins of the flesh through frailty are disposed to repentance by works of mercy. Wherefore such a one will not perish, that is to say, he will be disposed by those works not to perish, through grace bestowed on him by our Lord, Who is blessed for evermore. Amen.


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Latin — Supplementum

pr.

Deinde considerandum est de iustitia et misericordia Dei respectu damnatorum.

Circa quod quaeruntur quinque.

Primo: utrum ex divina iustitia inferatur peccatoribus poena aeterna.

Secundo: utrum per divinam misericordiam omnis poena tam hominum quam daemonum terminetur.

Tertio: utrum saltem poena hominum terminetur.

Quarto; utrum saltem poena Christianorum.

Quinto: utrum illorum qui opera misericordiae fecerunt.

a. 1 arg. 1

Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod ex divina iustitia non inferatur peccatoribus poena aeterna. Poena enim non debet excedere culpam: Deut. 25, (2), secundum mensuram delicti erit et plagarum modus. Sed culpa est temporalis. Ergo poena non debet esse aeterna.

a. 1 arg. 2

Praeterea, duorum peccatorum mortalium unum est altero maius. Ergo unum debet maiori quam alterum poena puniri. Sed nulla poena potest esse maior quam aeterna: cum sit infinita. Ergo non cuilibet peccato mortali debetur poena aeterna. Et si uni non debetur, nulli debetur: cum eorum distantia non sit infinita.

a. 1 arg. 3

Praeterea, a iusto iudice non infertur poena nisi ad correctionem: unde II Ethic. dicitur quod poenae sunt quaedam medicinae. Sed quod impii in aeternum puniantur, hoc non est ad correctionem eorum: nec aliquorum aliorum, cum tunc non sint aliqui futuri qui per hoc corrigi possint. Ergo secundum divinam iustitiam non infertur pro peccatis poena aeterna.

a. 1 arg. 4

Praeterea, omne quod non est propter se volitum, nullus vult nisi propter aliquam utilitatem. Sed poenae a Deo non sunt propter se volitae: non enim delectatur in poenis. Cum ergo nulla utilitas accidere possit ex perpetuatione poenae, videtur quod perpetuam poenam pro peccato non infert.

a. 1 arg. 5

Praeterea, nihil quod est per accidens est perpetuum, ut dicitur in I Caeli et Mundi. Sed poena est eorum quae sunt per accidens: cum sit contra naturam. Ergo non potest esse perpetua.

a. 1 arg. 6

Praeterea, iustitia Dei hoc requirere videtur ut peccatores ad nihilum redigantur. Quia propter ingratitudinem debet quis beneficia accepta amittere. Inter cetera autem Dei beneficia est etiam ipsum esse. Unde videtur iustum ut peccator, qui ingratus Deo exstitit, ipsum esse amittat. Sed, si in nihilum redigantur, eorum poena non potest esse perpetua. Ergo non videtur esse consonum divinae iustitiae ut peccatores perpetuo puniantur.

a. 1 s. c. 1

Sed contra: Est quod dicitur Matth, 25, (46): ibunt hi, scilicet peccatores, in supplicium aeternum.

a. 1 arg. 7

Praeterea, sicut se habet praemium ad meritum, ita poena ad culpam. Sed secundum divinam iustitiam merito temporali debetur praemium aeternum: Ioan. 6, (40), omnis qui videt Filium et credit in eum, habet vitam aeternam. Ergo et culpae temporali secundum divinam iustitiam debetur poena aeterna.

a. 1 arg. 8

Praeterea, secundum Philosophum, in V Ethic., poena taxatur secundum dignitatem eius in quem peccatur: unde maiori poena punitur qui percutit alapa principem, quam alium quemcumque. Sed quicumque peccat mortaliter, peccat contra Deum, cuius praecepta transgreditur, et cuius honorem alii impartitur dum in alio finem constituit. Maiestas autem Dei est infinita. Ergo quicumque peccat mortaliter, dignus est infinita poena. Et ita videtur quod iuste pro peccato mortali quis perpetuo puniatur.

a. 1 co.

Respondeo dicendum quod, cum poena duplicem habeat quantitatem, scilicet secundum intensionem acerbitatis, et secundum durationem temporis; quantitas poenae respondet quantitati culpae secundum intensionem acerbitatis, ut secundum quod gravius peccavit, secundum hoc gravior poena ei infligatur; unde Apoc. 18, (7): quantum se glorificavit et in deliciis fuit, tantum date ei tormentum et luctum. Non autem respondet duratio poenae durationi culpae, ut dicit Augustinus, XXI de Civ. Dei: non enim adulterium, quod in momento temporis perpetratur, momentanea poena punitur, etiam secundum leges humanas. Sed duratio poenae respicit dispositionem peccantis. Quandoque enim ille qui peccat in aliqua civitate, ex ipso peccato efficitur dignus ut totaliter a societate civitatis repellatur, vel per exilium perpetuum, vel etiam per mortem. Quandoque vero non redditur dignus ut totaliter a civium societate excludatur: et ideo, ut possit esse conveniens membrum civitatis, poena ei prolongatur vel breviatur secundum quod expedit eius curationi, ut in civitate convenienter et pacifice vivere possit.

Ita etiam secundum divinam iustitiam aliquis ex peccato redditur dignus penitus a civitatis Dei consortio separari: quod fit per omne peccatum quo quis contra caritatem peccat, quae est vinculum civitatem praedictam uniens. Et ideo pro peccato mortali, quod est contrarium caritati, aliquis, in aeternum a societate sanctorum exclusus, aeternae poenae addicitur: quia, ut Augustinus in libro praedicto dicit, quod est de civitate ista mortali homines supplicio primae mortis, hoc est de civitate illa immortali homines supplicio secundae mortis auferre. Quod autem poena quam civitas mundana infligit perpetua non reputatur, hoc est per accidens: vel inquantum homo non perpetuo manet; vel in quantum etiam ipsa civitas deficit. Unde, si homo in perpetuum viveret poena exilii et servitutis, quae per legem humanam inferuntur, in eo perpetuo permanerent. Qui vero hoc modo peccant ut tamen, non reddantur digni totaliter separari a sanctae civitatis consortio, sicut peccantium venialiter, tanto eorum poena erit brevior vel diuturnior, quanto magis vel minus purgabiles erunt, secundum quod eis peccata vel plus vel minus inhaeserunt. Quod in poenis huius mundi et purgatorii secundum divinam iustitiam servatur.

Inveniuntur etiam et aliae rationes a Sanctis assignatae quare iuste pro peccato temporali aliqui poena perpetua puniantur. Una est quia peccaverunt contra bonum aeternum, dum contempserunt aeternam vitam. Et hoc etiam est quod Augustinus in praedicto libro dicit: factus est malo dignus aeterno, quia hoc in se peremit bonum quod esse posset aeternum.

Alia ratio est quia homo in suo aeterno peccavit. Unde Gregorius dicit, in IV Dialog.: ad magnam iustitiam iudicantis pertinet ut nunquam careant supplicio qui nunquam voluerunt carere peccato. Et si obiiciatur quod quidam peccantes mortaliter proponunt vitam suam in melius commutare; et ita, secundum hoc, non essent digni aeterno supplicio, ut videtur: dicendum est, secundum quosdam, quod Gregorius loquitur de voluntate quae manifestatur per opus. Qui enim in peccatum mortale propria voluntate labitur, se ponit in statu a quo erui non potest nisi divinitus. Unde ex hoc ipso quod vult peccare, consequenter vult in peccato manere perpetuo: homo enim est spiritus vadens, scilicet in peccatum, et non rediens per seipsum. Sicut, si aliquis se iri foveam proiiceret unde exire non posset nisi adiutus, posset dici quod in aeternum ibi manere voluit, quantumcumque aliud cogitaret. Vel potest dici, et melius, quod ex hoc ipso quod mortaliter peccat, finem suum in creatura constituit. Et quia ad finem vitae tota vita ordinatur, ideo ex hoc ipso totam vitam suam ordinat ad illud peccatum; et vellet perpetuo in peccato manere si hoc sibi esset impune. Et hoc est quod Gregorius dicit, in XXXIV lib. Moral., super illud Iob 41, (23), aestimabit abyssum quasi senescentem: Iniqui ideo cum fine deliquerunt, quia cum fine vixerunt. Voluissent quippe sine fine vivere ut sine fine potuissent in suis iniquitatibus permanere: nam magis appetunt peccare quam vivere.

Potest et alia ratio assignari quare poena peccati mortalis sit aeterna: quia per eam contra Deum, qui est infinitus, peccatur. Unde, cum non posset esse infinita poena per intensionem, quia creatura non est capax alicuius qualitatis infinitae; requiritur quod sit saltem duratione infinita.

Est etiam quarta ratio ad hoc idem: quia culpa manet in aeternum; cum culpa non possit remitti sine gratia, quam homo non potest post mortem acquirere. Nec debet poena cessare quandiu culpa manet.

a. 1 ad 1

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod poena non debet aequari culpae secundum quantitatem durationis: ut videtur etiam secundum leges humanas accidere.

Vel dicendum, sicut Gregorius solvit, quod, quamvis culpa sit actu temporalis, voluntate tamen est aeterna.

a. 1 ad 2

Ad secundum dicendum quod quantitati peccati respondet quantitas poenae secundum intensionem. Et ideo peccatorum mortalium inaequalium erunt poenae inaequales intensione, aequales autem duratione.

a. 1 ad 3

Ad tertium dicendum quod poenae quae infliguntur his qui a civitatis societate non penitus eiiciuntur, sunt ad correctionem eorum ordinatae: sed illae poenae per quas aliqui totaliter a civitatis societate exterminantur, non sunt ad correctionem eorum. Possunt tamen esse ad correctionem et tranquillitatem aliorum qui in civitate remanent. Et ita damnatio aeterna impiorum est ad correctionem eorum qui nunc sunt in Ecclesia: non enim poenae sunt ad correctionem solum quando infliguntur; sed etiam quando determinantur.

a. 1 ad 4

Ad quartum dicendum quod impiorum poenae in perpetuum duraturae non erunt omnino ad nihilum utiles. Sunt enim utiles ad duo. Primo, ad hoc quod in eis divina iustitia conservatur: quae est Deo accepta propter seipsam. Unde Gregorius, IV Dialog.: omnipotens Deus, quia pius est, miserorum cruciatu non pascitur. Quia autem iustus est, ab iniquorum ultione in perpetuum non sedatur.

Secundo, ad hoc sunt utiles ut de his electi gaudeant, dum in his Dei iustitiam contemplantur, et cum hoc se evasisse cognoscunt. Unde Psalmo (57, 11): laetabitur iustus cum viderit vindictam; et Isaiae 66, (24): erunt, scilicet impii, usque ad satietatem visionis, scilicet sanctis, ut Glossa dicit. Et hoc est quod Gregorius dicit, IV Dialog.: iniqui omnes, aeterno supplicio deputati, sua quidem iniquitate puniuntur: et tamen ad aliquid ardebunt, scilicet ut iusti omnes et in Deo videant gaudia quae perceperunt, et in illis percipiant supplicia quae evaserunt; quatenus tanto magis in aeternum divinae gratiae debitores se esse cognoscant, quanto in aeternum mala puniri conspiciunt, quae eius adiutorio vicerunt.

a. 1 ad 5

Ad quintum dicendum quod, quamvis poena per accidens respondeat animae, tamen per se respondet animae culpa infectae. Et quia culpa in perpetuum in ea manebit, ideo et poena perpetua erit.

a. 1 ad 6

Ad sextum dicendum quod poena respondet culpae, proprie loquendo, secundum inordinationem quae invenitur in ipsa, et non secundum dignitatem ipsius in quem peccatur: quia sic cuilibet peccato responderet poena infinita intensione. Quamvis ergo ex hoc quod aliquis peccat contra Deum, qui est Auctor essendi, mereatur ipsum esse amittere; considerata tamen ipsius actus inordinatione, non debetur ei amissio esse: quia esse praesupponitur ad meritum et demeritum, nec per inordinationem peccati esse tollitur vel corrumpitur. Et ideo non potest esse debita poena alicuius culpae privatio ipsius esse.

a. 2 arg. 1

Videtur quod per divinam misericordiam omnis poena terminetur tam hominum quam etiam daemonum: Sap. 11, (24): misereris omnium, Domine, quoniam omnia potes. Sed inter omnia etiam daemones continentur, qui sunt Dei creaturae. Ergo et ipsorum daemonum poena finietur.

a. 2 arg. 2

Praeterea, Rom. 11, (32): conclusit Deus omnia sub peccato ut omnium misereatur. Sed Deus daemones sub peccato conclusit, idest, sub peccato concludi permisit. Ergo videtur quod etiam daemonum aliquando misereatur.

a. 2 arg. 3

Praeterea, sicut dicit Anselmus, in libro Cur Deus homo: non est iustum ut Deus creaturam quam fecit ad beatitudinem, omnino perire sinat. Ergo videtur, cum quaelibet creatura rationalis creata fuerit ad beatitudinem, non esse iustum ut omnino perire permittatur,

a. 2 s. c. 1

Sed contra: Est quod dicitur Matth. 25, (41): ite, maledicti, in ignem aeternum, qui paratus est diabolo et angelis eius. Ergo aeternaliter punientur.
B: (Rom 10:10) [b:Rom 10:10]

a. 2 arg. 4

Praeterea, sicut boni angeli effecti sunt beati per conversionem ad Deum, ita mali angeli effecti sunt miseri per aversionem a Deo. Si ergo miseria malorum angelorum finiatur quandoque, et beatitudo bonorum finem habebit. Quod est inconveniens.

a. 2 co.

Respondeo dicendum quod error Origenis fuit, ut Augustinus, XXI de Civ. Dei, dicit, quod daemones quandoque per Dei misericordiam liberandi sunt a poenis. Sed iste error est ab Ecclesia reprobatus propter duo. Primo, quia manifeste auctoritati Scripturae repugnat, quae habet, Apoc. 20, (9–10): diabolus, qui seducebat eos, missus est in stagnum ignis et sulphuris, ubi bestia et pseudoprophetae cruciabuntur die ac nocte in saecula saeculorum, per quod in Scriptura significari aeternitas consuevit.

Secundo, quia ex una parte nimis Dei misericordiam extendebat, et ex alia parte nimis eam coarctabat. Eiusdem enim rationis esse videtur bonos angelos in aeterna beatitudine permanere, et malos angelos in aeternum puniri. Unde, sicut ponebat daemones et animas damnatorum quandoque a poena liberandas, ita ponebat angelos et animas beatorum quandoque a beatitudine in huius vitae miserias devolvendas.

a. 2 ad 1

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod; Deus, quantum in ipso est, miseretur omnibus: sed quia eius misericordia sapientiae ordine regulatur, inde est quod ad quosdam non se extendit, qui se misericordiae fecerunt indignos, sicut daemones et damnati, qui sunt in malitia obstinati. Tamen potest dici quod etiam in eis misericordia locum habet, inquantum citra condignum puniuntur: non quod a poena totaliter absolvantur.

a. 2 ad 2

Ad secundum dicendum quod ibi intelligenda est distributio pro generibus singulorum, et non pro singulis generum: ut intelligatur auctoritas de hominibus secundum statum viae; quia scilicet et Iudaeorum et gentilium misertus est, sed non omnium gentilium vel omnium Iudaeorum.

a. 2 ad 3

Ad tertium dicendum quod Anselmus intelligit non esse iustum quantum ad decentiam divinae bonitatis: et loquitur de creatura secundum genus suum. Non enim est conveniens divinae bonitati ut totum unum genus creaturae deficiat a fine propter quod est factum. Unde nec omnes homines, nec omnes angelos damnari convenit. Sed nihil prohibet quin aliqui vel ex hominibus vel ex angelis in aeternum pereant: quia divinae voluntatis intentio impletur in aliis, qui salvantur.

a. 3 arg. 1

Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod divina misericordia non patiatur saltem homines in aeternum puniri . Genes. 6, (3): non permanebit spiritus meus in homine in aeternum, quia caro est: et accipitur ibi spiritus pro indignatione, ut patet per Glossam ibidem. Cum ergo indignatio Dei non sit aliud quam eius poena, non punientur aeternaliter.

a. 3 arg. 2

Praeterea, caritas sanctorum in praesenti hoc facit ut pro inimicis exorent. Sed tunc habebunt perfectiorem caritatem. Ergo tunc orabunt pro inimicis damnatis. Sed orationes eorum esse cassae non poterunt: cum sint maxime Deo acceptae. Ergo precibus sanctorum divina misericordia damnatos quandoque a poena liberabit.

a. 3 arg. 3

Praeterea, hoc quod Deus poenam damnatorum aeternam praedixit, ad prophetiam comminationis pertinet. Sed prophetia comminationis non semper impletur: quod patet per hoc quod dictum est de subversione Ninive, quae non fuit subversa sicut praedictum fuerat per prophetam, qui ex hoc etiam contristatus fuit. Ergo videtur quod multo amplius per divinam misericordiam comminatio poenae aeternae mutabitur in mitiorem sententiam, quando in nullius tristitiam, sed in omnium gaudium cedere poterit.

a. 3 arg. 4

Praeterea, ad hoc facit quod in Psalmo (76, 8) dicitur: nunquid in aeternum irascetur Deus? Sed ira Dei est eius punitio. Ergo Deus in aeternum homines non puniet.

a. 3 arg. 5

Praeterea, Isaiae 14, super illud (v. 19), tu autem proiectus es etc., dicit Glossa: si omnes animae aliquando habebunt requiem, tu nunquam, loquens de diabolo. Ergo videtur quod omnes animae humanae aliquando requiem habebunt de poenis.

a. 3 s. c. 1

Sed contra: Est quod dicitur Matth. 25, (46), simul de electis et reprobis: ibunt hi in supplicium aeternum; iusti autem in vitam aeternam. Sed inconveniens est ponere quod iustorum vita quandoque finiatur. Ergo inconveniens est ponere quod reproborum supplicium terminetur.

a. 3 arg. 6

Praeterea, sicut dicit Damascenus, hoc est hominibus mors quod angelis casus. Sed angeli post casum irreparabiles fuerunt. Ergo et homines post mortem. Et sic reproborum supplicium nunquam terminabitur.

a. 3 co.

Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit, XXI de Civ. Dei, quidam in hoc ab errore Origenis declinaverunt quod daemones posuerunt in perpetuum puniri, sed omnes homines quandoque liberari a poena, etiam infideles. Sed haec positio omnino est irrationabilis. Sicut enim daemones sunt in malitia obstinati, et ita perpetuo puniendi, ita et animae hominum qui sine caritate decedunt: cum hoc hominibus sit mors quod angelis casus, ut Damascenus dicit.

a. 3 ad 1

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod verbum illud est intelligendum de homine secundum genus suum: quia ab humano genere quandoque Dei indignatio est remota per Christi adventum. Sed illi qui in hac reconciliatione quae facta est per Christum, noluerunt esse vel permanere, in seipsis divinam iram perpetuaverunt: cum non sit nobis aliquis modus reconciliationis concessus nisi per Christum.

a. 3 ad 2

Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit, XXI de Civ. Dei, et Gregorius, XXXIV Moral. et IV Dialog., quod sancti in hac vita ideo pro inimicis exorant, ut convertantur ad Deum: cum adhuc converti possint. Si enim esset nobis notum quod essent praesciti ad mortem, non magis pro eis quam pro daemonibus oraremus. Et quia post hanc vitam decedentibus sine gratia tempus conversionis non erit, nulla pro eis fiet oratio, nec ab Ecclesia militante nec a triumphante. Hic enim pro eis orandum est, ut Apostolus dicit, II Tim. 2, (25–26), ut det illis Deus poenitentiam, et resipiscant a diaboli laqueis.

a. 3 ad 3

Ad tertium dicendum quod prophetia comminatoria poenae tunc solum immutatur quando variantur merita eius in quem comminatio facta est. Unde Ierem. 18, (7–8): repente loquar adversus gentem et adversus regnum, ut eradicem et destruam et disperdam illud. Si poenitentiam egerit gens illa a malo suo, agam et ego poenitentiam super malo quod cogitaveram ei. Unde, cum damnatorum merita mutari non possint, comminatio poenae semper in eis implebitur. Nihilominus tamen prophetia comminationis semper quantum ad aliquem intellectum impletur. Quia, ut dicit Augustinus, in praedicto libro, eversa est Ninive quae mala erat, et bona aedificata est, quae non erat: stantibus enim moenibus atque domibus, eversa est civitas in perditis moribus.

a. 3 ad 4

Ad quartum dicendum quod illud verbum Psalmi pertinet ad vasa misericordiae, quae se indignos misericordia non fecerunt: quia in hac vita, quae quaedam ira Dei est propter vitae miserias, vasa misericordiae mutat in melius. Unde sequitur in Psalmo (76, 11): haec mutatio dexterae Excelsi.

Vel dicendum quod hoc intelligitur de misericordia aliquid relaxante, non de misericordia totaliter liberante, si extendatur etiam ad damnatos. Unde non dicit, continebit ab ira misericordias suas, sed, in ira (v. 10): quia non totaliter poena tolletur, sed, ipsa poena durante, misericordia operabitur eam diminuendo.

a. 3 ad 5

Ad quintum dicendum quod Glossa illa non loquitur simpliciter, sed sub hypothesi impossibilis, ad exaggerandum peccati magnitudinem ipsius diaboli, vel Nabuchodonosor.

a. 4 arg. 1

Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod saltem Christianorum poena per divinam misericordiam terminetur. Quia Marc. 16, (16) dicitur: qui crediderit et baptizatus fuerit, salvus erit. Sed hoc est omnium Christianorum. Ergo omnes Christiani finaliter salvabuntur.

a. 4 arg. 2

Praeterea, Ioan. 6, (55) dicitur: qui manducat meam carnem et bibit, meum sanguinem, habet vitam aeternam. Sed hoc est communis cibus et potus Christianorum. Ergo omnes Christiani finaliter salvabuntur.

a. 4 arg. 3

Praeterea, I Cor. 3, (15): si cuius opus arserit, detrimentum patietur, ipse autem salvus erit, sic tamen quasi per ignem: et loquitur de illis in quibus fuit fundamentum fidei Christianae (v. 11–12). Ergo omnes tales finaliter salvabuntur.

a. 4 s. c. 1

Sed contra: Est quod dicitur I Cor. 6, (9): iniqui regnum Dei non possidebunt. Sed quidam Christiani sunt iniqui. Ergo non omnes Christiani ad Regnum pervenient. Et ita perpetuo punientur.

a. 4 arg. 4

Praeterea, II Petr. 2, (21) dicitur: melius erat eis viam veritatis non cognoscere quam post agnitam retroire ab eo quod traditum est illis sancto mandato. Sed illi qui viam veritatis non cognoverunt, aeternaliter punientur. Ergo et Christiani qui ab agnita retrocesserunt.

a. 4 co.

Respondeo dicendum quod quidam fuerunt, ut dicit Augustinus, in praedicto libro, qui non omnibus hominibus promiserunt absolutionem a poena aeterna, sed solis Christianis. Et in hoc respectu diversificati sunt. Quidam enim dixerunt quod quicumque sacramenta fidei perceperunt, ab aeterna poena erunt immunes. Sed hoc est, contrarium veritati: quia quidam sacramenta fidei recipiunt et fidem non habent, sine qua impossibile est placere Deo, Heb. 11, (6).

Et ideo alii dixerunt quod solum illi ab aeterna poena erunt immunes qui sacramenta fidei sunt consecuti et fidem Catholicam tenuerunt. Sed contra hoc esse videtur quod aliquando aliqui Catholicam fidem tenent et postea resipiscunt: qui non minori poena sunt digni, sed maiori, quia, 11 Petr. 2, (21), melius erat eis viam veritatis non cognoscere quam post agnitam retroire. Planum est etiam plus peccare haeresiarchas, qui, de fide Catholica recedentes, novas haereses fingunt, quam illos qui a principio aliquam haeresim sunt secuti.

Et ideo alii dixerunt quod illi soli sunt ab aeterna poena immunes qui in fide Catholica finaliter perseverant, quantumcumque aliis criminibus involvantur. Sed hoc manifeste contrariatur Scripturae. Quia lac. 2, (20, 26) dicitur; fides sine operibus mortua est; et Matth. 7, (21): non omnis qui dicit mihi, Domine, Domine, intrabit in regnum caelorum et in multis aliis locis Scriptura peccantibus aeternas poenas comminatur.

Unde non omnes finaliter in fide persistentes a poena aeterna erunt immunes, nisi et ab aliis criminibus inveniantur finaliter absoluti.

a. 4 ad 1

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Dominus ibi loquitur de fide formata, quae per dilectionem operatur: in qua quicumque decesserit, salvus erit. Sed huic non solum opponitur infidelitatis error, sed quodlibet peccatum mortale.

a. 4 ad 2

Ad secundum dicendum quod verbum Domini est intelligendum, non de illis qui tantum sacramentaliter edunt, qui, indigne quandoque sumentes, iudicium sibi manducant et bibunt, ut dicitur I Cor. 11, (29): sed loquitur de manducantibus spiritualiter, qui per caritatem ei incorporantur; quam incorporationem facit sacramentalis comestio si quis digne accedat. Unde, quantum est ex virtute sacramenti, ad vitam aeternam perducit: quamvis aliquis se possit tali fructu privare per peccatum, etiam postquam digne sumpserit.

a. 4 ad 3

Ad tertium dicendum quod fundamentum in verbis Apostoli intelligitur fides formata: supra quam qui peccata venialia aedificaverit, detrimentum patietur, quia pro eis punitur a Deo; ipse tamen salvus erit finaliter quasi per ignem, vel temporalis tribulationis, vel purgatoriae poenae, quae post mortem erit.

a. 5 arg. 1

Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod illi omnes qui opera misericordiae faciunt, non punientur aeternaliter: sed solum illi qui opera misericordiae negligunt. Iac. 2, (13): iudicium sine misericordia ei qui non fecit misericordiam. Et Matth. 5, (7): beati misericordes: quoniam ipsi misericordiam consequentur.

a. 5 arg. 2

Praeterea, Matth. 25, (31 sqq.) ponitur disceptatio Domini cum electis et reprobis. Sed illa disceptatio non est nisi de operibus misericordiae. Ergo solum pro operibus misericordiae omissis aliqui aeternaliter punientur. Et sic idem quod prius.

a. 5 arg. 3

Praeterea, Matth. 6, (12) dicitur: dimitte nobis debita nostra sicut et nos dimittimus debitoribus nostris: et sequitur (v. 14): si enim dimiseritis hominibus etc. Ergo videtur quod misericordes, qui aliis peccata dimittunt, ipsi veniam peccatorum consequentur. Et sic non aeternaliter punientur.

a. 5 arg. 4

Praeterea, I Tim. 4, super illud (v. 8), pietas ad omnia valet, dicit Glossa Ambrosii: omnis summa disciplinae Christianae in misericordia et pietate est: quam aliquis sequens, si lubricum carnis patiatur, sine dubio vapulabit, sed non peribit. Si quis autem solum exercitium corporis habuerit, perennes poenas patietur. Ergo illi qui insistunt operibus misericordiae, qui peccatis carnalibus detinentur, non in aeternum punientur. Et sic idem quod prius.

a. 5 s. c. 1

Sed contra: Est quod dicitur I Cor. 6, (9): neque fornicarii neque adulteri regnum Dei possidebunt. Sed multi qui se exercent in operibus misericordiae, sunt tales. Ergo non omnes misericordes ad regnum aeternum pervenient. Et ita aliqui eorum aeternaliter punientur.

a. 5 arg. 5

Praeterea, lac. 2, (10) dicitur: quicumque totam legem servaverit, offendat autem in uno, factus est omnium reus. Ergo quicumque servat legem quoad opera misericordiae et negligit alia opera, reatum de transgressione legis incurret. Et ita aeternaliter punietur.

a. 5 co.

Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit, in libro praedicto, quidam posuerunt non omnes qui Catholicam fidem tenent a poena aeterna esse liberandos, sed solum illos qui operibus misericordiae insistunt, quamvis etiam aliis criminibus sint subiecti. Sed istud non potest stare. Quia sine caritate non potest aliquid Deo esse acceptum; nec sine ea prodest aliquid ad vitam aeternam. Contingit autem aliquos operibus misericordiae insistere qui caritatem non habent. Unde his nihil prodest ad vitam aeternam promerendam, vel ad immunitatem aeternae poenae: ut patet I Cor. 13, (1–3). Et praecipue hoc apparet absurdum in raptoribus, qui multa rapiunt et tamen aliqua misericorditer largiuntur.

Et ideo dicendum quod quicumque cum peccato mortali decedunt, nec fides nec opera misericordiae eos liberabit a poena aeterna, etiam post quantumcumque spatium temporis.

a. 5 ad 1

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod illi misericordiam consequentur qui misericordiam ordinate impendunt. Non autem ordinate misericordiam impendunt qui seipsos in miserendo negligunt: sed magis se impugnant male agendo. Et ideo tales misericordiam penitus absolventem non consequentur: etsi consequantur misericordiam de poenis debitis aliquid relaxantem.

a. 5 ad 2

Ad secundum dicendum quod non propter hoc ponitur disceptatio de operibus misericordiae solum quia pro eorum neglectu tantummodo aliqui puniantur aeternaliter: sed quia illi aeterna poena liberabuntur post peccata qui per opera misericordiae sibi veniam impetraverunt, facientes amicos sibi de mammona iniquitatis.

a. 5 ad 3

Ad tertium dicendum quod illud a Domino dicitur his qui petunt sibi debitum relaxari: non illis qui in peccato persistunt. Et ideo soli poenitentes per opera misericordiae consequentur misericordiam iam penitus liberantem.

a. 5 ad 4

Ad quartum dicendum quod Glossa Ambrosii loquitur de lubrico venialis peccati, a quo aliquis post purgatorias poenas, quas vapulationem dicit, per opera misericordiae absolvetur.